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WlEUNIVFRi/A 


.KinSANf.Flfr. 


ELEMENTS 


OF 


m5ral  science 


BY  JAMES  BEATTIE,  LL.  D. 

jssor  of  Moral  Philosophy  and  Logick  in  the  Marischal 
Cdllege  and  University  of  Aberdeen. 


IX  THREE  VOLUMI^S. 

A 


A 


VOL.  II. 


PHII^\DELPHL\r 

1>-UBLISHED  BY  HOPklNS  A^l^^EARLF- 

Fry  and  Karamerer,  Printed. 

1809. 


\ 


V   \ 


\ 


V 


Cliap.II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  289 

speak  as  he  thinks;  and  it  is  easy,  like  walking 
forward.  One  may  walk  backwards,  or  sideways; 
but  it  is  uneasy,  and  a  son  of  force  upon  nature: 
and  the  same  thin.^  is  true  of  speaking  one  thing 
and  thinking  another.  It  is  also  natural  for  us  to 
believe  what  others  seriously  tell  us.  We  trust 
the  word  of  a  man  of  wliose  veracity  we  have 
had  experience;  but  we  also  credit  testimony 
previously  to  such  experience;  for  children,  who 
have  least  experience,  are  most  credulous.  It  is 
from  having  had  experience  of  the  dishonesty  of 
men,  and  of  the  motives  that  tempt  them  to  it, 
that  we  come  to  disbelieve  or  distrust  what  they 
say.  In  general,  when  we  doubt  a  man*s  word, 
we  have  ahvays  some  reason  for  it.  We  think 
that  what  he  says  is  incredible  in  itself;  or,  th'dt 
there  is  some  motive  or  temptation  which  inclines 
him  in  the  present  case  to  violate  truth;  ov,  that 
he  is  not  a  competent  judge  of  the  mutter  in 
which  he  gives  testimony;  or,  lastly,  v.e  distrust 
him  now,  because  we  know  him  to  have  been  a 
deceiver  formerly. 

1027.  Faith  in  testimony  often  rises  to  absolute 
certainty.  Of  places  and  persons  whom  v.e  never 
saws  and  of  whom  we  know  nothing  but  from  the 
testimony  of  others,  we  believe  Inany  things  as 
fir'T)j^  as  we  believe  our  own  existence.  This 
happens,  when  the  testimonies  of  men  concern- 

VoL.  IX  ^  ,  v^      2  B 


290  ELExME^•TS  Of  Part  IV 

ing  sucli  places  and  persons,  are  so  many,  and  so 
consistent,  that  it  seems  impossible  they  should 
be  fictitious.  When  a  number  of  persons,  not 
acting  in  concert,  having  no  interest  to  disguise 
what  is  true,  or  to  affirm  what  is  false,  and  com- 
petent judges  of  what  they  testify,  concur  in 
making  the  same  report,  it  would  be  accounted 
folly  to  disbelieve  them;  especially  if  what  they 
testified  were  credible  in  itself.  Even  when 
three,  or  when  two  witnesses  separately  exam- 
ined, and  who  have  had  no  opportunity  to  con- 
rcrt  a  plan  beforehand,  concur  in  the  same  de- 

iuratiOH,  we  believe  them,  though  we  have  had 
no  experience  of  their  veracity;  because  we 
know,   that  in    such   a  case,  their  declarations 

ould  not  be  consistent,  if  they  were  not  true. 
i6.'^8.  With  regard  to  an  impossible  thing,  we 

nmld  not  believe  our  own  senses,  nor  conse- 

cntly  iHimun  testimony.  If  we  were  to  sec  the 

uic  man  Joublc,  or  in  two  places  at  the  same 

.'ne,  we  should  think,  not  that  it  was  so,  but  that 

something  was  wrong  in  our  eyes,  or  that  the  ap- 

pearaiKC  miopht  be  owing  to  the  medium  through 

^lich  wc  saw  it.  Miraculous  facts  arc  not  to  be 
.  iked  with  impossibilities.  To  raise  a  dead  man 

>  life,  to  cure  blindness  with  a  touch,  to  rcmov. 
lameness  or  a  disease  by  speaking  a  word,  ui' 

.:v"';  '^'r^r   bn»   to  diviOC  pOWCr  as  CO«^v.  ;i^  m  r^i.  . 


CUap.  II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  291 

life  to  an  embryo,  make  the  eye  an  organ  of 
sight,  or  cause  vegetables  to  revive  in  the  spring. 
And  therefore,  if  a  person,  declaring  himself  to 
be  invested  with  divine  power,  and  saying  and 
doing  what  is  worthy  of  such  a  commission, 
should  perform  such  miracles,  mankind  would 
have  the  best  reason  to  believe,  that  he  was 
really  sent  of  God,  and  that  every  thing  he  said 
was  true. 

1029.  As  the  common  people  have  neither 
time  nor  cap?xity  for  deep  reasoning;  and  as  a 
divine  revelation  must  be  intended  for  all  sorts 
of  men,  the  vulgar  as  well  as  the  learned,  the 
poor  as  well  as  the  rich,  it  is  necessary,  that  the 
evidence  of  such  a  revelation  should  be  fit  for 
commanding  general  attention,  and  convincing 
all  sorts  of  men;  and  should  therefore  be  level  to 
every  capacity.  Now  there  is  no  kind  of  evidence, 
consistent  with  man's  free  agency  and  moral 
probation,  which  is  likely  to  command  universal 
attention,  and  carry  full  conviction  in  religious 
matters  to  the  minds  of  all  sorts  of  men,  except 
the  evidence  of  miracles,  or  erjttraordinary  events. 
Some  facts  seem  extraordinary  which  are  really 
not  so.  Such  are  the  tricks  of  jugglers,  of  which 
when  we  are  told  the  contrivance,  we  are  sur- 
prised to  find  it  so  easy.  Other  facts  seem  extra- 
ordinary to  those  only  who  are  ignorant  of  their 


ii92  ELEMENTS  OF,  k^^-  Part  IV. 

causes:  and  such  are  many  things  m  electricity, 
magnetism,  and  chemistry.  But  the  miracles  re- 
corded in  the  gospel  are  quite  of  a  different  kind. 
They  were  such  as  no  power  of  mun  could  ac- 
complish; and  of  so  particular  a  nature,  that  every 
person,  present  at  the  performance,  who  had 
eyes,  ears,  and  common  sense,  was  as  competent 
a  judge  of  them,  as  the  most  learned  philosopher 
could  have  been.  Of  these  miracles  our  Saviour 
not  only  performed  many,  but  also  imparted  to 
his  disciples  the  power  of  doing  the  same.  If  it 
be  asked,  what  evidence  is  sufficient  to  establish 
the  truth  of  a  miraculous  event,  I  answer,  that 
every  event  admits  of  proof  from  human  testi- 
mony, which  it  is  possible  for  a  sufficient  number 
of  competent  witnesses  to  see  and  to  hear. 


END  OF  MORAL  SCIF.NCF. 


CONTENTS, 


PART  II. 
NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

Pagf 
Introduction I 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  the  Divine  Existence (> 

CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  Divine  Attributes 18 

APPENDIX. 

Of  the  Incorporeal  Nature  of  the  Soul.  ...    29 
Of  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul ^sr 


vi  CONTENTS. 

PART  III. 
MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Introduction 61 

PART  FIRST.    OF  ETHICKS.   .  .  .      65    "Ip 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  the  general  Nature  of  Virtue 67 


CHAPTER  IL 

The  Subject  continued.    Miscellaneous  Ob- 
servations     94 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  Nature  and  Foundation  of  Particular 
Virtues. 

SECTION  I. 
Of  Piety,  or  the  Duties  we  owe  to  God '.  .  .     1-1 

SECTION  II. 

<9f  the  Duties  Men  owe  to  one  another.    . 136 

SEC!  ION  III. 

Of  the  Daties  whiob  a  Mwi  owes  to  himself. Hi 


CONTENTS.  VU 

PART  SECOND.  ECONOMICKS. 

Relation  of  Husband  and  Wife, — Parent  and 
Child, — Master  and  Servant.  Of  Slavery, 
particularly  that  of  the  Negroes 161 

PART  THIRD.  POLITICKS.    ...    245 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  the  general  Nature  of  Law. 247 


^ 


ELEMENTS 


OF 


f 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 

PART  SECOND. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

INTRODUCTION. 

407.  rS  ATURAL  theology  explains  what 
human  reason  can  discover  concerning  the  be- 
ing and  attributes  of  God.  It  is  a  science  of 
boundless  extent;  but  we  must  confine  ourselves 
to  a  few  general  principles.  In  respect  of  cer« 
tainty  it  is  equal  to  any  science;  for  its  proofs 
rise  to  demonstration:  in  point  of  dignity  it  is  su- 
periour  to  all  others;  its  object  being  the  Creator 
of  the  universe;  and  its  utility  is  so  great,  that  it 
lays  the  only  sure  foundation  of  human  society 
and  human  happiness.  The  proofs  of  the  Divine 
Existence  are  innumerable,  and  continually  force 
themselves  upon  our  observation;  and  are  withal 
so  clear  and  striking,  that  nothing  but  the  most 

Vol.  VIII.  A 


2  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  IT 

obstinate  prejudice,  and  extreme  depravity  of 
both  heart  and  understanding,  could  ever  bring 
any  rational  being  to  disbelieve,  or  doubt  of  it. 
With  good  reason,  therefore,  it  is,  that  the 
psalmist  calls  the  man  "  a  fool,  who  saith  in  his 
"  heart,  there  is  no  God."  Without  belief  in 
God,  a  considerate  person  (if  it  were  possible 
for  such  a  person  to  be  without  this  belief) 
could  never  possess  tranquillity  or  comfort;  for 
to  him  the  world  would  seem  a  chaos  of  misery 
and  confusion.  But  where  this  belief  is  estab- 
lished, all  things  appear  to  be  right,  and  to  have 
a  benevolent  tendency;  and  give  encouragement 
to  hope,  patience,  submission,  gratitude,  adora- 
tion, and  other  good  affections  essential  to  hu- 
man felicity. 

408.  That  men,  from  education,  or  from  na- 
ture, might  have  some  notion  'of  duty,  even 
though  they  were  to  harden  themselves  into 
atheists,  can  hardly  be  doubted:  but  that  notion 
would,  in  such  men,  be  wholly  ineffectual.  From 
the  fear  of  shame,  or  of  human  laws,  the  atheist 
may  be  decent  in  his  outward  behaviour;  but  he 
cannot  act  from  any  nobler  principle.  And,  if  at 
anytime,  he  could  promote  (what  he  takes  to  be) 
his  interest,  by  the  comi.  ission  of  the  greatest 
crime,  it  is  plain  that  there  would  be  nothing  to 
restrain  him,  provided  he  could  conceal  his  guilt; 


i.ti.  MORAL  SCmNCE.  3 

which  any  man  might  do  occasionally,  and  which 
men  of  great  wealth  or  powder  could  do  at  any 
time.  Atheism  is  utterly  subversive  of  morality, 
and,  consequently,  of  happiness:  and  as  to  a  com- 
munit;%  or  political  society,  of  atheists,  it  is 
plainly  impossible,  and  never  took  place  irs  any 
nation.  They,  therefore,  who  teach  athei.itical 
doctrines,  or,  who  endeavour  to  make  men  doubt- 
ful in  regard  to  this  great  and  glorious  truth,  the 
BEING  OF  God,  do  every  thing  in  their  poAver  to 
overturn  government,  to  unhinge  society,  to 
eradicate  virtue,  to  destroy  happiness,  and  to 
promote  confusion,  madness,  and  misery. 

409.  On  what  human  reason  discovers  of  the 
divine  nature  is  partly  founded  the  evidence 
even  of  revelation  itself.  For  no  pretended 
revelation  can  be  true,  which  conlradicts  what, 
by  human  reason,  is  demonstrable  of  the  divine 
perfections.  We  do  not  prove  from  scripture, 
that  God  exists;  because  they  who  deny  God, 
deny  the  authority  of  scripture  too  But  when, 
by  rational  proof,  we  have  evinced  his  being 
and  attributes,  we  may  then  ascertain  the 
truth  of  divine  revelation,  or  detect  the  false- 
hood of  a  pretended  one.  When  we  have,  from 
the  purity  of  its  doctrine,  and  the  external  evi- 
dence of  miracles,  prophecy,  and  human  testi- 
mony, satisfied  ourselves  of  the  truth  of  the 
vhi'istian  revelation,  it  becomes  us  to  believe 


4  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  H 

even  such  parts  of  it  as  could  never  have  been 
found  out  by  human  reason.  And  thus  it  is,  that 
our  natural  notions  of  God  and  his  providence 
are  wonderfully  refined  and  improved  by  what 
is  revealed  in  holy  writ:  so  that  the  meanest  of 
our  people,  who  has  had  a  christian  education, 
knows  a  great  deal  more  on  these  subjects,  than 
could  ever  be  discovered  by  the  wisest  of  the 
ancient  philosophers.  That  many  things  in  the 
divine  government,  and  many  particulars  relat- 
ing to  the  divine  nature,  as  declared  in  scrip- 
ture, should  surpass  our  comprehension,  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at;  for  we  are  daily  puzzled 
with  things  more  within  our  sphere:  we  know 
that  our  own  soul  and  body  are  united,  but  of 
the  manner  of  that  union  we  know  nothing.  A 
past  eternity  we  cannot  comprehend;  and  a  fu- 
ture eternity  is  an  object  by  which  our  reason 
is  astonished  and  confounded:  yet  nothing  can 
be  more  certain,  than  that  one  eternity  is  past 
and  another  to  come. 

410.  In  evincing  the  being  of  God,  two  sorts 
of  proof  have  been  employed;  which  arc  called 
the  proofs  a  priori  and  a  Jiostn'iori.  In  the  for- 
mer, the  being  of  God  is  proved  from  this  con- 
sideration, that  his  existence  is  necessary,  and 
tliat  it  is  absurd  and  impossible  to  suppose  that 
he  docs  not  exist.  This  argument  is  fully  dis- 


Intt-.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  5 

eussed  by  Dr.  Clarke,  in  the  first  part  of  his 
excellent  book  on  the  evidence  of  natural  and 
revealed  religion.  The  proof  a  /losteriori  shows, 
from  the  present  constitution  of  things,  that 
there  is,  and  must  be,  a  supreme  being,  of 
infinite  goodness,  power,  and  wisdom,  who  cre- 
ated and  supports  them.  This  last  is  the  most 
obvious  proof,  and  the  most  easily  comprehend- 
ed; and  wdthal,  so  satisfying,  that  the  man  must 
be  mad  who  refuses  to  be  convinced  by  it.  I 
shall,  therefore,  give  a  brief  account  of  this  ar- 
gument; referring  to  Dr.  Clarke  for  the  other. 
Natural  theology  consists  of  two  parts:  in  the 
first,  we  demonstrate  the  existence  of  God;  in 
the  second,  his  attributes.  These  parts,  how- 
ever, are  strictly  connected;  for  the  same  ar- 
guments that  prove  the  first,  prove  also  the 
s*econd. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  Divine  ILxistencc 

411.    1  HAT  we  ourselves,  and  innumerable 
other  things,  exist,  may  be  taken  for  granted  as  a 
first  principle,  as  evident  as  any  axiom  in  Euclid. 
Hence   we   infer,  that   something  must  always 
have  existed.  For  if  ever  there  was  a  time  when 
nothintj  existed,  there  must  have  been  a  time 
Avhen  something  i>cgan  to  be;  and  that  something 
must  have  come  into  being  without  a  cause;  since, 
by  the  supposition,  there  was  nothing  before  it. 
But  that  a  thing  should  begin  to  exist,  and  yet 
proceed  from  no  cause,  is  both  absurd  and  in- 
conceivable; all  men,  by  the  law  of  their  nature, 
being   necessarily    determined   to   believe,  that 
wluitever  begins  to  exist  proceeds  from  some 
cause;  therefore  some  being  must  have  existed 
from  eternity.  This  being  nuist  have  been  either 
dependent  on  something  else,  or  not  dependent 
on  any  thhig  else.    Now  an  eternal  succession 
of  dependent  beings,  or  a  being  which  is  depen- 
dent, and  yet  exists  from  eternity,  is  impossible. 
¥ov  if  every  part  of  such  a  succession  be  depen- 


«hap.  I.  ELEMENTS  OF,  &e.  f 

dent,  then  the  whole  must  be  so;  and,  if  the 
whole  be  dependent,  there  must  be  something 
on  which  it  depends;  and  that  something  must 
be  prior  in  time  to  that  which  depends  on  it, 
which  is  impossible,  if  that  which  is  dependent 
be  from  eternity.  It  follows,  that  there  must  be 
an  eternal  and  independent  being  on  whom  all 
other  beings  depend. 

412.  Some  atheists  seem  to  acknowledge  a 
first  cause,  when  they  ascribe  the  origin  of  the 
universe  to  chance.  But  it  is  not  easy  to  guess 
what  they  mean  by  this  word.  We  call  those 
things  accidental^  casual^  or  the  effects  of  chance^ 
whose  immediate  causes  we  are  unacquainted 
with;  as  the  changes  of  the  weather,  for  exam- 
ple; which  however  every  body  believes  to  be 
owing  to  some  adequate  cause,  though  we  cannot 
find  it  out.  Sometimes,  when  an  intelligent  being 
does  a  thing  without  design,  as  when  a  man 
throwing  a  stone  out  of  his  field  happens  to 
strike  a  man  whom  he  did  not  see;  it  is  called 
accidental.  In  affu'ming  that  the  universe  pro- 
ceeds from  chance,  it  would  appear,  that  atheists 
mean,  either  that  it  has  no  cause  at  all,  or  that 
its  cau^e  did  not  act  intelligently,  or  with  design, 
in  the  production  of  it.  That  the  universe  pro- 
ceeds from  no  cause,  we  have  seen  to  be  absurd, 
and  therefore,  we  shall  overturn  all  the  atheisti- 


8  KLKMEN'TS  OF  Part  II 

cul  notions  concerning  chance,  if  we  can  show, 
what  indeed  is  easily  shown,  and  what  no  con- 
siderate person  can  be  ignorant  of,  that  the  cause 
of  the  universe  is  intelligent  and  wise,  and  in 
creating  it,  must  have  acted  with  intelligence 
and  wisdom. 

413.  Wherever  we  find  a  number  of  things, 
complex  in  their  structure,  and  yet  perfectly 
.similar,  we  believe  them  to  be  the  work  of  de- 
Jiign.  Were  a  man  to  find  a  thousand  pair  of 
shoes,  of  the  same  shape,  size,  and  materials,  it 
would  not  be  easy  to  persuade  him  that  the 
whole  was  chancevvork.  Now  the  instances  of 
complex  and  similar  productions  in  nature  are 
so  very  numerous  as  to  exceed  computation.  All 
human  bodies,  for  example,  though  each  of  them 
consists  of  almost  an  infinite  number  of  parts, 
are  perfectly  uniform  in  their  structure  and 
functions;  and  the  same  thing  may  be  said  of  all 
the  animals  and  plants  of  any  particular  species. 
To  suppose  this  the  effect  of  undesigning  chance, 
or  the  production  of  an  unintelligent  cause, .is  as 
great  an  absurdity  as  it  is  possible  to  imagine. 

414.  I'urther,  a  composiiion  of  parts  mutually 
adapted  we  must  always  consider  as  the  work  of 
dc^^ign,  especially  if  it  bo  found  in  a  great  variety 
ol'instinces.  Suppose  a  body,  an  equilateral  prism, 

or  example,  to  be  formed  by  chance;  and  suppose 


Uhap.  I.  MORAL  SCIE^XE.  9 

a  certain  quantity  of  matter  accidentally  deter- 
mined to  resolve  itself  into  tubes  of  a  certain  di- 
mension. It  is  as  infinite  to  one,  that  these  tubes 
should  have  orifices  pqual  to  the  base  of  the  prism; 
there  being  an  infinity  of  other  magnitudes  equally 
possible.  Suppose  the  orifices  equal,  it  is  as  infinite 
to  one  that  any  of  the  tubes  should  be  prismatical; 
infinite  other  ^gures  being  equally  possible.  Sup- 
pose one  of  them  prismatical,  there  is,  for  the 
same  reason,  an  infinity  of  chances,  that  it  shall 
not  be  equilateral.  Suppose  it  equilateral,  there 
are  still  infinite  chances  that  the  tube  and  prism 
shall  never  meet.  Suppose  them  to  meet,  there 
are  innumerable  chances  that  their  axes  shall  not 
be  in  the  same  direction.  Suppose  them  to  have 
the  same  direction,  there  are  still  many  chances 
that  the  angles  of  the  prism  shall  not  coincide 
with  those  of  the  tube:  and  supposing  them  to 
coincide,  there  are  innumerable  chances  that  no 
force  shall  be  applied  in  such  a  direction  as  to 
make  the  prism  enter  the  tube. 

415.  How  many  millions  of  chances,  then,  are 
there  against  the  carnal  formation  of  one  prism 
inserted  in  a  prismatick  tube!  which  yet  a  small 
degree  of  design  could  easily  accomplish.  Were 
we  to  find,  in  a  solitary  place,  a  composition  of 
this  kind,  of  which  the  tube  was  iron  and  the 
prism  of  wood,  it  would  not  be  easy  for  us  to 


To  EIJiMENTS  OF  Part  II. 

believe,  that  such  a  thing  was  the  work  of  chance. 
And  if  so  small  a  thing  cannot  be  without  design, 
what  shall  we  say  of  the  i^,echanism  of  a  plant, 
an  animal,  a  system  of  pVants  and  animals,  a 
world,  a  system  of  worlds,  an  universe!  No  per- 
son, who  has  any  pretensions  to  rationality,  and 
is  not  determined  to  shut  his  eyes  against  the 
truth,  will  ever  bring  himself  to  believe,  that 
Y/orks  so  stupendous  could  be  the  effect  of  unde- 
signing  chance. 

416.  To  set  tills  argument  in  a  proper  light,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  take  a  survey  of  the  works 
of  nature;  in  which  the  vast  number  of  systems, 
the  artful  union  of  parts,  the  nice  proportions 
established  between  every  part  and  system  and 
its  respective  end,  the  innumerable  multitudes 
of  species,  and  the  infinite  numbers  of  forms  in 
every  species,  are  so  conspicuous  as  to  prove, 
beyond  all  doubt,  that  the  Creator  of  ihc  world  is 
infinitely  wise,  powerful,  and  good.  Let  a  min 
examine  only  a  grain  of  corn,  by  cutting  it  open, 
and  viewing  it  with  a  microscope;  and  then  let 
him  consider  another  grain  as  planted  in  the 
earth,  and  by  the  inlluencc  of  heat,  soil,  air,  and 
moisture,  springing  up  into  a  plant,  consisting 
of  a  great  number  of  vessels  that  disperse  the 
vital  sap  into  every  part,  and  endowed  with  the 
power,  or  susceptibility,  of  growing  in  bulk,  till 


yhup.  I  MORAL  SCIENCE.  1 1 

ill  due  time  it  produce  a  number  of  other  grains 
of  the  same  kind,  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
man  and  other  creatures;  let  a  rational  being 
attend  to  this  fact,  and  compare  it  with  the  no- 
blest efforts  of  human  art;  and  if  he  is  not  struck 
with  the  infinite  superiority  of  the  one  to  the 
other,  what  can  we  say  of  him,  but  that  he  is 
void  of  understanding!  And  yet  the  mechanism 
and  growth  of  a  vegetable  seems  an  inconsidera- 
ble thing,  when  we  think  of  the  wisdom  and 
power  displayed  in  many  other  works  of  nature. 
417.  What  a  fabrick  is  our  solar  system' 
wherein  bodies  of  such  enormous  magnitude 
accomplish  their  revolutions  through  spaces  im- 
mense; and  with  a  regularity,  than  which  no- 
thing can  be  more  perfect.  The  distance  of  the 
planets  from  the  sun,  and  their  several  magni- 
tudes, are  determined  with  the  utmost  wisdom, 
and  according  to  the  nicest  geometrical  propor- 
tion. The  central  orb,  whether  we  consider  its 
glorious  appearance,  its  astonishing  greatness,  or 
the  beneficial  influence  of  its  light  and  heat,  is 
such  an  object  as  no  rational  being  can  conLem- 
plate  "without  adoring  the  Creator.  We  have  good 
reason  to  believe,  that  there  are  thousands  of 
other  suns  and  systems  of  worlds,  more  glorious 
perhaps,  and  more  extensive  than  ours;  which 
form  such  a  stupendous  whole,  that  the  human 


1-2  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  11 

soul,  labouring  to  conjprehend  it,  loses  sight  of 
itself  and  of  all  sublunary  things,  and  is  totally 
overwhelmed  with  astonishment  and  veneration. 
With  such  thoughts  in  our  view,  we  are  apt  to 
forget  the  wonders  that  lie  immediately  around 
us,  and  that  the  smallest  plant  or  animal  body 
amounts  to  a  demonstration  of  the  divine  exist- 
ence. But  God  appears  in  all  his  works,  in  the 
least  as  wxll  as  in  the  greatest;  and  there  is  not, 
in  the  whole  circle  of  human  sciences,  any  one 
truth  confirmed  by  so  many  irresistible  proofs,  as 
the  existence  of  the  Deity. 

418.  The  diurnal  motion  of  the  planets  is  the 
easiest  way  possible  of  exposing  all  their  parts  to 
the  influence  of  light  and  heat.  Their  globular 
form  is  the  fittest  for  motion,  and  for  the  free 
circulation  of  atmosphere  around  them;  and  at 
the  same  time  supplies  the  most  capacious  sur- 
face. The  principle  of  gi'avitation,  prevailing 
through  the  whole  system,  and  producing  inim- 
mcrable  phenomena,  is  a  most  amazing  instance 
of  unbounded  variety  united  with  the  strictest 
uniformity  and  proportion.  But  it  is  impossible 
in  a  few  pages  to  give  such  an  enumeration  of 
particulars,  as  would  do  any  juslice  to  the  sub- 
ject. The  man,  who  should  suppose  a  large  city, 
consisting  of  a  hundred  thousand  palaces,  all 
finished  in  the  minutest  parts,  and  furnished  with 


Ghap.  L  MORAL  SCIENCE.  13 

the  greatest  elegance  and  variety  of  ornament, 
and  with  all  sorts  of  books,  pictures,  and  statues, 
executed.in  the  most  ingenious  manner;  to  have 
been  produced  by  the  accidental  blowing  of 
■winds  and  rolling  of  sands,  would  justly  be  ac- 
counted irrational.  But  to  suppose  the  universe, 
or  our  solar  system,  or  this  earth,  to  be  the  work 
of  undesigning  chance,  is  an  absurdity  incompa- 
rably greater. 

419.  And  now,  from  a  particular  survey  of  tlie 
terraqueous  globe;  of  the  atmosphere,  so  neces- 
sary to  light,  and  life,  and  vegetation;  of  the  dif- 
ferent productions  of  different  countries,  so  well 
adapted  to  the  constitution  and  use  of  the  inhabi- 
tants: from  the  variety  of  useful  minerals  to  be 
found  in  all  parts  of  the  earth;  from  the  wonder- 
ful mechanism  and  still  more  wonderful  growth 
of  vegetables,  their  vast  number  and  variety,  their 
beauty  and  utility,  and  the  great  abundance  of 
such  as  are  most  useful,  particularly  grass  and 
corn;  from  the  structure,  life,  motion,  and  in- 
stincts, of  animals;  from  the  exact  correspon- 
dence of  their  instincts  to  their  necessities;  from 
the  different  kinds  of  them  and  of  vegetables 
having  been  so  long  preserved;  from  the  simili- 
tude between  all  the  individuals  of  each  species; 
from  the  body  and  soul  of  man  so  replete  with 
wonders;  from  his  intellectual  and  moral  facul- 

VoL,  VIII.  B 


1 4  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  1 1 . 

lies;  and  from  innumerable  other  particulars  that 
come  under  the  cognisance  of  man;  we  might 
proceed  to  set  the  Divine  Existence  in  a  still 
clearer  light,  if  that  were  necessary,  but  the 
subject  is  so  copious  that  wc  cannot  enter  upon 
it.  We, should  injure  it  by  a  brief  summary;  and 
a  full  detail  would  comprehend  astronomy,  geo- 
graphy, natural  history,  natural  philosophy,  and 
several  other  sciences.  I  therefore  refer  you  to 
what  has  been  written  on  it,  by  Xenophon,  in  the 
fourth  chapter  of  -his  first  book  of  Alemorabilia; 
by  Cicero,  in  his  second  book  De  natura  deorum; 
by  Derham,  Ray,  Fenelon,  Niewentyt;  by  Clarke, 
Bentley,  Aberneihy,  Sfc.  in  their  sermons;  and 
by  other  ingenious  authors. 

420.  Some  have  urged,  that  there  are  in  the 
\miversc  many  marks  of  irregularity  and  want  of 
design,  as  well  as  regularity  and  wisdom;  and 
that  therefore  we  have  no  cVidence,  that  the 
Being,  who  made  all  things  is  perfectly  good 
and  wise.  But  though  we  were  to  admit  the  fact, 
the  inference  would  not  be  fair.  The  wonderful 
contrivance,  which  appears  in  the  arrangement 
of  the  solar  system,  or  even  in  the  human  body, 
abundantly  proves  the  Creator  to  be  infinitely 
wise.  I'hat  he  has  not  thought  fit  to  make  all 
jthings  ctjually  beautiful  and  excellent,  can  never 
be  an  impviiation  on  his  wisdom  and  goodness:' 


tiap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  1^ 

tor  how  absurd  would  it  be  to  say,  that  he  would 
have  displayed  more  wisdom,  if  he  had  endowed 
all  things  with  life,  perception,  and  reason!  Stones 
and  plants,  air  and  water,  are  most  useful  things, 
and  would  have  been  much  less  useful  if  they 
had  been  percipient  beings;  as  the  inferiour  ani- 
mals would  have  been  both  less  useful  and  less 
happy,  if  they  had  been  rational.  Their  existence, 
therefore,  and  their  natures,  are  proofs  of  the 
divine  goodness  and  wisdom,  instead  of  being 
arguments  against  it. 

42 1 .  Besides,  no  man  of  sense  accounts  himself 
a  complete  judge  of  any  work,  even  of  a  fellow 
creature,  unless  he  understand  its  end  and  struc- 
ture, as  well  as  the  workman  himself  does.  When 
we  wish  to  know  with  certainty  the  value  of  a 
ship,  or  a  house,  or  any  complex  machine,  we 
consult  those  who  are  skilled  in  such  things;  for 
them  only  we  hold  to  be  competent  judges.  In  a 
complex  contrivance  there  may  be  many  parts 
of  the  greatest  importance,  which  an  unskilful 
observer  would  not  perceive  the  use  of,  or  would 
perhaps  declare  to  be  useless.  Now,  in  the  course 
of  Providence,  a  vast  number  of  events  and  ob- 
jects may  be  employed  to  accomplish  one  great' 
end;  and  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  pronounce 
reasonably  of  any  one  event,  or  object,  that  it  is 
'iselcso,  or  improper,  unless  we  know  its  ten- 


16  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  0. 

dency  and  connection  with  other  things  both 
past  and  future;  which  in  cases  innumerable  wc 
cannot  do.  For  of  the  past  we  know  but  little, 
the  present  we  know  imperfectly,  and  of  the 
future  we  have  no  certain  knowledge  beyond 
what  is  revealed.  The  system  of  Providence 
relating  to  us  and  to  our  final  destination  extends 
through  thousands  of  years,  as  we  have  good 
reason  to  believe;  but  our  life  is  short,  and  our 
views  are  bounded  by  our  experience,  which  is 
very  limited.  That  therefore  may  be  a  most  wise 
and  beneficent  dispensation,  which  to  a  captious 
mind  and  fallible  judgment  may  appear  the  con- 
trary. 

422.  Moreover,  the  Deity  intended,  that  the 
nature  of  all  created  things  should  be  progressive. 
Many  years  pass  away  before  a  man  arrives  at 
maturity;  and  many  days,  before  a  plant  can 
yield  good  fruit.  Every  thing  is  imperfect,  while 
advancing  to  perfection;  and  we  cannot  say  of 
any  thing,  whether  it  be  well  or  ill  contrived  for 
answering  its  end,  till  we  know  what  its  state  of 
maturity  will  be,  and  what  the  effects  are  whereof 
it  may  be  productive.  Physical  evils  may,  as  will 
be  shown  by  and  by,  be  improved  into  blessings; 
and  it  will  also  be  shown,  that  moral  evil  is  a  con- 
sccjuence  of  that  law  of  nature  which  makes  us 
(■apiiblo  of  virtue  and  happiness.  Even  in  thi«5 


Ghap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  1 T 

world,  Providence  often  brings  good  out  of  evil; 
and  every  man  of  observation  must  have  per- 
ceived, that  certain  events  of  his  life,  which  when 
they  happened  seemed  to  be  great  misfortunes, 
have  been  found  to  be  great  blessings  in  the  end. 
423.  If,  then,  that  which  seems  evil  may  really 
be  good,  for  any  thing  we  know  to  the  contrary, 
and  if  that  which  is  really  evil  often  does,  and 
always  may,  produce  good:  how  can  man  be  so 
presumptuous  as  to  suppose,  because  he  cannot 
distinctly  see  the  nature  and  use  of  some  things 
around  him,  that  therefore  the  Creator  of  the 
world  is  not  supremely  good  and  wise!  No  man 
can  draw  this  conclusion,  unless  he  believe  him- 
self infallible  in  his  knowledge  of  all  things  past, 
present,  and  future;  and  he  who  believes  so,  if 
there  be  any  such,  is  a  fool . 


n2 


CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  Divine  At  tribute  a. 

424.  vJUR  knowledge  of  the  Divine  Nature, 
though  sufficient  to  raise  within  us  the  highest 
adoration  and  love,  must  needs  be  very  imper- 
fect; for  we  cannot  form  a  distinct  idea  of  any 
moral  or  intellectual  quality,  unless  we  find  some 
trace  of  it  in  ourselves.  Now  God  must  possess 
innumerable  perfections,  which  neither  Ave,  nor 
any  created  being  can  comprehend.  When  we 
ascribe  to  him  every  good  quality  that  we  can 
conceive,  and  consider  him  as  possessed  of  them 
all  in  supreme  perfection,  and  as  free  from  every 
imperfection,  we  form  the  best  idea  of  him  that 
we  can:  but  it  must  fall  infinitely  short  of  the 
truth.  The  attributes  of  God,  which  it  is  in  our 
power  in  any  degree  to  conceive,  or  to  make  the 
subject  of  investigation,  have  been  divided  into 
NATURAL,  as  unitxj^  selfcxistencc,  s/iij'itiiality^  om- 
m/iotcncr^  immutability^  eternity;  intellectual, 
as  knoivlcdgi'  and  ivvnlom;  and  moral,  as  ju.'itice, 
i('0O(hiess,  inercy^  liuliiicfiS. 

435,  That  Ciod  is,  has  bet-n  proved  already. 


Chap.  II.  ELEMENTS  OF,  kc.  19 

That  there  are  more  gods  than  one,  we  have  no 
evidence,  and  therefore  cannot  rationally  believe. 
Nay,  even  from  the  light  of  nature,  we  have  evi- 
dence, that  there  is  one  only.  For,  in  the  works 
of  creation,  there  appears  that  perfect  unity  of 
design,  which  naturally  determines  an  attentive 
spectator  to  refer  them  all  to  one  first  cause.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  wisest  men  in  the  heathen  world, 
though  they  worshipped  inferiour  deities,  (I 
should  rather  say,  names  nvhich  they  substituted 
for  deities),  did  yet  seem  to  acknowledge  one 
iiupreme  god,  the  greatest  and  best  of  beings, 
the  father  of  gods  and  men.  It  is  probable,  that 
belief  in  one  God  was  the  original  belief  of  man- 
kind with  respect  to  Deity.  But,  partly  from  their 
narrow  views,  which  made  them  think  that  one 
being  could  not,  without  subordinate  agents,  su- 
perintend all  things;  purtiy  from  their  flattery  to 
living  great  men,  and  gratitude  to  the  dead,  dis- 
posing them  to  pay  divine  honours  to  human 
creatures;  partly  from  fanciful  analogies  betv/ecn 
the  Divine  Providence  and  earthly  governments; 
and  partly  fi'om  the  figures  of  poetry,  by  which 
they  saw  the  attributes  of  the  deity  personified, 
th^y  soon  corrupted  the  original  belief,  and  fell 
into  polytheism  and  idolati-y.  And  no  ancient 
people  ever  retained  long  their  belief  in  the  one 
true  God,  except  the  Jews,  who  were  enlightened 


20  ELEMENTS  OP  Part  U. 

by  revelation;  and  even  they  were  frequently  in- 
clined to  adopt  the  superstitions  of  their  neigh- 
bours. We  see  then,  that,  in  order  to  ascertain, 
and  fix  men*s  notions  of  the  divine  unity ^  revela- 
tion seems  to  be  necessary. 

426.  Selfexistence,  or  independence,  is  another 
natural  attribute  of  God.  If  he  depended  on  any 
thing',  that  thing  would  be  superiour  and  prior  to 
him,  which  is  absurd;  because  he  himself  is  the 
supreme  and  the  first  cause:  therefore  his  exist- 
ence does  not  depend  on  any  thmg  whatever. 
The  attribute  of  selfexistence  is  sometlvng  that' 
surpasses  our  comprehension;  and  no  wonder, 
since  all  the  beings  that  we  see  around  us  in  the 
"world  are  dependent.  But,  as  already  observed, 
there  are  many  things  which  we  must  acknow- 
ledge to  be  true,  notwithstanding  that  we  cannot 
comprehend  them. 

427.  We  see  the  material  universe  in  motion; 
but  matter  is  inert,  and,  so  far  as  we  know,  no- 
thing can  move  it  but  mind;  therefore  God  is  a 
Spirit.  We  do  not  mean  that  his  nature  is  the 
same  with  that  of  our  soul:  it  is  infinitely  more 
excellent.  But  we  mean,  that  he  possesses  intel- 
ligence and  active  ])owcr  in  supreme  perfection; 
and  as  these  qualities  do  not  belong  to  matter, 
which  is  neither  active  nor  intelligent,  we  must 
refer  them  to  that  which  is  not  matter,  but  mind. 


Chap.  II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  21. 

Some  of  the  ancients  thought,  that  God  is  the 
soul  of  the  universe,  and  that  the  universe  is,  as 
it  were,  his  body.  But  this  cannot  be;  for  wherever 
there  is  body,  there  must  be  inactivity,  and  con- 
sequently imperfection.  He  is  therefore  a  pure 
Spirit.  Nor  can  we  conceive,  that  he  is  confined 
within  the  limits  of  creation,  as  a  soul  is  within 
its  body;  or  that  he  is  liable  to  impressions  from 
material  things,  as  the  soul  is  from  the  body;  or, 
that  material  things  are  instruments  necessary  to 
the  exertion  of  his  attributes,  as  our  bodies  are  to 
the  exertion  of  our  faculties.  It  must  be  as  easy 
for  him  to  act  beyond  the  bounds  of  creation,  as 
within  them;  to  create  new  worlds,  as  to  ceas&, 
from  creation.  He  is  every  where  present  and 
active;  but  it  is  a  more  perfect  presence  and 
activity,  than  that  of  a  soul  within  a  body.  An- 
other notion  once  prevailed,  similar  to  that  which 
has  been  just  now  confuted,  that  the  world  is 
animated,  as  a  body  is  by  a  soul,  not  by  the  Deity 
himself,  but  by  an  universal  spirit,  which  he 
created  in  the  beginning,  and  of  which  the  souls 
of  men,  and  other  anim.als,  are  parts  or  emana- 
tions. This  I  mention,  not  because  a  confutation 
is  necessary,  for  it  is  mere  hypothesis,  without 
any  shadow  of  evidence;  but,  because  it  may  be 
")f  use  in  explaining  some  passages  of  ancient. 


22  ELEMENTS  OF  Pmtll. 

authors,   particularly  of  Virgil,   who  once  and 
again  alludes  to  it.* 

428.  In  order  to  be  satisfied,  that  God  is  omni- 
potent, we  need  only  to  open  our  eyes,  and  look 
round  upon  the  wonders  of  his  creation.  To  pro- 
duce such  astonishing  effects,  as  we  see  in  the 
universe,  and  experience  in  our  own  frame;  and 
to  produce  them  out  of  nothing,  and  sustain  them 
in  the  most  perfect  regularity,  must  certainly  be 
the  effect  of  power,  which  is  able  to  do  all  things, 
and  which,  therefore,  nothing  can  resist.  But  the 
divine  power  cannot  extend  to  what  is  either  im- 
possible in  itself,  or  unsuitable  to  the  perfection 

rf)f  his  nature.  To  make  the  same  thing  at  the 
same  time  to  be  and  not  to  be,  is  plainly  impos- 
sible; and  to  act  inconsistently  with  justice,  good- 
ness, and  wisdom,  must  be  equally  impossible  to 
a  being  of  infinite  purity. 

429.  That  God  is  from  everlasting  to  everlast- 
ing, is  evident  from  his  being  selfexistent  and 
almighty.  That  he  was  from  all  eternity,  was 
proved  already;  and  it  can  admit  of  no  doubt, 
that  what  is  independent  and  omnipotent  must 
continue  to  all  eternity.  In  treating  of  the  eternity 
of  God,  as  well  as  of  his  omnipresence,  some 
authors  have  puzzled  themselves  to  little  pur- 

**  .-Enri.l.  vi.  724.  Goor.  iv.  22<'> 


Chap.  H.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  23 

pose,  by  attempting  to  explain  in  what  manner 
he  is  connected  with  infinite  space  and  endless 
duration.  But  it  is  vain  to  search  into  those 
mysteries;  as  they  lie  far  beyond  the  reach  of  all 
human,  and,  most  probably,  of  all  created  intelli- 
gence. Of  this  we  are  certain,  for,  upon  the 
principle  just  now  mentioned  it  may  be  demon- 
strated, that  the  Supreme  Being  had  no  begin- 
ning, and  that  of  his  existence  there  can  be  no 
end.  That  which  is  omnipotent  and  eternal,  is 
incapable  of  being  changed  by  any  thing  else; 
and  that  which  is  infinitely  wise  and  good  can 
never  be  supposed  to  make  any  change  in  itself. 
The  Deity,  therefore,  is  unchangeable. 

430.  As  he  is  the  maker  and  preseiTer  of  all 
things,  and  every  where  present  (for  to  suppose 
him  to  be  in  some  places  only,  and  not  in  all, 
would  be  to  suppose  him  a  limited  and  imperfect 
being),  his  knowledge  must  be  infinite,  and  com- 
prehend, at  all  times,  whatever  is,  or  was,  or 
shall  be.  Were  his  knowledge  progressive,  like 
ours,  it  would  be  imperfect;  for  they  who  be- 
come more  wise,  must  formerly  have  been  less 
so.  Wisdom  is  the  right  exercise  of  knowledge: 
and  that  he  is  infinitely  wise,  is  proved,  incon- 
testably  by  the  same  arguments  that  prove  his 
existence. 

431.  The  goodness  of  God  appears  in  all  his 


24  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  11 

works  of  creation  and  providence.  Being  infinitely 
and  eternally  happy  in  himself,  it  was  goodness 
alone  that  could  move  him  to  create  the  universe, 
and  give  being,  and  the  means  of  happiness,  to 
the  innumerable  orders  of  creatures  contained  in 
it.  Revelation  gives  such  a  display  of  the  divine 
goodness,  as  must  fill  us  with  the  most  ardent 
gratitude  and  adoration:  for  in  it  we  find,  that 
Cod  has  put  it  in  our  power,  notwithstanding  our 
degeneracy  and  unworthiness,  to  be  happy  both 
in  this  life  and  for  ever;  a  hope,  which  reason 
alone  could  never  have  permitted  us  to  entertain 
on  any  ground  of  certainty.  And  here  we  may 
repeat,  what  was  already  hinted  at,  that  although 
the  riglit  use  of  reason  supplies  our  first  notions 
of  the  divine  nature,  yet  it  is  from  revelation  that" 
we  receive  those  distinct  ideas  of  his  attributes 
and  providence  which  are  the  foundation  of  our 
dc.ircst  hopes.  Tlie  most  enlightened  of  the  hea- 
then had  no  certain  knowledge  of  his  unity, 
spirituality,  eternity,  wisdom,  justice,  or  mercy; 
and,  by  consequence,  could  never  contrive  a  com- 
fortable system  of  natural  religion;  as  Socrates., 
the  ^\iscst  of  tiicni,  acknowledged. 

432.  Lastly,  justice  is  necessary  to  the  forma- 
tion of  every  good  character;  and,  therefore,  the 
Deity  must  be  ])(Mfe(  tly  just.  This,  however,  is 
an  uwlul  consideration  to  creatures,  who^like  us, 
are  immersed  in  errour  ;jind   wickedness,  and 


Chap.  n.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  2d 

whose  conscience  is  always  declaring,  that  every 
sin  deserves  punishment.  It  is  reasonable  to  think, 
that  a  being  infinitely  good  must  also  be  of  in- 
finite mercy:  but  still,  the  purity  and  justice  of 
God  must  convey  the  most  alarming  thoughts  to 
those  who  know  themselves  to  have  been,  in  in- 
stances without  number,  inexcusably  criminal. 
But,  from  what  is  revealed  in  scripture,  concern- 
ing the  divine  dispensations  with  respect  to  man, 
we  learn,  that,  on  performing  certain  conditions, 
we  shall  be  forgiven  and  received  into  favour,  by 
means,  which  at  once  display  the  divine  mercy  in 
the  most  amiable  light,  and  fully  vindicate  the 
divine  justice. 

433.  It  is,  indeed,  impossible  to  understand  the 
doctrines  of  our  religion,  and  not  to  wish^  atleasty 
that  they  may  be  true:  for  they  exhibit  the  most 
comfortable  views  of  God  and  his  providence; 
they  recommend  the  purest  and  most  perfect 
morality;  and  they  breathe  nothing  throughout, 
but  benevolence,  equity,  and  peace.  And  one 
may  venture  to  affirm,  that  no  man  ever  wished 
the  gospel  to  be  true,  who  did  Txotjind  it  so.  Its 
evidence  is  even  more  than  sufficient  to  satisfy 
those  who  love  it.  And  every  man  who  knows  it 
must  love  it,  if  he  be  a  man  of  candour  and  of  a 
good  heart. 

THE   END  OF  PNEUMATOLOG Y. 

Vol.  Vm.  C 


APPENDIX. 


'•?l 


APPENDIX. 

Of  the  Incorfioreal  JVature  of  the  Human  Soul. 

434.  JVl  AN  is  made  up  of  a  body  and  a  soul, 
intimately  connected  together,  we  know  not  how, 
or  when.  In  consequence  of  this  connection,  the 
body  lives  and  moves,  is  nourished  with  food  and 
refreshed  by  sleep,  and,  for  a  certain  time  in- 
creases in  bulk.  When  this  connection  is  dis- 
solved, the  body  is  insensible  and  motionless, 
soon  becomes  cold,  and  gradually  moulders  into 
dust.  That  the  soul  and  body  are  distinct  and 
different  substances,  was  formerly  inferred  (see 
§  119),  from  the  general  consent  of  mankind  in 
regard  to  this  matter.  It  seems  to  be  natural  for 
us  to  believe,  that  the  soul  may  exist,  and  be 
happy  or  miserable,  without  the  body.  This  ap- 
pears from  those  notions,  which,  in  every  age 
and  countiy  have  prevailed,  concerning  a  future 
state. 

435.  But  of  the  soul's  immateriality  there  is 
other  evidence.  When  two  things  have  some 
essential  qualities  in  common,  we  refer  them  to 
one  class,  or,  at  least,  consider  them  as  somewhat 

C  2 


30  ELEMENTS  OP  App 

similar  in  their  nature.  But  when  two  things  are 
found  ID  have  not  one  quality  in  common,  we 
must  consider  them  as  totally  unlike  and  differ- 
ent. If,  therefore,  any  piece  of  matter  (or  body) 
appear  to  have  qualities  v/hich  we  know,  for  cer- 
tain do  not  belong  to  matter,  we  conclude,  that 
to  this  piece  of  matter  there  is  joined  something 
which  is  not  matter.  The  human  frame  presents 
to  our  outward  senses  a  certain  quantity  of  mat- 
ter, divided  into  various  parts  of  different  shapes 
and  colours.  Now  the  essential  qualities  of  mat- 
ter we  know,  from  experience,  to  be  gravity,  ex- 
tension, solidity,  inactivity,  and  some  others. 
These  qualities  are  all  in  the  human  body:  but 
in  the  humay  frame  there  are  many  qualities^ 
not  only  different  from  these,  but  altogether  un- 
like them.  We  are  conscious  of  perceiving,  re- 
membering, judging,  imagining,  willing,  and  of 
a  variety  of  passions,  affections,  and  appetites. 
Surely  these  qualities,  which  are  indisputably  in 
the  human  frame,  are  very  different  from,  and 
very  unlike  to  hardness,  softness,  weight,  exten- 
sion, and  the  other  qualities  of  body.  There  is 
therefore  in  "man,  something  which  cannot  be 
called  body,  because  from  body  it  is  in  every 
respect  different. 

436.  Moreover;  the  further  we  carry  our  in- 
quiries into  mutter,  and  its  qualities,  the  more  w^ 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  ai 

iire  convinced,  that  it  is  essentially  inactive,  op 
incapable  of  beginning  motion.  But  in  ti^ie^iiiiman 
frame  we  know,  for  certain,  that  there  is  some- 
thing essentially  active,  and  capable  of  beginning 
motion  in  a  thousand  different  ways.  In  the  hu- 
man frame,  therefore,  there  are  two  things  whose 
natures  are  not  only  unlike,  but  opposite:  the 
one  is  body,  which  is  essentially  inactive;  the 
other,  which  is  essentially  active;  shall  we  call  it 
body  too?  Then  body  must  be  something  which 
unites  in  itself  qualities  directly  opposite,  and  de- 
structive of  each  other:  that  must  be  in  it  which 
is  not  in  it;  it  must  at  once  have  a  certain  quality, 
and  not  have  that  quality;  it  must  be  both  active 
and  inactive.  Round  squareness,  white  blackness, 
or  redhot  ice,  are  as  natural,  and  may  be  as  easily 
conceived  by  the  mind,  as  that  one  and  the  same 
thing  should  be,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  capa- 
ble of  beginning  motion,  and  incapable  of  begin- 
ning motion.  The  hunricai  frame  is  partly  ma- 
terial. It  follows,  therefore,  from  what  has  been 
said,  that  the  human  frame  must  also  be  in  part 
immaterial^  spiritual,  or  not  corporeal.  That  part 
of  it  which  is  material  we  call  our  bodu;  and  that 
part  of  it  which  has  been  proved  to  be  immate- 
rial^*' we  call  our  soul^  spirit,  or  mind. 

*  Till  of  late  there  was  no  ambigaity  in  this  epithet,  as 
here  applied.  But  since  oiiv  hmg-nag-e  began  to  decline. 


.>2  ELEMENTS  OP  App 

437.  Many  controversies  have  been  raised  about 
the  origin  of  the  soul,  and  the  time  when  it  is 
united  with  the  body.  The  common  opinion 
seems  to  be  the  most  probable;  namely,  that  the 
soul  is  created  and  united  with  the  body  when  the 
body  is  prepared  for  its  reception.  At  what  time, 
or  in  what  manner,  this  union  may  take  place,  it 
is  impossible  for  us  to  determine,  and  therefore 
vain  to  inquire.  Let  us  not  suppose  it  derogatory 
from  the  liappiness  or  perfection  of  the  Deity,  to 
be  always  employed  (if  we  may  so  speak)  in 
creation.  To  Omnipotence  it  must  be  as  easy,  and 
as  glorious,  to  create,  as  not  to  create.  The  best 
philosophers  have  thought,  that  his  continual  en- 
ergy is  necessary  to  produce  gravitation,  and 
other  appearances  iu  the  material  world.  That 
the  divine  providence?  extends  to  the  minutest 
parts  of  creation,  lu  .>  I  -•  '^eln-ved  by  wise  men 
in  liil  ages;  is  confirmee  b)  revelation;  and  is 
agretable  to  right  reason.  For  as  he  is  every 
where  present,  and  of  infinite  power,  it  is  im- 
possible that  any  thing  should  happen  without 
his  permission. 

438.  When  we  consider  man's  helplesf  condi- 
tion at  his  coming  into  this  world;  how  ignorant 

imniateria/  huH  htcn  lircntiously  used  to  sigrjify  unim- 
portant. 'I'iu'  true  Eiifi^lisli  sense  of  it  is,  incorporeal^  c/is 
iinctfroiri  tnaitcr. 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  33 

he  is,  and  how  unfit  for  action;  that  all  he  ever 
acquires  in  knowledge  is  by  experience  and  me- 
mory; that  we  have  no  remembrance  of  any  thing- 
previous  to  the  present  state;  and  that  both  re- 
velation, and  the  conscience  of  mankind,  declare 
the  punishment  which  the  wicked  fear,  and  the 
reward  which  the  good  hope  for,  hereafter,  to  be 
the  consequence  of  their  behaviour  in  this  life: 
when,  I  say,  we  lay  all  these  things  together,  we 
must  be  satisfied  that  the  present  is  our  first 
state  of  being.  But  it  is  said,  that  in  this  world  we 
sometimes  suffer  evil  which  we  do  not  deserve; 
that  the  vicious  triumph,  while  the  virtuous  are 
unsuccessful;  that  the  infant  child  may  be  liable 
to  want  or  disease,  from  the  profusion  or  de- 
bauchery of  £he  parent,  and  the  harmless  villager 
to  ruin,  from  th  "imes  of  bis  s^  v^reign:  and 
thg^,  therefore,  ive  rni  .,  yu  \  former  state,  have 
incurred  guilt,  of  whlc*.  ■  ;,se,  and  the  like  evils, 
are  the  punishment. 

439.  This  leads  to  an  important,  and,  as  many 
think,  a  difficult  subject,  the  ori^n  of  evil;  on 
which  I  shall  make  some  remarks,  after  I  have 
offei'ed  an  observation  or  two  upon  the  opinion 
that  introduced  it.  First,  it  may  be  observed,  that 
the  unequal  distribution  of  good  and  evil  in  this 
life,  naturally  turns  our  thoughts,  not  to  a  former, 
but  to  a  future  state  of  being;  and  does,  in  fact, 
as  we  shall  see  by  and  by,  afford  a  proof  of  a 
future  state.  Secondly:  of  virtues  performed,  or 


J4  ELEMENTS  OF  App 

crimes  committed,  in  a  former  state,  we  have  no 
remembrance,  consciousness,  or  belief:  and  to 
punish  us  for  crimes  which  we  cannot  conceive 
that  we  ever  committed,  and  of  which  we  know 
nothing,  is  inconsistent  with  divine  justice.  And, 
thirdly,  if  we  sinned,  or  suffered,  in  a  former 
state,  the  origin  of  that  sin,  or  suffering,  must 
be  as  hard  to  be  accounted  for,  as  the  origin  of 
present  evil. 

440.  Evil  is  of  two  sorts;  physical^  as  pain, 
poverty,  death;  and  morale  or  vice.  1.  Our  being 
subject  to  physical  evil  puts  it  in  our  power  to  ex- 
ercise patience,  fortitude,  resignation  to  the  divine 
will,  trust  in  providence,  compassion,  benevo- 
lence, industry,  temperance,  humility,  and  the 
fear  of  God.  If  there  were  no  physical  evil,  there 
would  hardly  be  an  opportunity  of  exercising 
these  virtues;  in  which  case  our  present  state 
could  not  be,  what  both  reason  and  scripture 
declare  it  to  be,  a  state  of  probation.  Besides,  our 
present  sufferings  we  may,  if  we  please,  con- 
vert into  blessings;  which  we  shall  do,  if  we 
take  occasion  from  them  to  cultivate  the  virtues 
above  mentioned:  for  thus  they  will  prove  means 
of  promoting  our  eternal  happiness.  The  exist- 
ence, therefore,  of  physical  evil,  being  necessary 
to  train  us  up  in  virtue,  and,  consequently,  to 
prepare  us  for  future  felicity,  is  a  proof  of  the 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  35 

goodness  of  God,  instead  of  bein^  an  objection 
to  it. 

441.  2.  Without  virtue,  such  a  creature  as  ma;i 
could  not  be  happy.  In  forming  an  idea  of  a 
happy  state,  we  must  always  suppose  it  to  be  a 
state  of  virtue;  the  natural  tendency  of  virtue 
being,  to  produce  happiness;  as  vice  invariably 
leads  to  misery.  Now,  man  could  not  be  capable 
of  virtue,  nor,  consequently,  of  happiness,  if  he 
were  not  free,  that  is,  if  he  had  it  not  in  his 
power  to  do  either  good  or  evil.  And  if  he  have 
this  in  his  power,  he  must  be  liable  to  vice. 
Vice,  therefore,  or  moral  evil,  is  the  effect  of 
that  law  of  divine  providence,  whereby  man  is 
made  capable  of  virtue  and  happiness.  As  the 
possibility  of  falling  into  errour,  and  mistaking 
falsehood  for  truth,  is  necessary  to  the  improve- 
ment of  our  rational  powers,  so  the  existence  of 
evil,  as  well  as  of  good,  is  necessary,  at  least  in 
this  life,  to  the  improvement  of  our  moral 
nature.  And  upon  the  improvement  of  our  moral 
nature  our  future  happiness  must  depend. 

442.  Supposing  the  present  life  to  be  prepara- 
tory to  a  future  and  eternal  state,  the  evils  we 
are  now  exposed  to  must,  to  a  good  man,  appear 
inconsiderable.  What  are  a  few  years  of  sorrow  to 
an  eternity  of  happiness?  Not  so  much  as  a  head- 
ach  of  an  hour  is  to  a  thousand  years  of  good 


J6  ELEMENTS  OF  App. 

liealth.  And  who  would  scruple  to  suffer  pain  for 
several  months,  if  he  could  thus  insure  health 
for  many  years?  But,  in  fact,  the  evils  of  life  are 
not  so  great  as  some  people  represent  them. 
There  is  in  human  nature  a  pliableness,  by  which 
it  can  adapt  itself  to  almost  any  circumstances: 
and  contentment,  and  resignation  to  the  divine 
will,  which  are  virtues  in  every  person's  power, 
are  sufficient  to  render  all  the  evils  of  life  toler- 
able. And  if  to  these  virtues  there  be  added  a 
well  grounded  hope  of  future  felicity,  which  is 
also  in  the  power  of  every  person  who  is  willing 
to  be  good,  our  present  afflictions  may  become 
not  only  tolerable,  but  light.  The  wicked,  indeed, 
must  be  unhappy,  both  now  and  hereafter:  but 
they  will  not  suffer  more  than  they  deserve;  they 
will  be  punished  according  to  their  works.  And 
so  far  is  their  suffering  from  being  an  objection 
to  the  divine  character,  that  it  would  be  a  very 
strong  objection  if  they  were  not  to  suffer.  For 
he  who  is  perfectly  good  must  be  perfectly  just: 
and  a  being  perfectly  just  must  punish  those  who 
deserve  punishment. 

443.  To  ask,  why  we  are  not  maoe  infallible 
and  perfect,  and  capable  of  happiness  without 
virtue  or  liberty,  is  an  impertinent,  and,  perhaps, 
an  impious  question.  It  may  as  reasonably  be 
Asked,  why  there  are  not  twenty  planets  in  tlie 


App.  MORAL  SCIBKCE.  37 

solar  system?  why  a  stone  was  not  made  a  man 
or  an  angel?  or,  why  the  Deity  did  not  make  all 
his  creatures  equal  to  himself?  Such  questions 
deserve  no  answer,  but  this;  that  whatever  God 
has  been  pleased  to  do  must  be  right,  whether 
we  can  account  for  it  or  not.  Creatures  who  have 
it  in  their  power  to  be  happy,  and  whose  happi- 
ness will  ever  increase  as  they  improve  in  virtue, 
are  surely  under  the  greatest  obligations  to  be 
thankful  to  that  Providence  which  has  mad^  them 
what  they  are. 

Of  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul. 

444.  It  is  unnecessary  to  prove  to  a  christian, 
that  his  soul  will  never  die;  because  he  believes 
that  life  and  immortality  have  been  l)rought  to 
light  by  the  gospel.  But,  though  not  necessary, 
it  may  be  useful,  to  lay  before  him  those  argu- 
ments, whereby  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
might  be  made  to  appear,  even  to  those  who 
never  heard  of  revelation,  probable  in  the  highest 
degree.  Whether  the  human  soul  shall  die  with 
the  body,  or  survive  death  and  live  for  ever,  is 
an  inquiry  which  may  be  said  to  comprehend  the 
three  following  questions.  1.  Does  the  light  of 
nature,  unaided  by  revelation,  afford  any  reason 
to  think,  that  the  soul  of  man  may  /lossibly  sur- 
vive the  body?  2.  Does  the  light  of  nature  afford 

Vol.  VIII.  '^  D 


38  ELEMENTS  OF  App. 

any  reason  to  believe,  that  the  soul  ivill  actually 
survive  the  body?  3.  If  it  do,  what  may  be  rea- 
sonably conjectured  concerning  a  future  state? 


SECTION  1 

445.  Does  the  light  of  nature,  unaided  by  re- 
velation, afford  any  reason  to  think,  that  the  hu- 
man soul  may  possibly  survive  the  body?  First, 
death  destroys  the  body  by  disuniting  its  parts,  or 
preparing  them  for  being  disunited:  and  we  have 
no  reason  to  think  that  death  can  destroy  in  any 
other  way,  as  we  have  never  seen  any  thing  die, 
which  did  not  consist  of  parts.  But  the  soul  con- 
sists not  of  parts;  having  been  proved  to  be  in- 
corporeal. Therefore,  from  the  nature  of  death 
and  of  the  soul,  we  have  no  evidence  that  death 
can  destroy  the  soul.  Consequently,  the  soul  may 
fiossidly,  and  for  any  thing  we  know  to  the  con- 
trary, survive  the  body. 

446.  Secondly,  the  soul  is  a  substance  of  one 
kind,  and  the  body  of  another;  they  arc  united; 
and  death  dissolves  the  union.  We  may  conceive 
them  to  exist  after  this  union  is  dissolved;  for  we 
sec  that  the  body  does  exist  for  some  time  after; 
and  may,  by  human  art,  be  made  to  exist  for  a 
long  time.  And  as  most  men  have,  in  all  ages* 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  39 

entertained  some  notion  of  a  future  state,  it  must 
be  agreeable  to  the  laws  of  the  human  under- 
standing to  believe,  that  the  soul  7nai/  live  when 
separated  from  the  body.  Now  the  dissolution  of 
the  union  of  two  distinct  substances,  each  of 
whicli  is  conceived  to  be  capable  of  existing  se- 
parate, can  no  more  be  supposed  necessarily  to 
imply  the  destruction  of  both  the  united  sub- 
stances, than  the  dissolution  of  the  marriage 
union  by  death,  can  be  supposed  to  imply,  of  ne- 
cessity, the  destruction  of  both  husband  and  wife. 
Therefore  the  union  of  the  soul  and  body  is  not 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  the  soul  after  death. 
Consequently,  the  soul  may  possibly  survive  the 
body. 

447.  Thirdly,  naturalists  observe,  that  the  par- 
ticles whereof  our  bodies  consist  are  conthiualiy 
changing;  some  going  off,  and  others  coming  in 
their  room:  so  that  in  a  few  years  a  human  body 
becomes,  not  indeed  different  in  appearance,  but 
wholly  different  in  substance.  But  the  soul  con- 
tinues always  the  same.  Therefore,  even  in  this 
life,  the  soul  survives,  or  may  survive,  several 
dissolutions  of  the  body.  And  if  so,  it  may  fiossi- 
bly  survive  that  other  dissolution  which  happens 
at  death.  It  is  true,  these  dissolutions  are  gradual 
and  imperceptible;  whereas  that  is  violent  and 
sudden.  But  if  the  union  of  the  soul  and  body  be 


40  ELEMENTS  OF  Ai>i>. 

necessary  to  the  existence  of  the  soul,  the  disso- 
lution of  this  union,  whether  sudden  or  gradual, 
whether  violent  or  imperceptible,  must  destroy 
the  soul.  But  the  soul  survives  the  gradual  disso- 
lution. Therefore,  for  any  thing  we  know  to  the 
contrary,  it  possibly  maij^  and  probably  will,  sur- 
vive that  which  is  instantaneous. 

448.  Some  object,  that  it  is  only  additional 
matter  joined  to  our  original  body,  which  is  gra-s 
dually  dissolved  by  the  attrition  of  the  parts; 
■whereas  death  dissolves  the  original  body  itself. 
Though  this  were  granted,  it  must,  at  any  rate, 
be  allowed,  that  the  soul  has  as  much  command 
over  this  additional  matter  as  over  the  original 
body.  For  a  fullgrown  man  has,  at  least,  as  much 
command  of  his  limbs,  as  an  infant  has  of  his; 
and  yet,  in  the  limbs  of  the  former  there  must 
be  a  great  deal  of  additional  matter,  which  is  not 
in  the  limbs  of  the  latter.  And  the  soul  and  body 
of  a  fullgroAvn  man  do  mutually  affect  each  other, 
as  much,  at  least,  as  the  soul  and  body  of  an 
infant.  Conse(|uently,  the  union  between  our  soul 
and  this  supposed  additional  matter,  is  as  strict 
and  intimate  as  that  between  the  soul  and  its 
supposed  original  body.  But,  we  find,  that  the 
former  iiiiion  nvy  be  dissolved  without  injury  to 
the  soul:  therefore,  the  union  of  the  soul,  with 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  41 

its  supposed  original  body,  viay  also  be  dissolved, 
without  endangering  the  soul's  existence. 

449.  Further:  admitting  the  same  doctrine  of 
an  original  body,  we  must,  however,  observe,  that 
living  men  may  lose  several  of  their  limbs  by 
amputation.  Those  limbs  must  contain  parts  of 
this  original  body,  if  there  be  any  such  thing. 
There  is,  then,  a  dissolution  of  the  union  between 
the  soul  and  part  of  the  original  body;  and  a  vio- 
lent one  too;  wliich,  howe>er,  affects  not  the  ex- 
istence of  the  soul:  and,  therefore,  for  any  thing 
that  appears  to  the  contrary,  the  soul  may  possi- 
bly survive  the  total  dissolution  at  death. 

450.  But  it  is  now  time  to  reject  this  unintel- 
ligible doctrine  of  an  original  body.  From  a  small 
beginning,  man  advances  gradually  to  his  full 
stature.  At  what  period  of  his  growtii  is  it,  that 
the  original  body  is  completed,  and  the  accession 
of  additional  matter  commences?  What  is  the 
original  body?  Is  it  the  body  of  an  embryo,  of 
an  infant,  or  of  a  man?  Does  the  additional  mat- 
ter begin  to  adhere  before  the  birth,  or  aftfer  it; 
in  infancy,  in  childhood,  in  youth,  or  at  maturity? 
These  questions  cannot  be  answered;  and,  there- 
fore, we  cannot  admit  the  notion  of  an  oric;;inal 
body,  as  distinguishable  from  the  ackiitional  mat- 
le-v  whri  ebv  our  btilk  is  increased.  Consequently, 

D  2 


42  ELEMENTS  OF  App. 

the  third  argument  remains  in  lull  force;  and  is 
not  weakened  by  this  objection. 

451.  Fourthly,  if  the  soul  perish  at  death,  it 
must  be  by  annihilation;  for  death  destroys  no- 
thing, so  far  as  we  know,  but  what  consists  of 
parts.  Now  we  have  no  evidence  of  annihilation 
taking  place  in  any  part  of  the  universe.  Our 
bodies,  though  resolved  into  dust,  are  not  anni- 
hilated; not  a  particle  of  matter  has  perished 
since  the  creation,  so  far  as  we  know.  The  de- 
struction of  old,  and  the  growth  of  new,  bodies, 
imply  no  creation  of  new  matter,  nor  annihilation 
of  the  old,  but  only  a  new  arrangement  of  the 
elementary  parts.  What  reason  then  can  we  have 
to  think,  that  our  better  part,  our  soul,  will  be 
annihilated  at  death,  when  even  our  bodies  are 
not  then  annihilated;  and  when  we  have  no  evi- 
dence of  such  a  thing  as  annihilation  ever  taking 
place?  Such  an  opinion  would  be  a  mere  hypo- 
thesis, unsupported  by,  nay,  contrary  to,  expe- 
rience; and,  tlierefore,  cannot  be  reasonable.  We 
have,  then,  from  reason  and  the  light  of  nature, 
•iifficicnt  evidence,  that  the  soul  may  posnibly 
survive  the  body,  and,  consequently,  be  immor- 
tal; there  being  no  event  before  us,  so  far  as  we 
know,  except  death,  which  would  seem  likely  to 
endanger  its  existence. 


App  MORAL  SCIENCE. 


SECTION  II. 


452.  Does  the  light  of  nature  afford  any  reason 
to  believe,  that  the  soul  ivill  actually  survive  the 
body?  The  following  are  reasons  for  this  belief. 
First:  it  is  natural  for  us  to  think,  that  the  course 
of  things,  whereof  we  have  had,  and  now  have, 
experience  will  continue,  unless  we  have  positive 
reason  to  believe  that  it  will  be  altered.  This  is 
the  ground  of  many  of  those  opinions,  which  we 
account  quite  certain.  That,  to-morrow,  the  sun 
will  rise,  and  the  sea  ebb  and  flow;  that  night 
will  follow  day,  and  spring  succeed  to  winter; 
and,  that  all  men  will  die,  are  opinions  amount- 
ing to  certainty:  and  yet  we  cannot  account  for 
them  otherwise  than  by.  saying,  that  such  has 
been  the  course  of  nature  hitherto,  and  that  we 
have  no  reason  to  think  it  will  be  altered.  When 
judgments  of  this  kind  admit  of  no  doubt,  as  in 
the  examples  given,  our  conviction  is  called  mo- 
ral certainty.  I  am  morally  certain^  that  the  sun 
will  rise  to-morrow,  and  set  to-day,  and  that  all 
men  will  die,  See.  The  instances  of  past  expe- 
rience, on  which  these  judgments  are  founded, 
are  innumerable;  and  there  is  no  mixture  of 
such  contradictory  instances,  as  might  lead  us  to 
expect  a  contrary  event. 


44  ELEMENTS  OF  App 

453.  But  it  often  happens,  that  the  experiences 
on  which  we  ground  our  opinions  of  this  sort,  are 
but  few  in  number;  and  sometimess  too  they  are 
mixed  with  contradictory  experiences.  In  this 
case,  we  dcr  not  consider  the  future  event  as 
morally  certain;  but  only  as  more  or  less  proba- 
ble, or  likely,  according  to  the  greater  or  less 
surplus  of  the  favourable  instances.  If,  for  exam- 
ple, a  medicine  has  cured  in  five  cases,  and  never 
failed  in  one,  we  should  think  its  future  success 
probable,  but  not  morally  certain;  still  more  pro- 
bable, if  it  has  cured  in  twenty  cases;  and  more 
still,  if  in  a  hundred,  without  failing  in  one.  If  a 
medicine  has  cured  in  ten  cases,  and  failed  in 
ten,  our  mind,  in  regard  to  its  future  success, 
would  be  in  a  state  of  doubt;  that  is,  we  should 
think  it  as  probable  ?  that  it  would  fail  on  a  future 
trial,  as  that  it  would  succeed.  If  it  had  cured 
ten  times,  and  failed  only  six,  we  should  think  ii 
more  probable  that  it  would  cure  on  a  future 
trial,  than  that  it  would  fail;  and  still  more  pro- 
bal)lc,  if  it  had  cured  ten  times  and  failed  only 
once. 

454.  Those  remarks,  which  properly  belong 
to  logick,  will  help  to  explain  in  what  manner 
our  judgments  are  regulated,  in  regard  to  the 
l>robability  or  moral  certainty  of  future  events. 
To  make  us  morallv  certain  of  a  future  c vein 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  45 

requires,  we  cannot  tell  how  many,  but  requires 
a  veiy  great  number  of  favourable  experiences, 
without  any  mixture  of  unfavourable  ones.  It  is 
true,  we  have  heard  of  two  men,  Enoch  and 
Elijah,  who  did  not  die,  yet  we  expect  our  own 
death  with  absolute  certainly.  But  these  instances 
are  confessedly  miraculous;  and,  besides,  are  so 
very  few,  compared  with  the  infinite  number  of 
instances  on  the  other  side,  that  they  make  no 
alteration  in  our  judgment. 

455.  To  apply  all  this  to  the  present  subject. 
Our  bodies  just  now  exist,  but  we  foresee  a  cause 
that  will  destroy  them,  namely,  death;  and,  there- 
fore, we  believe  that  they  will  not  exist  long.  Our 
souls  just  now  exist;  but  we  do  not  foresee  any 
positive  cause  that  will  destroy  them:  it  having 
been  proved,  that  they  may  survive  the  body;  and 
there  being  no  cause,  so  far  as  we  know,  that  will 
then,  or  at  any  other  time,  destroy  them.  We 
must,  therefore,  admit,  that  our  souls  v)ill  prQ- 
bably  survive  the  body.  It  is  natural  for  us  to 
believe  this:  the  rules  of  evidence,  which  deter- 
mine our  belief  in  similar  cases,  determine  us  to 
this  belief.  But  there  are  other  arguments,  which 
prove  the  same  thing,  by  evidence,  still  higher. 

456.  Secondly,  we  are  conscious  of  being,  in 
many  respects,  capable  of  endless  improvenieut. 
The  more  knowledge  we  acquire,  the  greater  is 


46  ELEMENTS  OF  App. 

our  capacity  and  our  relish  for  further  acquisi- 
tions. It  is  not  so  with  the  brutes;  for  such  of 
them  as  are  at  all  docile,  soon  reach  th6  highest 
improvement  whereof  they  are  capable.  Disease 
may  put  a  stop  to  our  improvement  as  well  as 
curiosity,  for  a  time;  but  when  it  goes  off,  we 
arc  curious  and  improvable  as  before.  Dotage  is 
a  disease;  from  which,  if  we  could  recover,  there 
is  reason  to  think,  that  we  should  be  as  rational 
and  ingenious  as  ever;  for  there  have  been  in- 
stances of  recovery  from  dotage;  and  of  persons, 
who,  at  the  close  of  life,  have  regained  the  full 
use  of  those  faculties,  of  which  they  had  been, 
for  several  years,  deprived.  And  it  often  happens 
that  old  people  retain  all  their  mental  powers, 
and  their  capacity  of  improvement,  to  the  last. 
Now  God,  being  perfect  in  wisdom,  cannot  be 
supposed  to  bestow,  upon  his  creatures  useless  or 
superfluous  faculties.  But  this  capacity  of  end- 
less improvement  is  superfluous,  if  man  be  to 
perish  finally  at  death;  for  much  more  limited 
powers  would  have  suited  all  the  purposes  of  a 
creature,  whose  duration  comprehends  no  more 
than  ninety  or  a  hundred  years.  It  is,  therefore, 
unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  soul  will  perish 
with  the  body. 

457.  Thirdly,  the  dignity  of  the  human  soul, 
compared  with  llic  vital  i^rinciple  of  brutes,  leads* 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  47 

to  the  same  conclusion.  Brutes  have  some  facul- 
ties in  common  with  us;  but  they  are  guided  by 
instinct  chiefly,  and  incapable  of  science.  Man's 
arts,  and  his  knowledge,  may  be  said  to  be,  in 
one  sense,  of  his  own  acquisition;  for,  independ- 
ently on  experience  and  information,  he  can  do 
little,  and  knows  nothing.  But  then,  he  is  im- 
provable, as  was  just  now  observed,  to  an  extent 
to  which  he  can  set  no  bounds.  He  is,  moreover, 
capable  of  science;  that  is,  of  discovering  the  law  s 
of  nature,  comparing  them  together,  and  applying 
the  knowledge  of  them  to  the  regulation  of  his 
conduct,  and  to  the  enlargement  of  his  power. 
He  has  a  sense  of  truth  and  falsehood,  virtue  and 
vice,  beauty  and  deformity.  He  is  impressed  witli 
a  belief  that  he  is  accountable  for  his  conduct. 
He  is  endowed  with  the  capacity  of  knowing, 
obeying,  and  adoring  his  Creator;  on  whom,  he  is 
sensible,  that  he  and  all  things  depend,  and  to 
whom  he  naturally  looks  up  for  protection  and 
comfort;  and  he  expects  that  his  being  will  not 
end  with  this  life,  but  be  prolonged  through 
eternity.  These  are  principles  and  sentiments, 
whereof  the  most  sagacious  biaites  are  not,  in 
any  degree,  susceptible. 

458.  The  instincts,  appetites,  and  faculties, 
which  we  have  in  common  with  them,  are  ne- 
cessary to  our  existence  and  wcUbcing  as  ani- 


/ 
/ 


48  ELE1M.ENTS  OF  App, 

mals;  but,  for  what  purpose  are  we  endowed  with 
nion;!  and  religious  principles?  These  are  not 
necessary  to  the  support  of  our  animal  nature; 
these  are  useless,  or,  at  least,  fallacious,  if  there 
be  no  future  state.  To  those  who  attend  to  the 
economy  and  analogies  of  nature,  and  observe 
how  nicely  every  thing  is  fitted  to  its  end,  it  must 
appear  incredible,  that  man  should  have  the 
same  final  destiny  with  the  brutes;  considering 
that  his  mental  constitution  is  so  very  different, 
that  his  capacities  are  transcendently  superiour; 
and  that  his  highest  happiness  and  misery  arise 
from  circumstances  whereof  the  brutes  feel 
nothing,  and  know  nothing,  namely,  from  his 
virtue  and  vice,  and  from  his  hope  of  the  ap- 
probation, and  fear  of  the  disapprobation  of  his 
Creator. 

459.  Fourthly,  we  are  possessed  of  many  facul- 
ties, which,  in  the  present  lite,  are  never  exerted. 
This  we  know  to  be  the  case  with  those  who  die 
young,  or  uninstructcd,  that  is,  with  the  greatest 
part  of  mankind:  and  we  have  reason  to  think, 
that  this  is  the  case,  in  some  measure,  with  all; 
for  wc  seldom  prosecute  any  new  study,  without 
finding  in  ourselves  powers  which  wc  were  not 
conscious  r>f  before;  and  no  man,  after  the  great- 
est attainments  in  art  and  science,  and  at  the  end 
of  the  longest  life,  could  s  y,  that  he  had  exer- 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  49 

cised  all  the  powers,  or  knew  the  full  extent  of 
his  own  capacity.  In  most  men,  therefore,  we 
are  sure  that  there  are,  and  in  all  men  we  have 
reason  to  think  that  there  are,  faculties,  which 
are  not  exerted  in  this  life;  and  which,  by  conse- 
quence, must  be  useless  if  there  is  no  other.  But 
in  the  works  of  creation  there  is  nothing  useless: 
therefore,  the  souls  of  men  will  exist  in  a  future 
state. 

460.  Fifthly,  ail  men  have  a  natural  desire  and 
expectation  of  immortality.  The  thought  of  being 
reduced  into  nothing  is  shocking  to  a  rational 
soul.  These  hopes  and  desires  are  not  the  effect 
of  education;  for,  with  a  very  few  exceptions, 
they  are  found  in  all  ages  and  countries.  They 
arise  not  from  selfconceit,  or  pride,  or  any  ex- 
travagant passion;  for  the  conscience  of  mankind 
approves  them  as  innocent,  laudable,  and  right: 
and  they  prevail  most  in  those  who  are  most  re- 
markable for  virtue,  that  is,  for  the  moderation 
and  right  government  of  their  passions  and  de- 
sires. They  must,  therefore,  take  their  rise  from 
something  in  the  original  frame  of  human  na- 
ture: and,  if  so,  their  author  is  God  himself.  But 
is  it  to  be  supposed,  that  he,  who  is  infinitely 
wise  and  good,  should  have  inspired  his  creatures 
with  hopes  and  wishes,  that  had  nothing  in  na- 
ture to  gratify  them?  Is  it  to  be  supposed,  that 

Vol.  VIII.  K 


30  ELEMENTS  OF  Aj.p. 

he  shoiiid  disappoint  his  creatures,  and  frustrate 
those  very  desires  which  he  has  himself  im- 
planted? The  expectation  of  immortality  is  one 
of  those  things  that  distinguish  man  from  all 
other  animals.  And  what  an  elevating  idea  does 
it  give  us  of  the  dignity  of  our  nature! 

461.  Sixthly,  it  is  remarkable,  that  the  wisest 
men  in  all  ages,  and  the  greatest  part  of  mankind 
in  all  nations,  have  believed  that  the  soul  will  sur- 
vive the  body;  how  much  soever  some  of  them 
may  have  disfigured  this  belief  by  vain  and  in- 
credible fictions.  Now  here  is  a  singular  fact,  that 
deserves  our  attention.  Whence  could  the  uni- 
versal belief  of  the  soul's  immortality  arise?  It  is 
true,  that  all  men  have  believed  that  the  sun  and 
starry  heavens  revolve  about  the  earth:  but  this 
opinion  is  easily  accounted  for;  being  warranted 
by  what  seems  to  be  the  evidence  of  sense.  It  is 
also  true,  that  most  nations  have,  at  one  time  or 
other,  acknowledged  a  plurality  of  gods:  but  this 
is  a  corruption  of  an  original  true  opinion;  for  it 
is  highly  probable,  nay,  it  appears  from  history, 
that  bcUcving  in  one  God  was  the  more  ancient 
opinion,  and  that  polytheism  succeeded  to  it,  and 
was  a  corruption  of  it.  Now  it  is  not  at  all  sur- 
prising, that  when  a  true  opinion  is  introduced 
among  mankind,  i»  should,  in  ignorant  ages,  be 
,„.,.,-,.,.f,wi    i«.-   ;v''iitional   and    ia!)ulous   circum- 


Ipp.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  61 

stances.  But  the  immortality  of  the  soul  is  not  a 
corruption  of  an  original  true  opinion;  nor  does 
it  derive  any  support  from  the  evidence  of  sense. 
It  is  itself  an  original  opinion,  and  the  testimony 
of  sense  seems  rather  to  declare  against  it. 
Whence,  then,  could  it  arise? 

462.  Not  from  the  artifice  of  politicians,  in 
order  to  keep  the  world  in  awe,  as  some  have 
vainly  pretended:  for  there  never  was  a  time 
when  all  politicians  were  wise,  and  the  rest  of 
mankind  fools:  there  never  was  a  time  when  all 
the  politicians  on  earth  were  of  the  same  opinion, 
and  concurred  in  carrying  on  the  same  design: 
there  never  was  a  time  when  all  politicians 
thought  it  their  interest  to  promote  opinions  so 
essential  to  human  happiness,  and  so  favourable 
to  virtue,  as  this  of  immortality:  and,  in  ancient 
times,  the  intercourse  between  nations  was  not 
so  open  as  to  permit  the  universal  circulation  ot 
this  opinion,  if  it  had  been  artificial.  To  which,  I 
may  add,  that  mankind  have  never  yet  adopted  any 
opinion  universally,  merely  upon  the  authority  of 
cither  politicians  or  philosophers.  This  opinion, 
therefore,  must  have  arisen  from  a  natural  sug- 
gestion of  the  human  un<lerstanding,  or  from  a 
divine  revelation  communicated  to  our  first  pa- 
rents, and  by  them  transmitted  to  their  posterity. 


52  ELEMENTS  OF  App. 

In  either  case,  this  opinion  will  be  allowed  to  be 
of  the  most  respectable  authority;  and  it  is  highly 
absurd  and  dangerous  to  reject  it,  or  call  it  in 
question.  Another  argument  is  founded  upon  the 
unetjual  distrilnition  of  good  and  evil  in  the  pre- 
sent life.  This  will  be  considered  by  and  by. 


.SECTION  IIT. 

463.  What  may  be  reasonably  conjectured 
concerning  a  future  state?  First,  from  the  wisdom 
and  goodness  of  God,  we  may  reasonably  infer, 
that  it  will  be  governed,  like  the  present,  by 
established  laws.  What  those  may  be,  it  is  not 
for  us  to  determine;  but  we  may  rest  assured, 
that  they  will  be  wise  and  good.  Secondly,  from 
the  different  circumstances  wherein  we  shall  then 
be  placed,  and  from  the  different  beings  with 
whom  we  shall  then  probably  have  intercourse, 
it  may  be  inferred,  that  in  a  future  state  we  shall 
be  endowed  with  many  new  faculties,  or,  at  least, 
that  many  faculties,  now  hidden  and  unknown, 
will  then  exert  tlicmsclves..In  our  progress  from 
infancy  to  mature  age,  bur  powers  are  continually 
improving,  and  new  ones  often  appear  and  are 
exerted.    Wc   may   thercfo?'e   expect,   that  the 


App.  .MOiiAL  SCIENCE.  So 

same  prog-ression  will  be  continued  hereafter.  It 
is  true,  we  cannot  now  form  any  idea  of  faculties 
different  from  thoseof  which  we  have  experience: 
but  this  arguesnothingagainst  thepresent  conjec- 
ture. A  man  born  blind  has  no  notion  of  seeing, 
nor  has  an  ignorant  man  any  idea  of  those  opera- 
tions of  the  human  mind  whereby  we  calculate 
eclipses,  and  ascertain  the  periods  of  the  planets: 
yet  it  would  be  absurd,  in  those  who  want  these 
powers,  to  deny  their  reality  or  possibility. 

464.  Thirdly,  as  the  future  state  will  be  a  state 
of  happiness  to  the  good,  we  may  reasonably  con- 
jecture,  that  it  will  be  a  state  of  society:  for  we 
cannot  suppose  it  possible,  for  such  creatures  as 
we  are,  to  be  happy  in  perfect  solitude.  And  if 
we  shall  then  have  any  remembrance  of  present 
things,  which  is  highly  probable,  there  is  reason 
to  hope,  and  good  men  have,  in  all  ages,  rejoiced 
in  the  hope,  that  the  virtuous  will  then  know  and 
converse  with  those  friends,  with  whom  they  have 
been  intimately  connected  in  this  world.  This, 

We  cannot  but  think,  will  be  an  addition  to  their 
Iiappiness.  But  painful  remembrances,  of  every 
kind,  will,  probably,  be  obliterated  for  ever. 

465.  Fourthly,  the  future  state  will  be  a  state 
of  retribution;  that  is,  of  reward  to  the  good,  and 
of  punishment  to  tlie  wicked.  This  is  intimated 

K2 


54  ELEMENTS  OF  App. 

by  many  considerations;  which  prove,  not  only 
that  a  future  state,  if  there  be  one,  will  be  a  state 
of  retribution,  but  prove  also,  that  there  will  be  a 
future  state.  Vice  deserves  punishment,  and  vir- 
tue reward:*  this  is  clear  from  the  dictates  of 
reason  and  conscience.  In  the  present  life,  how- 
ever, the  wicked  sometimes  meet  with  less 
punishment  than  they  deserve,  while  the  vir- 
tuous are  often  distressed  and  disappointed.  But, 
under  the  government  of  Him,  who  is  infinitely 
good  and  just,  who  cannot  be  mistaken,  and 
whose  purposes  it  is  impossible  to  frustrate,  this 
will  not  finally  be  the  case;  and  every  man  must, 
at  last,  receive  according  to  his  works. 

466.  Fuither:  good  men  have  a  natural  hope, 
and  wicked  men  a  natural  fear,  in  consequence 
of  what  they  expect  in  the  life  to  come.  Those 
hopes  and  fears  result  from  the  intimations  of 
conscience,  declaring  the  merits  of  virtue,  and 
the  demerits  of  vice:  and,  therefore,  as  it  is  im- 
possible for  us  to  believe,  that  the  dictates  of 
conscience,  our  supreme  faculty,  are  delusive  or 
irrational,  we  must  believe,  that  there  is  future 
evil  to  be  feared  by  the  wicked,  and  future  good 
to  be  expected  by  the  righteous.  Even  in  this 

•  In  what  respects  vh'tnc  is  meritorious,  will  be 
aOer\v:(i-ds  considcrt-d. 


App  MORAL  SCIENCE,  35 

life  there  are  signs  of  a  retribution  begun;  whence 
we  learn,  that  we  are  subject  to  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  God,  and  that  things  have  a  tendency  to 
retribution.  Certain  virtues,  as  temperance  and 
industry,  are  frequently  their  own  reward,  and 
the  opposite  vices  seldom  fail  to  bring  along  with 
them  their  own  punishment.  Nay,  sometimes, 
even  here,  the  wicked  are  overtaken  with  judg- 
ments of  so  peculiar  a  kind,  that  we  cannot  help 
ascribing  them  to  a  just  providence.  But  the 
retribution  here  begun  is  not  perfect.  Perfect, 
however,  under  the  government  of  a  just  and 
almighty  being,  it  must  be  in  the  end.  And, 
therefore,  there  will  be  a  future  state  of  most 
righteous  retribution. 

467.  Fifthly,  in  a  future  life,  the  virtuous  will 
make  continual  improvements  in  virtue  and 
knowledge,  and,  consequently,  in  happiness. 
This  may  be  inferred,  from  the  progressive  na- 
ture of  the  human  mind,  to  which,  length  of 
time,  properly  employed,  never  fails  to  bring  an 
increase  of  knovvledge  and  virtue  even  in  this 
world;  and,  from  the  nature  of  the  future  state 
itself,  in  which  we  cannot  suppose,  that  any  cross 
accidents  will  ever  interfere  to  prevent  viituc 
from  attaining  happiness,  its  natural  consequence 
and  reward. 


56  ELEMENTS  OF  App. 

468.  Lastly,  in  the  future  state,  virtue  shall 
prevail  over  vice,  and  happiness  over  misery. 
This  must  be  the  final  result  of  things,  under 
the  government  of  a  Being  who  is  infinitely  good, 
powerful,  and  wise.  Even  in  this  life,  virtue  tends 
to  confer  power  as  well  as  happiness:  many  na- 
tions  of  vicious  men  might  be  subdued  by  one 
nation  of  good  men.  There  is  hardly  an  instance 
on  record  of  a  people  losing  their  liberty  while 
they  retained  their  virtue;  but  many  are  the  in- 
stances of  mighty   nations  falling,   when  their 
virtue  was  lost,  an  easy  prey  to  the  enemy.  In 
this  life,  the  natural  tendency  of  virtue  to  confer 
superiority  is  obstructed  in  various  ways.  Here, 
all  virtue  is  imperfect;  the  wicked,  it  is  to  be 
feared,  are  the  most  numerous;  the  virtuous  can- 
not always  know  one  another;  and,  though  they 
could,  many  accidents  may  prevent  their  union. 
But  these  causes  extend  not  their  influence  be- 
yond the  grave;  and,  therefore,  in  a  future  state, 
happiness  and  virtue  must  triumph,  and  vice  and 
miseiy  be  borne  down. 

469.  This  is  a  very  brief  account  indeed,  of  the 
arguments  that  liuman  reason,  unaided  by  reve- 
lation, could  furnisli,  for  the  immortality  of  the 
soul.  All  taken  together  amount  to  such  a  higli 
probability,  as   can   liardly  be   resisted  by   any 


App.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  37 

rational  being.  Yet  we  must  acknowledge,  that, 
unassisted  reason  makes  this  matter  only  in  a 
very  high  degree  probable.  It  is  the  gospel, 
which  makes  it  certain;  and  which,  therefore, 
may  with  truth  be  said  to  have  brought  life 

AND  IMMORTALITY  TO  LIGHT. 


y 


ELEMENTS 


OF 


MORAL  SCIENCE. 
PART  III. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


PART  THIRD. 

MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
INTRODUCTION. 

470.  jVIoRAL  philosophy  treats  of  the  culti- 
vation of  our  active  or  moral  powers.  It  has  been 
defined,  the  science  which  explains  our  duty,  and 
\he  reasons  of  it;  and,  more  briefly  by  Dr.  More, 
^rs  bene  beateque  vivendi.  As  it  would  be  neither 
easy  nor  expedient  to  keep  the  several  divisions 
of  the  abstract  philosophy  entirely  separate,  I 
have  not  scrupled,  in  the  former  part  of  this 
summary,  to  anticipate  some  things  which  pro- 
perly belong  to  this  part,  and  v/hich  it  is  unne- 
cessary to  repeat.  By  the  omission  of  these  here, 
the  extent  of  the  science  now  before  us  will  be 
contracted,  as  well  as  by  this  other  consideration, 
that,  as  the  most  perfect  system  of  duty  is  con- 
tained in  holy  writ,  no  person,  who  has  had  a 
christian  education,  can  be  ignorant  of  morality. 
The  chief  points  of  it,  and  the  more  important 
speculations  connected  with  them,  I  shall  briefly 

Vol.  VIII.  F 


62  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

illustrate,  and  endeavour  to  arrange  in  a  scienti- 
fick  form:  and  this  is  all,  perhaps,  that  can  rea- 
sonably be  expected,  considering  the  shortness 
of  the  time,  and  the  great  number  of  subjects 
that  fall  within  my  province. 

471.  The  word  moral  signifies,  o/",  or  belonging 
fo,  manners.  Manners  are  human  actions,  or, 
rather,  human  habits  acquired  by  action.  But  all 
human  actions  and  habits  are  not  of  that  sort 
which  we  call  moral.  Manual  dexterity,  bodily 
activity,  and  the  exertions  of  memory  and  genius, 
are  not,  in  themselves,  either  moral  or  immoral; 
for  it  is  not  from  circumstances  of  this  kind  that 
we  form  an  estimate  of  the  human  character,  a§ 
dignified  by  the  performance  of  duty,  or  debased 
by  the  neglect  of  it.  An  ingenious  mechanick,  a 
strong  and  active  man,  a  person  of  lively  fancy, 
or  tenacious  memory,  may  be  the  object  of  our 
esteem,  disapprpbation,  or  contempt,  according 
as  he  applies  his  talents  to  a  good,  a  bad,  or  an  in- 
significant purpose.  But  moral  goodness  implies 
a  regard  to  duly,  and  is  always  the  object  of 
esteem  and  approbation. 

472.  The  common  use  of  language  requires, 
that  a  distinction  be  made  between  morals  and 
ynanncrft:  the  former  depend  upon  internal  dispo- 
sitions, the  latter  on  outward  and  visible  accom- 
plishments. A  man's  manners  may  be  pleasing, 


Intr.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  63 

^vhose  morals  are  bad:  such  a  man  shows  what  is 
good  in  him,  and  conceals  what  is  evil.  They  who 
in  their  manners  are  agreeable,  and  who  also 
exert  themselves  in  doing  good,  that  is,  in  pro- 
moting happiness,  are  of  good  morals  as  well  as 
of  good  manners.  And  to  do  good,  or,  at  least, 
to  wish  to  do  good,  and  be  ready  to  do  it  when 
opportunity  offers,  is  in  every  person's  power, 
and  every  person's  duty:  whereas,  to  have  manual 
dexterity,  a  sound  state  of  mind  and  body,  great 
genius,  great  memory,  or  elegant  manners,  is  not 
every  man's  duty,  because  not  in  every  man's 
power.  Those  actions  and  habits,  therefore,  are 
properly  called  moral,  or  immoral,  which  are  in 
the  power  of  the  agent,  and  which  he  knows  to 
have  an  influence,  favourable  or  unfavourable,  on 
human  happiness. 

473.  Some  duties  are  incumbent  on  all  men 
without  exception,  because  tending  to  promote 
good  in  general.  Other  duties  are  incumbent  on 
us  in  consequence  of  our  connection  with  parti- 
cular societies;  because  they  tend  to  promote  the" 
good  of  those  societies.  To  enumerate  all  the 
forms  of  society  with  which  we  may  be  connected, 
is  impossible:  but  there  are  two,  which  may  be 
considered  as  the  most  important,  and  with  which 
every  one  of  us  eillier  is,  or  may  be  connected; 
and  those  are,  a  family,  and  a  state  or  govern- 


64  ELEMENTS  OF,  &c.  Pait  III. 

ment.  Hence  moral  philosophy  may  be  divided 
into  three  parts.  The  first,  which  I  call  ethicks, 
treats  of  the  morality  of  actions,  as  arising  from 
the  disposition  of  the  agent,  and  as  tending  to 
promote  good  in  general.  The  second,  called 
economicks,  regulates  human  conduct,  so  as  to 
make  it  promote  the  good  of  that  family  of  which 
one  may  be  a  member.  The  third,  which  may, 
without  impropriety,  be  termed  politicks,  ex- 
plains the  nature  of  political  or  civil  society,  and 
the  duties  and  rights  of  men  with  respect  to  it. 
A  more  minute,  as  well  as  more  comprehensive 
distribution  of  this  science  might  be  given:  but, 
considering  the  limits  within  which  our  acade- 
mical rules  oblige  me  to  confine  myself,  this  may, 
perhaps,  be  thought  sufficient. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

PART  FIRST. 

OF  ETHICKS. 

474.  Here  we  are  to  consider  human  actions 
as  good  or  bad,  according  to  the  motives,  princi- 
ples, intentions,  or  dispositions,  from  which  they 
proceed;  and,  according  as  they  tend  to  promote 
good  in  general,  or  the  contrary.  In  prosecuting 
this  subject,  I  shall  inquire,  first,  into  the  nature 
and  foundation  of  man's  moral  goodness,  that  is, 
of  human  virtue;  and,  secondly,  into  the  nature 
and  foundation  of  particular  virtues,  or  duties. 
The  former  may  be  called  speculative  ethicks^  and 
the  latter  practical  ethicks.  Observe  here,  that 
the  words  virtue  and  duty  have  often,  but  not 
always,  the  same  signification.  He  is  a  man  of 
virtue  who  does  his  duty;  he  is  a  vicious  man 
who  n^eglects  it:  and  modesty,  humility,  piety, 
benevolence,  may  be  called  either  virtues,  or 
duties.  But,  when  called  virtues^  we  consider 
them  as  performed^  or  acquired;  when  called  du- 
firs,  we  consider  them  as  what  it  is  incumbent  or. 

F2 


66  ELEMENTS  OF,  &c.  Part  UI 

2is  to  perform,  or  acquire.  Accordingly,  we  call 
a  good  man,  not  a  man  of  duty^  but  a  man  of 
virtue;  because  we  mean  a  person  who  has  actu- 
ally done  what  he  ought  to  do,  or  who  has  ac- 
quired those  habits,  or  dispositions,  which  he 
ought  to  acquire:  but  a  regard  to  duty,  and  a  re- 
gard to  virtue,  are  phrases  nearly  synonymous. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  Kature  of  Virtue, 

475.  1  HIS  word,  in  its  most  general  accep- 
tation, denotes  fiower^  or  ability.  As  applied  to 
man,  and  characterised  by  the  epithet  moral  (to 
distinguish  it  from  other  sorts  of  virtue,  which 
will  be  specified  afterwards),  it  signifies  some 
quality,  disposition,  or  habit,  which  fits  a  man 
for  answering  his  end^  that  is,  for  living  as  he 
ought  to  live,  and  l)eing  what  he  ought  to  be; 
or,  more  explicitly,  for  living  as  the  author  of 
his  nature  intended  that  he  should  live,  and  being 
what  the  author  of  his  nature  intended  that  he 
should  be.  But,  can  human  reason  discover  what 
the  author  of  nature  intended  in  making  men 
such  beings  as  they  are?  Yes:  reason  can  discover 
this,  in  the  same  way  in  which  it  discovers  (and 
with  the  same  degree  of  certainty),  that  an  artist, 
in  making  a  clock  such  a  thing  as  we  see  it  is, 
intended  that  it  should  measure  time,  and  an- 
nounce the  hour.  For  what  end  was  man  made, 
is,  therefore,  the  first  inquiry  in  et'nicks.  Till  we. 
know  this,  we  cannot  know  what  is  suitable  tt> 


68  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III 

]us  end,  or  what  is  unsuitable;  that  is,  we  cannot 
I;now  what  is  his  virtue,  or  wliat  is  not  his  virtue. 

476.  Human  nature  is  a  very  complex  ol)ject, 
and,  confessedly,  in  a  state  of  lamentable  degene- 
racy. But  neither  from  its  degeneracy,  nor  from 
its  complexness,  can  any  reasonable  supposition 
arise  of  the  impossibility  of  discovering  its  end. 
I'rom  many  api^earances  in  n  ruinous  building,  it 
might  be  easy  to  see  the  intention  of  the  builder; 
\\  hether  he  meant  it  for  a  church,  or  a  storehouse, 
a  dwelling  for  men,  or  a  shelter  for  cattle.  And  a 
person  moderately  skilled  in  mechanicks  might 
lind  out  the  use  of  a  very  complex  machine,  even 
though  every  part  of  it  were  new  to  him;  which, 
it  cannot  be  pretended,  that  any  part  of  human 
nature  is  to  us.  And  when,  from  the  structure 
and  relations  of  the  parts,  the  end  of  any  system 
is  fairly  investigated,  the  complex  nature  of  that 
system  proves  nothing  against  the  certainty  of 
the  investigation,  but  is  an  argument  for  it. 

477.  Man  was  made  for  two  ends,  or  purposes, 
action  and  knowledge.  This  will  be  readily  ad- 
mitted by  every  person  wlio  has  observed,  that  all 
the  powers  of  our  nature  fit  us  (as  was  formerly 
intimated)  for  action,  for  knowledge,  or  for  both. 
That  of  these  two  ends  action  is  the  nobler,  and 
that,  by  conseriuence,  action  is  inan's  chief  end, 
will  appear,  when  wc  consider,  that  our  happincis- 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  69 

depends  rather  on  what  we  do,  than  on  what  we 
know;  that  extensive  knowledge  falls  to  the  share 
of  but  few,  whereas  action  is  the  business  of  all 
men;  and  that  knowledge  is  valuable  only  as  it 
serves  to  promote  or  assist  action;  ihose  specu- 
lations being  of  no  value,  which  can  be  applied 
to  no  practical  purpose.  Now  we  are  capable  of 
various  sorts  of  action.  The  next  inquiry,  there- 
fore, is,  for  what  sort  of  action  was  man  made? 

478.  We  discover  the  end  for  which  a  system 
is  made,  by  examining  its  fab  rick,  or  constitution. 
In  this  way  one  might  find  out  for  what  end  a 
clock  or  watch  was  made,  though  one  had  never 
seen  or  heard  of  such  a  thing  before.  But  the 
mere  knowledge  of  the  parts,  taken  and  examined 
separately,  would  not  be  enough;  the  wheels  and 
pegs  lying  in  a  heap,  or  detached  from  one  an- 
other, would,  to  a  person  unskilled  in  the  art, 
convey  no  idea  of  a  clock  or  watch,  or  of  the  use 
of  either:  they  must  be  put  together  ayccording  to 
the  intention  of  the  maker,  and  examined  in  their 
connected  state,  and  as  operating  on  one  another: 
and  that  circumstance,  in  the  structure,  must  be 
particularly  attended  to,  that  they  are  all  subser- 
vient to,  and  regulated  by,  the  balance,  or  the 
pendulum.  Human  nature,  though  not  a  machine, 
is  a  most  curious  system,  more  so  than  any  other 
that  this  sublunary  world  can  exhibit,  and  consists 


70  ELEMENTS  Of  Part  HI. 

of  many  parts,  or  faculties,  mutually  operating 
upon,  or  influencing  one  another;  one  of  which, 
in  common  language  called  conscience,  has  a 
natural  supremacy  over  all  the  rest;  as  I  shall 
endeavour  to  prove,  -when  I  have  first  given  a 
brief  account  of  this  faculty.  (§  162). 

479.  Every  man  must  be  conscious,  that  he 
approves  of  some  actions,  because  they  seem  to 
him  to  be  good,  and  right,  and  what  ought  to  be 
done;  and  disapproves  of  other  actions,  because 
he  thinks  them  bad,  wrong,  and  what  ought  not 
to  be  done.  Now  it  is  this  faculty  of  conscience, 
that  gives  rise  to  these  sentiments  of  approbation 
and  disapprobation,  and  so  enables  us  to  distin- 
guish between  virtue  and  vice,  between  moral 
good  and  moral  ev'l,  between  what  is  our  duty 
and  what  is  contrary  to  duty.  This  faculty  is 
peculiar  to  rational  nature;  brutes  have  nothing 
like  it:  the  being  who  is  destitute  of  it  we  cannot 
consider  as  rational.  It  is  this  faculty  which 
makes  man  capable  of  virtue,  and,  consequently, 
of  happiness;  for,  without  virtue,  rational  beings 
cannot  be  happy.  Some  modem  philosophers  are 
Milling  to  believe,  that  of  every  human  faculty 
the  inferiour  animals  participate,  in  some  degree; 
and,  because  a  dog  loves  and  fears  his  master, 
infer,  that  brutes  are  not  quite  destitute  of  moral 
and  religious  notions.  With  equal  reason  it  might 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  fi 

be  inferred,  because  dogs  bark  at  the  moon,  and 
wolves  behold^  or  behowl  it,  as  Shakspeare  says, 
(either  reading  will  serve  in  this  place),  that 
they  are  also  studious  of  astronomy.  ^ 

480.  Actions  performed  through  compulsion, 
or  against  our  will,  conscience  does  not  approve, 
even  though  they  may  tend  to  good;  nor  disap- 
prove, though  they  may  have  an  evil  tendency; 
those  only  are  approved  as  morally  good,  or  dis- 
approved as  immoral,  in  the  performance  of  which 
man  is  understood  to  be  a  free  agent.  Nor  is  it 
the  action  merely,  that  we  either  approve  or  dis- 
approve. A  man  may  kill  another  by  accident,  or 
may  kill  another  by  design;  and,  in  both  cases, 
the  action  may  be  the  same;  the  firing  of  a  mus- 
ket may  do  either.  But,  in  the  former  case,  the 
m.anslayer  may  be  entirely  innocent;  in  the  latter, 
he  may  be  guilty  of  murder:  for,  in  the  latter, 
there  may  be  a  criminal  purpose;  in  the  former? 
there  is,  or  may  be,  none.  Our  affections,  there- 
fore, dispositions,  motives,  purposes,  or  inten- 
tions, are  the  real  objects  of  moral  approbation 
or  disapprobation. 

481.  The  actions  we  consider  as  the  signs  and 
proofs  of  what  was  in  the  mind  of  the  agent:  for 
man  cannot  see  the  heart;  and  we  call  an  action 
immoral,  or  virtuous,  according  as  it  seems  to  us 
to  manifest  a  criminal,  or  a  virtuous  intention.  Id 


72  ELEMENTS  OF  J»art  Ul. 

our  intentions  themselves,  though  not  exerted  hi 
action,  there  may  be  virtue,  or  there  may  be  vice. 
He  who  intends  to  murder,  is  really,  and  in  the 
liight  of  God,  who  knows  the  heart,  a  murderer: 
and  he  who  does  all  the  good  he  can,  and  wishes 
he  were  able  to  do  more,  is  virtuous  in  proportion 
to  the  extent  of  his  wishes,  however  small  his 
ability  may  be. 

482.  In  this  notion  of  moral  approbation,  sug- 
gested to  every  man  by  his  conscience,  several 
notions,  or  sentiments,  are  comprehended,  simi- 
lar, indeed,  in  their  nature,  but  which  may  be 
verbally  distinguished.  A  generous,  or  good  ac- 
tion, delights  us  when  we  think  of  it;  and  we  say, 
that  it  is  fit,  right,  and  what  ought  to  be  done, 
and  that  he  who  has  done  it  deserves  reward  or 
praise.  A  wicked  action  gives  us  pain  when  we 
think  of  it;  and  we  say,  that  it  is  improper, 
wnjng,  and  what  ought  not  to  be  done,  and  that 
he  who  has  done  it  deserves  punishment  or  blame. 
These  notions  are  universal  among  mankind. 
We  are  conscious  of  tliem  in  some  degree,  and 
frequently  in  a  great  degree,  when  the  good  or 
evil  is  done  by  others:  we  are  conscious  of  them  in 
a  very  great,  and  often  in  u  most  intense  degree, 
wlicn  it  is  done  by  ourselves.  A  man's  moral  judg- 
Tuei'.t,  applied  to  the  consideration  of  his  own 
conduct,  is,  in  common  language,  called  his  con- 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  73 

science;  when  applied  to  the  consideration  of 
moral  good  or  evil  in  general,  it  may  be  called 
the  moral  faculty;  and  has  sometimes,  both  by 
modern  and  by  ancient  philosophers,  been  termed 
the  moral  sense.  Disputes  have  been  raised  about 
the  propriety  of  these  appellations;  but,  if  the 
the  thing  be  understood,  the  name  is  of  small 
importance. 

483.  That  this  faculty  is  implanted  in  us  as  a 
rule  of  conduct,  and  has  a  natural  right  to  regu- 
late the  whole  human  system,  will  appear  from 
the  follo^ving  considerations.  To  counteract  our 
bodily  appetites;  to  abstain  from  food  when  we 
are  hungry,  from  drink  when  thirsty,  from  any 
other  similar  indulgence  when  appetite  stimu- 
lates, may  be  not  only  innocent,  but  laudable:  but 
to  counteract  conscience,  to  neglect  to  do  what 
the  moral  faculty  declares  to  be  incumbent,  is 
always  blamable.  He  had  a  craving  for  food,  but 
would  not  eat,  is  a  phrase  which  implies  no  cen- 
sure; nay,  a  man  might  do  so  from  a  regard  to 
iiealth,  in  whicli  case  it  would  be  praiseworthy; 
but,  his  conscience  urged  him  to  abstain,  but  he 
would  not,  intimates  criminal  behaviour;  and  no 
man  is  ever  blamed  for  acting  according  to  con- 
science, or  praised  for  acting  in  opposition  to  it. 
Cases  might  be  mentioned,  in  which  every  other 
sort  of  selfdenial  would  be  right;  but  to  resist  or  di?- 
Vol.  VIII.  G 


t4f  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

regard  conscience,  is,  in  all  possible  cases,  wrong-. 
Such  is  the  opinion  of  mankind,  especially  of  all 
wise  and  good  men.  The  opinion,  therefore,  must 
be  rational.  Consequently,  the  principle  of  con- 
science is  naturally  superiour  to  our  bodily  ap- 
petites, and  ought  to  regulate  and  control  them. 

484.  Secondly,  to  prefer  deformity  to  beauty, 
discord  to  harmony,  bad  imitations  to  good  ones, 
Cowley  to  Milton,  broad  Scotch  to  the  English  of 
Addison,  is  only  an  instance  of  bad  taste,  which 
might  be  innocent,  or  indifferent;  and  the  person 
who  should  do  so  might  be  a  worthy  man  upon 
the  whole:  but  to  prefer  an  action  which  our  own 
conscience  condemns  to  another  which  it  approves; 
to  prefer  fraud  to  honesty,  malice  to  benevolence, 
blasphemy  to  devotion,  impudence  to  modesty,  is 
a  proof  of  a  bad  heart,  which  every  man  of  sense 
and  virtue  must  condemn  as  worthy  of  blame,  and 
even  of  punishment.  Are  not,  then,  the  dictates  of 
conscience  more  sacred,  and  of  higher  authority, 
than  the  principles  of  taste? 

485.  Thirdly,  to  act  upon  the  supposition,  tliat 
the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  arc  less  than  two 
right  angles,  or  that  the  history  of  Julius  Cesar 
is  a  fable,  or  that  the  sun  and  starry  heavens  re- 
volve round  the  earth,  would  be  absurd,  and  a 
proof  of  ignorance;  but  might,  possibly,  be  inno- 
cent:  and  a  lawgiver  would  act  foolishly' who 


Chap.  I.  :moral  science.  75 

should  prohibit,  on  pain  of  fine  and  imprison- 
ment, the  holding  of  such  opinions.  But  to  act 
upon  a  supposition,  that  what  conscience  dictates 
ought  not  to  be  done;  that  ingratitude  and  perjury 
are  duties;  or  that  piety  to  God,  and  benevolence 
to  man,  are  not  incumbent,  can  never  be  innocent 
in  any  rational  being.  I  do  not  say,  however,  that 
false  opinions  in  matters  of  mere  science  are  al- 
ways innocent;  I  only  say,  that  they  may  be  so, 
and  often  are.  But  to  act  contrary  to  conscience, 
or  to  disregard  its  dictates,  is  always  a  proof  of  a 
wicked  heart,  and  always  blamable. 

486.  Fourthly,  to  gratify  hunger  and  thirst,  to 
prefer  elegance  to  deformity,  to  act  conformably 
to  mathematical,  historical,  and  physical  truth,  is 
right;  but  we  do  not  suppose,  that  a  man  deserves 
reward  or  praise  for  having  done  so.  But  when 
we  do  that  which  the  moral  faculty  commands, 
and  abstain  from  what  it  forbids,  we  are  con- 
scious, and  all  mankind  acknowledge,  that  we 
deserve  reward,  or  praise  at  least,  which  is  a 
species  of  reward.  He  is  a  man  of  taste,  an  acute 
mathematician,  an  intelligent  historian,  skilled  in 
astronomy,  and  rational  in  his  political  notions: 
all  this  is  very  well.  A  man,  however,  may  be 
all  this,  who  is  impious,  unjust,  and  intemperate; 
and  who,  of  course,  merits  nothing  from  society, 
and  can  entertain  no  reasonable  hope  of  happines?^ 


76  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  HI 

in  the  life  to  come.  But  he  Mho  acts  in  a  confor- 
mity to  moral  truth,  and  obeys  the  dictates  of  his 
conscience,  is  entitled  to  the  approbation  and  es- 
teem of  his  fellow  creatures,  and  may,  through 
the  divine  goodness,  entertain  the  hope  of  future 
reward;  though  he  be  skilled  very  imperfectly,  or 
not  at  all,  in  human  sciences.  Does  not  this  prove, 
that  there  is  inherent  in  the  dictates  of  conscience 
a  peculiar  sanctity  and  supremacy,  that  distin- 
guish them  from  the  other  suggestions  of  ra- 
tional nature? 

487.  Fifthly,  conscience  often  obtrudes  itself 
upon  us  against  our  will,  and  in  the  midst  of  out- 
ward prosperity  makes  the  sinner  miserable,  in 
spite  of  all  his  endeavours  to  suppress  it:  and  it  is 
never  so  keen  in  its  reproaches  as  when  a  wicked 
person  comes  to  die,  and  has  nothing  further  to 
fear  from  man.  To  paint  the  horrours  of  a  guilty 
conscience,  some  ancient  poets  have  typified  it  by 
the  image  of  a  fury,  brandishing  a  scourge  made 
of  serpents,  and  thundering  condemnation  in  the 
ear  of  the  criminal.  A  gnawing  worm,  that  never 
dies,  is  a  scriptural  emblem  of  similar  import. 
The  images  are  strong,  but  not  hyperbolical:  for 
of  all  the  torments  incident  to  human  nature,  that 
of  a  guilty  and  awakened  conscience  is  the  most 
drcjdful.  Bad  men  have  sometimes  felt  it  so  in- 
supportable, as  to  make  life  a  burden  (sec  §  :>'56); 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE,  T7 

and  good  men  will  defy  death,  and  torture,  and 
distress  of  every  kind,  rather  than  do  that  which 
their  conscience  declares  to  be  unlawful.  Surely 
there  must  be  something  very  peculiar  in  that 
faculty,  which  has  so  powerful  an  influence  on 
the  felicity  of  man,  and  can  triumph  so  easily, 
and  so  effectually,  over  sublunary  things.  So  high 
is  the  authority  of  conscience,  in  declaring  the 
merit  of  virtue,  and  demerit  of  vice,  that  con- 
siderate men,  not  finding  that  the  one  obtains  a 
suitable  reward,  or  the  other  an  adequate  punish- 
ment, in  this  world,  have  been  led,  even  by  the 
light  of  nature,  to  look  forward  to  a  future  life  of 
more  perfect  retribution. 

488.  Conscience,  therefore,  is  our  supreme 
faculty.  We  see  that  every  other  power  of  our 
nature  ought  to  submit  to  it;  and  that  it  may  be 
stronger  than  even  our  love  of  life,  or  horrour  of 
infamy.  And  when  this  is  the  case,  all  men  ac- 
knowledge that  it  is  no  stronger  than  it  ought  to 
be,  and  has  a  natural  right  to  be:  whereas,  if  any 
other  passion,  principle,  or  propensity,  were  to 
gain  such  influence,  or  assume  such  authority, 
disorder  would  prevail  in  the  mental  system,  and 
neglect  of  duty  would  discompose  the  procedure 
of  human  affairs.  Even  to  the  love  of  learning 
(for  I  speak  not  of  criminal  or  debasing  pur- 
suits), if  we  were  to  sacrifice  every  other  cor- 

G2 


78  ELEMENTS  OF  I'aiini. 

cern,  we  should  justly  incur  censure.  But  too 
conscientious  we  can  never  be',  the  best  of  us 
are  not  sufficiently  so;  and  if  all  men  were  as 
much  so  as  they  ought  to  be,  nothing  would  be 
wanting  to  n\ake  society  happy. 

489.  Conscience  being  proved  to  be  the  su- 
preme regulating  principle  of  human  nature,  it 
follows  that  virtuous  action  (see  §  477)  is  the  ul- 
timate end  for  which  man  was  made.  For  virtue 
is  that  whicli  conscience  approves;  and  what 
contradicts  the  supreme  principle  of  any  system, 
must  be  contrary  to  the  end  of  that  system.  It  is 
true,  tliat  in  most  men  for  a  little,  and  in  bad 
men  for  a  long  time,  conscience  may  lose  its 
power,  when  borne  down  by  evil  habit,  or  tumul- 
tuous passion:  even  as  the  strongest  man,  by 
being  kept  long  in  fetters,  may  lose  the  use  of 
his  limbs;  and  as  the  most  lively  genius,  if 
doomed  to  slavery,  may  sink  into  inactivity  and 
stupefaction.  But  though  conscience  may  lose 
its  power,  it  still  retains  its  authority,  that  is,  its 
right  to  govern.  A  good  king  may  be  dethroned 
by  the  rebellion  of  a  wicked  subject,  and  may, 
for  a  time,  be  unable  to  enforce  his  own  laws;  but 
he  still  retains  that  ri!fht  to  govern,  which  is 
secured  to  him  by  the  constitution  of  his  coun- 
try. He,  however,  may  die  without  being  re- 
stored: but  sooner  or  later,  in  the  next  world,  if 


Cliap.  I  MORAL  SCIENCE.  79 

not  in  this,  conscience  will  resume  its  rights,  and 
cover  the  guilty  head  with  confusion. 

490.  We  act,  therefore,  according  to  the  end 
and  law  of  our  nature,  when  we  act  acoording  to 
conscience.  By  doing  so,  we  may,  and,  indeed, 
often  must,  control  our  inferiour  appetites;  but 
then  we  promote  the  happiness  and  perfection  of 
our  whole  naiure.  So  a  medicine  may  do  good  to 
the  whole  body,  though  it  be  offensive  to  the 
taste,  or  even  to  the  stomach.  By  complying 
with  an  appetite  in  opposition  to  conscience,  we 
may  obtain  a  slight  gratification;  but  then  we 
introduce  disorder  and  unhappiness  into  our  na- 
ture, and  make  it  more  imperfect  ,than  it  was 
before.  So  things  may  please  the  palate,  and 
give  momentary  comfort  to  the  stomach,  which 
yet  have  poisonous  qualities. 

491.  And  now,  we  see  in  what  respects  a  life 
of  virtue  may  be  said  to  be,  what  some  ancient 
moralists  called  it,  a  life  according  to  nature.  The 
indulgence  of  any  natural  appetite  may  be  called 
a  natural  indulgence;  but,  to  act  suitably  to  the 
dictates  of  the  moral  faculty,  is  according  to  the 
general  tendency  of  our  luhole  nature^  because 
agreeable  to  the  supreme  principle  of  the  human 
system.  Some  vices  may  be  called  natural;  be- 
cause there  are  in  us  passions  that  prompt  to 
them,  and  a  principle  of  corruption,  or  degenr - 


80  ELEMENTS  01  f»art  III. 

racy,  that  urges  our  compliance:  but  no  vice 
can  be  said  to  be  according  to  our  whole  nature; 
because  nothing  is  so,  but  what  conscience,  our 
supreme  regulating  principle,  approves*  What 
pleases  the  palate  may  hurt  health,  and  be  there- 
fore pernicious  to  the  human  constitution.  That 
only  can  be  called  natural  food,  w.hich  preserves, 
or  promotes  the  health  of  the  whole  body. 

492.  Yet,  it  has  been  said,  that  a  life  of  virtue 
is  a  life  of  mortification  and  warfare.  And  no- 
thing is  more  true;  notwithstanding  that,  upon 
the  whole,  such  a  life  must  be  the  most  happy. 
The  nature  of  man  is  miserably  corrupted.  Cri- 
minal passions  crave  indulgence;  and  it  requires 
great  efforts  to  resist  them:  criminal  habits  nuist 
be  overcome;  and  this  is  a  work  of  long  and  di{H- 
cult  labour.  Things,  that  by  their  agreeable  qua- 
liiics  attract  our  notice,  and  engage  our  liking, 
often  prove  a  snare;  and  it  requires  incessant, 
watchfulness  to  keep  aJoof  from  them,  or,  when 
they  fall  in  our  way,  to  prevent  their  gaining  on 
our  affections.  The  best  men  fall  into  transgres- 
sion, which,  in  a  good  man,  is  always  followed  by' 
repentance;  and  repentance,  though  most  salutary 
in  its  effects,  is  attended  with  great'anguish  of 
mind.  How  many  dangers  and  disappointments 
must  they  encounter  who  engage  in  active  life! 
Yet  Buch   a   life   \<  iiicfjmparably  happier  than 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  81 

security  with  idleness.  Even  so,  virtue  may  be  a 
warfare;  but  it  is,  upon  the  whole,  happy  as  well 
as  honourable,  and  never  fails  to  be  crowned  with 
victory  and  eternal  peace.  Vice  is  a  warfare  too; 
but  it  is  neither  honourable  nor  happy,  and,  ne- 
cessarily, ends  in  shame  and  punishment. 

493.  We  may  further  learn,  from  what  has 
been  said,  how  foolishly  those  men  argue,  who 
give  way  to  all  their  passions  without  reserve,  and 
excuse  themselves  by  saying,  that  every  passion 
is  natural,  and  that  they  cannot  be  blamed  for 
doing  what  nature  prompts  them  to  do.  The 
fallacy  of  this  plea  must  be  very  apparent  to 
those,  who,  in  their  notions  of  man,  can  distin- 
guish between  the  whole  and  a  part.  Partial  in-, 
dulgence  may,  no  doubt,  be  obtained  by  gratify- 
ing criminal  propensity;  as  a  man  may  please 
his  palate  while  he  is  swallowing  poison:  but 
every  indulgence  is  unnatural,  or,  at  least,  im- 
proper, which  disorders  the  moral  system,  by 
counteracting  its  supreme  regulating  principle. 
From  the  wheels  of  a  clock,  or  watch,  if  you 
take  off  those  restraints  vv^hereby  the  motion  is 
made  regular,  the  wheels  must  move  irregularly. 
Such  motion  you  may,  if  you  please,  call^natural; 
because  it  is  natural  for  bodies  to  move  accord- 
ing to  the  force  that  impels  them:  but  such  mo- 
tion you  cannot  call  right,  or  agreeable  to  the 


82  ELEMENTS  OF  Fart  11  [ 

purpose  of  the  maker,  because  it  is  not  governed 
by  that  principle  which  was  intended  to  control 
and  regulate  the  whole  machine. 

494.  Few  sentiments  are  more  familiar  to  the 
human  mind  than  this,  that  vice  deserves  punish- 
ment, and  virtue  reward.  But,  to  prevent  mis- 
takes, it  is  necessary  to  add,  that,,  in  strict  pro- 
priety of  speech,  our  virtue  is  meritorious  with 
respect  to  our  fellow  creatures  only.  Considered 
in  his  relation  to  the  Supreme  Being,  man, 
Avhen  he  has  done  his  best,  is  an  unprofitable 
servant.  To  enter  into  some  particulars  on  this 
subject.  Life  is,  by  all  men,  accounted  a  great 
blessing;  for,  in  the  general  intercourse  of  the 
world,  few  things  are  more  valued  than  that 
which  supports  it.  Now  life  is  a  blessing,  which 
the  Deity  confers  on  his  creatures  gratuitously: 
we  cannot  say  that  our  virtue  gives  us  a  title  to 
it,  or  is  an  adequate  return  for  it.  Our  reason, 
conscience,  susceptibility  of  happiness,  and  ca- 
pacity for  virtue,  are  all  the  free  gift  of  God:  and 
who  can  imagine  that  there  is  merit  in  having 
received  what  has  been  given  us?  If  we  abuse  his 
benefits,  we  deserve  punishment;  if  we  make  a 
right  use  of  them  (which  no  man  of  sense  will 
bay  that  he  does),  we  do  nothing  more  tlian  what 
is  incumbent  on  us  in  consequence  of  (jur  having 


Cliap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  83 

received  them,  vmd  for  which  our  enjoyment  of 
them  is  more  than  an  adequate  recompense. 

495.  Besides,  virtue,  even  in  this  life,  obtains 
very  considerable  gratifications.  It  obtains  peace 
of  mind,  and  an  approving  conscience;  blessings, 
more  precious  than  life.  It  generally  obtains  the 
esteem  of  good  men,  and  some  degree  of  respect 
even  from  the  worthless:  the  advantaoes  whereof 
will  be  allowed  to  be  great  by  those  who  consider, 
that  good  reputation,  which  alone  can  procure  us 
the  esteem  of  others,  is,  by  every  generous  mind, 
accounted  invaluable.  Now,  let  it  not  be  foreot- 
ten,  that  this  peace  of  mind,  esteem  of  good  men, 
and  respect  from  all  men,  are  the  result  of  laws 
established  by  our  beneficent  Creator,  for  the 
comfort  of  the  virtuous  in  this  world  of  trial. 
These  are  high  privileges:  for  what  other  ter- 
restrial consolations  would  a  wise  man  exchange 
them? 

496.  It  is  to  be  observed  further,  that  all  hu- 
man virtue  is  very  imperfect;  and  that  the  best 
man  on  earth  can  scarce  be  said  to  pass  a  day, 
"without  violating  the  divine  law  in  thought,  word, 
or  deed.  There  are  hardly  any  human  actions, 
how  virtuous  soever  they  may  seem,  and  how 
meritorious  soever  with  respect  to  our  fellow 
creatures  they  may  be,  of  which  the  agent,  if  a 
man  of  sense,  will  not  readily  acknowledge,  that 


84  ELEMENTS  OF  PurtllT. 

they  must,  in  the  sight  of  the  Creator,  appear 
tainted  with  imperfection;  and  tliat  we  have  al- 
ways reason  to  pray,  with  humility  and  contri- 
tion, that  God  would  pardon  what  is  wrong-,  or 
wanting,  even  in  our  best  performances.  We  all 
know,  that  criminal  habits  pervert  the  under- 
standing, and  debase  the  moral  faculty;  and  that 
we  have  contracted  many  evil  habits,  which,  with 
proper  attention,  v*'c  might  have  avoided,  and  are, 
of  course,  accountable  for  those  debasements  and 
perversities  which  are  owing  to  our  inattention, 
and  for  all  the  errours  and  follies  thence  result- 
ing. 

497.  Now,  since  all  human  excellence  is  so 
defective;  since  even  the  best  men  are  so  great 
offenders;  and  since  the  advantages  that  virtue 
may  enjoy,  even  in  this  life,  arc  so  important; 
what  man  is  there  who  can  say,  that  his  virtue  in- 
(itles  him  to  receive  any  other  rewards  from  that 
God  whom  he  is  continually  offending;  to  whoso 
goodness  he  is  every  moment  under  unspeak- 
able obligations;  and,  compared  with  whose  con- 
summate purity,  all  human  attainments  are  in 
the  proportion  of  weakness  to  omnipotence,  of 
finite  to  infinite,  of  time  'to  eternity  I  From  the 
placability  of  our  judge,  who  knows  our  frailty, 
reason,  unenlightened  by  revelation,  might,  per- 
haps, encourage  the  penitent  to  hope  for  pardon; 
'•nt,  to  pardon  a  criminal,  and  to  receive  him  into 


(Jhai).  1.  •MORAL  SCIENCE.  SS 

favour,  are  different  things:  and  what  proportion 
is  there  between  hunnan  virtue,  debased  as  it  is 
with  vice  and  with  errour,  and  a  state  of  never 
ending  felicity  in  the  life  to  come?  Can  we  merit 
such  a  reward?  we,  whose  goodness,  if  we  have 
any,  is,  even  in  this  Avorld,  rewarded  beyond  what 
it  deserves! 

498.  These  speculations  might  lead  into  a 
labyrinth  of  perplexity,  if  it  were  not  for  what 
revelation  declares  concerning  the  divine  govern- 
ment. It  declares,  that  man  may  expect,  on  the 
performance  of  certain  conditions,  not  only  par- 
don, but  everlasting  happiness;  not  on  account  of 
his  own  merit,  which  in  the  sight  of  God  is  no- 
thing, but  on  account  of  the  infinite  merits  of  the 
Redeemer;  who,  descending  fi  om  the  height  of 
glory,  voluntarily  underwent  the  punishment  due 
to  sin,  and  thus  obtained  those  high  privileged 
for  as  many  as  should  comply  with  the  terms  an- 
nounced by  him  to  mankind.  So  much  for  the 
supremacy,  and  general  nature,  of  the  faculty  of 
conscience. 

499.  It  was  hinted,  and  partly  proved,  that 
man's  chief  happiness  results  from  virtue.  A 
more  explicit  proof  of  this  point  may  now  be 
proper,  and  is  as  follows.  If  we  could  at  once 
gratify  all  the  propensities  of  our  nature,  that 
would  be  our  highest  possible  happiness,  and 

Vol.  VIII.  H 


86  KLEMENT6  0F  Part  111 

what  we  might  call  our  ftummum  boinnn^  or  chief 
good.  liUt  that  cannot  be;  for  our  propensities  arc 
often  inconsistent,  so  that  if  we  comply  with  one, 
we  must  contradict  another.  He  who  is  enslaved 
to  sensuality,  cannot  at  tlie  same  time  enjoy  the 
more  sublime  pleasures  of  science  and  virtue:  and 
he  who  devotes  himself  to  science,  or  adheres  to 
virtue,  must  often  act  in  opposition  to  his  infcri- 
our  appetites.  The  ambitious  man  cannot  labour 
for  the  acquisition  of  power,  and  taste  the  sweets 
of  indolence  at  the  same  time:  and  the  miser, 
while  he  indulj^cs  himself  in  the  contemplation 
of  his  wealth,  must  be  a  stran|2;er  to  the  pleasures 
of  beneficence.  The  gratification  of  all  our  ap- 
petites at  once,  is  therefore  impossible.  Conse- 
(}uently,  some  degree  of  seli'dcnial  must  be  prac- 
tised by  every  man,  whether  good  or  bad,  by  the 
rufi'ian  as  well  as  the  saint,  the  sensualist  as  well 
as  the  hermit:  and  man's  greatest  possible  hap- 
piness must  be,  at  least  in  the  present  state,  not 
:•.  complete  gratification  of  all  our  propensities, 
but  the  most  comprehensive  gratification  of 
which  we  are  capable.  Now  some  pleasures  con- 
duce more  to  happiness  than  others,  and  are 
therefon*  more  important  than  those  others.  And 
if  we  sacrifice  a  less  important  to  a  more  import- 
ant one,  we  add  to  our  sum  of  happiness;  and  we 
take  away  from  that  sum,  when  we  sacrifice  a 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENGE,  87 

more  important  pleasure  to  one  of  less  import- 
ance. 

500.  In  forming  a  judgment  of  the  compara- 
tive importance  of  gratifications,  the  following 
maxims  may  be  safely  admitted.  First,  some  are 
of  greater  dignity  than  others,  because  more  suit- 
able to  our  rational  nature,  and  tending  more  to 
improve  it:  the  pleasures  of  the  glutton,  or  the 
miser,  are  surely  of  less  dignity  than  those  which 
we  derive  from  the  discovery  of  truth,  from  the 
study  of  nature,  or  from  the  performance  of  a 
generous  action.  Pleasures,  therefore,  which  have 
more  dignity,  are  preferable  to  such  as  have  less. 
And  it  will  be  readily  allowed,  in  the  second 
place,  that  a  more  intense  pleasure  is  more  valu- 
able than  one  that  is  less  intense;  and  that  such 
as  are  not  attended  with  pain  are  better  than  those 
that  bring  pain  along  with  them.  Thirdly,  con- 
sidering the  manifold  evils  of  life,  it  will  hardly 
be  doubted,  that  pleasures  which  alleviate  dis- 
tress are  preferable  to  those  that  do  not;  and  that 
those  which  give  a  relish  to  other  pleasures  are 
belter  than  such  as  make  others  insipid.  Fourthly, 
durable  gratifications  are  preferable  to  such  as 
are  transient;  and  those  that  do  not  please  on  re- 
ilection,  are  of  less  value  than  those  that  do. 
Fifthly,  some  grow  mere  insipid  the  more  vve 
are   used  to  them,  others  continually  improve 


88  FXEMENTS  OF  Pait  UK 

upon  repetition;  the  last  are  undoubtedly  prefer- 
able. And,  lastly,  those  which  may  be  had  at  all 
times,  and  in  all  places,  must  contribute  more  to 
happiness,  than  such  as  depend  on  circumstances, 
and  are  not  in  our  own  power. 

501.  If  we  be  satisfied  with  the  truth  of  these 
remarks  on  the  comparative  value  of  human 
gratifications,  and  we  can  hardly  call  them  in 
quesiion,  if  we  allow  experience  to  be  a  rational 
ground  of  knowledge,  we  must  also  be  satisfied, 
that  of  man*s  chief  good,  or  greatest  possible 
happiness,  the  following  is  a  just  character.  It 
must  be  something  that  gratifies  the  more  dig- 
nified powers  of  his  nature;  yields  intense  plea- 
sure, unmixed,  and  unaccompanied,  with  pain; 
alleviates  the  calamities  of  life;  is  consistent  with, 
and  gives  a  relish  to,  other  pleasures;  is  in  itself 
durable,  and  pleases  on  reflection;  does  not  pall 
upon  the  sense,  but  grows  more  exquisite  the 
more  we  are  accustomed  to  it;  is  attainable  by 
every  man,  because  dependent  on  himself,  and  not 
on  outward  circumstances,  and  is  accommodated 
to  all  times  and  places.  Now,  every  gratification, 
whereof  human  nature  is  capable,  may  be  com- 
prehended under  one  or  other  of  these  three 
classes:  the  pleasures  of  outward  sense;  the 
pleasures  of  imagination  and  intellect,  that  is  of 
taste  and  science;  and  the  i)Ieasures  that  result 
from  the  right  exercise  of  our  moral  powers. 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  89 

Let  us  see  then  in  which  of  these  classes  we  arc 
likely  to  find  our  chief  good,  or  greatest  felicity. 

502.  First,  That  the  pleasures  of  sense  contri- 
bute not  a  little  to  our  comfort,  and  that  some  of 
them  are  not  momentary,  is  acknowledged.  But 
they  are  confessedly,  at  least  in  the  opinion  of  all 
the  enlightened  part  of  mankind,  the  lowest  gra- 
tifications of  our  natuie;  for  no  man  ever  yet 
became  respectable  by  attaching  himself  to  them. 
They  o  ten  bring  disgust  and  even  pain  along 
with  them;  they  please  not  upon  reflection;  and 
they  tend  to  disqualify  us  for  the  nobler  delights 
of  science  and  virtue.  They  depend  not  on  our- 
selves, but  on  other  things  and  persons;  they 
are  attainable  in  certain  circumstances  only;  and 
^we  lose  all  taste  for  them  in  adversity.  To  them 
therefore  the  character  of  man's  chief  gooil  is  not 
applicable. 

503.  Secondly,  the  pleasures  of  imagination 
and  science  have  great  dignity;  the  pursuit  of 
them  is  honourable,  though  it  may  run  to  excess, 
and  they  are  consistent  both  with  moral  and  with 
sensual  gratification,  and  in  an  eminent  degree 
friendly  to  the  former.  They  are  not  momentary; 
they  please  upon  reflection;  and  they  grow  more 
exquisite  by  being  frequent.  But  they  do  not 
alleviate  the  calamities  of  life:  and  so  far  are  they 
from  being  accommodated  to  all  times  and  places, 

H  2 


90  ELEMENTS  OF  i'artllU 

that  by  all  the  iininstructed,  that  is,  by  the  greater 
part  of  the  human  race,  they  are  absolutely  unat- 
tainable. Consequently,  the  character  of  man*s 
chief  good  docs  not  belong  to  them. 

504.  Thirdly,  the  delights  that  arise  from  the 
light  exercise  of  our  moral  powers,  and  from  the 
approbation  of  conscience,  are  of  all  gratifications 
the  most  dignified:  the  more  a  man  attaches 
himself  to  them,  the  more  respectable  he  be- 
comes, and  it  is  not  possible  for  him  to  carry 
such  attachment  to  excess:  with , disgust,  or  with 
pain,  they  are  never  attended:  they  give  a  relish 
for  other  pleasures,  by  preserving  the  mind 
cheerful,  and  the  body  in  health:  they  are  not 
inconsistent  with  any  innocent  gratification,  that 
is,  they  are  consistent  with  ail  pleasures  except 
those  which  bring  pain  and  misery:  they  please 
intensely  on  reflection;  are  a  perpetual  source  of 
comfort  in  adversity;  become  more  exquisite 
the  more  we  are  accustomed  to  them;  are  within 
the  reach  of  every  man,  high  and  low,  learned 
and  ignorant;  are  suited  to  all  times  and  places: 
and,  so  long  as  we  retain  our  rationality,  it  is  not 
in  the  power  of  malice  or  of  fortune  to  deprive 
us  of  them.  To  virtue,  therefore,  which  is  the 
rigiit  exercise  of  our  moral  powers,  the  charac- 
ter of  man's  chief  good  docs  belong;  which  will 
^pprnr  still  more  evident  whrn  wr  consiHcr,  tliat 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  91 

the  hope  of  future  felicity  is  the  chief  consolation 
of  the  present  life,  and  that  the  virtuous  alone  can 
reasonably  entertain  that  hope.  As,  on  the  other 
hand,  vice,  in  the  most  prosperous  condition,  is 
subject  to  the  pangs  of  a  guilty  conscience,  and 
to  the  dreadful  anticipation  of  future  punishment; 
which  are  sufficient  to  destroy  all  earthly  happi- 
ness. 

505.  I  am  far  from  adopting,  in  its  literal  sense, 
that  maxim  of  the  poet,  "  Virtue  alone  is  happi- 
''  ness  below."  For  though  I  say,  with  the  peri- 
I)ateticks,  that  virtue  is  the  chief  good,  I  do  not 
say,  with  the  stoicks,  that  it  is  the  only  good. 
/That  a  virtuous  man  in  health  and  prosperity 
may  be  happier  than  a  man  of  equal  virtue  beset 
with  adversity  and  disease,  I  see  no  reason  to 
doubt;  and  if  so,  health  and  prosperity  are  good, 
and  disease  and  adversity  evil.  Besides,  if  desti- 
tute of  the  hope  of  immortality,  the  mind  of  a 
good  man  (especially  if  he  were  a  man  of  sensi- 
bility and  penetration)  would  not  be  happy  in 
this  world,  but  would,  on  the  contrary,  be  a  prey 
to  perplexity  and  anguish.  Such  a  man  would  be 
perpetually  shocked  with  the  confusion  which 
would  then  appear  in  the  universe,  and  of  which 
he  could  foresee  no  end.  The  world  to  him  would 
seem  to  be  governed  by  a  being,  whose  power 
was  indeed  great,  but  whose  justice  and  gocdne^c 


92  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  HI. 

Avere  not  equally  conspicuous.  It  is  the  belief  of 
a  future  state  of  retribution  that  satisfies  the  ra- 
tional mind  of  the  infinite  rectitude  of  the  divine 
government;  and  it  is  this  persuasion  oniy^  that 
can  make  the  virtuous  happy  in  the  present  life. 
And  as  we  could  not,  without  revelation,  enter- 
tain a  well  grounded  hope  of  future  reward,  it  is 
only  the  virtue  of  the  true  christian  that  can  ob- 
tain the  happiness  we  now  speak  of. 

506.  Virtue  being  the  chief  good  of  individuals, 
it  is  hardly  necessary  to  add,  that  it  must  be  the 
chief  good  of  society.  For  of  individuals  society 
is  made  up,  and  that  is  the  happiest  society  in 
which  there  is  most  private  happiness.  We  can- 
not conceive  a  community,  or  a  nation,  to  be 
prosperous,  if  the  people  who  compose  it  ai'e 
miserable.  Kingdoms  in  every  age  have  been 
flourishing  and  happy  no  longer  than  they  main- 
tained their  virtue. 

507.  And  now  it  appears,  that  vJKtue  is  founded 
in  our  constitution,  and  agreeable  to  our  whole 
natiire^'oi  which  indeed  it  is  the  perfection;  that 
it  must  therefore  be  conlormable  to  tlic  will  of 
Ilim  who  is  the  author  of  our  nature;  and  that  it 
is  the  only  means  of  making  mankind  truly  hap- 
py. Vice,  conseijuently,  is  contrary  to  our  nvhole 
nature^  and  tends  to  debase  and  destroy;  it  is 
contrary  to  the  will  of  God,  and  contrary  to  our 


Ciiap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  9J 

own  interest.  I  conclude  the  chapter  with  the 
following  descrilition^  every  part  of  which  will  be 
found  to  have  been  enforced  and  illustrated  by 
the  foregoing  reasonings.  "  Moral  virtue  is  a 
"  disposition  of  the  mind,  voluntary  and  active, 
*i  agreeable  in  itself,  and  praiseworthy,  incum- 
"  bent  on  all  men,  and  tending  to  improve  our 
''  whole  nature,  and  promote  our  happiness  both 
"  here  and  hereafter."  So  much  for  the  general 
nature  of  virtue.  I  shall  proceed  to  the  practical 
part  of  ethicks,  when  I  have  made  a  few  miscel- 
laneous observations. 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  SubjecJ,  continued.  Miscellaneous  Observations. 

508.  I  HE  word  virtue^  like  many  other  ab- 
stract terms,  has  great  latitude  of  signification. 
Often  it  denotes  power  or  agency;  as  when  we 
speak  of  the  virtues  of  a  plant  or  mineral.  Some- 
times it  means  that  which  makes  a  thing  good  or 
agreeable:  thus  perspicuity,  simplicity,  correct- 
ness, and  harmony,  have  been  called  the  virtues 
of  a  good  style.  The  Romans  by  the  word  virtus 
frequently  si|^nified  valour  and  publick  spirit, 
because  they  Jlield  these  qualities  in  peculiar  es- 
teem. The  ^me  term  is  used  to  signify  any 
quiility,  or  perfection  of  qualities,  which  fits  a 
thing  for  answering  its  end;  and,  in  this  sense, 
has  been  applied  not  only  to  the  moral,  but  also 
to  the  intcllcclual,  and  even  to  the  corporeal  part 
of  our  coKistitulion.  Plencc  human  virtues  have 
been  distinguished  into  Corjioreal,  as  health, 
strength,  swiftness,  kc.;  Intellectual^  as  genius, 
learning,  wit,  humour,  eloquence.  See;  aiul,  Mo- 
ral^  as  temperance,  justice,  benevolence,  pic- 
tv,  5vc.  ' 


Chap.  II.  ELEMENTS  OF,  Sec.  9J 

509.  Every  rational  being  must  see,  that  these 
last  are  quite  different  from  corporeal  and  intel- 
lectual abilities,  and  that  the  preceding  reason- 
ings and  description  are  applicable  to  moral 
virtue  alone.  This  is  valuable  for  its  own  sake, 
and  always  tends  to  happiness;  and  every  man 
may  be,  and  ought  to  be,  possessed  of  it.  But  in- 
tellectual and  corporeal  accomplishments, though 
they  give  pleasure,  and  may  even  raise  admira- 
tion, are  not  valuable  on  their  own  account;  nor 
valuable  at  all,  unless  they  promote  moral  good- 
'ness.  They  are  not  the  objects  of  choice,  and 
therefore  cannot  be  said  to  be  incumbent  on 
mankind.  They  may  be  employed  in  doing  evil, 
in  which  case  they  make  a  man  more  odious 
than  he  would  have  been  without  them.  For 
what  should  we  think  of  him,  who  would  employ 
his  learning  or  eloquence  in  perverting  the  prin- 
ciples of  others,  or  his  bodily  strength  in  destroy- 
ing their  lives. 

510.  It  is  true,  we  ought  to  do  every  thing  in 
our  power  for  the  improvement  of  our  nature  in 
all  its  parts.  But  this  is  moral  virtue,  or  is  not 
moral  virtue,  according  to  the  intention  with 
•which  it  is  done.  If  we  endeavour  to  improve 
ourselves,  because  we  consider  it  as  our  duty,  and 
that  we  may  have  it  in  our  power  to  be  useful,  we 
act  virtuously;  if  we  do  the  same  thing,  in  order 


96  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

to  qualify  ourselves  for  doing  harm  to  others,  we 
act  viciously.  Besides,  to  have  naturally  a  weak 
judgment,  a  bad  memory,  a  narrow  capacity,  or 
a  sickly  constitution,  makes  one  the  object  not 
of  blame,  but  of  pity;  for  these  things  are  not  in 
our  power,  and  every  man  would  be  without 
them  if  he  could:  but  to  want  honesty,  benevo- 
lence, justice,  or  piety,  is  always  criminal,  and 
deserves  blame  and  punishment. 

511.  Aristotle  and  the  peripateticks,  following* 
perhaps  the  notions  of  Pythagoras,  who  wished 
to  reduce  every  thing  to  number  and  proportion, 
gave  it  as  a  general  character  of  virtue,  that  it 
consists  in  mediocrity,  /ttfo-ox^c,  or  a  middle  be- 
tween two  extremes;  one  of  which  is  criminal 
from  excess,  and  the  other  from  deficiency.  This 
doctrine  maybe  of  use  in  the  conduct  of  life,  and 
will  ])e  found  to  hold  true  in  many  respects.  It 
seems  to  be  warranted  by  common  opinion:  ''  the 
*'  middle  way  is  best,"  is  a  proverb  with  us, 
as  7ufdio  tutissimus  idi.s  was  with  the  Romans. 
But  it  does  not  hold  universally,  as  Aristotle 
himself  acknowledges.  Love  to  God,  and  good- 
will to  man,  cannot  l)ecome  vicious  through  ex- 
cess; because  they  never  can  be  excessive.  The 
same  author  held,  as  was  formerly  observed, 
(§  263)  that  virtue  consists,  not  in  transient  acts, 
Slit  in  settled  habits,  or  dispositions;  whence  the 


Chap.  ir.  MOIIAL  SCIENCE,  97 

word  t^Ki  or  habit,  occurs  in  many  of  his  defini- 
tions of  the  virtues.  Some  idea  of  his  method  of 
arranging  this  subject  may  be  formed  from  the 
following  brief  remarks. 

512.  He  considered  all  virtue  as  resolvable  into 
the  four  cardinal  virtues  of  Prudence,  Justice, 
Temperance,  and  Fortitude.  Prudence  is  a  habit 
of  mediocrity,  enabling  us  to  act  reasonably  in 
regard  to  those  things  that  are  good  or  evil;  and 
it  includes  these  three  particulars.  First,  a  habit 
of  acting  at  all  times  ivith  coiisideration;  the  vi- 
cious defect  is  rashness;  the  blamable  excess  is 
that  mean  spirite  1  caution,  which  keeps  a  man 
inactive  and  irresolute.  Secondly,  prudence  in- 
cludes a  habit  of  judging  rightly  of  the  true  na- 
ture of  those  good  or  evil  things  that  may  prompt 
us  to  action:  the  defect  is  folly:  for  the  excess  we 
have  no  name.  But  folly,  when  unavoidable,  as  it 
sometimes  may  be  even  in  the  wisest  men,  can- 
not be  accounted  blamable,  though  we  must  allow 
it  to  be  an  imperfection.  Nor  can  a  habit  of  right 
judgment  be  carried  to  excess.  Nay,  right  judg- 
ment, so  far  as  it  depends  not  on  ourselves,  but 
is  the  gift  of  nature,  cannot  be  called  a  moral 
virtue.  And  Aristotle  himself  names  it  among 
the  intellectual  virtues. 

513.  Prudence  includes,  thirdly,  a  habit  o^ dis- 
covering the  firopcr  means  for  attaining  good  ends. 

Vol.  Vlir.  I 


98  ELEMENTS  OP  Part  III. 

Cunning  is  said  to  be  the  excess,  and  imprudence 
the  defect.  But  imprudence,  if  owing  to  a  weak 
judgment,  is  no  vice  at  all;  for  we  cannot  help  it: 
cunning,  as  it  seeks  to  gain  its  ends  by  secret  and 
unfiiir  means,  is  rather  an  abuse,  than  an  excess 
of  prudence;  and  a  habit  of  discovering  the  best 
means  for  accomplishing  good  purposes  can  never 
be  carried  to  excess.  Here  observe,  that,  thougli 
the  pcripateticks  and  stoicks  treated,  in  their 
systems  of  duty,  of  intellectual  as  well  as  moral 
virtues;  because  they  considered  both  as  neces- 
sary to  form  a  perfect  character,  and  thought  it 
their  duty  to  improve  their  whole  nature,  so  as  to 
make  themselves  useful  and  agreeable;  yet  they 
never  thought  of  confounding,  as  a  late  writer 
endeavoured  to  do,  moral  virtues  with  intellec- 
tual. The  distinction  is  expressed  in -the  clearest 
terms,  by  Aristotle  in  the  bc.2;inning  of  his  cthicks, 
and  by  Cicero  in  his  fifth  book  dc  Jinibu&  bonorum 
ct  malorum. 

514.  Justice  is  said  to  consist  in  the  middle  be- 
tween doing  and  suffering  injury;  as  in  the  case 
of  a  man  selling  a  piece  of  goods  for  as  much  as  it 
is  worth,  and  no  more;  for,  were  he  to  take  less, 
he  would  injure  himself,  and,  were  he  to  take 
more,  he  would  injuie  the  buyer.  But  to  suffer 
injury  by  another's  injustice  is, no  fault,  Ijut  a  mis- 
&>rtunc;  and  therefore,  except  in  some  particular 


Chap.  II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  99 

cases,  justice  is  not  the  medium  between  two  cri- 
minal extremes.  Justice  is  twofold,  namely,  ge- 
neral or  strict  justice,  which  consists  in  observing 
the  laws,  and  the  aim  of  which  is  publick  good; 
and  particular  justice  or  equity,  which  aims  at  the 
good  of  individuals,  and  is  then  observed,  when 
one  obtains  no  more  good,  and  suffers  no  more 
evil,  than  is  agreeable  to  humanity  and  common 
sense.  Justice  is  also  divided  into  distributive  and 
commutative:  the  former  respects  reward  and 
punishment;  the  latter  regulates  the  ordinary 
dealings  of  men  with  one  another. 

515.  Justice  implies  many  virtues.  It  implies 
liberality,  or  mediocrity  with  respect  to  the  use 
of  wealth;  the  defect  is  avarice,  the  excess  prodi- 
gality. It  implies  veracity,  or  adherence  to  truth; 
the  one  extreme  is  said  to  be  dissimulation,  when 
one  conceals  what  is  true;  the  other  simulation, 
when  one  pretends  what  is  false.  But  these  two 
opposite  extremes  are  not  criminal  in  the  same 
degree,  at  least  in  many  cases.  To  conceal  what 
we  know  to  be  true  may  sometimes  be  innocent,^, 
and  sometimes  even  laudable;  as  in  the  case  »f 
our  being  bound  by  oath  or  promise  to  do  so. 
Nor  is  simulation  always  criminal;  to  compose  a 
sick  person's  mind,  or  pacify  a  madman,  one  may 
without  blame  say  what  one  does  not  think.  iJm^ 
tice  further  implies  fidelity  to  promises,  ano'to 


100  ELEMENTS  01  Part  111 

the  trubt  reposed  in  us:  the  defect  is  unfaithful- 
ness: the  excess  has  no  name,  nor  needs  any;  for 
one  cannot  be  too  faithful.  Justice  implies  also 
such  a  regard  to  the  rights  of  our  fellow  crea- 
tures as  prevents  our  doing  them  wrong.  The 
defect  is  injury;  the  excess  needs  not  a  name, 
because  it  never  happens. 

516.  Fortitude  is  a  habit  of  mediocrity  relating 
to  fear  and  confidence.  Its  object  is  evil.  It  con- 
sists in  being  not  insensible  to  evil,  but  superiour 
to  it.  Now  there  are  evils  which  wc  ought  to  fear 
and  guard  against;  namely,  the  evil  of  vice,  and 
such  other  evils  as  it  is  in  our  power  to  prevent. 
Aristotle  therefore  rightly  determines,  that  evils 
which  depend  on  ourselves  are  not  the  objects  of 
this  virtue.  Fortitude  requires,  that  we  should 
not  be  afraid  without  reason:  the  excess  is  fool- 
hardiness;  the  defect  is  called  panick,  unreason- 
able and  unaccountable  fear  being  by  some  of  the 
ancients  ascribed  to  the  influence  of  the  god  Pan. 
Fortitude,  when  its  object  is  real  danger,  may  be. 
called  intrepidity:  the  excess  is  also  termed  fool 
hardiness,  the  defect  is  cowardice.  When  its  ,. 
object  is  pain,  fortitvide  is  called  patience;  the  1 
extremes  are  said  to  be  impatience  on  the  one 
hand  and  insensibility  on  the  other.  But  insensi- 
bility to  pain  is  no  vice  at  all;  and  therefore  pa- 
tience, though  a  virtue,  is  not  the  middle  between 


Chap.  11.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  101 

two  extremes.  Fortitude  in  regard  to  labour  is 
activity;  the  excess  restlessness,  the  defect  lazi- 
ness. Fortitude,  when  injury  is  its  object,  is  for- 
bearance; the  one  extreme  is  implacability,  an 
odious  and  inhuman  vice;  the  other  may  be  called 
stupidity,  which,  though  an  imperfection,  is  not 
criminal,  because  it  depends  on  constitution, 
and  not  on  freewill.  See  more  on  this  subject 
§  339,  &c. 

517.  Tem/ierance  is  a  habit  of  mediocrity  re- 
specting those  appetites  which  man  has  in  com- 
jnon  with  the  brutes;  as  eating,  drinking,  sleep, 
Sec.  and  consists  in  having  moderate  desires,  and 
being  satisfied  with  moderate  gratifications.  The 
defect  is  intemperance;  which  those  men  are 
guilty  of,  who  are  either  immoderate  in  the  use 
of  sensual  pleasure,  or  uneasy  in  the  want  of  it. 
Excessive  t'emperance  cannot  be  reckoned  a 
fault,  unless  when  it  goes  so  far  as  to  injure 
health,  and  when  a  man  means  to  injure  his 
health  by  it:  a  circumstance,  which  may  have 
happened,  but  is  not  likely  to  be  frequent. 

518.  The  stoicks  divided  moral  philosophy 
into  two  parts,  the  speculative  and  the  practical. 
In  the  former  they  inquired  into  the  general  na- 
ture of  good  and  evil;  in  the  latter,  they  explained 
the  several  duties  incumbent  on  mankind  in  the 
various  conditions  of  life.  The  former  is  iiliistra- 

1  2 


102  KLEMENTSOl  PartlH 

ted  by  Cicero  in  his  five  books  de  Jlnibus  honor um 
et  mahrum^  concerning  the  boundaries  of  good 
and  evil;  the  latter  in  his  three  books  of  moral 
duties,  dc  ojficiis.  In  this  last  treatise  he  examines 
t]\c  five  following-  questions;  the  first  and  second 
in  the  first  book,  the  third  and  fourth  in  the  se- 
cond book,  and  the  fifth  in  the  third  book:  fu'st, 
what  is  virtue,  honestum?  Secondly,  of  two  ci^iven 
virtues  which  is  the  greater,  or  more  important? 
Thirdly,  what  is  utility?  Fourthly,  of  tAvo  given 
utilities  which  is  the  greater?  Fifthly,  can  virtue 
and  utiliiy  ever  be  inconsistent?  in  other  words, 
can  it  ever  be  a  man's  interest  to  violate  or  ne- 
glect his  duty?  This  last  question,  though  he 
does  not  discuss  it  with  so  much  precision  as 
could  be  wished,  he  very  properly  determines  in 
the  negative. 

519.  Virtue, /zon^'iY/^7«,  belongs,  not  to  things 
inanimate,  or  to  brutes,  but  to  man.  It  must 
therefore  be  founded  in  those  parts  of  the  human 
constitution  which  arc  peculiar  to  man,  and  dis- 
tinguish him  from  infcriour  beings.  Accordingly, 
Cicero,  having  finished  his  introduction,  begins 
his  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  virtue,  by  drawing  a 
comparison  between  man  and  irrational  animals. 
He  observes,  that  all  animals  have  some  qualities 
in  common,  as  a  desire  of  selfpieservation,  ol" 
avoiding  pain,  of  gratifying  hungmnd  tlnrstand 


Chap.  IT.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  103 

other  natural  appetites,  and  a  certain  decree  of 
attachment  to  their  young.  But  man,  he  says,, 
differs  from  other  animals  in  these  four  respects, 
520.  First,  man  is  rational,  desirous  and  capa- 
ble of  knowledge,  and  a  lover  of  truth;  whence 
arises,  according  to  our  author,  the  virtue  of 
prutlence.  Secondly,  man  is  a  social  and  political 
being;  who  wishes,  not  only  to  live  in  society, 
and  convey  his  thoughts  to  others  by  means  of 
speech,  but  also,  that  the  society  in  which  he 
lives  should  be  moulded  into  a  certain  form,  and 
governed  by  political  institutions  or  laws.  Hence 
arises  social  virtue,  which  is  the  second  of  the 
great  virtues,  and  which  the  author  subdivides 
into  justice  and  beneficence.  Thirdly,  man  loves 
liberty,  and  naturally  aspires  after  excellence  and 
preeminence;  .yet  is  conscious  of  legal  authority? 
and  willing  to  submit  to  it:  on  this  peculiarity  in 
man's  nature  Cicero  founds  the  third  great  virtue 
of  magnanimity  or  fortitude.  Lastly,  man  has  a 
sense,  which  brutes  have  not,  of  elegance,  orders 
and  propriety,  not  only  in  things  external  and 
visible,  but  also  in  the  thoughts  and  emotions  of 
the  mind.  And  hence,  we  are  told,  arises  tempe- 
rance or  modesty,  the  fourth  of  the  great  virtue?:. 
Into  these  four,  prudence,  social  virtue,  fortitude, 
and  temperance,  the  whole  of  human  virtue,  may 
be  resolved;   according  to  the   doctrine  of  the 


104  ELEMENTS  or  Part  Iff. 

stoicks,  as  explained  by  Cicero  in  his  books  de 
officiis. 

521.  It  may  be  proper,  before  we  proceed  to 
practical  ethicks,  to  offer  a  few  brief  observations 
on  some  points  relating  to  the  moral  faculty, 
which  have  been  made  matter  of  controversy 
among  philosophers.  Some  have  maintained,  that 
moral  approbation  is  an  agreeable  feeling,  and 
nothing  more;  and  that  moral  disapprobation  is 
merely  a  disagreeable  feeling.  The  truth  is,  that 
moral  approbation  is  both  an  agreeable  feeling, 
and  also  a  determination  of  judgment  or  reason; 
the  fonncr  following  the  latter,  as  an  effect  fol- 
lows the  cause.  For  the  conduct  of  others,  or  of 
ourselves,  would  not  give  us  an  agreeable yft/Zw^, 
if  we  did  not  first  judge  it  to  be  right;  nor  any 
painful  feeling,  if  we  did  not  first  judge  it  to  be 
wrong.  Feelings  and  determinations  of  judg- 
ment frequently  accompany  each  other:  and 
sometimes,  as  in  the  case  ^ust  now  mentioned, 
the  jvidgmcnt  precedes  the  feeling,  and  gives 
rise  to  it;  and  sometimes  the  feeling  precedes 
and  gives  rise  to  the  judgment;  as  in  the  case  of 
our  judging,  that  external  things,  because  they 
affect  our  senses  in  a  certain  way,  (that  is,  raise 
in  us  certain  feelings),  do  really  exist,  and  are 
what  they  appear  to  be.  In  popular  language 
feelings  and  judgments  arc  too  often  confounded; 


I 


Chap.  II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  lOu 

but  they  are  not  the  same.  Feelings  distinguis^i 
wJiat  is  animated  from  what  is  inanimate;  judg- 
ments, what  is  rational  fi-om  what  is  irrational. 
In  other  words,  all  animals  feel,  rational  beings 
alone  can  judge.  Previously  to  their  acquiring 
the  use  of  reason,  human  creatures  arc  not  con- 
sidered, by  either  the  moralist  or  the  lawL.iver;  as 
moral  beings:  which  could  hardly  be  the  case,  if 
moral  approbation  and  disapprobation  w^re  un- 
derstood to  be  feelings  merely,  and  not  also  ex- 
ertions of  rationality. 

522.  Sensations  and  sentiments  should  also  be 
distinguished,  though  they  too  have  been  con- 
founded by  some  modern  writers.  Opinion,  no- 
tion, judgment,  is  the  true  English  meaning  of 
sentiment^  which  of  course  implies  the  use  of  rea- 
son. Oi  moral  sentiment^  therefore,  we  may  speak 
with  strict  propriety;  but  moral  senmtion  is  not 
proper  English:  and  yet,  if  the  suggestions  of  the 
moral  faculty  were  understood  to  be  mere  feel- 
ings, it  would  seem  captious  to  object  to  it.  In 
French  the  word  sentiment  has  greater  latitude  of 
signification  than  in  English;  and  this  may  have 
led  some  of  our  writers  into  a  licentious  use  of  that 
term.  It  may  be  added,  that  the  same  word  has 
been,  and  often  is,  used  in  another  peculiar  sense, 
to  denote  an  opinion  or  thought  which  greatly 
aftects  or  interests  us.  This,  too,  is  an  innovati«r. 


106  ELEMENTS  OF  Putt  IU= 

in  our  language,  and  seems  to  have  given  rise  to 
various  modes  of  expression,  which,  though  we 
frequently  see  and  hear  them,  it  is  not  easy  to 
explain.  We  have  heard,  not  only  of  men  and 
women  of  sentiment,  (where  perhaps  the  word 
may  mean  tante  or  delicacy).^  and  of  stntimental 
men  and  women,  (which  I  know  not  whether  I 
understand);  but  also  of  sentimental  tales;  and, 
what  is  yet  more  extraordinary,  of  sentimental 
jourtitijs;  which  I  think  should  be  advertised  in 
the  same  paragraph  yvixh  Jihilosofihical  razors, 

523.  Conscience,  like  every  other  human  facul- 
ty, and  suitably  to  the  whole  analogy  of  animal 
and  even  of  vegetable  nature,  arrives  at  maturity 
by  degrees,  and  may  be  either  improved  by  culti- 
vation, or  perverted  by  mismanagement.  In  our 
early  years,  it  is  improved  by  moral  precept  and 
good  example;  and,  as  we  advance  in  life,  by 
habits  of  consideration,  and  a  strict  adherence  to 
trutli  and  our  duty.  By  different  treatment;  by 
want  oi  instruction,  bad  example,  inconsiderate 
Ijchaviour,  neglect  of  duty,  and  disregard  to  truth, 
it  may  be  perverted,  and  almost  destroyed.  From 
this,  however,  we  arc  not  warranted  to  infer,  as 
some  have  done,  that  it  is  not  a  natural  faculty, 
but  an  artificial  way  of  tliinking  superinduced  by 
education;  nor  suppose,  that  opposite  habits,  and 
opposite  modes  of  teaching,  would  have  made  U3 


le  us  I 


•€hap.  II.  ^SrOIlAL  SCIENCE.  107 

disapprove  virtue  and  appix)ve  vice,  with  the  same 
energy  of  thought,  wherewith  we  now  disapprove 
vice,  and  approve  virtue. 

524.  For,  let  it  be  observed,  that  even  our 
outward  senses  may  be  made  better  or  worse,  by 
good  or  bad  management.  Excessive  light,  or 
too  long  continuance  in  darkness,  may  hurt  our 
eyes  irrecoverably;  and,  from  a  companion  who 
squints,  it  is  neither  difficult  nor  uncommon  to 
learn  a  habit  of  squinting:  fever  may  destroy  taste 
and  smell:  even  touch,  or  any  other  faculty,  may 
be  depraved  by  those  disorders  which  we  call- 
nervous;  and  which,  by  injudicious  conduct,  in 
regard  to  food,  study,  or  exercise,  any  man  may 
bring  upon  himself.  Those  powers  also,  which  I 
took  the  liberty  to  call  (perhaps  not  very  pro- 
perly) secondary  senses  (see  §  1  62),  may,  in  like 
manner,  be  either  debased; — a  musical  ear,  for  ex- 
ample, by  continually  hearing  barbarous  musickj 
and  a  taste  for  elegance  and  sublimity,  by  long  ac- 
quaintance with  vulgar  manners,  vulgar  language, 
and  bad  company:  or  imjiroved; — the  former,  by 
hearing  and  studying  good  musick;  and  the  latter, 
by  reading  such  books,  and  keeping  such  compa- 
ny, as  may  make  good  manners,  good  language, 
and  elegant  writing,  familiar  to  us.  Yet  it  cannot 
be  denied,  that  the  external  senses  are  original 
faculties  of  our  nature:  it  cannot  be  denied,  tha^. 


ip8  ELEMENTS  OF  Pai  t  III. 

there  is  in  man,  if  in  any  degree  enlightened,  a 
capacity  of  distinguishing  between  beauty  and 
deformity,  meanness  and  dignity,  grossness  and 
delicacy,  dissonance  and  harmony:  nor  can  it  be 
denied,  that  these  distinctions  have  as  real  a 
foundation  in  nature,  as  any  other  that  can  be 
mentioned. 

525.  Even  reason  itself  (which,  if  we  have  any 
original  faculties,  is  surely  one  of  them),  is  sub- 
ject to  the  same  law  of  habit,  as  the  means  of 
improvement  or  of  debasement.  How  different  is 
this  faculty  in  its  cultivated  state,  as  it  appeared  in 
Newton,  Clarke,  Butler,  (for  example),  or  as  it 
appears  in  any  man  of  leaniing  and  good  sense, 
from  the  unimproved  understanding  of  a  pea- 
sant, who  can  hardly  follow  the  shortest  train  of 
reasoning;  or  from  the  still  ruder  intellect  of  a 
savage,  who  has  never  been  accustomed  to  argu- 
mentation at  all!  What  care  is  taken,  by  judi- 
cious parents  and  teachers,  to  improve  both  the 
moral  and  intellectual  powers  of  children!  Yet  it 
will  not  be  said,  that  reason  is  merely  an  artificial 
thing,  a  way  of  thinking  superinduced  by  educa- 
tion; or  that  human  beings  could,  by  the  most 
artful  management,  be  taught  to  mistake  the 
plainest  truth  for  falsehood,  or  the  most  glaring 
falsehood  for  truth.  Ignorant  people  believe  many 
things  which  are  not  true;  and  may,  no  doubt,  by 


Chap.  II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  109 

those  who  can  infuse  prejudice,  or  work  upon  the 
passions,  be  prevailed  on  to  acquiesce  in  very 
gross  absurdities:  reason,  in  short,  as  well  as 
sense  and  conscience,  may  be  artificially,  or  may- 
be accidentally,  perverted  to  a  certain  degree; 
and,  in  some  minds,  even  to  a  great  degree.  But 
a  total  perversion  of  these  faculties,  needs  not  be 
apprehenjied.  The  most  ignorant  man  will  never, 
if  he  is  not  an  idiot,  be  induced  to  reject  the  evi- 
dence of  sense,  to  disbelieve  the  existence  of  the 
material  world,  to  think  all  human  actions  equally 
right  or  equally  wrong;  or,  in  general,  to  doubt 
the  truth  of  what  is  selfevident,  or  of  what,  by  a 
few  words  of  argument  suited  to  his  capacity,  has 
been  in  his  hearing  demonstrated  to  be  true. 

526.  To  prove  that  moral  sentiments '  arc 
merely  the  effect  of  education,  some  authors 
have  taken  pains  to  collect,  from  the  history  of 
both  civilized  and  savage  men,  a  detail  of  singu- 
lar customs  and  institutions,  which  are  accounted 
lawful  in  some  countries,  and  criminal  in  others. 
Something  of  this  kind  was  attempted  by  Locke, 
in  the  first  book  of  his  essay  on  human  under- 
standing. His  examples,  however,  though  they 
were  all  unexceptionable,  could  prove  nothing 
more,  than  that  conscience  is  liable  to  be,  in  some 
•degree,  influenced  by  habit;  which  nobody  denies: 
but  would  be  far  from  proving,  that  it  is  wholly 

Vol.  VIII.  K 


tl6  ELEMENTS  OP  Part  III. 

subject  to  that  influence.  But  of  those  examples 
it  might  easily  be  shown,  that  some  are  so  bare 
of  circumstances,  that  they  prove  nothing;  that 
some  are  quoted  from  writers  of  doubtful  autho- 
rity; and  that  some,  when  fairly  stated,  will  be 
found  to  prove  just  the  contrary  of  what  they  are 
brought  to  prove.  Till  the  motives  whence  men 
act  be  known,  one  cannot,  with  certainty,  deter- 
mine whether  they  be  actuated  by  a  good  or  a 
bad  principle:  and  to  detect  the  motives  of  those 
savage  men,  of  whose  customs  and  language  lit- 
tle or  nothing  is  known  except  to  themselves, 
would,  in  most  cases,  be  difficult,  in  many,  im- 
possible; and  require  a  degree  of  sagacity  which 
few  travellers  possess,  or  are  solicitous  to  attain. 

527.  Besides,  it  is  a  true  as  well  as  an  old 
observation,  that  most  travellers  are  fond  of  the 
marvellous;  few  of  them  having  that  candour, 
humanity,  and  philosophical  acuteness,  which  so 
eminently  distinguished  that  ornament  of  his 
country  and  profession,  the  incomparable  James 
Cook.  And  I  fear  it  is  no  less  true,  that,  in  an 
age  so  addicted  to  paradox  as  the  present,  too 
many  of  the  readers  of  travels  may  be  well  enough 
pleased  to  see  the  licentious  theories  of  modern 
Europe,  countenanced  by  reports  IVom  the  exr 
tremities  of  Asia.  We  should,  therefore,  as  long 
at  least   as  this  mode  of  thinking  remains  in 


Chap.  II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  1 1  i 

fashion,  be  cautious  of  admitting  with  implicit 
faith  the  first  accounts,  that  may  be  circulated 
among  us,  of  the  immoralities  said  to  prevail  in 
remote  nations.  Some  particulars  of  this  sort, 
which  appeared  in  a  late  collection  of  late  voy- 
ages, have  already,  if  I  am  not  misinformed, 
been  declared  on  good  authority  to  be  unwar- 
rantably exaggerated:  but,  even  supposing  the 
worst  accounts  to  be  true,  we  shall  not  find  that 
they  prove  virtue  an  indeterminate  thing;  or  the 
moral  faculty  a  bias,  either  artificially,  or  acci- 
dentally, impressed  upon  the  mind  by  education 
and  habit. 

528.  We  may  with  good  reason  suppose,  that 
in  savage  life  moral  notions  must  be  few,  the 
sphere  of  human  action  and  human  intellect 
being  there  extremely  limited.  In  childhood  we 
see  the  same  thing  happen  among  ourselves, 
even  where  the  mind  has  been,  in  some  degree, 
expanded  by  education.  But  if  savages  have  any 
moral  notions  at  all,  they  are  not  destitute  of  a 
moral  faculty.  And  if  there  be  friendship  among 
them,  or  natural  affection,  or  compassion  towards 
one  another,  there  must  also  be  mutual  confi- 
dence, gratitude,  goodwill,  and  some  regard  to 
equity;  virtues  which  cannot  be  where  mora} 
principle  is  not.  Nor  can  any  thing  favourable  to 
the  opposite  side  of  the  question  be   inferr€«l 


1 1 2  ELEMENTS  01  Part  Til 

from  their  untowardly  treatment  of  strangers, 
even  of  such  as  visit  them  with  benevolent  pur- 
poses; for  it  is  very  natural  for  them  to  mistake 
strangers  for  enemies;  and  it  is  melancholy  to 
consider  how  often  they  have  found  them  so. 
And  if  they  be,  as  probably  they  all  arc,  enslaved 
more  or  less  to  superstition,  the  immoralities 
and  other  absurdities  thence  resulting,  need  not 
raise  wonder;  for  superstition  ever  was,  and  ever 
will  be,  productive  of  absurd  and  immoral  be- 
iiaviour. 

529.  Against  the  doctrine  here  maintained,  of 
conscience  being,  as  well  as  reason,  a  natural  fa- 
culty  implanted  in  man  by  his  Creator,  it  is  no 
argument,  that,  where  the  objects  of  duty  are 
unknown,  or  where  mistakes  are  entertained 
concerning  their  nature,  man  must  be  liable  to 
misapprehend  his  duty  with  respect  to  those 
objects.  The  objects  of  duty  are,  the  Deity,  our 
fellow  creatures,  and  ourselves.  Give  a  rational 
being  right  notions  of  these,  and  his  moral  faculty 
will  not  permit  him  to  be  ignorant  of  the  duty  he 
owes  them.  Convince  him,  for  example,  that  God 
is  infinitely  wise,  powerful,  good,  and  holy,  the 
'>ourcc  of  happiness,  and  the  standard  of  pcrfec- 
lion;  and  he  cannot  fail  to  hioiu  (whether  his 
firaciice  be  conformable  or  not)  that  it  is  his  duty 
10  love,  fear,  and  obey  so  great  and  glorious  a 


Chap.H.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  113 

being.  Teach  him,  on  the  contrary'-,  that  there 
are  many  gods,  some  capricious  and  foohsb, 
others  a  little  more  intelligent,  some  as  weak 
andjyvicked  as  men,  not  one  of  them  free  from 
imperfection,  and  not  a  few  infamously  profligate, 
and  you  will  make  him  have  the  same  absurd 
notions  which  the  heathen  vulgar  formerly  had, 
of  the  duties  that  men  owe  to  those  gods.  Is  this 
occasioned  by  a  depravity  of  conscience,  or  by  a 
total  want  of  that  faculty?  Is  it  not  owing  to  an 
understanding  perverted  by  misrepresentation 
and  ignorance? 

530.  Consider  the  following  case,  which,  if  not 
exactly,  is  nearly  parallel.  With  the  bodily  eyes 
we  cannot  perceive  what  is  situated  beyond  our 
sphere  of  vision;  and  through  an  impure,  or  un- 
equal medium,  we  must  see  things  discoloured, 
or  distorted.  This  does  not  prove,  either  that  we 
have  no  eyes,  or  that  they  are  fallacious:  nor  does 
this  prove,  that  it  is  education,  or  habit,  which 
teaches  men  to  see  rightly,  or  to  see  wrong.  For, 
without  making  any  change  on  the  visual  organ, 
without  subduing  any  evil  habit  or  prejudice  of 
education,  and  merely  by  purifying  the  medium, 
and  bringing  the  objects  within  our  sphere  of  vi« 
sion,  we  see  tliem  at  once  in  their  natural  colours 
and  proportions.  Similar  mistakes,  with  respect 
to.  social  virtue  and  the  (hnif^s  of  selfgovernmen'-. 


114  ELEMENTS  OF  I'ai  t  II F 

may  be  either  infused  into  the  mind,  by  false  in- 
formation concerning  the  nature  and  end  of  man, 
or  removed  and  rectified,  by  counteracting  false 
information,  and  enforcing  true.  Now,  of  the 
divine  nature,  of  the  end  for  which  men  are  sent 
into  this  world,  of  their  relation  to  God  and  their 
fellow  men,  and  of  the  dispensations  of  providence 
with  respect  to  their  present  and  future  state,  the 
heathen  world  were  very  imperfectly  informed; 
much  more  imperfectly  indeed,  than  many  of 
them  might  have  been,  if  they  had  rightly  im- 
proved the  rational  and  moral  faculties  that  had 
been  given  them.  Need  we  wonder  then  at  the 
imperfection  of  the  best  systems  of  pagan  mo- 
rality? Need  we  wonder  that  pagan  nations,  ac- 
cording as  they  make  a  better,  or  a  worse  use  of 
their  mental  powers,  are  some  of  them  more, 
and  others  less,  enlightened  with  the  knowledge 
of  moral  truth? 

531.  Nor  is  it  any  objection  to  the  prcscn^ 
doctrine,  that  all  sorts  of  wickedness  arc  perpe- 
trated in  civilized  nations.  This  is  a  proof,  that 
there  the  moral  faculty  has  not  so  much  power 
as  it  ought  to  have;  but  this  does  not  prove,  that 
there  the  moral  faculty  does  not  exist,  or  is 
entirely  borne  down  by  fashion  and  bad  example. 
My  argument  requires  me  to  speak  here,  not  oi 
the  fierformancey  but  of  the  acknowledf^ment^  of 


Cliap.H.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  115 

duty:  and  nobody  needs  be  informed,  that  men 
well  instructed  in  all  the  duties  of  life,  act,  too 
often,  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  their  conscience, 
'and  the  known  w  ill  of  God.  Video  meliora  firobo- 
que^  deteriora  sequor^  is  a  confession  which  even 
the  best  men  have  frequent  occasion  to  repeat. 
But  while  the  faults  of  individuals  are  condemned 
by  the  general  voice  of  a  nation,  or  of  the  unpre- 
judiced and  considerate  part  of  mankind,  that 
general  voice  is  prompted  by  the  suggestions  of 
a  moral  faculty,  which,  in  spite  of  bad  example, 
licentious  opinion,  and  absurd  education,  has  been 
able  to  retain  both  its  authority,  and  its  power. 
And  the  conscience  of  the  criminal  himself,  how- 
ever thoughtless  or  hardened  he  may  be  for  a 
time,  seldom  faijs,  sooner  or  later,  to  bear  such 
testimony  against  him,  as  he  finds  it  misery  to 
endure,  and  an  impossibility  to  evade. 

532.  Were  it  necessary  to  bring  further  evi- 
dence, of  conscience  being  not  an  artificial,  but  a 
natural,  way  of  thinking,  and  that  moral  senti- 
ments are  among  men  as  prevalent  and  peniia- 
nent  as  rationality  itself,  I  might  remark,  that 
philosophers  (r^a/ philosophers  1  mean),  however 
they  may  have  differed  in  their  speculative  no- 
tions concerning  the  foundation  of  morality, 
have  not  often  disputed  concerning  the  mierit 
and  demerit  of  particular  virtues  and  vire**;  tha- 


116  ELEISIENTSOF  Part  iff 

in  writings  composed  by  the  -wisest  men  of  re- 
mote antiquity,  and  under  the  influence  of  go- 
vernments and  manners  very  unlike  ours,  moral 
notions  are  exhibited  and  exemplified,  similar 
to,  and  in  many  particulars  the  same  with,  our 
own;  that  in  ancient  poems  and  histories  we  sel- 
dom find  those  personages  proposed  as  patterns 
for  imitation  whom  ive  disapprove,  or  those 
actions  condemned  which  nve  consider  as  merito- 
rious; and  that,  though  it  might  seem  possible 
for  us,  after  undergoing  a  certain  course  of 
discipline,  to  choose  modes  of  life  extremely 
different  from  those  in  which  we  have  been 
educated,  it  seems  not  possible  for  us  to  recon- 
cile our  minds  to  such  characters  as  Nero,  He- 
rod, Catiline,  Muley  Ishmael,  &c.  I  may  add, 
that  moral  sentiments  seem  to  be  necessary  to 
the  very  existence  of  society;  that  no  association 
of  human  beings,  in  which,  invariably,  that  should 
be  believed  to  be  virtue  which  we  account  vice, 
and  that  to  be  vice  which  we  account  virtue,  could 
subsist  for  a  single  day,  if  men  were  to  do  what 
in  that  case  they  would  think  their  duty;  and  that, 
by  consequence,  wherever  human  societies  are 
established,  we  may  warrantably  conclude  that 
moral  distinctions  arc  there  acl;uowledged.  I  do 
not  say,  that  any  ])articular  moral  principle  is 
^!mate,  or  tliat  an  infant  brings  it  into  the  worl{| 


Chap.  II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  117 

^vith  him:  this  would  be  as  absurd  as  to  say,  that 
an  infant  brings  the  multiplication  table  into  the 
world  with  him.  But  I  say,  that  the  moral  faculty 
which  dictates  moral  principles,  and  the  intellec- 
tual faculty  which  ascertains  proportions  of  quan- 
tify and  number,  are  original  parts  of  man's  na- 
ture; which,  though  they  appear  not  at  his  birth, 
nor  for  some  time  after,  even  as  the  ear  of  com 
is  not  seen  till  long  after  the  blade  has  sprung 
up,  fail  not  however,  provided  outward  circum- 
stances be  favourable,  to  disclose  themselves  in 
due  season.* 

533.  Much  has  been  said,  by  writers  on  casuis- 
try, concerning  the  merit  or  demerit  of  those 
actions  which  proceed  from  an  erroneous  con- 
science; that  is,  which  are  authorized  by  a  con- 
science so  perverted  by  education  or  habit,  as  in 
a  particular  case  to  approve  what  is  wrong,  or 

*  This,  and  the  ten  preceding  paragraphs,  contain  the 
general  principles  of  a  treatise  on  the  universality  of  mo- 
ral sentiment,  written  in  1767.  Some  of  the  reasons 
which  then  hindered  me  from  prosecuting  the  subject 
to  its  full  extent,  I  have  given  elsewhere.  Others,  that 
have  prevented  the  prosecution  of  it  since,  might  be 
mentioned.  But  the  detail  of  these  it  would  be  painful 
to  write,  and  not  pleasant  to  read:  therefore  I  suppress 
them.  See  an  essay  on  truth,  page  137,  quarto  edition: 
and  see  the  preface  to  dissertations  moral  and  cvitiral 
printed  in  London  1783. 


118  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  ni. 

disapprove  what  is  right.  On  this  subject  vohimcs 
might  be  written,  and  a  thousand  difficulties  sup- 
posed, which,  probably,  will  never  take  place  in 
fact:  but  the  whole  matter  as  far  as  it  may  be  ex- 
pressed in  general  terms,  amounts  to  little  more 
than  this.  It  is  man's  duty,  not  to  debase  his  rea- 
son by  prejudice,  nor  his  moral  faculty  by  crimi- 
nal practice;  but  to  do  every  thing  in  his  power 
to  improve  his  nature,  and  particularly  to  obtain, 
in  all  matters  that  affect  the  conscience,  the  ful- 
lest information.  If  the  person  who  has  done  this 
shall  mistake  his  duty  after  all,  the  errour  is  un- 
avoidable, and  he  is  not  to  blame.  But  if  he  has 
not  taken  due  pains  to  obtain  information,  or  t-^i 
improve  his  moral  nature,  he  has  no  right,  at 
least  in  ordinary  cases,  to  urge  the  plea  of  an 
erroneous  conscience.  In  fact,  men  seldom  do  so: 
which  is  a  proof  that,  when  Ave  do  evil,  our  con- 
science seldom  fails  to  inform  us,  that  it  is  evil 
which  wc  are  doing. 

534.  It  has  been  the  opinion  of  some  respect- 
able writers,  that  no  action  or  aficction  is  morally 
good,  unless  it  have  a  benevolent  tendency.  And 
it  is  true,  that  every  virtue  tends  to  publick  as  well 
as  private  good;  and  that  whatever  is  done  with  a 
view  to  j)ioniote  happiness,  without  doing  injury, 
is  well  done,  aiid  a  proof  of  goodness  in  the  agent. 
It  is  also  true,  thai  every  act  of  virtue,  even  the 


Chap.  II.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  119 

most  secret  that  we  can  perform,  tends  eventually 
to  the  good  of  others;  either  by  diff  iismg  happi- 
ness immediately,  or  by  improving  our  nature, 
and  consequently  making  us  more  useful  and 
more  agreeable  members  of  the  community.  But 
there  are  in  the  world  many  men,  whose  minds, 
from  natural  weakness,  or  other  unfavourable  cir- 
cumstances, have  ahvays  remained  in  an  un- 
cultivated state;  and  who,  therefore,  must  be  very' 
incompetent  judges  of  publick  good,  as  well  as 
of  the  tendency  of  their  actions  to  promote  it. 
Yet,  if  such  men  are  industrious  and  sober, 
honest  in  their  dealings,  and  regardful  of  their 
duty,  it  would  be  very  hard  to  refuse  them  the 
character  of  virtuous  men. 

535.  Every  moralist  allows,  that  there  are  du- 
ties which  a  man  owes  to  himself:  in  the  deepest 
solitude  we  are  not  exempted  from  religious  and 
moral  obligation.  For  if  a  man  were  in  the  con- 
dition in  which,  according  to  the  fable,  Robinson 
Crusoe  is  said  to  have  been,  and  confined  for 
many  years  in  a  desert  island,  without  having  it  in 
his  power  to  do  either  good  or  harm  to  others  of 
his  species,  he  would,  according  to  the  measure 
of  rationality  that  had  been  given  him,  be  as  really 
a  moral  being,  and  accountable  to  God  and  his 
conscience  for  his  behaviour,  as  if  he  were  in  the 
most  crowded  society.  In  such  a  solitude,  it  would 


120  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  lit. 

be  in  his  power  to  be  in  various  ways  virtuous  or 
vicious.  He  might  impiously  repine  at  the  dis- 
pensations of  providence,  or  he  mig:ht  acquiesce 
in  them  with  thankfulness  and  humility.  He  might 
lead  a  life  of  industry,  or  abandon  himself  to  idle- 
ness and  all  other  sensualities  that  were  within 
liis  reach.  He  might  envy  the  prosperity  of 
others,;  and  amuse  himself  with  laying  plans  for 
their  destruction;  or  pray  for  their  happiness,  and 
wish  for  opportunities  of  promoting  it.  In  a  word, 
benevolence  is  not  the  only  virtue:  but  I  admit, 
that  there  can  be  no  virtue  M-ithout  it. 

536.  The  stoicks,  who  were  much  given  to 
wrangling,  and  in  many  things  affected  to  differ 
from  popular  opinion,  maintained,  that  all  virtues 
are  equally  meritorious,  and  all  vices  equally 
blamable.  As  one  truth  (said  they)  cannot  be  more 
true  than  another,  nor  one  falsehood  more  false 
than  another,  so  neither  can  one  vice  or  virtire  be 
greater  or  less  than  another  vice  or  virtue.  As  he 
who  is  a  hundred  miles  from  Home  is  not  more 
really  out  of  Rome  than  he  who  is  one  mile  from 
it,  so  he  who  has  transgressed  tlie  bounds  of  in- 
nocence is  c(]ually  a  transgressor,  whether  he  has 
gone  a  great  way  beyond  them,  or  a  little  way. 
Some  crimes,  however,  they  allowed  to  deserve 
a  heavier  pimishmcnt  than  otiiers;  but  that,  they 
said,  was  owing,  not  to  the  comparative  greatness 


Chap.U.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  121 

of  one  crime  above  another,  but  to  this  considera- 
tion, that  one  crime  might  be  more  complex  than 
another.  For  example:  he  who  murders  a  slave 
is  as  really  a  murderer  as  he  who  commits  parri- 
cide: but  the  former  is  guilty  of  one  injurious  act, 
the  other  is  guilty  of  many;  the  one  has  killed  a 
man;  the  other  has  killed  a  man,  has  killed  his 
parent,  has  killed  his  benefactor,  has  killed  his 
teacher.* 

537.  Such  a  tenet  may  be  useful  to  declaimers; 
as  one  may  argue  long,  and  plausibly,  in  behalf 
of  it:  but  plausible  declamation  is  of  no  weight, 
■when  counterbalanced  by  the  general  opinion  of 
mankind,  as  warranted  by  conscience  and  reason. 
What  would  be  thought  of  a  lawgiver  who  should 
declare  every  violation  of  the  law  a  capital  crime; 
or  v/ho,  because  some  transgressions  are  venial, 
should  grant  pardon  to  every  transgressor?  The 
best  man  on  earth  is  every  day  guilty  of  sins  of 
infirmity;  but  who  will  say,  that  all  the  sins  of  this 
sort,  which  a  good  man  commits  in  the  course  of 
a  long  life,  are  equal  in  guilt  to  one  single  act  of 
treachery  or  cruelty!  Every  vice  is,  indeed, 
blamable;  and  every  virtue,  which  it  is  in  our 
power  to  perform,  we  ought  to  perform:  but  it 
may  be  presumed,  that  the   possible  degrees  of 

*  Cic.  Paradox,  See  Hor.  Sat.  i.  3. 
Vol.  VIII.  I. 


1212  ELEMENTS  OP,  kc  J»ait  III. 

guilt,  which  one  may  incur  even  by  single  acts 
of  transgression,  are  as  many  as  the  possible  de- 
grees of  punishment;  and  that  the  possible  de- 
grees of  virtue  are  as  various  as  the  possible  de- 
grees of  reward.  Though  all  men  are  sinners, 
yet  some  are  highly  respectable  on  account  of 
their  goodness:  and  there  are  crimes  so  atrocious, 
perjury  for  example,  that  one  single  perpetration 
makes  a  man  infamous.  The  scripture  expressly 
declares,  that,  in  the  day  of  judgment,  it  will  be 
more  tolerable  for  some  criminals  than  for  others; 
and  not  obscurely  insinuates,  that  the  future  ex- 
amination of  the  righteous  will  be  in  proportion 
to  their  virtue. 


qHAPTER  in. 

Of  the  Js'ature  and  Foundation  of  Particular 
Virtues. 

Every  duty  has  an  object;  and  the  objects 
of  duty  are,  the  Deity,  our  fellow  creatures,  and 
ourselves.  Into  three  classes,  therefore,  man*s 
moral  duties  may  be  divided. 


SECTIGfN  I. 
Of  Piety,  or  the  Duties  Ave  owe  to  God. 

538.  The  first  part  of  piety  is,  to  form  right 
notions  of  God,  as  the  t^reatest,  wisest,  and  best 
of  beings.  All  men,  who  are  capable  of  reflection, 
must  be  sensible,  that  this  is  a  matter  of  infinite 
importance:  for  if  our  opinions  concerning  him 
are  erroneous,  our  sentiments  of  the  duty  we 
owe  him  will  be  so  too,  and  our  whole  moral 
nature  must  be  perverted.  Every  considerate 
person,  therefore,  will  be  careful  to  obtain  the 
fullest  information  possible  with  respect  to  the 


124  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  IIL 

divine  existence  and  attributes.  To  be  indiffer- 
ent about  this,  m  hich  is  beyond  comparison  the 
most  important  part  of  knowledge,  is  inexcus- 
able; and  the  ignorance  is  criminal  which  pro- 
ceeds from  such  indifference.  And  if  ignorance 
of  God  was  without  excuse  in  some  ancient 
heathen  nations,  as  the  scripture  warrants  us  to 
believe,  it  must  be  highly  criminal  in  us,  who, 
both  from  reason  and  from  revelation,  have  the 
best  means  of  knowing  what  God  is,  and  what  he 
requires  us  to  beheve  Concerning  him.  How  far 
the  deplorable  condition  of  many  of  the  human 
race,  with  respect  to  false  religion,  barbarous 
life,  and  an  exclusion  hitherto  unsurrnountable 
from  all  the  means  of  intellectual  improvement, 
may  extenuate,  or  whether  it  may  not,  by  virtue 
of  the  great  atonement,  entirely  cancel  the  im- 
perfection of  those  to  whom,  in  this  world,  God 
never  was,  or  without  a  miracle  could  be,  known, 
we  need  not  inquire.  It  is  enough  for  us  to 
know,  that  for  our  ignorance  we  can  plead  no 
such  apology;  and  that  the  righteous  judge  of  all 
the  earth  will  never  impute  to  his  creatures  mis- 
fortune and  miseiy,  w  hich  they  neither  did  bring 
upon  themselves,  nor  could  avert  when  brought; 
especially  that  greatest  of  all  misfortunes,  invin- 
4ible  ignorance  of  God  and  their  duty. 

^>Z[\  The   second  part  of  piety  is.  to  clierish 


i 


J 


Chap.  CI.  JIORAL  SCIENCE.  125' 

right  affections  suitable  to  those  right  notions  of 
ihe  divine  nature.  These  affections  are,  venera- 
tion of  his  infinite  and  incomprehensible  great- 
ness: adoration  of  his  wisdom  and  power;  love  of 
his  goodness  and  mercy;  resignation  to  his  will; 
gratitude  for  his  innumerable  and  inestimable 
benefits;  a  disposition  to  obey  cheerfully  all  his 
laws;  fear,  in  the  apprehension  of  his  displeasure; 
joy,  in  the  hope  of  his  approbation;  and  a  desire 
to  imitate  ^him  as  far  as  we  are  able,  and,  with 
well  meant,  though  weak  endeavours,  to  second 
the  purposes  of  his  providence,  by  promoting  the 
virtue  and  happiness  of  our  fellow  creatures.  They 
w4io  believe  in  the  infinite  goodness,  greatness, 
wisdom,  justice,  and  power  of  the  Supreme  Being, 
will  acknowledge,  that  these  glorious  attributes 
do  naturally  call  forth,  and  ought  reasonably  to 
call  forth,  the  pious  affections  above  mentioned; 
and  that,  not  to  cultivate  those  affections,  or  to 
encourage  evil  passions  inconsistent  with  them, 
must  be,  in  the  highest  degree,  criminal  and  un- 
natural. 

540.  A  third  part  of  piety  is  worship;  or  the 
outward  expression  of  these  pious  affections  in 
suitable  words  and  behaviour.  Of  this  great  duty, 
I  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  is  quite  na- 
tural. Good  affections,  when  strong,  as  all  the 
pious  affections  ought  to  be,  have  a  tendency  to 

L2 


126  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  111 

express  themselves  externally:  where  this  does 
not  appear,  there  is  reason  to  apprehend  that  the 
affections  are  weak,  or  wanting.  If  a  man  is  grate- 
ful to  his  benefactor,  he  will  tell  him  so;  if  no 
acknowledgments  are  made,  and  no  outward 
signs  of  gratitude  manifest  themselves,  he  will 
be  chargeable  with  ingratitude.  When  we  ad- 
mire the  wisdom,  and  love  the  goodness  of  a  fel- 
low creature,  we  naturally  show  him  respect, 
and  wish  to  comply  with  his  will,  and  recommend 
ourselves  to  his  favour;  and  we  speak  of  him,  and 
to  him,  in  terms  of  esteem  and  gratitude:  and  the 
greater  his  wisdom  and  goodness,  the  more  we  are 
inclined  to  do  all  this.  Now,  God's  wisdom  and 
goodness  are  infinite  and  perfect;  and,  if  we  vener- 
ate these  attributes  as  we  ought  to  do,  it  will  be 
neither  natural  nor  easy  for  us  so  to  conceal  that 
veneration,  as  to  prevent  its  discovering  itself 
externally.  It  is  true,  that  the  omniscient  Being 
knows  all  our  thoughts,  whether  we  give  them 
utterance  or  not:  but,  if  expressing  them  from 
time  to  time  in  words  is  by  him  required  of  us 
as  a  duty;  if  it  is  beneficial  to  ourselves;  and  if, 
as  an  example,  it  has  good  effects  on  our  fellow 
men;  no  argument  can  be  necessary  to  prove  the 
j)ropriety  of  the  practice. 

541.  Let  it  therefore  be  considered,  that  wor- 
ship, properly  conducted,  tends  greatly  to  our 


Chap.  HI.  MORAL  SCIENCE  127 

improvement  in  every  part  of  virtue.  To  indulge 
a  pious  emotion,  to  keep  it  in  our  mind,  to  me- 
ditate on  its  object,  and  with  reverence  and  in 
due  season  to  give  it  vocal  expression,  cannot  fail 
to  strengthen  it:  whereas,  by  restraining  the  out- 
ward expression,  and  thinking  of  the  emotion, 
and  its  object,  seldom  and  slightly,  we  make  it 
weaker,  and  may,  in  time,  destroy  it.  Besides, 
the  more  we  contemplate  the  perfections  of  God, 
the  more  we  must  admire,  love,  and  adore  them, 
and  the  more  sensible  we  miust  be  of  our  own 
degeneracy,  and  of  the  need  we  have  of  pardon 
and  assistance.  And  the  wishes  we  express  for 
that  assistance  and  pardon,  if  they  be  frequent 
and  sincere,  will  incline  us  to  be  attentive  to  oui 
conduct,  and  solicitous  to  avoid  what  may  offend 
him.  These  considerations  alone  would  recom- 
mend external  worship  as  a  most  excellent 
means  of  improving  our  moral  nature.  But 
christians  know  further,  that  this  duty  is  ex- 
pressly  commanded;  and  that  particular  blessings 
are  promised  to  the  devout  performance  of  it.  In 
us,  therefore,  the  neglect  of  it  must  be  inexcus- 
able, and  highly  criminal. 

542.  It  being  of  so  great  importance,  we  ought 
not  only  to  practise  this  duty  ourselves,  but  also 
by  precept  and  example,  avoiding  however  all 
ostentation,  to  entourage  others  to  do  the  same. 


128  ELEMENTS  OF  Pact  HI. 

Hence  one  obligation  to  the  duty  of  social  and 
publick  worship.  But  there  are  many  others.  One 
arises  from  the  nature  and  influence  of  sympathy, 
by  which,  as  formerly  observed  (§  221),  all  our 
good  affections  may  be  strengthened.  To  join 
Avith  others  in  devotion  tends  to  make  us  devout, 
and  should  be  done  for  that  reason.  Besides, 
publick  worship,  by  exhibiting  a  number  of  per- 
sons engaged,  notwithstanding  their  different 
conditions,  in  addressing  the  great  Father  of  all, 
and  imploring  his  mercy  and  protection,  must 
have  a  powerful  tendency  to  cherish  in  us  social 
virtue,  as  well  as  piety.  The  inequalities  of  rank 
and  fortune,  which  take  place  in  society,  render 
it  highly  expedient,  and  even  necessary,  that 
there  should  be  such  a  memorial,  to  enforce  upon 
the  minds  of  men,  that  they  are  all  originally 
equal,  all  placed  in  the  same  state  of  trial,  all 
liable  to  tlic  same  wants  and  frailties,  and  all 
equally  related,  as  his  accountable  creatuies,  to 
the  supreme  Govcrnour  of  the  universe.  Hence 
let  the  mean  learn  contentment,  and  the  great 
humility;  and  hence  let  all  learn  charity,  meek- 
ness, and  mutual  forbearance. 

543.  By  associating  together  men  are  much 
improved  both  in  temper  and  understanding. 
Where  they  live  separate,  they  are  generally 
sullen  and  selfish,  as  wc!his  ic,qiorant:  "v^'hen  they 


Chap.  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  129 

meet  frequently,  they  become  acquainted  with 
one  another's  characters  and  circumstances,  and 
take  an  interest  in  them;  acquire  more  extensive 
notions,  and  learn  to  correct  their  opinions,  and 
get  the  better  of  their  prejudices:  they  become, 
in  short,  more  humane,  more  generous,  and 
more  intelligent.  Were  it  not  for  that  rest  which 
is  appointed  on  the  first  day  of  the  week,  and  the 
solemn  meetings  which  then  take  place  for  the 
purposes  of  social  worship  and  religious  instruc- 
tion, the  labours  of  the  common  people,  that  is 
of  the  greatest  part  of  mankind,  would  be  insup- 
portable; most  of  them  would  live  and  die  in 
utter  ignorance,  and  those  who  are  remote  from 
neighbours  would  degenerate  into  barbarians. 
Bad  as  the  world  is,  there  is  reason  to  think  it 
would  be  a  tnoiisand  times  worse,  if  it  were  not 
for  this  institution;  the  wisdom  and  humanity  of 
which  can  never  be  sufficiently  admired;  and 
which,  if  it  were  as  strictly  observed  as  it  is 
positively  commanded,  would  operate  with  singu- 
lar efficacy  in  advancing  publick  prosperity,  as 
well  as  pri^te  virtue. 

544.  It  is  our  duty  to  be  devout,  not  at  certain 
tim.es  only,  but  at  all  times;  that  is,  to  be  con- 
stantly sensil)ie  of  our  dependence  on  God,  of  the 
mercies  we  every  moment  receive  from  him,  of 
*whe  gratitude,  obedience,  and  resignation  due  t*> 


130  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  ITT 

him,  and  of  our  being  continually  in  his  presence. 
These  sentiments,  habitually  cherished  in  our 
minds,  would  very  much  promote  our  virtue  and 
happiness;  by  keeping  us  at  a  distance  from 
criminal  pursuits,  and  giving  an  exquisite  relish 
to  every  innocent  pleasure.  Let  it  not  be  sup- 
posed, that  words  are  essential  to  devotion.  Every 
day,  indeed,  they  may  be  necessary  to  assist 
devotion,  and  render  pious  sentiments  so  definite 
and  so  comprehensive,  as  to  impress  upon  us 
with  energy  the  several  parts  of  our  duty.  But 
pious  emotion  may  rise  in  the  mind,  when  there 
is  no  time  for  utterance;  or  when  words,  by 
savouring  of  ostentation  or  hypocrisy,  might  be 
very  unseasonable. 

545.  The  vices,  I  should  rather  say,  the  crimes 
opposite  to  piety,  and  destructive  of  it,  are  athe- 
ism, impiety,  superstition,  and  enthusiasm.  On 
the  atrocious  nature  of  the  first,  I  made  some  re- 
marks already  (§  407).  It  is  either  a  disbelief  of, 
or  an  attempt  to  make  others  disbelieve,  the 
divine  existence  and  attributes:  the  former  may 
be  called  speculative  atheism,  the  latter  is  prac- 
tical atheism:  both  imply  hardness  of  heart,  and 
perversion  of  understanding;  the  latter  implies 
also  incurable  vanity,  and  maligjilty  in  the  ex- 
treme. It  has  been  doubted,  whether  any  rational 
being  can  be  really  an  atheist;  and  I  should  be 


Chap.  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  131 

inclined  to  think  speculative  atheism  impossible, 
if  I  had  not  met  with  some,  and  heard  of  more, 
instances  of  practical  atheism:  which  last,  though 
both  are  very  great,  is  undoubtedly  the  greater 
enormity  of  the  two,  and,  perhaps,  the  greatest 
of  which  man's  nature  is  capable. 

546.  Impiety  consists  in  neglecting  to  cultivate 
pious  affections;  or  in  cherishing  evil  passions  of 
an  opposite  tendency;  or  in  being  guilty  of  such 
practices,  by  word  or  deed,  as  may  lessen  our  own 
or  otlier  men's  reverence  of  the  divine  attributes, 
providence,  or  revelation.  If  we  neglect  the  means 
of  cultivating  pious  affection,  it  is  a  sign  that  in 
us  piety  is  weak,  or  rather  wanting;  and  that 
we  are  regardless  of  our  own  improvement,  and 
insensible  to  the  best  interests  of  mankind.  Want 
of  pious  affection  is  a  proof  of  great  depravity. 
When  infinite  goodness  cannot  awaken  our  love, 
nor  almighty  power  command  our  reverence; 
when  unerring  wisdom  cannot  raise  our  admira- 
tion; when  the  most  important  favours,  continu- 
ally and  gratuitously  bestowed,  cannot  kindle  our 
gratitude;  how  perverse,  how^  unnatural  must  we 
bel  In  order  to  guard  against  these  and  the  like 
impieties,  we  shall  do  well  to  meditate  frequently 
on  the  divine  perfections,  and  on  our  own  deme- 
rit, dependence,  and  manifold  infirmities.  Thus, 
-^ve  may  get  the  better  of  pride  and  selfconceit> 


132  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

passions  most  unfriendly  to  piety;  and  form  our 
minds  to  gratitude,  humility,  and  devotion.  But, 
instead  of  this,  if  we  cherish  bad  passions  of  a 
contrary  nature,  or  allow  ourselves  in  impious 
practice;  if,  at  any  time,  we  think  unworthily  of 
our  Creator;  if  we  use  his  name  in  common  dis- 
course without  reverence;  if  we  invoke  him  to  be 
the  witness  of  what  is  false  or  frivolous;  if  we 
practise  cursing;  and  swearing,  or  any  other  mode 
of  speech  disrespectful  to  his  adorable  majesty; 
if  by  serious  argument  we  attempt  the  subversion 
of  religious  principles;  or  if,  by  parody  or  ludi- 
crous allusion,  wc  endeavour  to  make  scriptural 
phraseology  the  occasion  of  merriment.  In  any 
of  these  cases,  we  too  plainly  show,  that  our 
minds  arc  familiarized,  more  or  less,  to  impiety, 
and  in  great  danger  of  utter  depravation. 

547.  Superstition  and  enthusiasm,  as  they  arise 
from  the  same  cause,  that  is,  from  false  opinions 
concerning  Deity,  are  to  be  removed  by  the  same 
means,  namely,  by  correcting  those  false  opinions, 
and  establishing  true.  They  difier  in  this,  how- 
ever, that  the  former  is  more  apt  to  infect  weak 
and  timorous  minds,  and  the  latter,  such  as  arc 
proud  and  i)rcsuniptuous;  and  therefore  the  cure 
will  not  be  complete,  unless  there  be  infused  into 
the  distempered  soul,  animation  and  comfort  in 
'.he  one  case,  and  humility  and  modesty  in  the 


Chap.  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  133 

other.  Superstition  assumes  different  appear- 
ances, according  to  the  diversity  of  those  false 
opinions  which  men  may  entertain  of  invisible 
beings;  and  as  the  varieties  of  falsehood  are  in- 
numerable, those  of  superstition  must  be  so  too. 

548.  To  think  that  the  world  is  governed  by  a 
being,  or  by  beings,  capable  of  deriving  gratifica- 
tion from  vengeance,  and  from  making  inferiour 
natures  unhappy,  produces  one  hideous  form  of 
superstition,  wholly  enslaved  to  cruelty  and  fear, 
which  prompts  the  poor  idolater,  in  order  to  pa- 
cify his  demons,  to  the  most  absurd  and  unnatural 
mortifications,  or  even  to  the  murder  of  human 
creatures,  under  the  denomination  of  sacrifice. 
To  suppose  that  God  takes  pleasure  in  particular 
doctrines,  that  contradict  the  clearest  intimations 
of  reason,  produces  a  superstitious  zeal  in  pro- 
moting such  doctrines,  with  contempt,  hatred,  or 
perhaps  persecution  of  those  who  refuse  to  say 
that  they  believe  them.  To  imagine,  that  he  ad- 
mires or  approves  what  some  vain  mortals  term 
magnificence,  produces  another  kind  of  supersti- 
tion, that  delights  in  pageantries,  processions, 
and  the  like  mummeries,  which  raise  the  wonder 
of  children,  and  of  men  who  think  like  children. 
To  believe,  that  he  governs  the  world,  not  by  his 
own  eternal  rules  of  rectitude,  but  by  caprice  and 
humour,  which  are  perpetually  changing;  and 

Vol.  VIII.  M 


134  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  IH. 

admits  other  beings,  and  some  of  the  most  con* 
temptible  that  can  be  conceived,  to  share  with 
him  in  that  government;  makes  men  supersti- 
tions in  regard  to  dreams,  omens,  witches,  spec- 
tres, enchantments,  and  other  ridiculous  things, 
which  can  never  have  any  influence  on  a  mind 
thoroughly  convinced,  and  seriously  considering, 
that  he  rules  all  nature,  and  that  without  his  per- 
mission nothing  can  happen.  But  it  were  endless 
to  enumerate  the  varieties  of  su])erstition.  The 
history  of  man  affords  too  many  examples.  Let 
it  be  our  care  to  fortify  our  minds  by  a  steady 
belief  in  the  one  true  God;  and  by  cherishing 
that  humble  cheerfulness,  perfectly  consistent 
with  pious  fear,  which  arises  from  being  resigned 
to  his  will,  and  satisfied  that  all  his  dispensations 
are  wise  and  good. 

549.  Entliusiasm,  when  the  word  denotes,  as  it 
often  docs,  elevation  of  mind,  ardour  of  fancy,  or 
keenness  of  attachment,  may  be  not  only  innocent, 
but  laudable:  seldom  has  any  great  undertaking 
been  accomplished  without  it.  The  enthusiasm 
here  to  be  considered,  as  detrimental  to  piety,  is 
a  presumptuous  conceit,  which  some  weak,  arro- 
gant, and  selfish  people  have  entertained,  of  their 
being  holier  than  others,  and  more  the  favourites 
of  heaven.  This  turn  of  mind,  which  has  also 
Necn  called  spiiitual  pride,  is  productive  of  many 


Chap.m.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  135 

hateful  passions  and  perversities;  of  uncharitable- 
ness,  contempt  of  virtue,  and  a  spirit  of  persecu- 
tion. No  man  is  truly  pious  but  he  who  is  humble, 
distrustful  of  himself,  anxious  to  do  good  to  others, 
and  willing  to  think  of  them  as  favourably  as  pos- 
sible. We  cannot  be  too  much  on  our  guard 
against  vice,  and  can  hardly  blame  it  too  severely 
in  ourselves;  but  our  abhorrence  of  it  should 
never  make  us  abhor  our  felloiv  creatures.  We 
have  no  right  to  consider  any  of  them  as  re- 
nounced by  heaven.  Though  their  wickedness  be 
great,  (and  we  are  not  always  competent  judges 
of  its  magnitude),  it  is  our  duty  to  believe  that 
God,  while  he  supports  their  lives,  is  willing  to 
be  reconciled  to  them;  as  he  allows  them  the 
opportunity  of  repentance. 

550.  Many  are  the  considerations  that  should 
move  us  to  compassion  and  charity  towards  our 
unhappy  brethren  who  fall  into  vice.  How  can  we 
know,  at  least,  in  many  cases,  whether,  in  the 
moment  of  transgression,  they  enjoyed  the  full 
use  of  their  rational  faculties?  or  how  judge  of 
the  strength  of  their  passions,  or  the  precise  na- 
ture of  the  temptation?  Perhaps  they  have  not 
had  the  means  of  so  good  education  as  may  have 
fallen  to  our  lot,  or  of  keeping  so  virtuous  com- 
pany as  we  have  kept.  How  do  we  know,  in 
short,  whether,  iif  we  had  been  all  alone;  in  t.hcii- 


136  ELEMENTS  01  Part  UI 

circumstances,  and  they  in  ours,  their  conduct 
would  not  have  been  as  good  as  ours,  or  even 
better,  and  ours  as  bad  as  theirs,  or  even  vv^orse? 
As  to  our  own  supposed  attainments  in  moral 
goodness;  the  moment  v,c  are  conscious  of  any 
decree  of  pride  on  account  of  them,  we  may  be 
assured  they  are  not  genuine.  The  further  a  man 
advances  in  real  virtue,  the  more  he  will  feel 
and  regret  his  own  imperfection,  and  the  more 
candid  and  charitable  he  will  become  in  judging 
of  other  men. 


SECTION  ir. 

Of  Social  \irtuc;  or  the  Unties  Avhicli  Men  owe  to  one 

anoUic;-. 

551.  Of  our  passions,  and  other  active  princi- 
ples, some  prompt  us  to  do  harm  to  one  another, 
and  others  to  do  good:  social  virtue  consists  in 
restraining  and  regulating  the  former,  and  che- 
rishing the  latter.  Of  the  former  sort  is  resent- 
ment, or  sense  of  injury;  a  passion,  innocent  in 
itself,  because  natural;  and  useful,  because  it 
makes  men  stand  in  awe  of  one  another;  but  apt 
to  become  criminal  by  excess,  or  by  being  other- 
wise perverted.  Too  keen  a  sense  of  injiiry,  to  be 
more  offended  thiU)  it  is  reasonable  we  should  bt 


Chap.  III.  MORAL  SCIENCB.  137 

is  one  abuse  of  resentment,  and  frequently  arises 
from  pride,  in  which  case  it  is  very  blamable: 
when  owing,  as  it  sometimes  is,  to  a  peculiar 
irritability  of  nerves,  the  effect  of  bad  health  per- 
haps, or  of  misfortune,  it  is  less  faulty;  but  ought, 
however,  to  be  guarded  against,  because  it  gives 
pain  to  others,  and  makes  a  man  unhappy  in 
himself.  A  worse  abuse  of  resentment  is  revenge; 
^vhich,  as  has  been  already  shown,  would,  if  ge- 
nerally practised,  introduce  endless  confusion, 
without  answering,  at  least,  in  civilized  society, 
any  one  good  purpose.  Other  abuses  of  resent- 
ment are,  passionateness  and  peevishness,  which 
also  have  been  taken  notice  of,  (see  §  364). 
Among  Bishop  Butler's  Sermons  there  is  an 
excellent  one  upon  resentment,  to  which,  for 
further  particulars,  I  refer  the  reader. 

552.  Opposite  to  all  abuses  of  resentment  are, 
goodnature,  an  amiable  virtue;  and  forgiveness, 
a  virtue  not  amiable  merely',  but  sublime,  and 
godlike.  He  who  is  possessed  of  these  virtues 
will  find,  that  they  contribute,  in  a  very  high 
degree,  to  his  peace,  interest,  and  honour,  even 
in  this  world:  without  them,  in  the  next,  no  hap- 
piness is  to  be  expected;  our  religion  having 
most  emphatically  declared,  that  unless  we  for- 
give others  we  cannot  be  forgiven.  Few  tempers 
are  less  respectable,  than  the   unforgiving  and 

M2 


1 S  8  ELKME^  I'S  OF  Part  IH. 

litigious;  who  easily  take  offence,  and  would 
prosecute  every  injury  to  the  utmost;  or  who  are 
gratified  by  giving  others  that  trouble,  for  which 
they  think  the  law  will  not  punish  them-  A  mo- 
dern poet*  has  the  following  sentiment,  and  is 
applauded  for  it  by  a  modern  sophister.  "  Virtue, 
^'  for  mere  goodnature  is  a  fool,  is  sense  and  spi- 
<^  rit  with  humanity."  It  might  have  been  said, 
with  equal  propriety  and  precision,  "  Virtue,  is 
"  Greek  and  Latin  with  humanity.'*  Sense  and 
spirit,  Latin  and  Greek,  may  no  doubt  serve  as 
auxiliaries  to  virtue,  but  they  may  also  promote 
the  purposes  of  vice;  and  are,  therefore,  neither 
moral  virtues,  nor  parts  of  moral  virtue.  And  if 
goodnature  be  folly,  what  shall  we  say  of  illna- 
uire?  Is  it  wisdom?  Or  what  shall  we  say  of  good 
men  (for  they  are  all  goodnatured)?  Arc  they 
fools?  It  would  be  difficult  to  mention  a  case,  in 
which  a  man's  character,  on  our  being  told  that 
he  is  goodnatured,  would  be  lowered  in  our  es- 
teem. The  contrary  never  fails  to  happen,  except, 
perhaps,  among  bullies,  and  other  barbarians. 

553.  That  principle,  which  restrains  malevolent 
passions,  by  disposing  us  to  render  to  every  one 
his  own,  is  called  juslirc:  a  principle  of  great  ex- 
'  Mit.  and  which  may  n(jt  improperly  be  said  to 

*  Ai  iii^.'rnnp. 


Chap.  m.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  139 

form  a  part  of  every  virtue;  as  in  every  vice  there 
is  something  of  injustice  towards  God,  our  fellow 
men,  or  ourselves.  As  far  as  our  fellow  men  are 
concerned,  the  great  rule  of  justice  is,  "  whatso- 
"  ever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  unto  you,  do 
"  you  even  so  to  them:"  a  precept,  which,  in  this 
its  complete  form,  we  owe  to  the  gospel;  and 
which,  for  its  clearness  and  reasonableness,  foi> 
being  easily  remembered,  and,  on  all  occasions, 
easily  applied  to  practice,  can  never  be  too  much 
admired.  Veracity,  adherence  to  promises,  dis- 
charge of  trust,  and  all  the  duties  comprehended 
in  fidelity,  or  faithfulness,  are  parts  of  justice, 
and  are  to  be  regulated  by  this  divine  rule. 

554.  Of  the  second  class  of  social  duties,  which 
consist  in  the  indulgence  of  those  affections  that 
incline  us  to  do  good  to  others,  the  first  is,  to 
cherish  benevolence,  charity,  or  love,  to  all  man- 
kind without  exception.  We  are  all  by  nature 
brethren,  placed  in  the  same,  or  in  similar,  cir- 
cumstances, subject  to  the  same  wants  and  in- 
firmities, endowed  with  the  same  faculties,  and 
equally  dependent  on  the  great  Author  of  our 
being;  we  cannot  be  happy  but  in  the  society  of 
one  another;  and  from  one  another  we  daily 
receive,  or  may  receive,  important  services. 
These  considerations  recommend  the  great  duty 
of  universal  benevolence,    which   is   not   iizor^ 


140  ELEMENTS  OF  Paitlll. 

beneficial  to  others  than  to  ourselves;  for  it  makes 
us  happy  in  our  own  minds,  and  amiable  in  the 
eyes  of  all  who  know  us;  it  even  promotes  bodily 
health,  and  it  prepares  the  soul  for  every  virtuous 
impression:  while  malevolent  passions  debase  the 
understanding,  harden  the  heart,  and  make  a  man 
disagreeable  to  others,  and  a  torment  to  himself. 
A  second  duty  of  this  class  is  compassion,  or 
that  sympathy  which  prompts  us  to  relieve  the 
distresses  of  one  another:  and  a  third  is  gratitude, 
which  makes  us  anxious  to  requite  the  favours 
we  may  have  received.  Of  these  I  have  formerly 
spoken.  Ciood  men  are  entitled  to  peculiar  love 
and  esteem.  He  who  does  good  to  one  person, 
fram  a  benevolent  principle,  lays  an  obligation 
on  the  whole  species;  for  he  shows  that  he  has  the 
interest  of  mankind  at  heart,  and  he  sets  a  good 
example.  Our  love  of  good  men,  therefore,  par- 
takes of  the  nature  of  gratitude:  to  be  destitute  of 
it  is  a  proof  of  such  depravity,  as  even  profligates 
would  be  ashamed  of. 

555.  Patriotism,  or  love  of  our  country,  has,  in 
all  ages,  under  free  governments  at  least,  been 
accounted  a  sublime  virtue.  It  is  natural,  and  cx- 
Icnsivcly  useful;  for,  as  Cicero  well  observes,  all 
those  chaiities,  all  those  affections  of  goodwill, 
which  we  bear  to  Jelations,  friends  and  bcnefac- 


Chftt>.  Ill-  MORAL  SCIENCE.  141 

tors,  are  comprehended  in  it.*  It  elevates  the 
mind,  and  promotes  generosity,  fortitude,  benevo- 
lence, and  a  sense  of  honour.  Even  by  the  ties 
of  gratitude  we  are  bound  to  defend,  as  far  as  we 
are  able,  the  government  that  has  protected  us 
and  our  fathers.  The  best  proof  that  people  in 
private  station  can  give  of  love  to  their  country^ 
is,  to  promote  peace,  and  set  an  example  of  piet) ;, 
industry,  and  moderation.  A  vicious,  selfish,  or 
turbulent  man  has  nothing  of  this  love,  however 
violent  his  pretensions  may  be. 

556.  It  becomes  us  to  have  a  particular  I'egard 
for  those  who  are  connected  with  us  by  kindred, 
by  friendship,  by  neighbourhood,  or  as  members 
of  the  same  society.  This  is  natural;  for  we  are 
apt  to  contract  attachments  to  those  whom  we  see 
often,  or  vnth  whom  we  have  intercourse:  and  it 
is  beneficial;  as  it  promotes  the  good  of  small 
societies,  whereof  the  great  community  of  man- 
kind is  made  up.  But  neither  this,  nor  even  the 
love  of  our  country  itself,  should  ever  interfere 
with  the  still  greater  duty  of  universal  benevo- 
lence. A  stranger,  nay  an  enemy,  is  entitled  to 
our  good  offices:  "  If  thine  enemy  be  hungry, 
"  feed  him;  if  thirsty,  give  him  drink.*'  It  is 
our  duty  to  defend  our  country,  and  maintain 
■its  laws  and  liberties;  even  as  it  is  incumbent  on 

*  De  Officiis,  i.  17. 


142  ELEMENTS  OF  PartllT 

each  individual  to  take  care  of  himself,  of  those 
who  depend  on  him,  and  of  those  whom  he  has 
it  in  his  power  to  protect  from  injury;  but 
neither  individuals,  nor  nations,  have  any  right 
to  raise-themselves,  by  injuriously  pulling  others 
down. 

557.  The  last  of  these  duties  to  be  mentioned 
ut  present  (for  some  of  them  have  come  in  our 
way  formerly,  and  others  will  hereafter),  is  the 
natural  affection  of  parents  and  children;  which 
in  a  greater  or  less  degree  prevails  through  the 
whole  of  animated  nature,  with  some  exceptions 
in  those  irrational  tribes,  where  it  is  not  necessary 
to  the  preservation  of  the  young.  1  express  my- 
self improperly,  when  I  mention  this  as  a  duty, 
and  at  the  same  time  speak  of  irrational  animals 
as  possessed  of  it:  it  is  a  duty  in  those  only  who 
have  a  sense  of  duty,  that  is,  who  are  endowed 
with  a  moral  faculty.  Natural  affection  is  in  brutes 
an  instinct  merely;  a  very  amiable  one,  it  must  be 
acknowledged  to  be,  but  nothing  more:  in  rational 
animals  it  is  both  an  instinct  and  a  duty;  and, 
when  exerted  in  action,  a  virtue.  Human  infants 
are  far  more  helpless,  and  much  longer  so,  than 
any  other  young  animals,  and  require  much 
more  education;  for  they  must  be  trained  up,  ncyt 
only  fur  animal  life,  and  taught  how  to  support 
'hcniselvc's  in  the  world  (all  which  the  brutes 


Chap.  III.  MOKAL  SCIENCE.  143 

know  by  instinct),  but  also  for  a  right  performance 
of  the  many  duties  incumbent  on  them  as  rational 
and  immortal  beings.  In  the  human  species, 
therefore,  natural  affection  is,  and  ought  to  be, 
peculiarly  strong,  and  to  continue  through  the 
whole  of  life.  In  other  animals,  it  lasts  while  the 
young  are  unable  to  provide  for  themselves,  and, 
for  the  most  part,  no  longer. 

558.  Unless  when  exerted  in  unfavourable  cir- 
cumstances, or  in  a  very  exemplary  manner, 
(and  these  peculiarities  enhance  the  merit  of  any 
virtue),  the  performance  of  this  duty  is  not  con- 
sidered as  a  proof  of  great  moral  goodness;  the 
motives  to  it  being  almost  irresistible.  But,  for 
the  same  reason,  the  neglect  of  it  incurs  the 
heaviest  censure.  An  unnatural  parent  is  a  cha- 
racter that  raises  not  only  disapprobation,  but 
horrour;  nor  less  odious  is  an  undutiful  child: 
indeed  it  is  not  easy  to  determine,  which  of  the 
two  is  the  more  detestable.  The  former  counter- 
acts one  of  the  best  and  most  powerful  instincts 
of  animal  nature,  is  at  no  pains  to  avert  perdition 
from  those  whom  he  has  been  instrumental  in 
bringing  into  the  world,  and  manifests  a  total 
disregard  to  the  good  of  society,  which  would 
soon  become  a  chaos  of  misery,  if  parents  were 
not  attentive  to  the  great  duty  of  educating  their 
children.  The  undutiful  child  hardens  his  heart 


144  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

no  less  against  the  calls  of  natural  affection; 
shows  that  he  can  hate  his  best  friends,  and  be 
ungrateful  for  the  most  important  favours;  and 
is  guilty  of  the  most  barbarous  cruelty,  in  wound- 
ing the  sensibility,  and  blasting  the  hopes  of  a 
parent,  to  whom,  in  the  emphatick  language  of 
a  poet  who  understood  human  nature,  "  a  ser- 
"  pent's  tooth  is  not  so  sharp  as  to  have  a  thank- 
^^  less  child."  To  which  I  may  take  the  liberty 
to  add,  that  of  the  undutiful  children  whom  it 
lias  been  my  misfortune  to  see,  or  hear  of,  not 
one  ever  came  to  eood. 


SECTION  m. 

Of  the  Duties  which  a  Man  owes  to  himself. 

J 59.  It  is  every  man's  duty  to  avoid  idleness, 
to  follow  some  useful  calling,  and  to  take  care  of 
his  life  and  health.  All  this  we  owe  to  society,  as 
well  as  to  ourselves:  for  sclfpreservation  is  one 
of  our  most  natural  and  most  powerful  principles; 
and  without  activity  there  can  be  no  happiness; 
and  without  industry  neither  individuals  nor 
society  can  prosper.  Industry  is  always  praise- 
worthy; common  degrees  of  it,  however,  are  not 
highly  praised:  it  is  generally  considered  as  its 


Chap  Iir.  MOTIAL  SCIENCE.  145 

OAvn  reward,  its  natural  effects  beir^g  competency 
and  convenience.  The  motives  to  it,  tlierefore, 
are  so  powerful,  and  withal  so  obvious  to  every 
person  of  sense,  that  in  complying  with  them 
there  can  be  no  extraordinary  merit.  Idleness 
being,  in  like  manner,  its  own  punishment,  and 
generally  ^ccoaipanied  with  want,  disease,  and 
contempt,  is  the  object  of  pity,  as  Avell  as  disap- 
probation; and  when  these  have  the  same  object, 
the  former  mitigates  the  latter.  We  blame  idle- 
ness, we  despise  the  man  who  is  enslaved  to  it, 
and  keep  at  a  distance  from  him;  but  for  the  most 
part,  do  not  entertain  towards  him  those  emo- 
tions of  indignation,  which  rise  within  us  on 
hearing  of  cruel,  ungrateful,  or  perfidious  be- 
haviour. 

560.  Uncommon  industry,  however,  or  ex- 
treme idleness,  give  greater  energy  to  our  moral 
sentiments.  They  who  labour  incessantly,  and 
more  than  their  own  wants  require,  in  improving 
useful  arts,  are  entitled  to  general  admiration  and 
gratitude.  To  such  persons  statues  have  been 
erected,  and  other  publick  honours  decreed;  and, 
in  the  days  of  idolatry,  even  divine  honours  have 
been  paid.  Such  industry  comprehends  many 
virtues;  activity,  rational  selflove,  superiority  to 
sensual  indulgence,  benevolence,  patriotism,  and 
a  desire  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  talents,  and 

VoL.VllI.  N 


146  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

other  blessings,  conferred  by  providence  on  man- 
kind. The  reverse  oi  uli  this  must  be  imputed  to 
that  man,  uho,  deaf  to  every  call  of  honour  and 
fiiendship,  of  social  love    and  natural  affection, 
abandons  himself  to  sloth;   and  can  bear  to  sec 
]us  dependents  miserable,  his  friends  in  affliction, 
and  himself  infamous  and  useless,  rather  than  dis- 
eng-age  himself  from  that  shameful  habit.    Such 
a  man,  though  he  should  not  be  guilty  of  those 
^normilies  that  draw  down  the  vengeance  of  hu- 
nan  law,  must  have  in  him  so  much  evil,  that  it 
a  impossible  not  to  consider  him  as  a  criminal  of 
he  first  magnitude.  The  compassion,  which  his 
.  retchedness  may  extort  from  us,  he  docs  not  de- 
crve:  for  it  will  generally  be  found,  that  persons 
)f  this  character  derive  from  their  idleness,  and 
even  from  their  infamy,  every  gratification  they 
wish  for;  and  that  they  rather  glory  in  their  vilc- 
Mcss,  than  are  ashamed  of  it. 

561.  Tliis  topick,  so  interesting  to  young  peo- 
ple, I  cannot  dismiss  without  further  illustration. 
So  active  a  being  is  the  human  soul,  that,  in  the 
opinion  of  many  philosopliers,  it  can  never  rest. 
Certain  it  is,  that  without  employment  it  cannot 
escape  misery;  and  that,  if  it  employ  not  itself  in 
good,  it  will  in  evil.  To  the  welfare  of  both  the 
soul  and  the  body  activity  is  essential.  Man  was 
made  for  labour;  and  they  who  do  not  lake  to 


Cliap.  Iir.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  147 

from  necessity,  must  either  use  it  for  recreation 
in  the  way  of  hunting,  riding,  walking;  or  mus-; 
pine  in  indolence,  a  preyjto  melancholy  and  dis- 
ease. A  sluggish  body  .is  always  unhealthy;  a 
lethargick  mind  is  always  unhappy.  In  the  higher 
ranks  of  life,  people  who  are  neither  engaged  ir^ 
business,  nor  anxious  to  improve  Jieir  minds  h\ 
study,  are  often  put  to  hard  shifts  in  their  at 
tempts  to  kill  the  time,  an  !  keep  away  trouble- 
some thoughts.  They  have  recourse  to  feasting, 
drinking,  gaming;  they  employ  thensseivcs  in 
receiving  and  retailing  scandal,  and  the  lies, 
which  they  call  the  news,  of  the  day;  or  in  a 
perpetual  hurry  of  visits,  that  promote  neither 
friendship  nor  rational  discourse;  or  in  running 
to  shows,  and  other  scenes  of  dissipation;  and  too 
frequently,  it  is  to  be  feared,  in  pursuits  still 
more  criminal,  in  seducing  their  fellow  creatures 
to  infamy  and  ruin.  I  appeal  to  any  man  of  sense, 
whether  it  would  not  have  been  better,  both  for 
their  souls  and  bodies,  in  this  world  as  well  as 
in  the  next,  if  they  had  laboured  all  their  days  to 
earn  a  livelihood?  and  whether  the  condition  of 
the  honest  plowman,  or  industrious  mechanick, 
is  not,  in  every  respect,  more  happy,  and  more 
honourable;  more  free  from  danger  and  disap- 
pointment; and  less  exposed  to  the  tyranny  ox 
unruly  passion,  and  unsatisfied  appetite"* 


148  ELEMENTS  or  Part  111. 

5  62.  Idleness,  at  any  period  of  life,  is  dan- 
j:5eious  to  virtue;  but,  in  youth,  is  more  to  be 
dreaded  than  at  any  other  season:  and,  therefore, 
it  is  peculiarly  incumbent  on  young  persons  to 
guard  against  it.  For  in  youth  the  active  powers 
are  awake  and  restless,  and  will  prompt  to  evil, 
if  a  sphere  of  operation  is  not  prescribed  them 
within  the  limits  of  innocence.  In  youth  the  pas- 
sions are  turbulent,  and  the  love  of  pleasure 
strong;  and  as  experience  and  knowledge  are 
scanty,  and  foresight  superficial,  men  want  many 
of  those  monitors  to  caution  and  rectitude,  which 
;.re  the  usual  attendants  of  riper  years.  In  youth 
the  mind  yields  easily  to  every  new  impression, 
and  to  those  in  particular  that  promote  intempe- 
rate emotions.  In  short,  in  youth  men  are  head- 
strong, fickle,  vain,  selfsufficient,  averse  to  con- 
sideration, intent  on  the  present  moment,  regard- 
less of  the  future,  and  forgetful  of  the  past,  and 
therefore  more  in  danger  from  temptation,  and 
from  idleness.  I  mean  not  to  write  a  satire  on 
youth,  or  to  say  that  from  the  above  account 
there  are  no  exceptions:  1  know  there  arc  many. 

But  I  need  not  hesitate  to  affirm,  that  idleness  in 
youth  is  never  followed  by  a  respectable  old  age. 
llubils  then  contracted  take  deep  root;  and  habits 

if  inattention  it  is  almost  ijii possible  to  eradicate. 
50?) .  Anotlicr  duty  which  a 'man  owes  both  Oj 


Chap.  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  149 

himself  and  to  societVj  is  temperance,  (see  §  5 17). 
Merely  to  be  temperate  requires  no  great  effort; 
which  makes  intemperance  (considering  its  con- 
sequences, whereof  no  person  can  be  ignorant) 
the  more  inexcusable.  Men,  habitually  inten)pe- 
rate,  justly  forfeit  the  esteem  of  their  fellow 
citizens;  because  they  disqualify  themselves  for 
every  duty,  and  prepare  themselves  for  the  vio- 
lation of  every  law:  for,  whether  they  become 
stupid  by  gluttony,  or  frantick  with  drunkenness, 
they  show  themselves  equally  insensible  to  the 
dignity  of  their  nature,  and  to  the  calls  of  honour 
and  duty.  Savage  and  half  civilized  people  are 
addicted  to  these  vices;  which,  as  men  improve 
in  arts  and  manners,  become  more  and  more 
mifashionable.  This,  however,  is  not  equally  the 
case  in  all  civilized  countries. 

564.  The  Athenians  loved  wine  and  dancing; 
the  Romans,  in  their  better  days,  were  temperate 
and  sedate.  Cicero  says,  in  his  oration  for  Mure- 
na,  that  no  man  dances  who  is  not  either  drunk 
or  mad:*and  it  is  remarkable,  as  the  same  author- 
in  another  place  observes,  that  of  an  entertainment 
the  Greek  name  (symfiosium)  denotes  drinking 
together^  and  the  Latin  name  (^conviviiuii)  living 
together.  In  the  Symposium  of  Plato,  at  which 
Socrates,  and  other  distin^^uished  characters,  arc 
^.aid  to  be  present,  it  is  proposed  to  enter  on  some 

N  ? 


150  ELEMENTS  OF  Pun  III. 

philosophical  inquiry,  in  order  to  avoid  excess  in 
drinking:  and,  befpre  the  end  of  the  comfiotatioii^ 
Alcibiades  comes  in  very  noisy,  and  very  drunk; 
and  Aristophanes  shows,  by  repeated  hiccoughs, 
that  he  had  both  drank  and  eaten  too  much.  In 
some  Grecian  states,  however,  the  laws  were  se- 
vere ai^ainst  ebriety.  Pittacus  of  Lesbos  ordered, 
that  every  crime  committed  by  a  drunk  man 
should  incur  two  punishments;  the  one  due  to 
the  crime,  the  other  to  the  intoxication:  which, 
thougii  not  accordhig  to  the  principles  of  strict 
morality,  was,  however,  no  bad  political  expe- 
dient. In  France  and  Italy,  and  among  the  better 
sort  of  people  in  England,  drunkenness  is  hardly 
known;  and  in  Scotland  we  begin  to  improve  in 
this  respect,  as  in  many  others,  by  the  example 
of  our  southern  neighbours. 

5  65.  As  habits  of  intoxication  arc  not  soon  or 
-  usily  acquired,  being  in  most  constitutions,  es- 
pecially in  early  yeai^,  accompanied  with  fits  of 
fever  and  headach,  young  persons  may  easily  guard 
against  them.  I  have  sometimes  met  with  those 
wiio  had  made  it  a  rule  never  to  drink  any  thing 
stron|,;er  than  water,  Avho  were  respected  on  that 
A(M-y  account;  who  enjoyed  health  and  strtngtlu 
and  vigour  of  mind,  and  gaiety  of  heart,  in  an  un  - 
fonimon  degree;  and  \\cre  so  far  from  consider- 
ng  thenjsclvcs  as  under  any  painful  restraint,  thu; 


Chap.  111.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  151 

they  assured  me  they  had  no  more  inclination  to 
taste  wine,  or  strong  drink,  than  I  could  have  to 
eat  a  nauseous  medicine.  If  I  could  prevail  on 
my  young  friends  (for  whose  sake  I  scruple  not 
to  digress  a  little  now  and  then)  to  imitate  the 
example,  I  should  do  much  good  to  their  souls 
and  bodies,  their  fortunes  and  intellects;  and  be 
happily  instrumental  in  preventing  a  thousand 
vices  and  follies,  as  well  as  many  of  those  infir- 
mities which  beset  the  old  age  of  him  who  has 
given  way  to  intemperance  in  youth. 

566.  Persons  of  delicate,  or  broken  constitu- 
tions, may  find  it  necessary  to  follow  the  apostle's 
advice  to  Timothy,  and  take  a  little  wine  for  their 
stomach's  sake:  but  how  much  happier  and  more 
independent  would  they  have  been,  if  they  had 
never  needed  such  a  cordiall — which  might  pos- 
sibly have  been  the  case,  if  in  youth  they  had  been 
uniformly  and  rigorously  temperate.  The  apostle 
seems  to  intimate,  that  liquors  which  may  produce 
inebriation,  are  to  be  used  as  medicines  only.  Let 
this  be  kept  continually  in  view;  and  then  we 
shall  make  no  account  of  those  rants  in  praise  of 
wine,  which  we  find  in  Anacreon,  and  other 
drunken  poets;  w  ho,  that  their  own  follies  might 
be  the  less  apparent,  wished  to  make  their  readers 
as  foolish  as  themselves.  I  shall  only  add,  that 
'rabits  of  intoxication,  as  wril  as  of  idleness,  arc 


152  ELEMENTS  OJ  Part  III. 

at  every  age  most  pernicious;  but,  if  contracted 
in  youth,  seldom  fail  to  end  in  utter  profiigacy, 
or  early  death,  or  perhaps  in  both.  Older  sinners 
may  have  a  reserve  about  them,  and  a  caution, 
that  shall  perhaps  in  part  prevent,  at  least  for  a 
time,  some  of  the  bad  effects  of  their  vices.  But 
when  the  natural  fire  of  youth  is  inflamed  by  ha- 
bitual intemperance,  Avhcn  the  imprudence  of  that 
period  is  heightened  into  frenzy,  every  principle 
of  honour  and  modesty  may  be  borne  down,  and 
the  person  become  useless,  odious,  and  miserable. 
567.  There  is  one  wickedness,  which  may  be 
referred  to  this  class;  and  which,  though  it  must 
raise  the  most  lively  compassion,  or  rather  the 
most  exciuisite  sorrow,  in  consideration  of  what 
the  unhappy  being  must  have  suffered  before 
committing  it,  and  may  suffer  after,  is  yet  the 
object,  not  only  of  disapprobation,  but  of  horrour; 
and  that  is  suicide.  When  selfdestruction  pro- 
ceeds from  insanity  which  one  has  not  brought 
on  one's  self,  it  is  no  more  a  crime,  than  a  man*s 
throwing  himself  from  a  window  in  the  delirium 
of  a  fever;  but  if  it  be  the  elfect  of  intemperance, 
atheism,  gaming,  disappointment  in  any  unjusti- 
fiable pursuit,  or  dissatisfaction  with  the  dispen- 
nations  of  Providence,  it  is,  of  all  enormities,  the 
most  unnatural  and  atrocious;  being,  with  respect 
n  God,  an  act  of  the  most  presumptuous  impiety. 


Chap.  111.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  153 

precluding,  if  the  death  be  sudden,  repentance, 
and  consequently  the  hope  of  pardon;  with  respect 
to  dependents  and  friepds,  most  cruel  and  unge- 
nerous; and,  -with  respect  to  the  perpetrator,  cow- 
ardly in  the  extreme.  Rebun  in  advcrsis  facile  est 
contemner  e  vita7n,  For  titer  ille  facit  qui  miser  esse 
potest.  It  is  indeed  so  shocking  to  nature,  that 
we  can  hardly  conceive  it  possible  for  any  person, 
in  his  perfect  mind,  to  be  guilty  of  it.  And  our 
laws  are  willing  to  suppose  (for  by  the  laws  of 
most  civilized  nations  it  has  been  prohibited)  that 
in  almost  all  cases  it  is  madness,  and  cannot  take 
place,  till  man,  by  losing  his  reason,  ceases  to  be 
an  accountable  being. 

568.  It  is  our  duty  to  embrace  every  opportu- 
nity of  improving  our  nature  in  all  its  pans,  for 
in  all  its  parts  it  is  improvable;  and  every  im- 
provement tends  to  both  private  and  pubhck 
good,  which  it  is  surely  every  man's  business  to 
promote.  As  far,  therefore,  as  we  are  able,  we 
ought  to  keep  our  bodies  so  decent  in  their  ap- 
pearance, as  that  they  may  give  no  offence;  and, 
by  means  of  temperance  and  exercise,  so  healthy, 
and  so  active,  as  that  they  may  be  in  a  condition 
to  obey  the  mind,  and  to  execute  what  reason 
declares  to  be  expedient,  and  conscience  to  be 
incumbent.  The  faulty  extremes  to  be  avoided 
?.re,  first,  a  finical  attention  to  dress,  complexion, 


1 64  ELEMEMSUI  Pan  HI. 

and  attitude;  and,  secondly,  such  anxiety  about 
health  and  the  means  of  it,  as  may  give  unneces- 
sary trouble  to  attenda^ts^or  associates.  A  manly 
spirit  loves  simplicity,  and  does  not  mind  trifles, 
nor  seeks  to  move  superfluous  pity  by  unscason- 
.ible  wailing,  "or  by  ostentatious  pretences  of  cau- 
tion to  assume  the  air  of  superiour  sagacity. 

569.  The  cultivation  of  our  ijitellectual  p-owera 
IS  a  duty  siill  more  important.  These,  in  propor- 
tion as  they  arc  improved,  are  ornamental  to  our 
nature,  and  qualify  us  for  being  serviceable  to 
ourselves,  our  friends,  the  community,  and  man- 
kind. Let  us,  therefore,  be  continually  solicitous 
to  acquire  kno)vledge,  strengthen  our  memory, 
rectify  our  judgment,  and  refine  our  taste;  by 
reading  good  books  and  those  only;  by  accurately 
observing  what  passes  in  the  world  around  us;  by 
studying  the  works  of  nature,  and  elegant  per- 
formances in  art;  by  meditating  on  the  real  nature 
of  things,  and  the  causes  and  consequences  of 
human  conduct,  as  they  occur  in  history  and 
common  life;  by  avoiding  frivolous  pursuits, 
trifling  discourse,  and  unprofitable  theory;  and 
by  losing  no  opportunity  of  profiting  by  the  con- 
versation and  example  of  wise  and  good  men. 
To  neglect  the  acquisition  of  wisdom,  when  the 
means  of  it  arc  in  our  power,  is  always  followed 
by  a  bitter,  and  generally  unavailing,  repentance. 


Cliap.  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  155 

This  is  at  least  the  case,  where  the  mind  retains 
any  moral  sensibility:  how  it  may  fare  with  those 
w4iose  faculties  have  become  torpid  with  idle- 
ness or  profligacy,  we  need  not  inquire. 

570.  A  third  duty  of  this  class,  still  more  im- 
portant, and  indeed  the  most  important  of  all,  is 
to  use  every  means  of  improving  our  moral  na^ 
lure;  th^t  being  the  business  for  which  we  were 
sent  into  this  world,  and  on  which,  our  happiness, 
through  eternity,  will  depend  As  means  of  moral 
improvement,  we  ought  constantly  to  be,  as  has 
been  often  observed  already,  attentive  to  our  con- 
duct, not  to  our  actions  only,  but  also  to  our 
thoughts,  passions,  and  purposes;  to  reflect  upon 
them  daily,  with  a  fixed  resolution  to  reform 
what  has  been  amiss;  and  carefully  to  avoid 
temptation  and  bad  company.  Of  bad  company 
indeed,  the  fascinations,  if  we  give  way  to  them 
ever  so  little,  are  so  powerful,  and  assault  our 
frail  nature  from  so  many  quarters  at  once,  that 
it  is  hardly  possible  to  escape  their  influence; 
our  minds  must  be  tainted  by  them,  even  though 
there  should  be  no  apparent  impurity  in  our  out- 
ward behaviour.  For,  from  our  proneness  to  imi- 
tation, we  come  to  act,  and  even  think  like  those 
with  whom  we  live;  especially  if  we  have  any  affec- 
tion for  them:  and  bad  men  have  often  agreeable 
qualities,  which  may  make  us  contract  such  a 


156  ELEMENTS  OF  P:irt  IIF. 

liking  to  them,  as  shall  incline  us  to  be  partial 
even  to  the  exceptionable  parts  of  their  character. 
Then,  the  fear  of  giving  offence,  or  of  being 
ridiculed  for  singularity;  the  sophistries  by  which 
wicked  men  endeavour  to  vindicate  their  conduct; 
and  the  habit  of  seeing  or  hearing  vice  encouraged, 
or  virtue  disregarded;  all  conspire,  by  lessening 
our  abhorrence  of  the  one,  and  our  reverence  for 
the  other,  to  seduce  into  criminal  practice  and 
licentious  principle. 

571.  Merely  because  it  is  his  duty,  a  good  man 
will  sometimes  do  good:  he  will  relieve  distress, 
when,  perhaps,  his  compassion  is  not  very  strong; 
he  may  be  regular  in  his  religious  performances 
when  his  devotion  is  not  so  fervent  as  it  ought  to 
be  Nothing,  surely,  i§  more  laudable,  than  to 
do  what  we  know  to  be  our  duty;  but  if  we  can, 
at  the  same  time,  call  up  the  correspondent  good 
affection,  the  devotion,  for  example,  or  the  coni- 
])assion,  we  shall,  by  so  doing,  both  improve  our 
moral  nature, and  give  double  force  to  the  virtuous 
motive.  Yet,  let  not  a  man  be  discouraged,  if, 
on  some  occasions,  the  good  affection  is  not  so 
lively  as  he  wishes  it  to  be;  let  him  do  the  good 
action  notwithstanding,  if  conscience  command  it; 
for  whatever  is  thus  done  is  virtue:  and  frequent 
repetitions  of  the  action,  from  this  principle,  will 


Cl.ap.Iir.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  157 

in  time  produce,  or  strengthen,  the  good  affection 
■which  he  is  anxious  to  cuhivate. 

572.  In  like  manner,  when  we  act  in  compli- 
ance with  a  good  affection;  when  we  relieve  dis- 
tress because  pity  impels  us;  requite  a  favour 
when  prompted  by  gratitude;  do  good  to  another 
from  a  desire  of  seeing  him  happy;  still  let  the 
performance  be  enforced  by  this  consideration, 
that  such  is  our  duty.  But  even  this  is  not  all:  to 
constitute  true  christian  virtue,  good  affections, 
disposing  to  good  actions,  and  accompanied  too 
with  a  sense  of  duty,  are  not  sufficient  without  the 
aid  of  another  principle,  and  that  is  piety.  The 
love  of  God  ought  continually  to  predominate  in 
the  mind,  and  give  to  every  act  of  duty  grace  and 
animation.  Christians  do  what  is  right,  not  only 
because  good  affections  prompt  them  to  it,  and 
because  their  conscience  declares  it  to  be  incum- 
bent; but  also  because  they  consider  it  as  agree- 
able to  the  will  of  God,  to  please  whom  is  ever 
their  supreme  desire. 

573;  From  every  occurrence  in  life  let  us  take 
occasion  to  practise  some  virtue,  and  cherish 
some  good  habit.  Few  occurrences  are  so  unin- 
teresting as  to  call  forth  no  affection;  most  of 
them  excite  either  a  good  or  a  bad  one.  Adver- 
sity may  make  us  discontented,  or  it  may  teach 
humility  and   patience;   affliction    may  dispose 

VoL.VIIL  O 


158  ELEMENTS  OF,  Sec.  Part  III. 

either  to  pious  resignation,  or  to  impious  repin- 
ing; prosperity  may  inflame  sensuality  and  pride, 
or  may  supply  the  means  of  exercising  modera- 
tion, beneficence,  and  gratitude  to  the  Giver  of 
all  good;  injury  may  provoke  hatred  and  reVenge, 
or  call  forth  the  godlike  virtues  of  forbearance 
and  forgiveness;  solitude  may  infuse  laziness,  or 
afford  leisure  for  industry;  and  the  bustle  of  busy 
life  may  form  habits  of  cunning  or  candour,  of 
selfishness  or  generosity.  On  these,  and  all  other 
occasions,  let  us  shun  tlie  criminal,  and  embrace 
the  virtuous,  affection.  And  let  us  study  our  own 
temper,  and  so  anticipate  the  events  of  life,  as  to 
be  always  ready  to  turn  in  this  manner  every  oc- 
currence to  good  account,  and  make  it  subser- 
vient to  the  cultivation  of  our  moral  nature.  To 
our  moral  improvement  the  regulation  of  the 
passions  and  imagination  is  most  essential;  but 
that  subject  was*  already  before  us.  Here,  there- 
fore, wc  conclude  ethic ks,  the  first  part  of  moral 
philosophy. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

PART  n. 

OF  FXONOMICKS. 


ELEMENTS 

OF 

MORAL  SCIENCE. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

PART  SECOND. 
OFECONOMICKS. 

574.  VV  E  are  now  to  consider  human  beings  as 
members  of  a  family,  which  is  the  foundation  of 
all  civil  society,  and  comprehends  the  three  re- 
lations of  husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child, 
master  and  servant.  The  duties  belonging  to 
these  relations  are  so  well,  and  so  generally  un- 
derstood, that  they  need  not  be  here  specified; 
but  connected  with  them  are  some  controverted 
points,  whereof  I  shall  attempt  a  brief  examina- 
tion. Among  the  inferiour  animals,  the  union  of 
the  sexes  is  temporary  and  casual;  the  passions 
that  prompt  to  it  being  periodical,  and  the  young 
soon  able  to  provide  for  themselves.  But  human 

O  2 


162  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  111 

infants  being,  of  all  animals,  the  most  helpless, 
stand  most  in  need  of  education  and  parental 
care.  For  man,  in  his  conduct,  is  guided,  not  by 
unerring  instinct,  as  the  brutes  are,  but  by  his 
own  reason;  which,  if  well  cultivated,  will  lead 
him  right,  but  if  neglected  or  perverted,  may 
lead  him  wrong. 

573.  Of  all  this,  man,  being  by  nature  com- 
passionate, as  well  as  endowed  with  reason,  re- 
flection and  foresight,  can  hardly  fail  to  be  sensi- 
ble. It  is  therefore  natural  that  he,  even  in  savage 
life,  should  have  a  certain  degree  of  attachment 
to  his  child,  and  its  mother,  and  do  what  he  can 
to  assist  and  defend  them.  Hence  it  seems  rea- 
sonable to  suppose,  that  marriage,  under  one 
form  or  other,  would  take  place,  even  where  not 
many  laws  had  been  established  w  ith  regard  to  it: 
and  this  is  in  fact  the  case.  Exceptions  may 
peniaps  be  found,  among  the  worst  sort  of 
savages;  but  those  are  not  consideral)le  enough 
to  affect  the  present  argument.  In  civilized  na- 
tions, the  matrimonial  union  must  appear  a  mat- 
ter of  very  great  importance;  being,  indeed,  the 
ground  work,  not  only  of  all  decency  and  domes* 
tick  virtue,  but  of  all  good  government  and  regu- 
lar society.  Were  we  to  hear  of  a  nation  inwliich 
tht'vc  is  no  such  thint';  as  marriage,  we  should 


Part  in.  MOKAL  SCIENCE.  163 

pronounce  that  nation   to  be  in  a  state  of  the 
q;rossest  barbarity. 

576.  The  principles  of  this  union  may  be  re- 
duced to  five:  first,  that  tendency,  which  belongs 
to  animal  nature  in  general,  towards  the  continua- 
tion of  the  species:  secondly,  that  love  or  esteem, 
which  arises  from  the  view  of  good  qualities,  in 
another:  thirdly,  benevolence  or  friendship  pro- 
ceeding from  this  iove:  fourthly,  a  natural  affec- 
tion to  children:  and,  lastly,  a  regard  to  one's  own 
happiness.  As  these  principles  are  natural,  and 
among;  mankind  universal,  and  tend  to  produce 
this  union,  and  actually  have  produced  it  in  all 
ages,  we  must  believe  it  to  be  the  intention  of 
Providence,  that  they  should  produce  it:  which 
will  be  still  more  evident  to  him  who  considers 
the  peculiar  and  very  different  characters,  where- 
by nature  has  discriminated  the  two  sexes;  and 
which,  even  in  the  amusements  of  male  and 
female  children,  begin  very  early  to  distinguish ' 
themseh'es.  The  ends  of  this  union  are  three. 
IJy  means  of  it,  Providence  intended,  first,  that 
the  human  race  should  be  continued,  in  a  way 
not  only  consistent  with,  but  conducive  to,  virtue, 
decency,  and  good  governmeni:  secondly,  to  pro- 
vide for  the  educalfcn  of  children:  and,  thirdly, 
o  promote  the  happiness  of  the  married  pcsons. 
5  77.  It  has   been   made  a  cjiiestion,  v/hethev 


164  ELEMENTS  OF  PaitlU. 

polygamy  be  naturally  unlawful.  Amon,[^  chris- 
tians, it  cannot  be  lawful;  because  our  religion 
forbids  it;  but  to  the  ancient  Jews  and  patriarchs, 
it  was  not  forbidden;  and  seems,  in  some  cases, 
to  have  been  permitted,  as  a  punishment  for  their 
intemperance,  in  desiring  it.  That  it  is  not  ac- 
cording to  the  analogy  of  nature,  may  be  proved, 
by  this  argument.  The  number  of  males  that  are 
born,  is  so  nearly  equal  to  that  of  females,  (being 
as  twenty  to  nineteen,  according  to  some  compu- 
tations, or  as  fourteen  to  thirteen,  according  to 
others),  that,  if  all  men  and  women  were  married, 
there  would  not  be  more  than  one  man  to  each 
woman,  and  one  woman  to  each  man.  That  more 
males  should  be  born  than  females,  is  wisely  or- 
dered by  Providence;  men  being  exposed  to  ma»y 
dangers,  in  war,  for  example,  and  at  sea,  from 
which  the  condition  of  the  female  is,  in  a  great 
measure,  exempted.  By  some  travellers,  who 
;i.ffcct  to  apologize  for  the  polygamy  allowed  by 
the  law  of  Mahomet,  it  has  been  said,' that,  in 
certain  eastern  nations,  particularly  in  Arabia, 
the  country  of  that  impostor,  there  are  three  or 
four  females  born  for  one  male.  When  this  is 
clearly  ascertained,  (for  as  yet  it  seems  to  be 
doubtful),  1  shall  admit,  that,  in  those  parts  of 
the  world,  polygamy  is  not  so  inconvenient  or  so 
»innatn»'al.  as  it  iindir>piitablv  would  be  in  thesr 


rartnr.  moral  science.  16j 

578.  It  is  inconsistent  M'ith  that  affection  which 
married  persons  owe  to  each  other.  Where  it 
prevails,  the  husband,  whatever  be  the  number 
of  his  wives,  has  commonly  but  one  favourite 
wife;  and  the  consequence  is,  that  she  is  hated  by 
all  the  rest,  and  he,  on  her  account;  in  other  re- 
spects, it  is  fatal  to  the  peace  of  families.  In 
Turkey,  a  husband  must  exercise  over  his  house- 
hold a  sort  of  tyrannical  authority;  so  that  his 
wives  are  really  his  slaves;  which  destroys  that 
friendship  and  mutual  confidence,  so  essential  to 
the  happiness  of  the  married  state.  To  which  we 
may  add,  that  the  natural  affection  between 
parents  and  children  must  be  very  much  weaken- 
ed by  polygamy,  and  consequently,  the  right 
education  of  children  neglected.  And  a  number 
of  children  of  the  same  father,  by  different  living 
mothers,  could  hardly  fail  to  become  the  rivals 
and  enemies  of  one  another. 

579.  That  marriage  may  be  a  determinate  ob- 
ject of  law,  it  must,  like  every  other  express  con- 
tract, be  ratified  by  some  form;  the  neglect  of 
which  is  to  be  considered  as  illegal,  but  not  as 
sufficient  in  all  cases  to  nullify  the  marriage: 
much,  however,  in  regard  to  this  matter,  will  de- 
pend on  human  law^s.  That  the  matrimonial 
union  should  be  for  life,  appears  from  the  very 
nature  of  friendship,  which  men  never  enter  into 


166  ELEMENTS  OF  l»;al  III. 

with  a  view  that  it  shall  last  .only  for  a  limited 
time.  And  the  education  of  children  requires, 
that  the  father  and  mother  should  be  united  for 
life.  If  this  were  not  the  case,  marriaijes  would 
he  contracted  with  such  precipitancy,  as  to  pre- 
clude the  hope  of  connubial  happiness;  and  tlie 
profligacy  of  individuals  would  inlroduce  endless 
confusion  into  human  affairs,  and  entirely  destroy 
the  attachments  of  kindred,  and  all  the  amiable 
virtues  thence  arising. 

580.  Plato  is  whimsical  on  this  subject,  as  on 
many  others.  He  thinks,  that  parents  should  not 
be  entrusted  with  the  brinp;ing  up,  or  with  the 
education  of  their  children,  which  ought,  in  hi» 
opinion,  to  be  provided  for  and  conducted  by  the 
state;  and  that  children  should  never  know  who 
their  parents  are,  but  consider  themselves  as  the 
sons  and  daughters  of  the  republick.  For  he  sup- 
poses, first,  that  parents  become  avaricious  in 
order  to  enrich  their  children:  secondly,  that 
persons  united  by  the  ties  of  blood  are  apt  to  con- 
spire against  the  state,  and  promote  rebellious 
insurrection:  and,  thirdly,  that  parents  ruin  their 
r.hildren  by  immoderate  fondness.  The  arguments 
are  as  Aveak,  as  the  scheme  is  unnatural;  though 
it  must  be  allowed,  that  there  is  a  defect  in  tlic 
'»licy  of  a  country,  in  wliich  the  law  takes  no 


rartlll.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  167 

notice  of  the  conduct  of  parents  with  respect  to 
the  education  of  their  children. 

581.  There  are  not  many  instances  of  children 
ruined  by  parental  fondness  merely:  a  little 
knowledge  of  the  world  commonly  wears  off  the 
bad  effects  of  that  fondness  where  it  has  been 
excessive.  And  if  at  their  birth  children  were 
sent  to  a  publick  seminary,  and  there  brought 
lip,  ignorant  of  their  parents,  it  is  not  unlikely 
that  some  of  them  might  be  ruined  by  bad  ex- 
ample, or  by  the  indiscretion  or  indifference  of 
nurses  and  teachers;  for  that  all  persons  should 
act  well,  who  act  by  publick  authority,  is  not  to 
be  expected.  Besides,  family  attachments  en- 
courage industry,  which  ought  to  be  encouraged; 
but  do  not  often  incline  parents  to  avarice,  which 
is  well  known  to  be  most  prevalent  in  those  who 
have  no  families;  and  conspiracies  against  the 
state  are  more  remarkable  for  breeding  dissen- 
sion among  relations,  than  for  arising  from  their 
unanimity.  But  it  is  still  more  to  the  present 
purpose  to  remark,  that  the  virtues  one  may  ac- 
quire in  domestick  life;  the  love  that  one  bears 
to  parents,  brethern,  and  kindred,  and  the  many 
kind  affections  thence  resulting,  are  among  the 
most  amiabl^qualities  of  our  nature;  and  have  a 
happy  effect  in  producing  a  sense  of  honour, 
gentleness  of  manners,  and  tenderness  of  heart, 


168  ELEME^^  TS  OF  I'art  HI. 

which  greatly  promote  the  improvement  of  the 
mind,  and  the  happiness  of  society?  and  which, 
under  a  scheme  like  Plato's,  could  hardly  exist. 

582.  From  these  reasonings  maybe  deduced 
the  following  definition  of  marriage.  It  is  a  strict 
and  indmate  union,  for  life,  founded  on  mutual 
esteem,  of  one  man  and  one  woman,  in  one  fami- 
ly, for  the  purpose  of  having  children,  educating 
them,  and  promoting  the  happiness  o  one  an- 
other. This  union  being  the  foundation  of  regular 
society,  all  persons  are  bound  in  conscience  to  pay 
great  regard  to  it;  to  account  its  laws  sacred; 
and  to  do  nothing  to  lessen  it  in  the  opinion  of 
the  publick,  or  of  individuals;  remembering  that 
it  has  been  in  the  world  from  the  beginning,  and 
is  of  divine  institution.  But  all  persons  arc  not 
obliged  to  enter  into  this  estate.  Want  of  pru- 
dence or  of  inclination,  untowardly  dispositions, 
immature  age,  and  the  indispensable  duties  an- 
nexed to  certain  em])loymcnts  that  one  may  be 
engaged  in,  may  make  it  in  particular  cases  ini- 
^)ropcr.  These  are  called  natural  impediments. 
Others  there  are  of  a  moral  kind,  which  render 
it  unlawful. 

583.  The  first  is,  a  prior  contract.  He  who  is 
iTKirried  to  twa  wives,  both  living,4sby  the  laws 
of  all  chrisiian  counlries  punishable;  and  in  some, 

particularly  Sweden,  is  punished  with  death.  }]f 


Part  III.  MOllAL  SCIENCE.  16i> 

who  marries  one  woman,  after  having  given  an- 
other reason  to  believe  that  he  would  many  this 
other,  is  guilty  of  a  crime,  which,  though  the  law 
should  not  reach  it,  ought  to  lie  very  iieavy  on  his 
conscience.  Too  near  a  degree  of  consanguinity 
is  another  moral  impediment.  A  line  of  kindred 
is  either  direct,  or  collateral.  I'hc  direct  line  com- 
prehends grandfathers,  fathers,  children,  grand- 
children, Sec;  and  in  this  line  all  marriages  arc 
accounted  unnatural,  and  are  accordingly  forbid- 
den by  the  luws  of  almost  all  nations.  In  the  col- 
lateral line  are  brothers  and  sisters,  and  their 
descendants;  among  whom,  by  the  laws  of  the 
Jews,  the  old  Romans,  and  all  protestant  coun- 
tries, all  marriages  are  forbidden  within  the 
fourth  degree,  that  is,  between  persons  more 
nearly  related  than  cousins-german. 

584.  The  canon  law,  that  is,  the  ecclesiastical 
law  of  the  church  of  Rome,  does  also  prohibit 
marriages  within  what  is  called  the  fourth  de- 
gree: but  their  way  of  considering  this  matter  is 
not  the  same  with  ours;  for  cousins-german,  or 
even  second  cousins,  of  the  Romish  religion, 
cannot  many  without  a  warrant  from  the  pope. 
He  indeed  was  wont  to  reserve  to  himself  the 
privilege  of  determining  what  marriages  are 
within  the  forbidden  degrees,  and  what  are  not; 
and  thus  he  has  had  it  in  his  power,  especially  in 

Vol.  VIII.  P 


1 70  ELEMENTS  OF  Turt  lU. 

former  times,  to  gratify  those  princes,  who  were 
tired  of  their  wives,  by  declaring  their  marriage 
imlawful  from  the  first,  and  consequently  null; 
and  to  gratify  others,  by  allowing  them,  for  rea- 
sons of  policy  or  interest,  to  form  connections 
^vhich  among  us  could  not  be  tolerated.  It  is  not 
'.ung  since  he  granted  a  dispensation,  whereby  a 
queen  of  Portugal  was  married  to  her  nephew. 

585.  It  is  not  easy,  nor  perhaps  possible,  to 
ascertain  on  philosophical  principles,  that  precise 
boundary,  in  the  collateral  line  of  kindred,  beyond 
which  marriages  are  lawful,  and  within  which 
they  are  incestuous.  Our  own  law  is  in  this  re- 
•  pcct  very  reasonable.  And  it  is  better  to  rest 

hjs  matter  on  positive  laws,  than  to  attempt  to 
-ctlle  it  by  general  reasoning.  That  men  should 
Tiot  be  allowed  to  marry  very  near  relations,  an- 
swers many  excellent  purposes,  and-'ttllStn  par- 
ticular, (for  the  rest  I  do  not  care  to  specify),  that 
it  extends  the  sphere  of  kindred  and  friendship, 
and  so  connects  society  more  closely  together. 

586.  The  superiority  of  the  husband  to  the  wife 
is  so  generally  acknowledged,  that  it  must  be 
owing  to  some  good  and  permanent  cause:  and 
tliat  il  was  so  from  the  beginning,  and  so  ap- 
pointed of  God,  we  believe  on  the  authority  of 

cripturc.  Considering  the  matter  abstractly,  we 
^Jlould  say,  tiiat  in  the  management  of  a  family, 


Part  in.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  171 

that  person  ought  to  be  superiour,  who  has  most 
prudence  and  virtue.  But  the  exact  degree  of 
virtue  and  prudence  it  might  be  difficult  to  as- 
certain; and  controversies  on  this  subject  between 
husband  and  wife  would  have  disagreeable  conse- 
quences. And  therefore  the  superiority  of  one 
sex  ought  to  be  fixed  by  law  as  well  as  by  cus- 
tom. Supposing  the  two  sexes  equal  in  virtue 
and  understanding,  which,  after  making  allow- 
ance for  diversity  of  education,  we  should  per- 
haps find  to  be  the  case,  it  is  still  right  that  the 
man  should  have  the  superiority.  For  his  bodily 
strength,  and  his  incapacity  for  some  domestick 
duties,  the  nursing  of  children  for  example,  not 
to  mention  other  circumstances  of  a  more  deli- 
cate nature,  make  him  better  qualified,  and  leave 
him  more  at  leisure,  to  guard  the  family  from 
injury,  and  superintend  all  the  members  of  it. 
However,  the  more  the  sexes  approach  to  equa- 
lity, the  more  will  society  be  civilized.  Savages 
are  tyrannical  to  their  women.  In  polite  nations, 
it  is  otherwise;  and  the  superiority  vested  by  law 
in  the  men  is  compensated  to  the  women,  by  that 
superiour  complaisance  which  is  paid  them  by 
every  man  who  aspires  to  elegance  of  manners. 

587.  The  duties  of  the  married  persons  with 
respect  to  each  other  are  so  well  known,  that  it  is 
unnecessary  to  give  a  detail  of  them  in  this  place. 


1  72  ELEM F,>  i\S  01  I'art  III 

They  may  all  be  reduced  to  those  of  mutual  love, 
and  mutual  fidelity;  the  violation  of  which  is  in 
the  wife  and  the  husband  equally  immoral,  though 
perhaps  in  a  political  view  not  equally  ruinous. 
Parental  authority  is  founded,  first,  in  the  need 
that  children  have  of  assistance  and  direction; 
secondly,  in  parental  love,  disposing  fathers  and 
mothers  to  assist  and  direct  them;  and,  thirdly, 
in  fdial  piety,"  disposing  children  to  love,  honour, 
and  obey,  their  parents.  In  the  father's  absence, 
the  mother's  authority  may  be  supposed  to  be 
equal  to  his,  because  it  has  the  same  foundation; 
but  when  he  is  present,  his  authority  must  hv 
superiour,  because  all  the  family  is  subject  to 
him.  That  mothers,  when  able,  ought  to  nurse 
their  oflspring,  is  generally  acknowledged,  and 
miglit  be  proved  from  many  considerations,  both 
moral  and  physical.  The  mother  is  by  nature 
supplied  with  the  means  of  yielding  her  infunt 
that  sort  of  nourishment  which  is  best  for  it;  the 
infant  by  natural  instinct  craves  this  nourishment; 
and  mothers  are  inclined,  botli  by  instinct  and  by 
reason,  to  give  it,  and  find  exquisite  delight  in 
doing  so.  To  which  we  may  add,  that  not  to 
comply  with  nature  in  this  particular,  is  often 
attended  with  dangerous,  and  sometimes,  fatal 
consequences  to  both  mother  and  child. 

"^SS.  Parents  om'c  tlicir  children  the  most  ten- 


Part  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  173 

der  affection,  which  must  neither  degenerate  into 
indiscreet  fondness,  nor  be  exercised  with  any 
partiality,  except  what  may  be  due  to  superiour 
merit.  They  ought,  as  far  as  is  in  their  power,  to 
provide  for  their- children  the  necessaries  of  life, 
an^  such  of  its  ornaments  as  befit  their  condition; 
but  are  not  obliged  to  endow  them  so  liberally  as 
to  encourage  vice  or  idleness.  They  are  bound  by 
every  tie  of  love,  honour,  and  duty,  to  give  them 
such  education,  as  may  qualify  them  for  acting 
their  part  aright  in  this  world,  and  preparing 
themselves  for  the  next;  and,  for  this  purpose,  to 
employ  all  the  proper  means  of  instruction;  mo- 
ral and  religious  precept;  prudent  advice;  good 
example;  praise,  in  order  to  encourage;  and  re- 
proof, and,  if  necessary,  even  correction,  in  order 
to  reform.  On  education  there  are  many  books 
that  deserve  attentive  perusal,  but  not  many  that 
ought  to  be  implicitly  followed:  for  too  many 
writers  on  this  subject  seem  more  anxious  to 
establish  paradoxes,  and  fashion  the  young  mind 
into  a  similarity  to  their  own,  than  to  give  gene- 
ral precepts  for  training  up  good  christians,  and 
useful  members  of  society.  The  topick  being  far 
too  extensive  for  this  place,  I  shall  only  make 
two  or  three  remarks  on  it;  in  order  that,  by 
pointing  out  a  few  examples,  not  universally  at- 
tended to,  of  improper  management  in  the  bu?i- 

P2 


.7  1  IXEMEXTSOf  VartlTl. 

ness  of  education,  I  in  v  engage  my  hearers  lo 
thi?ik  on  the  subject,  aiu'  ^o  think  for  themselves. 

589.  The  present  plan  of  education,  as  it  is 
commonly  (I  do  not  say  universally)  conducted, 
seems  to  proceed  on  a  supposition,  that  piety  and 
virtue  are  not  indispensable  parts  of  duty;  forliiat 
the  figure  a  man  makes,  and  the  gratifications  he 
obtains,  in  this  world,  are  of  more  value  to  him, 
tlian  eternal  happiness  in  the  world  to  come.  Ac- 
cordingly, some  pains  are  taken  to  cultivate  his 
understanding,  to  adorn  his  outside,  and  to  fit  him 
for  the  common  arts  of  life;  but  the  improvement 
of  iiis  heart,  and  the  regulation  of  his  passions  and 
principles,  are,  comparatively  speaking,  but  little 
mmdcd.  Children  arc  too  often  treated,  rather 
as  playthings,  than  as  immortal  beings,  who  have 
a  difficult  part  to  act  here,  and  a  strict  account  to 
reiider  hiircafter.  A  man  indeed  is  not  a  moral 
agent,  till  he  attain  the  use  of  reason.  But  before 
he  can  compare  tilings  together  so  as  to  draw  in- 
ferences, he  may  ccntract  habits  of  obstinacy  or 
obedience,  frctfulness  or  contentment,  good  or 
iMnaturc,  and  even  of  right  or  wrong  opinion, 

hirh  siiall  adhere  lo  him  through  life,  and  pro- 
duce important  consequences.  Therefore,  let  no 
one  thiiik  that  moral  discipline  in  the  Ijcginning 

r  life,  is  of  liltir  moment:  it  can  hardly  begii 
,,  1,. 


Part  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  1T5 

.  590.  Not  few  are  the  methods  taken,  even  by 
parents  who  mean  well,  which  would  seem  to 
teach  children  vice  rather  than  virtue,  and  to 
create  and  cherish  evil  passions,  instead  of  pre- 
venting them.  They  are  taught  to  threaten,  and 
even  beat  those  by  whom  they  think  themselves 
injured,  or  to  beat  other  persons  or  things  in 
their  stead;  and  thus  learn  to  be  peevish  and 
revengeful:  and  thus  too  their  notions  of  merit 
and  demerit  are  confounded;  for  how  is  it  possi- 
ble for  them  to  learn  any  thing  good,  from  seeing 
a  stranger  threatened,  a  dog  punished,  or  a  foot- 
stool beaten,  for  a  fault  committed  by  themselves, 
or  by  the  nurse!  Their  good  behaviour  is  some- 
times rewarded  so  absurdly,  as  to  hurt  their 
health,  and  teach  them  gluttony  or  sensuality  at 
the  same  time.  They  are  frequently  taught  to 
consider  strangers,  especially  those  who  are  okl 
and  illdressed,  as  frightful  beings,  by  whom  the) 
are  in  danger  of  being  taken  away:  and  thus  they 
learn  cowardice,  dislike  to  strangers,  disrespect 
to  old  age,  and  an  abhorrence  of  poverty  and 
misfortune,  as  if  these  rendered  a  man  thc 
object,  not  of  pity,  but  of  detestation. 

591.  They  are  from  time  to  time  entertained 
with  stories  of  gliosts  and  other  terrible  things, 
which,  they  arc  told,  appear  in  the  dark;  and 
h'^'---^  '"^^;^ivp  imprv^s^ions  nfi-cr-'^i:"  vnich  thpv 


176  ELEMENTS  OF  Paillll. 

find  it  difficult  to  get  the  better  of,  even  when 
they  come  to  be  men.  They  arc  fluttered,  on 
account  of  their  finery,  and  so  become  fond  of  a 
gaudy  outside;  a  passion  which,  if  they  do  not 
subdue  it,  will  go  near  to  make  them  ridiculous. 
When  they  begin  to  speak,  they  are  encouraged 
to  speak  a  great  deal;  and  thus  learn  petulance, 
and  want  of  respect  to  their  superiours.  They 
are  sometimes  threatened  with  dreadful  punish- 
ments, and  in  the  most  boisterous  language;  and 
by  this  example  of  ferocity  and  passion  arc 
taught  to  be  fierce  and  passionate.  At  other  times 
they  are,  without  sufficient  reason,  extravagantly 
caressed,  which,  while  it  enervates  their  minds, 
conveys  a  notion,  that  their  parents  act  capri- 
ciously, and  that  they  may  do  so  too.  The  slightest 
foibles  and  greatest  faults  are  often  blamed  with 
equal  severity;  and  the  most  trifling  accomplish- 
ment more  warmly  commended  than  a  generous 
sentiment,  or  virtuous  action.  You  may  have 
heard  them  tlamed  more  bitterly  for  making  an 
awkward  bow,  than  for  telling  a  lie;  and  praised 
more  for  their  dancing,  than  for  alacrity  in  obey- 
ing their  parents.  Docs  not  this  absurd  conduct 
lend  to  poison  their  principles,  deprave  their 
judgment,  and  even  pervert  their  conscience? 

592.  What  can  excuse  the  parent,  or  teacher, 
^\ho  chastises  a  child  for  u  natural  weakness  of 


Parttn.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  177 

memory,  or  slowness  of  apprehension?  Would  ii 
not  be  equally  reasonable  to  punish  him,  iDecause 
Providence  has  given  him  a  puny  frame  of  body, 
or  sickly  constitution?  And  what  notions  of  recti- 
tude is  a  child  likely  to  form,  from  seeing  cruelty 
where  there  ought  to  be  lenity,  and  from  being 
punished  because  he  cannot  do  what  is  above  his 
strength?  Many  more  instances  might  be  given 
of  parents  and  teachers,  who  really  mean  no 
harm,  inuring  children  to  vicious  habits,  and 
teaching  them  to  form  licentious  opinions,  in 
matters  which  the  world  in  general  considers  as 
of  little  moment.  But  very  trivial  matters  call 
forth  the  passions  of  a  child;  and  whatever  does 
so  is  of  serious  importance,  because  it  must  give 
rise  to  virtuous  or  to  criminal  practice,  and  tend 
to  form  habits  either  good  or  evil. 

593.  Let  children  be  taught,  as  far  as  their  ca- 
pacity will  admit,  to  form  right  opinions;  to  con- 
sider clothes,  for  example,  as  intended  more  for 
use  than  for  ornament;  and  food,  as  what  is  ne- 
cessary to  life  and  health,  but  must  not  be  per- 
verted to  the  purposes  of  sensuality.  Let  them 
be  informed,  that  by  nature  all  men  are  equal;  a 
lesson  v/hich  they  will  easily  learn,  as  pride  is 
one  of  those  passions  which  they  seldom  or  never 
acquire  of  themselves,  (§  305);  and  let  them  be 
made  to  understand,  that  a  man  is  contemptible. 


irS  ELEMENTS  OF-  Part  HI. 

wot  because  he  is  old,  or  ugly,  or  poor,  but  be- 
cause he  is  of  indecent  behaviour.  Let  them  be 
accustomed  to  reverence  old  age;  and  for  their 
parents  to  entertain  the  most  profound  respect, 
without  repining  at  their  commands,  or  ventur- 
ing on  any  pretence  to  dispute  their  opinion. 
This  will  make  them  affectionate  and  dutiful; 
for  the  more  they  respect  a  parent  or  teacher, 
the  more  they  will  love  him;  this  will  also  teach- 
them  to  be  modest,  obedient,  and  docile;  and 
soon  impress  them  with  a  sense  of  their  being 
subject  to  moral  discipline,  and  accountable  for 
their  conduct. 

594.  When  vices  are  practised,  or  without  dis- 
approbation named,  in  the  presence  of  children; 
when  a  parent  or  teacher  punishes  at  one  time  a 
fault  which  he  overlooks  at  another,  or  neglects 
to  take  cognizance  of  a  transgression  whereof  the 
child  knows  that  he  cannot  be  ignorant,  these  arc 
so  many  lessons  of  immorality,  which  cannot  fail 
to  corrupt  a  young  mind.  To  correct  a  child  when 
one  is  in  a  passion,  gives  him  an  example  of  two 
vices  at  once,  rage  and  revenge;  for  all  correction 
of  tliis  kind  is  likely  to  be,  and  to  the  sufferer  will 
appear  to  be,  excessive;  and  seem  to  have,  and 
perhaps  really  has,  something  vintlictivc  in  it.  To 
bodily  punishment  wc  are  not  to  have  recourse 
lill  all  other  means  of  reformation  have  bee-. 


Pan  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  179 

attempted  in  vain;  and  let  this  last  remedy  be 
applied,  if  at  all  applied,  with  temper  and  so- 
lemnity, that  the  child  may  see  we  are  driven  to 
it  against  our  will,  from  a  regard  to  our  duty  and 
his  good.  Honour  and  shame  are,  as  formerly 
observed,  much  more  liberal  motives;  and  expe- 
rience proves,  that  they  may  for  the  most  part,  ii 
not  always,  be  more  effectual.  These  indeed  may 
be  employed,  with  good  success,  through  the 
whole  of  life,  as  a  preservative  from  vice,  and  a 
curb  to  every  inordinate  passion. 

595.  Whether  a  publick  school,  or  the  privacy 
of  domestick  education,  be  preferable,  has  long- 
been  matter  of  controversy,  and  is  not  likely  to 
be  soon  determined.  Experience  will  not  settle 
the  point;  for  men  of  every  character,  and  of  all 
degrees  of  genius  and  literature,  have  been 
formed  both  by  the  one  method  and  by  the  other. 
Supposing  the  teachers  in  both  equally  conscien- 
tious, and  of  equal  ability,  one  might  say,  perhaps, 
that  the  former  is  the  best  scene  of  discipline  for 
this  world,  and  the  latter  for  that  which  is  to 
come.  In  the  former  there  are,  no  doubt,  supc- 
riour  opportunities  of  acquiring  habits  of  activity, 
a  free  and  manly  behaviour,  with  knowledge  of 
the  world  and  of  human  nature,  as  well  as  of 
making  valuable  connections  in  the  way  of  ac- 
quaintance and  friendship.  But  in  tlie  latter  may 


180  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  111. 

be  expected  more  modesty  and  mnocence,  stric- 
ter recikude  of  principle,  fewer  temptations  to 
irregularity,  and  less  danger  from  bad  company. 

596.  Perhaps,  if  the  two  methods  were  to  be 
united;  if  they  who  frequent  publick  schools  were 
also  to  be  continually  under  the  eye  of  an  attentive 
parent  or  tutor  (which,  comparatively  speaking, 
could  happen  but  to  few),  the  objection  to  those 
crowded  seminaries  might  in  part  be  obviated. 
But  without  such  private  inspection,  great 
schools,  especially  in  great  towns,  would  seem 
to  be  extremely  dangerous.  Horace  informs  us 
(sat.  i.  6),  that  he  was  educated  in  a  way  similar 
to  what  is  here  proposed;  that  his  father,  though 
by  no  means  wealthy,  brought  him  from  his 
native  village  to  Rome,  and  put  him  under  the 
best  masters;  but  did  himself  carefully  inspect 
every  part  of  his  son's  education  and  behaviour. 
What  the  poet  has  written  on  this  subject  merits 
particular  attention,  and  does  honour  both  to  his 
father's  worth  and  wisdom,  and  to  his  own  grati- 
tude and  filial  piety.  A  more  amiable  picture  of 
a  father  and  a  son  is  hardly  to  be  met  with  in 
pagan  antiriuity. 

597.  On  the  duties  of  children  to  tlicir  parents 
It  is  unnecessary  to  expatiate,  tiicy  being  in  chris- 
tian nations  universally  known.  Next  to  that 
which  is  due  to  the  Creator,  children  owe  thcis' 


Part  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  181 

parents  the  highest  love,  reverence,  and  grati- 
tude; for  to  a  good  parent,  in  all  ordinary  cases, 
his  child  is  more  obliged  than  to  any  other  fellow 
creature.  Children  ought,  as  far  as  it  is  necessaiy 
and  they  are  able,  to  support  their  parents,  and  to 
bear  with  their  infirmities,  do  every  thing  in 
their  power  to  make  their  lives  comfortable,  re- 
ceive their  advice  with  respectful  attention,  and 
obey  all  their  lawful  commands.  It  does  not, 
however,  appear,  that  in  things  so  intimately 
connected  with  the  happiness  of  life,  as  marriage, 
and  the  choice  of  an  employment,  parents  have 
any  right  to  force  the  inclinations  of  their  chil- 
dren. Their  best  advice,  in  these  and  all  other 
matters,  parents  are  bound  to  give  them:  but 
in  these  their  temporal  welfare  may  be  sc  deeply 
interested,  that  compulsion  would  be  cruelty; 
nay,  such  compulsion,  by  irritating  their  passions, 
and  unsettling  their  minds,  might  endanger  their 
happiness  in  a  future  life,  as  well  as  destroy  it  in 
this.  It  is  indeed  true,  that  habits  of  long  ac- 
quaintance will  som.etimes  overcome  dislike;  but 
it  is  no  less  true,  that  some  things  and  persons 
are  so  disagreeable,  that  we  dislike  them  the 
more  the  longer  we  know  them,  and  the  more 
intimately  we  are  connected  with  them.  In  the 
affair  of  marriage,  the  utmost  a  parent  can  claim 
is  the  validity  of  a  negative;  and  in  many  cases 
Vol.  VIII.  Q 


182  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III 

even  that  may  be  disputable.  Nature  inlended 
mutual  affection  to  be  the  principal  motive  to  this 
union;  and  therefore,  marriage  contracted  from 
a  different  motive,  where  that  is  wanting,  such 
as  ambidon,  the  love  of  mpney,  or  even  implicit 
obedience  to  parents,  is  unnatural,  and  of  course 
unlawful. 

598.  The  relation  of  master  and  servant  is 
founded  on  a  contract  or  agreement,  and  is  in- 
tended for  the  mutual  benefit  of  the  contracting 
parties.  The  peculiar  duties  belonging  to  it  are 
settled  either  by  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  or 
by  the  common  rules  of  equity,  and  the  general 
practice  of  the  country.  The  origin  and  reason- 
ableness of  this  relation  may  be  thus  explained. 
Human  creatures,  though  born  equal  in  many 
respects,  are,  in  respect  of  abilities  and  character, 
very  unequal:  and  if,  naturally,  one  man  is  enter- 
prising, prudent,  and  active,  and  another  irreso- 
lute, imprudent,  and  indolent,  it  will  happen  in 
process  of  time,  supposing  (what  we  call)  fortune 
equally  favourable  to  all,  that  one  shall  acquire 
much  property  without  doing  injury,  and  another 
little  without  suffering  any.  The  former  will  of 
< oursc  have  more  things  to  mind  than  the  latter, 
I  nd  will  be  supposed  to  hire  persons  to  assist  and 
serve  him;  and  they  who  have  little  or  no  pro- 
perty will  be  willing  to  be  hired  for  that  purpose. 


IPurtlll.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  183 

And  if  the  master  be  kind,  and  the  servant  fuith- 
Iful,  that  is,  if  each  do  what  he  ought  to  do,  they 
will  both  be  happier  in  this  connection  than  they 
icould  have  been  out  of  it. 

599.  Besides,  to  make  society  comfortable, 
there  must  be  established  in  it  a  number  of  em- 
ployments, which  cannot  all  be  equally  honour- 
able, or  attended  with  equal  advantage.  The  richer- 
sort,  having  the  means  of  a  better  education,  are 
better  qualified  than  the  poorer  for  the  higher 
offices;  and  the  poor,  conscious  of  their  inability, 
will  have  no  other  ambition  than  to  gain  a  com-v. 
petence  in  those  walks  of  life  to  which  they  have 
been  from  infancy  accustomed:  and  thus,  ail  the 
necessary  professions  will  be  filled  with  persons 
properly  qualified  for  them,  and  the  business  of 
social  life  will  go  on  with  regularity  and  expedi- 
tion. Far  be  it  from  me  to  insinuate,  that  low 
fortune  is  always  the  effect  of  mean  parts,  or  a 
high  one  of  the  contrary.  I  only  say,  that  the 
natural  varieties  of  human  character  would  in 
time  produce  varieties  of  condition,  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  things.  But  let  it  ever  be  ren^em- 
bered,  that  the  affairs  of  this  world  are  governed 
by  Providence,  who,  for  the  wisest  and  most  be- 
neficent purposes,  often  brings  down  one,  and 
sets  up  another,  by  such  means  as  may  to  us  ap- 
pear inadequate  and  extraordinary.  Hence,  let 


184  ELEMENTS  OF  Tart  III. 

the  great  learn  moderation,  and  the  lowly  content. 
All  are  equally  the  care  of  Providence;  and  in 
every  station  a  contented  mind  is  happy.  See 
§  152. 

600.  One  cannot  live  without  the  necessaries 
of  life,  but  he  who  has  them  may  live  without  a 
servant;  so  that  a  master  is  more  necessary  to  a 
servant,  than  a  servant  is  to  a  master.  It  is  there- 
lore  reasonable  that  the  servant  should  acknow- 
ledge the  master's  superiority,  and,  Qver  and 
above  the  stipulated  service,  pay  him  a  degree 
of  attention,  which  the  servant  is  not  entitled  to 
expect  in  return.  The  master,  on  the  other  hand, 
ought  to  consider  the  dependent  condition  of  his 
bumble  associate,  and  treat  him  with  that  lenity 
which  a  generous  mind  naturally  exercises  to- 
wards those  who  have  been  unfortunate  or  un- 
successful. In  short,  it  is  incumbent  on  each  to 
do  the  other  what  he  could  reasonably  wish  the 
other  to  do  to  him,  if  they  were  to  exchange 
conditions.  If  they  observe  this  rule,  their  rela- 
tion will  be  a  blessing  to  both. 

601.  A  severer  kind  of  service,  called  slavery, 
lias,  I  am  sorry  to  say  it,  prevailed  in  many  na- 
tions, and  in  many  does  still  prevail;  but  its  forms 
•arc  so  various,  that  one  cannot  express  its  general 
luiturc  in  a  definition.  Of  that  species  of  it  which 
il  is  my  dcsi(;n  to  consider,  the  following  particu 


l»ail  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  1 85 

lars  will  convey  a  pretty  just  idea.  1-  In  establish^ 
ing  this  kind  of  service,  the  will  of  the  master 
only  is  consulted,  and  no  regard  had  to  that  of 
the  slave.  2.  No  efforts  of  virtue  or  ability  can 
ever  change  the  slave's  condition  for  the  better, 
without  the  master's  consent;  which  in  all  cases 
he  may  refuse,  without  assigning  any  reason. 
3.  The  master  may  correct  his  slave  as  severely, 
and  in  other  respects  use  him  as  cruelly,  as  he 
pleases,  provided  he  do  not  deprive  him  of  his 
limbs  or  Hfe;  and  in  many  countries  even  these 
are  not  protected,  except  by  some  trivial  punish- 
ment or  fine,  which,  it  is  well  known,  neither  is, 
nor  can  be,  any  effectual  restraint  on  the  pas- 
sions of  a  tyrannical  and  wealthy  master.  4.  The 
slave  labours  for  his  master's  benefit  only;  and, 
in  some  parts  of  the  world,  can  acquire  little  or 
nothing  for  himself,  but  w  hat  his  master,  if  he 
pleases,  may,  without  being  obnoxious  to  the 
law,  contrive  methods  of  taking  from  him.  5. 
The  master  buys  a  slave,  and  sells  him,  with  as 
little  concern  as  we  do  an  ox  or  piece  of  house- 
hold stuff.  6.  The  children  of  slaves  are  borrx 
and  bred,  in  slavery,  and  their  children,  and  all 
their  posterity,  for  ever,  unless  it  be  the  master's 
pleasure  to  give  them,  liberty;  which  he  is  seldom 
or  never  obliged  to  do,  and  which  the  laws  of 
3t)me  countries  will  not,  in  certain  cases,  permit 


186  ELEMENTS  or  rarilll. 

liim  to  do.  7.  The  life  or  death  of  slaves,  in  the 
eyes  of  the  slavetnonger,  is  of  no  more  value  than 
the  money  for  which  they  might  have  been  sold: 
of  their  health  and  welfare  in  this  world  he  pro- 
bably will,  on  his  own  account,  take  some  care, 
but  is  not  obliged  to  take  much,  and  it  is  certain 
takes  very  little:  their  happiness  or  misery  in  the 
world  to  come,  is  a  consideration  in  which  he 
does  not  think  himself  interested  at  all. 

602.  After  this  account,  which  I  believe  is  not 
exaggerated,  it  must  be  unnecessary  to  add,  that 
lavery  is  inconsistent  with  the  dearest  and  most 
essential  rights  of  man's  nature;  that  it  is  detri- 
mental to  virtue  and  industry;  that  it  hardens  the 
heart  to  those  tender  sympathies  which  form  the 
most  lovely  part  of  the  human  character;  that  it 
involves  the  innocent  in  hopeless  misery,  in  order 
to  procure  wealth  and  pleasure  for  the  authors  of 
that  misery;  that  it  seeks  to  degrade  into  brutes, 
beings  wlwrn  the  Lord  of  heaven  and  earth  en- 
dowed with  rational  souls,  and  created  for  im- 
mortality; in  short,  that  it  is  utterly  repugnant  to 
every  principle  of  rei.son,  religion,  humanity,  and 
conscience.  In  protesting  against  such  a  practice, 
it  is  not  easy  to  preserve  that  lenity  of  language- 
and  coolness  of  argument,  which  philosophy  rc- 
ronunends:  and  one  eminent  author  has  not 
.'Mi(i;ht  to  pi-escrvc   it,   but  explicitly  declares, 


Part  111.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  187 

that  he  who  can  seriously  argue  in  vindication  of 
slavery,  deserves  no  other  answer  than  the  stab 
of  a  poniard.  I  am  not,  however,  so  bloody 
minded;  and  shall  endeavour  to  justify  what  I 
have  said  by  an  appeal  to  the  reason,  rather  than 
to  the  passions,  of  mankind. 

603.  To  my  shame  and  sorrow,  and  to  the  dis- 
grace of  human  nature,  I  must  confess  that  slavery 
is  of  ancient  date;  and  that  there  are  not  many 
countries  in  the  world,  where,  at  one  time  or 
other,  it  has  not  prevailed.  Among  savages  it 
probably  took  its  rise,  or  among  men  half  civi- 
lized, who  condemned  their  captives  to  this  con- 
dition; and  might  be  afterwards  adopted,  in  the 
way  of  retaliation,  by  more  enlightened  societies. 
We  find  in  the  Old  Testament,  and  in  Homer, 
that  in  early  times  it  was  customary  to  carry 
away  into  captivity,  and  sell  for  slaves,  those  who 
had  been  made  prisoners  of  war.  Those  slaves, 
however,  were  not  always  barbarously  treated  in 
other  respects,  but,  on  the  contrary,  often  became 
the  favourites  of  their  masters.  Yet  this  was  not 
universal.  In  Athens  and  Rome,  in  times  some- 
what later,  slaves  might  lead  lives  that  were  not 
uncomfortable;  but  at  Sparta  they  were  treated 
with  a  degree  of  rigour  that  is  hardly  conceiva- 
ble, although  to  them,  as  their  husbandmen  and 
artificer'?,  their  proud  and  idle  masters  were  in 


188  ELEMENTS  or  Vaitiil. 

debted  for  all  the  necessaries  of  life.  The  Lace- 
demonian youth,  trained  up  in  the  practice  of 
deceiving  and  butchering  those  poor  men,  were 
from  time  to  time  let  loose  upon  them,  in  order 
to  show  their  proficiency  in  stratagem  and  mas- 
sacre. And  once,  without  any  provocation,  and 
merely  for  their  own  amusement,  we  are  told  that 
they  murdered  three  thousand  in  one  night,  not 
only  with  the  connivance  of  law,  but  by  its  avowed 
permission.  Such,  in  promoting  the  happiness  of 
one  part  of  society,  and  the  virtue  of  another,  arc 
the  effects  of  slavery! 

604.  In  arguing  against  slavery,  it  may  perhaps 
be  thought  that  I  dispute  without  an  opponent. 
But  this  is  not  the  case.  I  have  met  with  a  native 
of  (ireat  Britain,  a  man  of  learning  and  some 
rank,  who  seriously  maintained  in  my  hearing, 
that  the  lower  orders  of  people  in  this  country 
ought  still  to  be,  as  they  once  were,  slaves,  and 
to  be  annexed,  as  in  some  miserable  parts  of  Eu- 
rope, they  still  arc,  to  the  soil,  and  bought  and 
sold  along  with  it.  Many  men,  who,  both  as  phi- 
losoplicrs  and  as  politicians,  were  pleased  to  think 
themselves  wonderfully  wise,  have  laboured  to 
prove  the  lawfulness  and  expediency  of  this  prac- 
tice; which  every  person,  worthy  of  the  honour 
of  being  born  a  Briton,  holds  in  utter  abomina- 
lioii.  I  shall   briclly  examine  their  pleas,  with 


Fart  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  189 

regard,  first,  to  slavery  in  general;  and,  secondly, 
to  that  of  the  African  negros  in  particular. 

605.  At  the  head  of  my  opponents  I  must 
place  Aristotle,  who,  in  his  first  book  of  poli- 
ticks, argues  thus.  "  That  men  of  great  bodily 
*'  strength,  and  deficient  in  mental  abilities,  are 
"  by  nature  destined  to  serve,  and  those  of  better 
"  capacity  to  command;  that  the  Greeks,  and 
"  some  of  the  adjoining  nations,  being  superiour 
"  in  genius,  have  a  natural  right  to  empire;  and 
"  that  the  rest  of  mankind  appear,  from  their 
"  innate  stupidity,  to  be  by  nature  intended  for 
"  slaver}^  and  toil."  Every  body  sees  the  absurdity 
of  this  reasoning,  and  that  it  is  founded  in  national 
prejudice,  and  want  of  knowledge  of  mankind. 
The  Greeks  are  not  now  a  nation  of  either  phi- 
losophers or  heros:  in  spite  of  the  advantages 
they  derive  from  climate  and  soil,  and  a  happy 
temperament  of  bodily  constitution,  they  are  the 
ignorant  and  devoted  slaves  of  Turkish  tyranny; 
while  other  nations,  our  own  in  particular,  which 
Aristotle,  no  doubt,  believed  (if  he  ever  heard  of 
it)  that  nature  had  consigned  to  everlasting  ob- 
scurity and  servitude,  have,  in  respect  of  genius, 
industry,  fortitude,  and  the  love  of  freedom,  be- 
come equal  to  the  most  accomplished  of  man- 
kind. To  infer,  because  a  people  is  now  barba- 
rous, that  it  never  can  be  civilized,  is  not  more 


190  KF-E.MEMSOi  VavilU. 

wise,  than  to  aHirm,  that  an  oak  of  ten  inches  long 
can  never  grow  up  into  a  tree,  or  that  an  infant 
can  never  become  a  man.  But,  whether  ingenious 
or  dull,  learned  or  ignorant,  clownish  or  polite, 
every  innocent  man,  without  exception,  has  as 
good  a  right  to  Hberty  as  to  life. 

606.  It  has  been  said,  that  an  institution  so 
widely  diffused  as  slavery,  and  so  ancient,  cannot 
be  either  unlawful  or  unnatural.  This  deserves 
no  ansvver.  Paganism  and  Mahometanism  have 
long  been,  and  still  are,  the  religion  of  many  na- 
tions; human  sacrifices  were  once  common  in 
the  north  of  Europe,  and  in  many  other  parts  of 
the  earth;  and  there  are  Indian  tribes,  who,  in 
the  spirit  of  savage  triumph,  cat  those  enemies 
whom  they  take  in  battle.  Does  it  follow  that  wc 
may  lawfully  eat  men,  or  offer  them  in  sacrificd 
to  idols;  that  Mahomet  was  a  true  prophet;  or 
that  Jupiter  and  his  Olympian  rabble  Avere  the 
makers  and  governours  of  the  universe? 

607.  The  Romans  tolerated  slavery;  and  their 
law  gives  three  accounts  of  it,  which,  as  historical 
facts,  may  be  true;  but,  considered  as  arguments 
to  justify  the  practice,  arc,  every  one  of  them, 
absurd.  First,  it  is  said,  that  piisoners  of  war 
may  be  enslaved  rather  than  put  to  death.  But 
the  most  that  a  conqueror  can  justly  claim  from 
his  prisoners  is  a  security  tliat  they  will  do  him 


Partlir.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  191 

no  hurt,  which  may  be  obtained,  and  in  civilized 
nations  is  daily  obtained,  without  either  putting 
them  to  death,  or  enslaving  them.  To  kill,  even 
in  war,  without  necessity,  is  murder:  to  enslave 
can  never  be  necessary,  and  therefore  must  al- 
ways be  unjust;  for  every  generous  mind  con- 
siders slavery  j^  worse  than  death;  and  so  in  fact 
it  is.  Death  affects  the  person  only  who  dies,  and 
who  must  soon  die  at  any  rate;  but  slavery  may 
extend  its  baleful  influence  to  the  innocent  chil- 
dren of  the  enslaved  person,  and  even  to  their 
descendants. 

608.  Where  caj/tives  have  been  reserved  for 
slavery,  it  is  plain  there  could  be  no  necessity  for 
killing  them;  and  if  it  w^as  not  necessary  to  kill 
them,  it  was  not  lawful;  and  a  punishment,  in 
itself  unlawful,  can  never  be  lawfully  exchanged 
for  another  punishment  which  is  equally,  or 
more  than  equally,  severe.  By  the  commission 
of  crimes,  a  man  may  no  doubt  forfeit  his  libcity 
as  well  as  life;  which,  however,  is  not  slavery  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  because  such  for- 
feiture of  freedom  descends  not  to  children:  but, 
where  there  is  no  guilt,  no  punishment,  not  even 
the  smallest,  can  be  lawful.  Now,  in  fighting  for 
his  country,  or  in  selfdefence,  what  crime  does 
the  soldier  commit?  So  far  from  committing  any 
crime,  it  is  universally  allowed  that  he  does  his 


192  ELEMENTS  OF  Pail  III 

duty:  and  is  a  man  to  be  punished  as  a  felon,  or  is 
to  be  punished  at  all,  for  doing  his  duty;  that  is, 
for  doing  what  he  would  deserve  punishment  for 
neglecting  to  do? 

609.  The  civil  law  supposes,  secondly,  that  a 
man  may  sell  himself  for  a  slave;  but  this,  as 
Montesquieu  observes,  can  hardly  be;  for  a  sale 
implies  a  price,  which  he  who  consigns  himself 
to  slavery  cannot  receive,  because  the  slave's 
property  is  supposed  to  be  in  the  master's  power. 
But  might  not  a  man  sell  himself  for  a  price  to 
be  applied  immediately  for  the  payment  of  his 
debts,  or  in  order  to  purchase  some  great  good 
to  another;  to  save,  for  example,  the  life  or  the  li- 
berty of  a  parent?  This  is  possible,  no  doubt,  and  in 
some  countries  may  have  happened;  and  this,  in 
him  who  could  make  such  a  sacrifice,  would  be 
an  act  of  great  magnanimity.  But  what  could  ex- 
cuse the  buyer,  or  render  a  transaction  lawful, 
by  which  so  noble  an  exertion  of  human  virtue 
would  be  subjected  to  a  lasting  and  cruel  punish- 
ment? 

610.  Thirdly,  the  civil  law  supposes  that  a  man 
may  sell  his  children.  But  all  human  beings  who 
have  never  injured  society  have  unequal  right  to 
liberty;  so  that  parents  can  no  more  sell  their 
children,  than  children  can  sell  their  parents. 
•Suppose  the  father  to  sell  them,  or  give  them 


Fai-tni.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  19.> 

away,  rather  than  to  see  them  perish  with  hunger, 
yet  still  the  person  who  received  or  bought  them, 
would,  if  he  made  them  slaves,  be  without  ex- 
cuse. For  helpless  pei'sons  in  want  have  a  right 
to  be  supported  by  those  who  are  not  in  want; 
and  the  labour  of  a  human  creature  is  always  of 
more  value  than  his  food  and  raiment,  at  least  if 
he  have  strength  to  do  the  work  of  a  slave:  and 
if  he  be  sickly  as  well  as  needy,  he  has  a  double 
claim  to  the  compassion  and  gratuitous  assistance 
of  the  wealthy. 

611.  It  is  impossible  for  a  considerate  and  un- 
prejudiced mind  to  think  of  slavery  without  hor- 
rour.  That  a  man,  a  rational  and  immortal  being, 
should  be  treated  on  the  same  footing  with  a 
beast,  or  piece  of  wood,  and  bought  and  sold,  and 
entirely  subjected  to  the  will  of  another  man, 
whose  equal  he  is  by  nature,  and  whose  superi- 
our  he  may  be  in  virtue  and  understanding,  and 
all  for  no  crime,  but  merely  because  he  was  born 
in  a  certain  country,  or  of  certain  parents,  or  be- 
cause he  differs  from  us  in  the  shape  of  his  nose, 
the  colour  of  his  skin,  or  the  size  of  his  lips;  if 
this  be  equitable,  or  excusable,  or  pardonable,  it 
is  vain  to  talk  any  longer  of  the  eternal  distinc- 
tions of  right  and  wrong,  truth  and  falsehood, 
good  and  evil. 

612.  So  repugnant  is  slavery  to  the  British  ge- 

VOL.VIII.  R 


194  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  HI 

niuSj  that  when,  about  two  hundred  years  ago,  a 
law  was  made  in  England  condemning  idle  vaga- 
bonds to  this  condition,  the  spirit  of  the  nation 
could  not  bear  it;  and  it  was  soon  after  repealed. 
And  now  every  slave,  of  whatever  colour,  from 
the  moment  of  his  arrival  in  Great  Britain,  and 
us  long  as  he  remains  in  it,  is  a  free  man,  and  a 
British  subject,  whether  baptized  or  not;  the  law 
protects  his  person  and  his  property;  he  has  no 
more  to  fear  from  his  master,  than  any  other 
free  servant  has;  he  cannot  be  bought  or  sold; 
but  if  he  has  bound  himself  by  contract  to  serve 
his  master  for  a  certain  length  of  time,  that  con- 
tract, like  those  entered  into  by  apprentices,  and 
i  omc  other  servants,  will  be  valid.  I  wish  I  were 
"\varrantcd  to  add,  that  the  same  regard  is  had  to 
ihe  rights  of  human  nature  hi  all  the  British  do- 
inhiions.  But  I  must  confess  with  anguish  of 
iicart,  that  it  is  not  so;  for  that  almost  all  the  pro- 
ducts of  the  West  Indies,  and  some  too  of  the 
East,  are  procured  for  us,  by  the  sweat,  the 
tctirs,  and  the  blood,  of  miserable  slaves.  And 
:Iiis  leads  me  to  consider,  in  the  second  placd, 
the  origin,  lawfulness,  and  expediency,  of  the 
slavery  of  the  ncgros. 

613.  In  evincing  the  unlawfulness  of  slavery, 
and  protesting  against  the  cruelty  of  it,  I  must 
not  be  understood  to  blame  every  person  who  is, 


Faitlir.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  195 

or  may  have  been,  concerned  in  it.  My  censure 
neither  is,  nor  can  be,  levelled  at  any  individuals, 
those  excepted  who  are  cruel  and  unjust  to  ihe'u' 
slaves;  and  that  all  such  deserve  censure,  every 
honest  man  will  allow.  The  present  race  of  Ame- 
rican and  West  Indian  planters  I  cannot  blame 
for  the  existence  of  a  commerce,  which  was 
estiiblished  before  their  grandfathers  were  born. 
I  cannot  blame  them  for  possessing  those  estates 
which  they  have  acquired  by  fair  means;  or  for 
not  abolishing  a  traffick,  which  it  is  not  in  their 
power  to  abolish.  Nor  can  I  blame  them  for  not 
giving  liberty  to  their  slaves,  when  I  consider, 
that  so  many  savage  men,  set  free  at  once,  might 
annul  the  property,  and  destroy  the  lives,  of 
thousands  of  innocent  persons,  and,  perhaps,  in- 
volve the  whole  empire  in  confusion.  The  guilt 
of  enslaving  the  negros  is  to  be  imputed,  not  so 
much  to  individuals,  as  to  the  lohole  comvmnity; 
those,  however,  excepted,  who  publickly  con- 
demn the  practice,  and  would  abolish  it  if  they 
could.  But  to  expose  it  in  what  I  think  its  proper 
colours,  is  a  duty  which  I  owe  to  humanity  and 
truth.  Such  attempts,  though  they  cannot  cure, 
may  have  a  tendency  to  alleviate,  the  evil;  and 
perhaps  contribute  something,  however  little,  to 
its  final  abolition. 

614.  The  Spaniards  having  taken  possession  of 


196  ELEMENTS  or  Part  111. 

the  West  Indies,  in  the  end  of  tlic  fifteenth  cen- 
tury, and  beini^  in  great  want  of  labourers  to  as- 
sist in  cultivating  their  plantations,  seized  upon 
and  enslaved  such  of  the  native  Indians  as  came 
in  their  way:  but  finding  them  an  indolent  and 
weakly  race  of  men,  and  hearing  that  the  negros 
of  Africa  had  more  activity,  they  encouraged 
Portuguese  traders  to  bring  them  slaves  from 
that  country;  and  the  same  policy  was  afterward;* 
adopted  by  other  European  colonies,  that  settled 
beyond  the  Atlantick.  This  was  the  beginning  of 
the  African  slave  trade,  which  has  continued 
ever  since,  and  has  become  so  extensive,  that  into 
the  British  America,  and  our  West  Indian  set- 
tlements alone,  there  are  now  imported  annually 
from  Africa,  and  sold,  thousands  of  negros, 
MANY  thousands  certainly;  how  many,  I  know 
not;  as  the  accounts  I  have  received  on  this  head 
are  not  consistent. 

615.  That  many  of  these  slaves  come  into  the 
hands  of  good  masters,  and  so  lead  lives  that  are 
not  uncomfortable,  I  am  very  willing  to  believe: 
and  it  is  well  known,  that  those  employed  in  do- 
nicstick  offices  have  not  so  much  reason  to  com- 
plain as  those  who  labour  in  the  field;  and  that, 
in  some  of  our  colonies,  they  are  less  rigorously 
used  than  in  others.  But  it  is  in  general  true,  and 
is  proved  by  unquestionable  evidence,  that  the 


PartUI.  MORAL  SC1E^XE.  19T 

methods  by  which  they  are  forced  from  their  na- 
tive land,  the  hardships  they  suffer  at  sea,  the 
dreadful  punisliments  inflicted  on  them  for  slight 
ofTenees,  the  excehsive  labour  they  are  compel- 
led to  undergo,  the  scanty  and  unhealthy  allot- 
ment that  is  given  them  of  the  necessaries  of  life, 
and  the  laws  they  are  subject  to,  in  some  islands 
and  provinces,  are  shocking  to  relate,  and  a  dis- 
grace to  human  nature.*  This,  therefore,  is  a 
most  infamous  business;  and,  though  slavery 
cannot  all  at  once  be  abolished,  it  ought  to  be, 
and  may  be,  and  probably  will  be,  discontinued 
gradually.  The  bad  policy  and  inhumanity  of  it 
were  lately,!  in  a  very  solemn  and  publick  man- 
ner, proved  by  irresistible  reasoning,  in  strains  of 
elocution,  and  with  a  warmth  of  benevolence, 
that  have  done  immortal  honour  to  the  names  of 
Pitt,  Fox,  Wilberforce,  Montagu,  and  Smith; 
while  on  the  other  side,  nothing  of  the  nature  of 
argument  was  urged,  that  might  not  be  resolved 
iflto  a  principle,  which  would  vindicate  half  the 
wickedness  of  mankind;  and  which,  if  proposed 

*  See  all  this  proved  unanswerably,  and,  alas,  by  fofl 
many  f-xts,  in  An  Abstract  of  the  evidence  delivered  be/ore 
a  select  coininittee  of  the  house  <f  coinvions,  in  the  year^ 
1790  and  1791 ,  London,  printed  1791. 

t  This  written  in  1791. 

R2 


198  ELEMENTS  OF  I Vt  lU, 

in  direct  terms,  every  individiuil  member  of  the 
illustrious  assembly  I  allude  to,  would  reject 
with  abhorrence;  namely,  that  practices  whereby 
money  may  be  gained  ought  not  to  be  discon- 
tinued. ^ 

616.  The  most  intelligent  writers  on  this  sub- 
ject are  of  opinion,  that,  by  our  planters  in  the 
West  Indies,  free  servants  might  be  employed  at 
less  expense  than  slaves  are;  of  whom,  in  that 
part  of  the  world,  and  in  North  America,  there  is 
reason  to  apprehend,  that,  in  consequence  of  the 
tyranny  under  which  they  groan,  many  thousands 
perish  every  year,  over  and  above  the  number 
that  would  die  in  that  time  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  nature.  For,  otherwise,  there  could  not  every 
year  be  a  demand  for  so  many  thousands;  as 
!)lack  men  and  women  arc  imported  promiscu- 
ously; and  it  is  very  much  the  planters  interest 
that  they  should  marry,  and  have  children.  In 
this  country  no  annual  importation  of  free  ser- 
vants was  ever  found  necessary;  because  here, 
among  people  of  almost  every  rank,  those  who 
arc  born  arc  nearly  equal  in  number  to  those  who 
die.  And  so  it  would  be  in  our  colonies,  if  there 
the  slaves  were  to  be  treated  as  free  servants; 
and  if  masters  did  not,  as  it  is  well  known  they 
do,  kec])  them  in  utter  ignorance  of  moral  and 
religious  duly,  and,  by  example  and  couDivanre, 


PartllL  MORAL  SCIENCE.  199 

encourage  them  to  wallow  in  beastly  sensuality. 
Let  us  now  examine  the  apologies,  which  those 
who  think  their  interest  promoted  by  the  slavery 
of  negros,  do  commonly  make  for  it.  They  may, 
I  think,  be  reduced  to  five. 

617.  First,  It  is  said,  "That  the  Africans, 
*'  whom  our  planters,  and  their  emissaries,  buy 
"  for  slaves,  are  publickly  exposed  to  sale  by 
"  their  countrymen;  and  that,  if  we  did  not  buy 
"  them,  others  would."  ^n  answer  to  this,  I  ob- 
serve, in  the  fiist  place,  that  it  cannot  be  pre- 
tended, that  all  the  negros  imported  into  our 
colonies  frcm  Africa  are  procured  by  sale  in  a 
publick  market;  for  it  is  notorious,  that  many  of 
them  are  stolen,  or  obtained  by  other  indirect 
methods.  Nor,  secondly,  can  it  be  pretended, 
that  the  planter,  who  buys  them  when  imported, 
makes  any  inquiry,  either  into  their  former  con- 
dition, or  into  the  legality  of  that  power  which 
the  merchant  assumes  over  them;  it  being  equally 
notorious,  that,  in  every  colony,  the  circum- 
stances of  their  being  black,  and  imported  from 
Africa,  are  alone  sufficient,  in  the  eye  of  the  law, 
to  fix  them  in  slavery  for  life,  and  to  entail  the 
same  ruin  upon  their  offspring. 

618.  Thirdly,  Though  ignorant  and  barbarous 
nations,  like  those  of  Guinea,  should  sell  their 
prisoners,  it  will  not  follow,  that  we  have  any 


200  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III 

right  to  buy  them;  unless  we  did  it  with  a  view 
to  deliver  them  from  misery,  to  improve  their 
manners,  and  to  instruct  them  in  the  christian  re- 
ligion; purposes,  which,  it  is  well  known,  never 
enter  into  the  head  of  the  slave  merchant.  Fourth- 
ly, It  is  strange,  that  merchants,  who  claim  the 
privilege  of  purchasing  whatever  is  offered  at  a 
price,  should  be  so  ignorant  in  their  own  trade,  as 
not  to  know,  that  those  goods  only  are  market- 
able, for  which  there  is  a  demand;  and  that  buy- 
ers, as  well  as  sellers,  are  necessaiy  in  commer- 
cial intercourse.  Will  it  be  pretended,  that  the 
petty  kings  of  Africa  would  continue  to  enslave 
their  subjects  and  neighbours  with  the  same 
alacrity  as  at  present,  if  our  West  Indians  and 
the  North  Americans  were  to  purchase  no  more 
slaves?  As  well  may  it  be  pretended,  that  the  de- 
mand for  tobacco  would  not  be  lessened,  though 
all  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  were  to  discontinue 
the  use  of  it. 

619.  liut,  passing  this,  let  me  ask,  in  the  fifth 
place,  who  it  was  that  first  taught  the  negros  of 
Africa  to  sell  one  another?  Who  are  they,  who 
tempt  those  unhappy  people,  by  every  sort  of 
bribery  that  can  be  supposed  to  have  influence  on 
them,  to  plunder  and  betray,  every  man  his  neigh- 
bour, in  order  to  get  together  a  multitude  of  hu- 
man virtims  to  ansv.er  the  vearlv  demand?  Arc 


Part  in.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  201 

3iot  Europeans,  and  European  planters,  the  first 
movers  in  this  dreadful  business?  Does  it  then 
become  them  to  cliarge  Africa  with  the  whole 
guUt  of  a  commerce,  which,  but  for  their  cun- 
ning cruelty,  and  avarice,  would  not  now  exist, 
and  would  never  have  existed?  This  sort  of  ca- 
suistry may  justly  be  termed  diabolical:  for  it  is 
thus,  that  the  most  malevolent  of  all  beings  is 
said,  first  to  tempt  and  corrupt,  and  then  to 
accuse. 

620. 1  shall  only  add,  with  respect  to  the  argu- 
ment now  before  us,  that  goods  are  sometimes 
exposed  to  sale,  which  every  trader  knows  it  is 
not  laviTfui  to  buy.  He  who  purchases  what  he 
knows  to  have  been  stolen,  is  a  partner  in  the 
guilt  of  the  thief.  He,  who  buys  a  human  being, 
with  a  view  to  reduce  him  to  the  condition  of  a 
wretched  negro  slave,  does  every  thing  in  his 
power  to  destroy  the  soul  and  the  body  of  that 
human  being,  in  order  to  get  money  for  himself. 
And  he,  who  tempts  a  poor  barbarian  king  to 
punish  with  slavery  the  most  inconsiderable  tres- 
pass, and  to  involve  the  innocent  in  the  same  ruin 
with  the  guilty,  that  he  may  have  men  to  give  in 
exchange  for  the  trinkets  and  luxuries  of  Europe, 
does  every  thing  that  with  imptmity  he  can  do, 
to  confound  truth  and  justice;  to  introduce  wick- 
edness and  misery  into  the  dominions  of  that 


202  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

barbarian;  and  to  promote  the  views,  and  extend 
the  influence,  of  the  great  adversary  of  God  and 
man. 

621.  Secondly,  it  is  said,  "that  the  negros 
"  are  happier  in  our  colonies  than  they  were  in 
*'  their  own  country."  Supposing  this  true,  it 
will  not  follow,  that  we  are  excusable  in  making 
them  slaves,  unless  we  did  it  with  a  sincere  in- 
tention to  make  them  happy;  and  with  their  free 
consent,  founded  on  a  belief  that  we  mean  to  do 
so.  If  I,  by  oppression,  reduce  an  innocent  man 
to  poverty,  and  if  Providence  endow  him  with 
strength  of  mind  to  bear  his  misfortunes  as  be- 
comes a  christian,  it  is  possible  he  may  he  hap- 
pier in  adversity  than  ever  he  was  in  prosperity: 
but  will  this  excuse  me  for  what  I  have  done?  If 
it  is  unlawful  to  enslave  an  inoffensive  fellow 
creature,  no  unforeseen  and  unintentional  good 
consequences,  that  may  follow  upon  it,  will  ever 
render  it  lawful.  The  knife  of  the  ruffian  may 
dismiss  a  good  man  from  the  troubles  of  this  life, 
and  send  him  to  heaven:  but  is  it  therefore  lawful 
to  murder  a  good  man!  If  we  estimate  the  mo- 
rality of  actions,  not  by  the  intention  of  the  agent, 
but  by  the  consequences,  whereof,  by  the  over- 
ruling care  of  a  good  Providence,  they  may  be 
productive,  we  shall  at  once  confound  all  niora^ 
principles 


Part  III.  MORAL  SC1ENX£,  20a 

622.  In  this  plea  of  the  slavemongers  there  is 
something  particularly  shocking.  By  their  cun- 
ning, and  cruelty,  and  love  of  money,  they  have 
introduced  many  evils  into  the  native  countries  of 
the  negros;  which,  according  to  the  best  histori- 
cal information,  were  formerly  regions  of  plenty 
and  peace.  And  now,  when  they  have  stolen,  or 
forced  away,  the  unhappy  victim  into  a  distant 
land,  and  torn  him  for  ever  from  the  arms  of 
consanguinity  and  friendship,  and  from  every 
other  cpm fort  which  remained  for  him  in  this 
world,  and  afterwards  loaded  him  and  his  off- 
spring with  the  chains  of  intolerable  servitude, 
they  are  pleased  to  affirm,  that  he  is  obliged  to 
them  for  delivering  him  from  calamities,  which 
by  their  means  he  might  have  been  exposed  to 
in  his  own  country.  As  if  an  enemy  v/ere  first  to 
fill  every  corner  of  my  house  with  poisonous  or 
inflammable  materials,  and  then  violently  to 
seize  and  cast  me  into  a  dungeon  for  life;  telling 
me,  that  in  this  he  did  me  a  great  favour,  for 
that,  if  he  had  not  forced  me  from  home,  I  might 
have  been  burned,  or  poisoned,  in  consequence  of 
the  snares  he  had  laid  for  me.  What  answer  is 
due  to  such  reasoningi 

623.  But  negros  are  addicted  to  intoxication, 
and  frequently  entertain  themselves  with  dancing 
and  wild  musickj  whence  planters  may  be  willing 


204.  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  Ilf. 

to  believe,  that  they  are  happier  Avith  them,  than 
they  could  have  been  in  a  country  where  rum  is 
not  known,  except  perhaps  in  the  cottages  ot 
kings.  Dancing,  however,  and  drinking  are  very 
equivocal  signs,  and  very  inadequate  means,  of 
human  happiness.  How  often  do  the  most  en- 
lightened Europeans  luive  recourse  to  them,  in 
order  to  banish  care,  or  bring  on  a  temporary 
stupefactioni  Even  in  those  prisons  they  may  be 
seen  every  day,  where  the  utmost  misery  pre- 
vails. 

624.  One  man  is  not  always  a  competent  judge 
of  another's  feelings.  But  there  are  certain  con- 
ditions and  circumstances  of  life,  whereof  wc 
say  that  they  may  make  any  reasonable  man 
happy;  and  there  are  others  which,  on  hearing 
them  described,  we  declare  to  be  worse  than 
death.  What  then  shall  we  say  of  the  condition 
of  a  negro  slave?  Let  us  make  his  case  our  own, 
and  usk  ourselves,  whether  death  or  it  be  tht. 
more  desirable.  To  be  stolen,  or  decoyed,  or 
forced  from  our  native  country,  for  no  crime  of 
GUI'S,  and  by  those  whom  we  never  injured;  to 
be  stowed,  like  luml)er,  amidst  darkness,  and 
death  perhaps,  and  jnilrefaction,  in  the  lower 
decks  of  a  ship,  sailing  wc  know  not  whither;  to 
be  stripped  naked,  and  sold  like  beasts  in  a  mar- 
ket; to  be  driven  away,  by  the  scourge  of  the 


iPart  m,  MORAL  SCIENCE.  205 

overseer,  into  hopeless  slavery,  in  a  strange 
land,  where  we  find  thousands  of  our  country- 
men in  the  same  circumstances;  to  be  compelled 
to  labour,  with  little  intermission  or  shelter, 
under  the  burning  sun  of  a  tropical  climate;  to 
be  ourselves  punished,  and  see  our  friends  and 
innocent  children  punished,  with  unrelenting 
severity,  for  a  slight  oftence,  or  merely  to  gra- 
tify the  unmeaning  rage  of  a  merciless  oppres- 
sor; to  be  subjected  to  laws,  by  which  we  are 
declared  to  be  brutish  slaves,  and  unworthy  of  a 
legal  trial;*  to  know  that  the  same  destiny  awaits 
our  posterity,  and  that  death  alone  will  deliver 
us  and  them  from  the  horrours  of  this  condition; 
to  see  our  companions  dying  around  us  every 
day,  in  consequence  of  the  miseries  they  un- 
dergo; and,  what  perhaps  is  worst  of  all,  to  be 
obliged  to  keep  company  with,  and  spend  our 
lives  in  the  service  of,  our  tyrants:  are  these 
desirable  circumstances?  are  they  likely  to  make 
any  rational  being  happy?  are  they  not  worse 
than  a  thousand  deaths? 

625.  But  can  savages  have  sensibility  to  be 
affected,  as  we  should  be,  with  these  circum- 
stances? Not  so  much,  I  grant,  as  we  have;  but 
enough   to   make   them   very   wretched.    The 

*  See  the  huvs  of  Barbadoes  relating-  to  slaves 
VoL.VIIL  ^    S 


'206  ELEMENTS  OF  Pail  III. 

African  negro  is  not  deficient  in  sensibility. 
Violent  in  anger,  and  terrible  in  vengeance,  he 
is  also  -warm  in  his  attachment  to  his  native 
country  and  kindred.  In  love,  and  in  friendship, 
he  has  sometimes  given  proof  of  such  generosity 
us  would  do  honour  to  any  hero  of  romance. 
From  the  blacks  themselves  we  may  learn, 
what  is  their  opinion  of  West  Indian  slavery. 
Their  frequent  attempts  to  run  away,  though 
they  know  not  whither  to  run;  the  obstinacy  of 
their  behaviour  towards  those  who  use  them 
cruelly;  the  cheerfulness  with  which  they  die, 
and  that  selfmurder  to  which  they  too  often  have 
recourse,  plainly  show,  that  they  look  upon  their 
condition  as  miserable.  And  their  notion  of  a 
future  state  is,  that  after  death  they  shall  return 
in  freedom  and  happiness  to  their  own  country; 
which  is  a  proof  that  they  consider  such  a  return 
as  the  most  desirable  of  all  things,  and  their 
being  detained  in  slavery  as  the  greatest  of  all 
calamities.  It  is  possible,  however,  that  there 
may  be  among  them  some  who  are  not  dissatis- 
fied with  their  condition.  But  those  are  indi- 
viduals, who  either  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
hinnane  nuisters;  or  wlio,  being  in  an  uncommon 
rlcgree  stupid  or  profligate,  are  equally  void  of 
magnanimity,  and  of  reflection. 

626.  It  is  urgecl,  'i  hirdiy,  "  that  the  African 


Fart  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  207 

"  blacks  are  so  very  wicked  as  to  deserve  no 
"  other  condition  than  slavery."  In  answer  to 
this,  let  me,  in  the  first  place,  repeat  a  question 
formerly  proposed,  how  came  they  to  be  so  very 
wicked?  Their  ancestors,  before  they  were  ac- 
quainted with  Europeans,  are  known  to  have 
been  a  harmless  race  of  men,  just,  friendly, 
temperate,  (as  much  as  people  in  their  circum- 
stances might  be  supposed  to  be),  and  strangers 
to  avarice  and  discontent.  Such  to  this  day  they 
would  probably  have  continued,  if  they  had 
never  heard  of  Europe,  or  of  white  men.  Euro- 
peans, therefore,  are  chargeable  with  their  pre- 
sent depravity;  and  that  in  three  respects:  first, 
by  introducing  among  them  intemperance  and 
cruelty,  and  teaching  them,  by  advice,  example, 
and  bribery,  to  be  profligate,  and  enslave  and 
sell  one  another:  secondly,  by  treating  them 
with  so  much  rigour;  keeping  them  ignorant  of 
religion  and  morality;  behaving  towards  them 
as  if  they  were  more  nearly  allied  to  brutes  than 
to  men;  and  setting  before  them  so  many  exam- 
ples of  wickedness:  and,thirdly,  by  making  them 
slaves. 

627.  For  it  is  well  observed,  by  the  wisest  of 
poets,  (as  Athenaeus,  quoting  the  passage,  justly 
calls  him);  it  is,  I  say,  well  observed  by  Homer, 
who  lived  when  slavery  was  common,  and  whosf^ 


208  ELE^IENTS  OF  Tart  Ilf. 

knowledge  of  the  human  heart  no  person  who 
understands  him  will  ever  call  in  question,  that 
^'  when  a  man  is  made  a  slave,  he  loses  from 
"  that  day  the  half  of  his  virtue."  And  Longi- 
nus,  quoting  the  same  passage,  affirms,  "  that 
"  slavery,  however  mild,  may  still  be  called  the 
»'  prison  of  the   soul,  and  a  publick  dungeon." 
And  Tacitus  remarks,  "  that  even  wild  animals 
^'  lose  their  spirit  when  deprived  of  their  free- 
"  dom."  Banish,  from  the  human  breast,  hope 
and  the  sense   of  honour,  (and  what   sense  of 
honour,  or  what  hope,  can  an  enslaved  pagan 
rctaini)  and  you  banish  at  the  same  time  the 
noblest  incentives  to   virtue.    "  Slavery,"   sa\ 
Montesquieu,  "  is  not  useful,  either  to  the  mii^ 
"  ter,  or  to  the  slave;  to  the  latter,  because  h 
"  can  do  nothing  by  virtue;  to  the  former, becauht- 
'*  he  contracts  with  his  slaves  all  sorts  of  evil  h:i- 
"  bits,  inures  himself  insensibly  to  neglect  ever 
'*  moral  virtue,  and  becomes  proud,  passionate  , 
"  hardhearted,  violent,  voluptuous,  and  cruel." 
All  history  proves,  and  every  rational  philoso- 
pher admits,  that,  as  liberty   promotes  virtin 
and  genius,  slavery  debases  the  understandin;. 
and  corrupts  the  heart,  of  both  the  slave,  and  th<. 
master;  and  that  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  as 
it  is  more  or  less  severe.  So  that  in  this  plea  of 
the  slavcmonger  we  have  another  example  ol 
the  dii\I)olical  casuistry  above  mentioned;  whei  r- 


Vail  III.  MORAL  SCIEXCE.    .  209 

by  the  tempter  and  corrupter  endeavours  to 
vindicate  or  gratify  himself,  by  accusing  those 
whom  he  has  tempted  and  corrupted. 

628.  That  negro  slaves  should  be  fierce  and 
savage,  is  not  wonderful;  it  would  be  a  miracle 
if  they  were  otherwise.  They  are  kept  ignorant 
of  their  nature,  duty  and  final  destination;  vi- 
tiated by  the  example  of  those  who  pretend  to 
be  wiser,  better,  and  nobler,  than  they;  Avantonly 
deprived  of  their  inherent  rights,  whereof  they 
have  a  sense  as  well  as  we;  hardened,  and  ren- 
dered furious  by  despair;  their  condition  is 
without  help,  and  without  hope.  That  minds, 
untutored  like  theirs,  and  actuated  by  strong- 
passions,  should  maintain  a  cheerful,  patient, 
or  pliable  temper,  in  the  midst  of  such  misery; 
or  be  virtuous,  Avhen  beset  on  all  sides  by  bad 
example,  and  cut  off  from  every  opportunity  of 
rational  improvement,  is  absolutely  impossible. 
With  all  the  advantages  we  have  derived  from 
philosophy,  religion,  and  the  manners  of  civi- 
lized life,  if  w^  were  to  suppose  our  country 
invaded,  and  our  rights  violated,  by  the  African 
negros,  as  cruelly  as  their  rights  are  violated 
bysomc  European  slave  merchants  and  planters, 
candour,  I  believe,  M^ould  compel  us  to  acknov.  - 
ledge,  that  we  should  be  as  untractable  and  re- 
-  cngcful  as  they.  And  vet,  vre  ^^  ould  hardlv  ar-- 


210  ELEMBM'SOl  raiLlIl 

mit,  in  their  vindication,  that  wc  are  by  nature 
so  depraved,  as  to  deserve  no  other  condition 
tlum  slavery.  On  the  contrary,  we  should  say  of 
tlieni,  and  with  truth,  that  they  were  such  bar- 
barians, as  to  deserve  at  our  hands  no  other  re- 
turn than  final  extermination.  And,  if  our  power 
were  equal  to  our  wishes  and  privileges,  and  if 
our  deliverance  could  be  effected  by  no  other 
means,  we  should  arm  ourselves  with  the  rights 
of  nature,  and  sweep  our  destroyers  from  the 
face  of  the  earth.  And  if  we  did  so,  who  would 
blame  usi 

629.  Makhig  those  allowances  that  ought  to 
be  made  for  the  education  and  habits  of  savage 
life,  and  for  that  warmth  of  temper  which  pre- 
vails among  the  natives  of  the  torrid  zone,  ^\ 
shall  not  find  that  the  ncgros  of  Africa  arc 
naturally  more  corrupt  than  other  men.  Their 
remote  ancestors,  if  we  believe  history,  were  a 
respectable  people.  And  they  themselves  Krc 
perhaps  less  corrupt  than  we  should  be  in  their 
circumstances:  certain  it  is,  that  in  general  they 
lie  not  more  so  than  their  masters.  Their  at- 
ichment  to  their  children  and  parents,  their 
gratitude  to  tliose  masters  who  use  them  well, 
the  warmth  of  their  iViendship,  their  superiority 
U)  pain  ami  the  fear  of  death,  are  evidences,  that 
•]v*v  iiiheri'  (Voni  nature  a  constitution  of  mind 


Part  III.  MORAL  SCIEXCE.  211 

very  capable  of  improvement.  If,  as  we  read  in 
Paradise  Lost,  Eve's  desperate  contempt  of  life 
and  pleasure  seemed  to  Adam  to  argue  in  her 
something  sublime  and  excellent,*  let  us  not  be 
insensible  to  the  merit  of  that  poor  negro  girl, 
who  refused  to  marry,  <'  because,"  as  she  told 
father  Tertre,  ''  though  miserable  herself,  she 
"  would  not  bring  into  the  world  children, 
*^  whose  sufferings  would  be  more  insupportable 
"  to  her  than  her  own."  Who  will  say  that  this 
creature  was  so  depraved,  as  to  deserve  no  other 
condition  than  slavery! 

630.  For  the  white  children  committed  to 
their  care  negro  nurses  are  said  to  contract 
sometimes  an  extraordinary  fondness;  by  which 
they  have  even  been  prompted  to  disclose  con- 
spiracies formed  by  their  countrymen  for  the 
recovery  of  their  freedom;  for  they  could  not 
beur  to  think  that  their  little  darlings,  who  had 
never  offended,  and  whom,  in  their  dialect,  they 
distinguish  by  a  name  of  peculiar  endearment, 
should  perish  in  the  intended  massacre.  If  this 
is  thought  to  be  an  example  of  weakness  rather 
than  of  magnanimity,  it  is,  however,  so  amiable 
a  weakness,  and  so  truly  feminine,  as  to  do 
honour  to  the  nature  that  is  capable  of  it.  So 

"  P:.ra'li.se  Lost, -X.  979—3016. 


212  ELEMENTS  OF  rait  III 

that,  if  we  uncle rutand  Homer's  computation 
literally;  and  suppose  that  the  day  which  de- 
livered them  into  bondage  took  away  the  half 
of  their  original  worth,  we  shall  be  inclined  to 
consider  the  ncgros  as  a  race  of  men  who 
might  do  credit  to  humanity,  if  we  did  not  de- 
base and  destroy  them,  and  who  arc  justly  enti- 
tled to  the  privileges  of  rational  beings. 
'  631.  Fourthly,  the  necessities  of  govern- 
ment and  commerce  have  been  pleaded  in  ex- 
cuse of  our  conduct  towards  black  men.  But  he 
Vvho  ])clieves  that  universal  justice  and  benevo- 
lence would  be  unfriendly  lo  our  political  and 
commercial  affairs,  must  admit,  either  that  in- 
justice and  cruelty  become  lawful  when  money 
is  to  be  got  by  them,  or  that  there  is  something 
in  our  commercial  policy  which  ought  to  be 
rectified.  For  as  that  which  leads  to  absurdity 
cannot  be  true,  so  that  cannot  be  right  which 
necessarily  produces  wrong.  And  to  go  on  in  an 
evil  course,  merely  because  it  seems  easier  to 
do  so  than  to  return  to  duty,  can  never  be  excu- 
sable in  any  man,  or  in  any  nation.  I  apprehend, 
however,  that  this  plea  is  no  better  founded  than 
the  f)thers.  Good  government  is  maintained  by 
j\istice,  moderation,  industry,  love  to  our  coun- 
try and  our  neighbour,  and  the  fear  of  God.  But 
'bo  practice  in  ([ucstion  tends  to  eradicate  these 


IVtIII.  MORAL  SCIENCK.  213 

virtues,  and  therefore  cannot  be  necessary  to 
good  government. 

632.  That  the  proprietors  of  West  Indian 
estates  would  be,  in  any  respect,  materially  in- 
jured by  employing  free  servants  (if  these  could 
be  had)  in  their  several  manufactures,  is  highly 
improbable,  and  has  indeed  been  absolutely 
denied  by  those  who  were  well  informed  upoii 
this  subject.  A  clergyman  of  V'irginia  assured 
me,  that  a  Avhite  man  does  double  the  work  of  a 
slave:  wdiich  will  not  seem  wonderful,  if  we 
consider,  that  the  former  works  for  himself,  the 
latter  for  another;  that  by  the  laws  the  one  is 
protected,  and  the  other  oppressed;  and  that  in 
the  articles  of  food  and  clothing,  relaxation  and 
rest,  the  free  man  has  innumerable  advantages. 
In  Jamaica,  many  slaves  are  kept  for  mere 
show;  and  a  gentleman  from  that  island  told  me, 
that  he  had  seen  six  of  them  loiter  about  a  long 
morning  in  putting  a  house  in  order,  which  two 
English  servants  w^ould  have  done  to  much  bet- 
ter purpose  in  half  the  time.  It  may  therefore 
be  presumed,  that  if  all  who  serve  in  the 
colonies  were  free,  the  same  work  would  be 
performed  by  half  the  number,  which  is  now 
performed  by  the  whole;  which,  even  in  a  com- 
mercial view,  would  be  of  great  benefit  to  the 
planter.  And  free  servants,  working  as  in  En- 


214  ELEMENTS  OF  I'aitlll. 

gland,  with  reasonable  wages,  rest  on  the  sab- 
hath,  and  amusement  on  holidays,  would  live 
longer  than  slaves,  have  more  children,  and  be 
;it  once  better  disposed,  and  better  (qualified 
l)oth  for  improving  their  country,  and  for  de- 
fending it. 

633. The  very  soil  becomes  more  fertile  under 
llie  hands  of  freemen,  and  the  fruits  of  the  earth 
of  a  more  generous  nature.  So  says  an  intelligent 
French  author  (Le  Poivre);  who,  after  observ- 
ing, that  the  products  of  Cochin  China  are  the 
same  in  kind  with  those  of  the  West  Indies,  but 
of  better  quality,  and  in  greater  abundance, 
gives  for  a  reason,  that  the  former  are  cultivated 
by  freemen,  and  the  latter  by  slaves;  and  thence 
argues,  that  the  negros  beyond  the  Atlantick 
ought  to  be  made  free.  "Liberty  and  property," 
says  he,  "  form  the  basis  of  abundance  and  good 
"  agriculture.  I  never  observed  it  to  flourish 
"  where  those  rights  of  mankind  Mere  not  firmly 
'•'  established.  The  earth,  which  multiplies  her 
"  productions  with  profusion  under  the  hands  of 
"  tlie  freeborn  labourer,  seems  to  shrink  into 
••'  barrenness  under  the  sweat  of  the  slave." 
The  same  sentiments  are  found  in  Pliny  and 
C-olumella:  who  both  impute  the  decay  of  hus- 
bandry in  their  time,  not  to  any  deficiency  in  the 
sr»il,  as  if  the  earth  could  be  exhausted  of  its 


Pun  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  21  o 

genial  powers  by  long  cultivation,  (which,  it 
seems,  "wxis  in  their  days  the  vulgar  belief)  but 
to  the  unwise  policy  of  leaving  to  the  manage- 
ment of  slaves  those  fields,  which  (to  adoj^^t  the 
words  of  Pliny)  "  had  formerly  rejoiced  under 
"  the  laurelled  plowshare  and  the  triumphant 
<'  plowman."  And  Rollin,  with  good  reason, 
imputes  to  the  same  cause  the  present  barren- 
ness of  Palestine,  as  compared  with  that  fer- 
tility, which  procured  for  it  in  ancient  times 
the  appellation  of"  a  land  flowing  with  milk  and 
"  honey."* 

634.  It  may  be  thought,  that  the  planter  could 
not  easily,  at  first  perhaps  not  possibly,  procure 
a  sufficient  number  of  free  servants.  But,  let  it  be 
remembered,  that  the  present  scarcity  of  them 
in  our  colonies  is  owing  to  the  wretched  policy 
there  established.  For  it  is  affirmed  by  Dr. 
Franklin,  whose  testimony  on  this  subject  will 
be  allowed  to  have  very  great  weight,  "  that  the 
'*  negros  brought  into  the  English  sugar  islands 
"  have  greatly  diminished  the  number  of  white 
"  men.  The  poor  whites,"  says  he,  "  are  by  this 
"  means  deprived  of  employment;  and  those 
''  white  men  who  have  slaves,  not  labouring  bu.i 

*  See  Columell.  Prxfat.— Plin.  Hist.  Nat.  xviii.  -3  — 
K')llin's  History-  of  Arts  and  Sciences,  vol.  i. 


216  ELEMENTS  OF  Pait  Ilf. 

^^  hixnrious,  are  enfeebled,  and  not  so  generally 
*'  proiifick."  So  that,  in  those  islands,  if  there 
were  no  slaves,  it  seems  to  be  Franklin's  opi- 
nion, that  white  men  would  be  more  numerous, 
more  active,  and  more  virtuous.  Surely,  that 
cannot  be  good  policy,  which  impairs  the  ac- 
tivity, corrupts  the  virtue,  and  lessens  the  num- 
ber of  white  men. 

635.  If  the  negros  in  Africa  could  once  be 
satisfied,  that  on  the  opposite  shores  of  the 
ocean  they  might  live  in  freedom  and  plenty, 
may  we  not  suppose,  ihat  many  of  them  would 
be  Avilling  to  leave  their  own  country,  and  seek 
their  fortune  on  the  footing  of  free  servants,  in 
North  America  and  the  West  Indies?  For  do 
we  not  see  that  to  the  same  parts  of  the  world, 
uid  with  no  better  prospects,  our  own  country- 
uien  often  choose  to  emigrate  from  a  land  which, 
except  where  merciless  tyrants  domineer,  is  a 
land  of  liberty  and  peace?  So  that,  if  slavery 
were  no  more,  it  seems  not  unreasonable  to  be- 
lieve, that  in  our  colonies  there  would  soon  be 
rather  a  superabundance  of  free  servants,  than  a 
ficficiency.  Those  regions,  which  were  long 
thought  to  be,  and,  when  first  discovered,  really 
were,  inhosi)itable,  arc  now  known  to  be  plea- 
sant, and  healthy,  and  fruitful  even  to  luxuri- 
ance. 


iPartlll.  MOllAL  SCIENCE.  217 


^ 


636.  But  how,  it  may  be  said,  would  it  be 
possible  to  satisfy  the  negros  in  Africa,  that 
they  might  with  safety  remove  to  the  new  world? 
That  could  not  be  very  difficult,  if  it  be  true,  as 
the  advocates  for  slavery  affirm,  that  they  are 
happier  with  them,  than  they  were  at  home.  But, 
this  being  false,  I  will  admit,  that  for  some  time 
it  might  not  be  easy  to  persuade  the  Africans, 
that  they  had  any  thing  to  expect  from  white 
men,  but  treachery  and  torment.  Yet  were  we 
to  send  among  them,  from  year  to  year,  some  of 
their  countrymen  whom  we  had  made  free  and 
happy,  and  who  could  with  truth  declare,  that 
we  wished  to  make  others  equally  so,  I  cannot 
but  think,  that  their  testimony  would  at  last 
obtain  belief;  especially,  when  it  was  observed 
that  th*ey  chose  to  return,  and  actually  did  re- 
turn, with  gladness,  to  the  European  colonies. 
And  thus,  among  the  nations  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantick,  a  right  understanding  might  in 
time  be  established;  which  would  prepare  the 
way  for  diffusing  knowledge,  civility,  and  true 
religion,  over, the  whole  face  of  the  earth. 

637.  But  while  the  present  system  prevails, 
this  scheme  is  wholly  visionary,  and  indeed  im- 
practicable. To  give  it  a  chance  of  being  realiz- 
ed, the  first  step  to  be  taken  is,  to  prohibit,  un- 
der the  severest  penalties,  the  importation  ol 

Vol,  VIII.  T 


218  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  IH. 

slaves  from  Africa  into  the  British  colonies. 
This  would  instantly  change  the  condition  of 
our  negros  for  the  better,  by  making  their 
lives  of  much  greater  importance  to  the  planter, 
and  consequently  obliging  him,  for  his  own  in- 
terest, to  make  their  labour  moderate;  their 
food  wholesome,  and  in  sufficient  abundance; 
their  habitations  and  raiment  comfortable;  their 
children  and  families  objects  of  general  concern; 
their  freedom  attainable  by  good  behaviour; 
their  education  such  as  befits  a  christian  ser- 
vant; and  by  enforcing  upon  them  the  laws  of 
wedlock,  and  restraining  that  unbounded  sen- 
suality, which,  I  am  told,  their  masters  at  pre- 
sent do  not  discountenance,  but  rather,  by  con- 
nivance and  bad  example,  encourage. 

688.  As  money  is  not  by  all  men  accounted  the 
chief  good,  and  there  are  some  who  think  virtue 
and  happiness  of  more  value,  it  is  not  imper- 
tinent to  remark  further,  that,  if  the  products  of 
the  Indies  were  to  be  procured  by  the  labour  of 
freemen,  planters  would  themselves  lead  happier 
lives,  than  they  ever  can  do,  under  their  present 
plan  of  policy.  For,  as  matters  now  stand,  they 
are  in  perpetual  danger  of  assassination;  and 
must  know,  that  it  is  fear  alone  that  restrains 
their  miserable  negro  brethren  from  exerting 
all  the  power  that  can  be  derived  from  superi- 


Part  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  219 

ority  of  number,  in  regaining  that  liberty,  which 
'they  never  forfeited,  and  to  which  the  \uthor 
of  nature  gave  them  a  perfect  right.  Free  ser- 
vants may  be  faithful  associates,  and  ca'e  often 
the  best  of  friends;  but  from  a  slave — what  is  to 
be  expected?  Montesquieu  informs  us,  in  the  fol- 
lowing words;  to  the  truth  uf  which  the  history 
of  mankind,  and  the  feelings  of  every  generous 
heart,  bear  testimony.  "  A  slave  sees  a  society 
"  happV)  whereof  he  is  not  even  a  part;  he  finds 
"  that  security  is  established  for  others,  but  not 
"  for  him;  he  perceives  that  his  master  has  a 
"  soul  capable  of  selfadvan cement,  while  his 
"  own  is  violently  and  for  ever  repressed.  No- 
"  thing  puts  one  nearer  the  condition  of  the 
"  beasts,  than  always  to  see  freemen,  and  not  to 
"  be  free.  Such  a  person  is  the  natural  enemy  of 
"  the  society  in  which  he  lives."  Grant,  that, 
by  means  of  his  slaves,  a  planter,  or  owner  of  a 
plantation,  may  acquire  ten  thousand  pounds 
sooner^  than  by  being  attended  and  served  by 
freemen  (which,  however,  I  believe  v/ould  not 
be  the  case);  yet,  might  not  the  tranquillity  of 
such  a  state;  the  satisfaction  of  being  surround- 
ed with  faithful  hearts  and  smiling  eyes;  the 
circumstance  of  having  escaped  from  a  scene  of 
misery  and  carnage;  the  approbation  of  a  good 
conscience,  and  the  hope  of  future  reward,  be 


:320  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  HI. 

accepted  as  equivalents  for  a  little  superfluous 
gold  and  silver? 

0:39.  If  nothing  will  satisfy  the  slavcmongcr, 
but  sudden  and  enormous  acquisitions,  and  if 
free  servants  be  a  tax  upon  his  rapacity;  let 
freedom,  however,  take  place,  and  let  him  in- 
demnify himself,  by  raising  the  price  of  his 
manufacture.  Sugar  and  rum  (thank  Heaven!) 
are  not  necessary  either  to  life,  or  to  virtue;  and 
if  they  were  to  become  somewhat  dearer,  where 
would  be  the  great  harm!  But,  (to  bring  this 
head  to  a  conclusion)  though  all  these  reason- 
ings should  be  rejected,  I  will  not  admit  that 
any  benefits  derived  from  the  trade  of  the  avcs- 
lern  world,  though  they  were  ten  thousand 
times  greater  than  they  are,  can  ever  justify  our 
enslaving  and  destroying  black  men.  Nor  will  I 
admit,  that  this  plea  deserves  the  least  notice, 
till  it  be  first  proved  to  my  conviction,  that  gold 
and  silver  are  of  greater  value  than  Christianity; 
that  tobacco  is  a  more  glorious  attainment,  and 
more  essential  to  happiness,  than  justice  and 
brotherly  love;  and  that  it  is  better  for  a  man  to 
live  luxuriously  in  this  world,  than  to  be  saved 
ill  that  which  is  to  come. 

04O.  The  FiFrii  argument  that  I  iiavc  heard 
in  favour  of  negro  slavery  is  founded  on  this 
principle,  that  ncgros  are  animals  of  a  nature 


Part  111.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  221 

inferiour  to  man;  between  whom  and  the  brutes 
they  hold,  as  it  were,  the  middle  place.  But, 
though  this  were  true,  it  would  not  follow,  that 
we  have  a  right,  either  to  debase  ourselves  by 
habits  of  cruelty,  or  to  use  them  ill:  for  even 
beasts,  if  inoffensive  are  entitled  to  gentle 
treatment;  and  we  have  reason  to  believe,  that 
they  who  are  not  merciful  will  not  obtain  mercy. 
Besides,  if  we  were  to  admit  this  theory,  we 
should  be  much  at  a  loss  to  determine,  whether 
the  negro  does  really  partake  so  much  of  the 
brute,  as  to  lose  that  right  to  liberty,  which,  un- 
less it  be  forfeited  by  criniinal  conduct,  is  in- 
herent in  every  human,  or  at  least  in  every  ra- 
tional, being.  And  further,  in  the  same  propor- 
tion in  which  black  men  are  supposed  to  be 
brutes,  they  must  be  supposed  incapable  of 
moral  notions,  and  consequently  not  account- 
able for  their  conduct;  and  therefore,  to  punish 
them  as  criminals  must  always  be  in  a  certain 
degree  both  absurd  and  cruel.  But  this  plea  I 
do  not  think  will  ever  be  urged  by  our  planters. 
Both  negros  and  mulattos  they  know  too  well, 
to  have  any  doubt  of  their  being  men.  I'or  this 
notable  piece  of  casuistry  v/e  are,  I  believe,  in- 
debted to  those  ingenious  modern  philosophers, 
who  never  find  any  difficulty,  or  v/ant  of  evi- 

T  ? 


222  ELEMENTS  OF  Tart  II L 

dence,  in  paradoxes  unfriendly  to  the  christian 
religion. 

64 1 .  The  only  credible  account  extant  of  the 
orig-in  of  mankind  is  that  which  we  have  in 
scripture.  And  if  we  acquiesce  in  it,  we  must 
believe,  that  all  the  nations  of  men  upon  the 
earth  are  "  of  one  blood,"  being  descended  of 
the  same  first  parents.  Nor  can  we  reject  it 
on  rational  grounds,  till  we  have  first  proved, 
either  from  more  authentick  records,  or  from  the 
nature  of  the  thing,  that  it  is  not  true.  More  au- 
thentick records  it  will  hardly  be  pretended  that 
there  are;  for  we  have  no  genealogical  table 
whereby  it  can  be  made  appear,  that  negros  arc 
not  descended  from  Adam  and  Eve.  We  must 
argue  therefore  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  if 
wc  argue  at  all  on  this  subject.  And  I  think  there 
is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  the  negro,  in  his  soul, 
or  in  his  body,  which  may  not  easily  be  account- 
ed for,  on  the  supposition  that  he  and  we  are  of 
the  same  family. 

642.  As  to  his  soul:  it  is  certain,  that  he  has 
reason,  risibility,  and  a  capacity  of  improve- 
uieiit;  that  he  possesses  the  faculty  of  speech, 
and  consequently  of  formhig,  what  philosophers 
call,  general  ideas  (sec  §  20);  that  he  perceives, 
as  we  do,  a  diflerence  between  beauty  and  de- 
'ormitv,  ti-iUJi  and  falsehood,   viiiuf   and   vice. 


Part  111.  MOKAL  SCIENCE.  223 

lawful  authority  and  oppressive  power,  (see  § 
520);  that  he  has  an  idea,  though  no  doubt  a 
very  imperfect  one,  of  a  supreme  Being  and  a 
future  state,  and  may,  by  suitable  education,  be 
trained  up  in  the  exercise  of  religious,  as  Avell 
as  of  social,  affections;  and  that,  undisciplined 
as  he  is,  he  has  frequently  given  proof  of  an 
elevated  and  generous  mind,  and  of  great  inge- 
nuity in  those  arts  and  manufactures  to  which 
he  has  been  accustomed  to  attend.  These  parti- 
culars, together  with  those  of  erect  form,  human 
shape,  and  human  features,  passions,  and  infir- 
mities, amount  to  a  demonstration,  either  that 
his  soul  is  human,  or  that  ours  is  not  human. 

643.  But  are  not  some  negros  remarkably 
stupid  and  perverse?  Yes:  and  the  same  thing  is 
true  of  some  white  men.  In  respect  of  under- 
standing, as  well  as  disposition,  do  we  not  often 
see  parents  differ  exceedingly  from  their  chil- 
dren, and  one  brother  from  another?  But  blacks 
have  not  our  delicacy  of  sensation,  and  can  laugh 
and  sing  in  the  midst  of  torments  which  we 
tremble  to  think  of.  And  were  not  Lacedemo- 
nians, though  white  men  and  Europeans,  equally 
magnanimous,  or,  if  you  please,  equally  insensi- 
ble? In  moral  sensibilities,  in  love,  friendship, 
and  natural  affection,  the  African  savage  is  not 
deficient.  And,  while  wc  value  ourselves  on  nwr 


224  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

compositions  in  prose  and  verse,  let  us  remem- 
ber, that,  not  many  years  ago,  a  poor  female 
negro  slave  in  Jamaica  wrote  some  poems  in 
the  English  tongue,  which  were  published,  and 
allowed  to  have  considerable  merit.* 

644.  I  was  once,  about  twenty  years  ago,  en* 
gaged  in  this  argument  with  a  very  eminent 
naturalist,  who  maintained  that  negros  are  of  a 
species  inferiour  to  the  human;  and  gave  this 
reason  among  others,  that  not  one  of  them  had 
ever  learned  to  speak  distinctly.  It  was  easy  to 
answer,  as  I  did,  that  such  of  them  as  were 
grown  up  to  manhood  before  they  conversed 
with  our  people,  could  not  possibly  acquire  a 
good  English  pronunciation,  even  though  pains 
were  taken  to  teach  them;  because  their  organs 
had  been  too  long  inured  to  a  different  language; 
and  that  the  children  of  our  slaves  could  not 
learn  to  speak  well,  because  they  associated 
from  infancy  with  people  of  their  own  condition, 
among  whom  a  barbarous  dialect  had  long  pre- 
vailed, wliich  their  masters  rather  encouraged, 
than  endeavoured  to  rectify;  but,  if  a  negro  from 
his  cai'liest  years  were  to  keep  company  with 

*  See  oil  this  subject  much  acute  and  authontick  ob- 
scrvatioii  \\\  Letters  on  Slavery ^  by  my  benevolent,  can- 
did, and  learned  friend,  Mr.  Dickson. 


Part  m.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  225 

English  people,  I  did  not  see  that  any  thing 
could  hinder  him  from  speaking  as  well  as  they 
did.  (See  §  44,  45).  This  did  not  satisfy  my 
opponent,  who  insisted,  that  negros  are  natu- 
rally and  utterly  incapable  of  distinct  articula- 
tion, and  must  therefore  be  of  a  race  inferiour 
to  the  human.  But  I  happened,  a  few  days  after, 
to  see  his  theory  overturned,  and  my  conjecture 
established,  by  a  negro  girl  about  ten  years  old, 
who  had  been  six  years  in  England,  and  not  only 
spoke  with  the  articulation  and  accent  of  a  native, 
but  repeated  to  me  some  pieces  of  poetry,  with 
a  degree  of  elegance,  which  would  have  been 
admired  in  any  English  child  of  her  years.* 
Since  that  time  I  have  conversed  with  several 
African  negros,  who  spoke  English  well;  much 
better  indeed  than  the  greater  part  of  the  com- 
mon people  of  Yorkshire,  Lancashire,  and  Scot- 
land. 

645.  But  if  negros  be  really  of  the  human 
species,  why  are  their  skins  black,  lips  thick, 
noses  flat,  and  hair  woolly?  The  question  cannot 
be  directly  answered,  because  we  have  little 

*  She  was  in  Lord  Mansfield's  fimily;  and  at  liis 
desh'e,  and  in  his  presence,  repeated  those  pieces  of 
poetry  tome.  She  was  called  Dido,  and  1  believe  is  still 
alive. 


226  ELEMENTS  Of  Part  HI- 

certain  knowledge  of  the  negro,  previous  to  the 
discovery  of  the  AVest  Indies.  But,  from  a  va- 
riety of  analogies  in  nature,  it  is  easy  to  shoAv, 
that  these  are  no  extraordinai'y  appearances; 
and  that,  though  we  had  never  seen  or  heard  of 
bhick  men,  our  knowledge  of  the  effects  of  cli- 
mate and  cultivation,  upon  animals  and  vegeta- 
bles, might  have  inclined  us  to  admit  the  exist- 
ence of  such  men  to  be  neither  impossible  nor 
improbable.  For,  between  the  skin  and  features 
of  our  fairest  ladies,  and  those  of  our  swarthy 
and  grimvisaged  men,  is  there  a  greater  dif- 
ference, than  between  the  latter  and  an  African 
black  or  Indian?  Do  not  noses  as  flat,  and  lips 
as  tliick,  as  those  of  the  negro,  sometimes  ap- 
pear among  us,  without  raising  any  suspicion 
of  a  foreign  kindred?  And  may  not  several 
varieties  of  crisp  and  sleek  hair  be  seen  in  the 
same  parish,  and  even  in  the  same  family? 

G46.  Lot  it  be  remarked  further,  that  towards 
the  north  the  whitish  colours  seem  to  prevail, 
and  the  tawny  towards  the  equator.  Hares, 
foxes,  and  some  other  animals,  that  are  russet 
in  this  country,  become  whiter  as  you  go  nearer 
the  pole.  Danes  and  Russians  are  generally 
white  haired,  and  the  more  southerly  Europeans 
of  a  dark  complexion.  Nor  is  there,  perhaps,  i\ 
greater  divcrfiity,  in  this  respect,  between  Ila- 


Tart  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  227 

lians  and  Ethiopians,  than  between  Danes  and 
Italians.  There  appears,  too,  to  be  something  of 
a  vegetative  nature  in  the  hair,  and  even  in  the 
flesh,  of  animals:  and  it  is  well  known,  that 
great  changes  may  be  produced  in  vegetables, 
by  a  change  of  cultivation  and  soil.  The  colour 
of  roses,  tulips,  and  daisies,  may  be  altered,  and 
the  new  colour  made  hereditary,  by  art;  and  a 
small  field  poppy  metamorphosed  into  a  most 
luxuriant  and  gaudy  flower.  Need  we  wonder, 
then,  that  men,  originally  white,  (as  there  is 
reason  to  believe  they  were),  living  naked  and 
savage  in  the  torrid  zone;  inhabiting  smoky  and 
dirty  hovels;  obliged  to  smear  their  bodies  to 
defend  them  from  insects  and  other  evils  that 
naked  men  are  exposed  to;  or  perhaps  inclined, 
from  some  principle  of  superstition,  or  barba- 
rous policy,  to  disfigure  or  disguise  themselves 
artificially;  and  eating  such  food,  and  drinking 
such  liquors,  as  to  us  are  utterly  unknoAvn, 
should,  in  a  long  course  of  ages,  lose  their  pri- 
mitive complexion,  and  become  black,  or  tawny, 
or  copper  coloured,  according  to  the  peculiarity 
of  their  circumstancesr  Is  this  more  surprising, 
than  that  Arabian  horses  should,  by  a  change 
of  climate  and  provision,  dwindle  into  Shetland 
ponies;  or  than  the  varieties,  in  respect  of  size, 
tail,  horns,  and  wool,  which  sheep,  of  the  same 


228  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

flock  originally,  may  be  made  to  undergo,  by 
being  sent  into  difTcrent  countries? 

647.  The  Ethiopian  colour  was,  by  Aristotle, 
Strabo,  and  most  of  the  ancient  philosophers,  as- 
cribed to  the  heat  of  the  sun  merely;  a  notion 
discoverable  in  the  etymology  of  the  word 
(Ai6io-^)y  and  countenanced  by  the  fable  of  Phie- 
ton.  But  it  may  be  presumed,  that  the  other 
causes  above  mentioned  have  contributed  to  the 
same  effect.  As  to  the  opinion  of  those  who 
derive  this  colour  from  the  curse  pronounced 
upon  Ham,  the  wicked  son  of  Noah,  it  is  suffi- 
ciently confuted  by  Sir  Thomas  Brown,  in  a 
learned  dissertation  upon  the  blackness  of  nc- 
gros,  in  the  sixth  book  of  his  Inquiries  into 
\  ulgar  and  common  errours. 

648.  It  has  been  objected,  that  the  descend- 
ants of  white  men,  who  have  inhabited  the  torrid 
..one  for  two  or  three  hundred  years,  do  still 
retain   the    colour   of  their    fathers;    and   that 

herefore  the  effects  of  climate,  in  changing  the 
human  features  and  complexion,  cannot  be  so 
■i^reut  as  this  account  supposes.  But  it  may  be 
answered,  that  the  condition  of  the  European 
planter  is  not  at  all  similar  to  that  of  the  original 
nutiA-es  of  Africa  and  America.  He  neither  goes 
Kikcd,  nor  cats  the  food  of  savages;  he  is  not 
j'>li''-cd  or  inclined  to  smear  or  otherwise  disR- 


Part  in.  MORAL  SCIENCf:.  229 

gure  his  body;  nor  is  a  small  and  smoky  hut  his 
habitation.  And,  though  they  were  to  live  savage 
and  naked  in  those  latitudes,  I  know  not  whether 
three  hundred,  or  even  six  hundred  years  would 
not  be  too  short  a  period  for  transforming  white 
into  black  men.  It  is,  however,  observed,  that 
the  negros  who  are  settled  in  Europe  do  in 
time  lose  a  little  of  their  native  blackness;  and 
we  may  presume  they  would  lose  more  of  it,  if 
they  were  to  be  more  exposed,  than  they  are,  to 
the  influences  of  a  northern  climate.  I  have 
been  assured  by  a  gentleman  of  observation  and 
unquestionable  veracity,*  that,  in  the  island  of 
St.  Christophers,  where  he  lived  for  some  years, 
the  legs  and  feet  of  those  white  servants  who 
wear  no  shoes  or  stockings,  become  in  time  of 
the  exact  colour  of  the  negro.  And  it  is  gene- 
rally believed,  that  the  descendants  of  white 
parents,  by  intermarrying  with  blacks,  and  the 
offspring  of  negros,  by  intermarrying  with 
whites,  ma^,  in  a  few  generations,  lose  their 
ancient  colour  and  features,  and  become,  the 
former  black,   and  the  latter  white;  Avhich,  if 

*  The  Lite  Mr.  Patrick  Wilson  'of  Aberdeen,  one  of 
the  most  learned  and  worthiest  men  I  have  ever  known; 
and  one,  whose  opinion  of  uet;'ro  slavery  was  the  same 
Aitli  mine. 
Vol.  VIII.  U 


230  ELEMENTS  OF  Partlli: 

they  were  really  different  species,  would  be  as 
great  an  irregularity  in  nature,  as  if  complete 
asses  or  horses  were  to  be  found  among  die 
descendants  of  a  mule. 

649.  I  remember  that,  in  the  course  of  the  de- 
bate with  my  friend  the  naturalist,  he  produced 
two  skulls,  the  one,  as  he  told  me,  of  a  white 
man,  and  the  other  of  a  black;  and  he  desired 
me  to  observe,  when  he  set  them  down,  that  the 
skull  of  the  white  man  rested  with  the  chin 
touching  the  table;  while  the  other  leaned  a 
little  backwards,  and  left  the  space  of  an  inch 
or  half  an  inch  between  the  table  and  the  point 
of  the  chin.  His  inference  was,  that  the  two 
skulls  could  not  belong  to  the  same  species  of 
animals,  and  that  therefore  the  negros  were 
not  perfect  men,  but  beings  of  a  lower  order. 
But  I  was  as  little  satisfied  with  this,  as  with 
his  other  arguments.  The  horizontal  position  of 
the  one  skull  did  not  seem  to  me  to  imply  supe- 
riority, nor  tlie  ol)li(|ue  inclination  of  the  other 
to  l)Ctoken  inferiority.  Or,  granting  the  attitudes 
in  (juestion  to  be  tliu:>  significant;  here  were  but 
two  individual  skulls;  and  there  was  no  evidence 
that  the  same  peculiarity  would  universally  dis- 
tinguisli  the  skull  of  a  white  man  from  that  of  a 
black.  Or,  if  it  should,  I  had  heard  of  nations 
who  mouUlcd  tJic  heads  of  their  infants  into  a 


iPii!  I  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  231 

certain  artificial  form,  which  in  process  of  time 
came  to  be  (if  we  believe  Hippocrates)  heredi- 
tary and  natural.  Or,  admitting  that  this  had 
inever  been  done  by  negros,  I  did  not  see  any 
absurdity  in  supposing,  t^iatthe  influence  of  soil 
.and  climate,  or  a  certain  temperature  of  the 
blood,  might  dispose  some  parts  of  the  human 
ibody  to  be  more  raised,  and  others  more  de- 
pressed, in  some  tribes  of  men,  and  in  some 
parts  of  the  earth,  than  others:  since  it  was  found 
in  fact,  that  some  families  are  distinguished  by 
aquiline,  some  by  flat,  and  some  by  crooked 
noses;  that  deformities,  and  elegancies,  and 
other  peculiarities  of  shape,  in  the  parent,  are 
often  transmitted  to  the  child;  and  that  the 
cheek  bones  of  the  highlanders  of  Scotland  are 
generally  thought  to  be  more  prominent  than 
those  of  Englishmen.  I  added,  or  1  might  have 
added,  that  many  varieties  yet  more  observable 
appear  in  the  brute  creation,  particularly  in 
dogs;  which,  however,  are  all  referred  to  the 
same  species,  notwithstanding  that,  in  shape, 
colour,  hair,  and  size,  they  are  diversified  al- 
most without  end. 

650.  To  conclude  this  part  of  the  subject:  wc 
have,  I  think,  the  fullest  evidence,  that  the  souls 
of  negros  are  human  souls:  and  wc  have  no 
evidence  tha.t  the  bodies  of  negros  are  not  hu- 


232  RLF.MKNTSOF  i»art  IIL 

man  bodies.  We  have  tlu'i'cforc  every  reason, 
that  the  case  admits  of,  to  believe,  that  all  tho 
men  upon  earth,  whatever  be  their  colour,  are 
our  brethern,  and  neighbours:  and  if  so,  both 
reason  and  scripture  declare,  that  it  is  our  duty 
to  love  them,  and  to  do  unto  them  as  we  would 
that  they  should  do  unto  us.  And  if  national 
peculiarities  of  sha/ir  and  stature,  as  well  as  of 
colour,  may  be  accounted  for,  as  I  think  they 
may,  from  the  forgoing  principles;  it  follows, 
that  Laplanders,  Samoeydes,  Esquimaux,  the 
Hurons,  the  Chinese,  and  the  American  and 
Asiatick,  as  well  as  African  Indians,  and,  in  a 
word,  all  the  inhabitants  of  this  globe,  who  have 
reason,  speech,  and  erect  figure,  must  be  con- 
sidered as  one  great  family,  and  as  informed 
with  souls  of  the  same  order,  whatever  slight 
varieties  may  appear  in  their  bodies.  So  that> 
though  there  are  many  nations  and  tribes  of 
men,  it  cannot  be  said  with  truth,  that  there  is 
more  than  one  species.  Indeed,  if  every  variety 
in  the  visible  part  of  the  human  frame  were  to 
be  ascribed  to  a  diflcrence  of  race,  the  species 
of  men  wovdd  be  too  numerous  for  computation, 
and  we  should  be  obliged  to  refer  to  different 
originals  those  whom  wc  knew  to  be  of  the  same 
kindred. 

651. 'I'Ke  human  bodv,  like   cvcrv  other  cor- 


Part  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  233 

poreal  system,  must  be  subject  to  the  physical 
laws  of  nature;  and  the  soul  of  man,  liable  to  be 
affected  by  every  thing  that  essentially  aifects 
the  body,  must  be  subject,  in  a  certain  degree, 
to  the  influences  of  soil  and  climate,  food  and 
drink,  and  other  modes  of  living.  This  we  all 
feel,  or  may  feel,  in  ourselves.  The  effects  of 
bright  and  cloudy  skies,  on  the  soul  as  w^ell  as 
the  body;  of  violent  heat  and  violent  cold;  of  a 
damp  and  a  dry  situation;  of  light  and  grosS' 
food;  of  weak  and  strong  liquors;  of  a  cleanly 
and  a  sluttish  economy;  are  known  to  many  men 
by  experience;  or,  at  least,  are  so  generally  ac- 
knowledged, that  w^e  need  not  scruple  to  affirm 
them  to  be  real,  and  important.  And  if  causes 
that  are  but  temporaiy  produce  sensible  effects, 
the  same  causes  when  permanent  must  produce 
effects  still  more  sensible,  as  well  as  durable.  If 
a  m.onth  of  excessive  heat  or  cold  disqualify  us 
for  many  of  our  customary  exertions,  years  and 
ages  of  such  heat  or  cold  must  disable  the  hu- 
man soul  and  body  in  several  of  their  faculties. 

652.  In  several,  I  say;  but  not  in  all.  Man's 
body  is  of  earth,  but  his  soul  is  from  heaven.  He 
depends  on  outward  things  for  convenience  and 
pleasure;  but  his  happiness  is  from  within.  In  all 
climates  and  conditions,  he  perceives  a  differ- 
ence between  truth  and  falsehood;  may  act  a 

U  2 


234  KLEMEXTS  OF  Part  ill. 

virtuous  or  a  vicious  part;  improve  his  nature 
to  a  certain  degree,  or  debase  it;  obtain  know- 
ledge of  those  things  thiU^  lie  within  his  reach, 
or  by  prejudice  or  neglect  harden  himself  in 
errou^  and  ignorance.  When  I  speak  of  the 
power  of  climate  over  the  human  faculties,  it  is 
with  a  view  to  those  more  conspicuous  opera- 
tions chiefly,  that  are  felt  in  society,  and  claim 
the  notice  of  the  historian. 

653.  Extremes  of  all  kinds  are  hurtful:  our 
minds  and  bodies  thrive  ])est  in  moderate  cir- 
cumstances. Hardship  and  opposition,  when 
such  as  may  be  overcome,  rouse  the  soul,  and 
improve  all  the  human  powers,  by  exercisuig 
them;  but,  when  excessive,  render  men  stupid 
or  desperate.  And  the  warmth  and  plenty  of 
some  countries  diffuse  a  languor  through  the 
human  frame,  and  promote  sensuality,  while 
they  debase  the  understanding.  But,  in  forming 
national  characters,  other  circumstances  concur, 
besides  those  of  soil  and  climate.  Had  the  states 
of  Greece  been  separated  by  inaccessible  moun- 
fains,  or  impenetrable  forests,  like  some  pro- 

inccs  in  America,  or  by  seas  which  cannot  i)e 
passed  without  difficulty, like  many  of  the  islands 
in  the  Pacitic,  Atlantick,  and  eastern  oceans;  or 
had  they  been  immined  in  the  centre  of  the 

MVir;m  or  Asiotick  continent;  we  should  nevcv 


Part  III.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  235 

have  heard  of  Athenian  elegance  or  Spartan 
valour.  Nations,  like  individuals,  are  improved 
by  emulation,  activity  and  mutual  intercourse. 
From  danger  they  learn  vigilance  and  fortitude; 
by  preparing  their  own  superfluities  for  expor- 
tation, and  importing  those  of  other  countries, 
they  become  industrious,  ingenious,  and  ac- 
quainted with  the  varieties  of  human  manners; 
and  the  necessity  of  uniting  against  a  common 
cnem.y  teaches  them  policy  and  the  discipline  of 
vrar. 

'654.  The  arts  of  Avriting  and  of  working  in 
iron  are  so  essential  to  the  attainment  of  know- 
ledge, and  to  many  of  the  most  important  pro- 
fessions, particularly  navigation  and  agriculture, 
that,  without  them,  we  can  hardly  conceive  how, 
in  our  sense  of  the  word,  any  people  should  be- 
come civilized.  And  let  it  be  observed,  that 
these  arts,  though  known  in  Europe  from  very 
early  times,  were  till  of  late  unknown  in  the 
southern  parts  of  Africa,  and  throughout  all  the 
islands  and  continents  of  America.  To  which 
we  may  add,  that  the  eastern  regions  of  Europe, 
from  their  vicinity  to  that  part  of  Asia  which 
produced  the  first  men,  enjoyed  the  advantage 
of  being  soon  peopled,  and  no  doubt  of  deriving 
from  their  progenitors  of  the  human  race  a 
great  deal  of  traditionary  information,  which,  ii. 


\    ' 


236  ELEMENTS  Of  Part  lU. 

the  long  ^7ancle^ings  of  other  tribes,  to  the  ex- 
tremities of  the  earth,  might  be  totally  forgot- 
ten. And  the  Mediterranean  sea,  winding  along 
so  many  shores,  with  a  gentle  undulation,  and 
in  a  temperate  climate,  supplied  the  best  oppor- 
tunities of  improving  the  navigator,  extending 
the  influence  of  the  merchant,  quickening  the 
industry  of  the  artisan,  and  gratifying  the  cu- 
riosity of  the  traveller. 

655.  By  these  and  the  like  considerations,  that 
superiority,  which  has  hitherto  distinguished 
the  inhabitants  of  Europe,  and  of  the  adjoining 
countries,  may  be  accounted  for,  without  sup- 
posing the  rest  of  mankind  of  an  inferiour  spe- 
cies. Were  two  brothers  of  equal  genius  to  be 
brought  up,  the  one  in  the  metropolis  of  En- 
gland, with  every  advantage  of  education  and 
company,  the  other  in  St.  Kilda,  without  any  of 
those  advantages,  it  is  probable  they  would 
differ  no  less  in  accomplishments  and  general 
character,  than  African  or  American  savages 
difler  from  Europeans.  And  thus,  our  former 
conclusion  is  still  further  confirmed,  and  every 
plea  in  favour  of  slavery  proved  to  be  frivolous. 

656.  But  what  would  you  have  us  do?  Must  all 
persons  concerned  in  colonies,  where  slavery  is 
tolerated,  be  branded  with  the  epithets  cruel  and 
unjust^  if  they  do  not  immediately  give  freedom 


I'art  in.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  237 

to  their  slaves,  and  so  relinquish  one  half  of  their 
property,  and  make  the  other  useless?  I  do  not 
say  so:  1  am  very  far  from  thinking  so.  I  have 
known  gentlemen  return  from  the  West  Indies, 
after  a  long  residence  there,  with  untainted 
minds,  tender  hearts,  and  of  the  strictest  pro- 
bity and  honour.  Many  persons  are  proprietors 
of  slaves,  who  have  come  innocently  by  them, 
and  whom  it  would  be  difficult  to  indemnify,  if 
a  general  emancipation  of  slaves  in  our  colonies 
were  immediately  to  take  place.  And  both  to 
them,  and  to  the  whole  British  empire,  it  might 
be  so  dangerous,  as  to  be  politically  impossible, 
to  overturn  all  at  once  an  establishment,  so 
■widely  diffused,  and  of  so  long  standing.*  See 
§637, 

*  These  pages  on  slavery  contain  in  brief  the  sub- 
stance of  u  treatise,  composed  in  the  year  1778,  from 
materials  which  I  had  been  gradually  collecting  for  al- 
most twenty  years.  I  then  had  thoughts  of  pubhshing 
the  whole;  but  was  prevented,  partly  by  my  not  having 
at  that  time  access  to  all  the  books  I  wished  to  consult; 
and  partly  by  the  fear  of  having  misrepresented  some 
things,  in  consequence  of  false  or  partial  information.  I 
find,  however,  since  this  matter,  having  attracted  the 
notice  of  the  legislature,  came  to  be  minutely  investi- 
gated, tliat  my  information  was  in  genei-al  but  too  well 
founded.  It  may  be  said,  that  these  remarks  of  mine 
come  too  late,  now  (1792)  when  the  commons  of  Grea". 


238  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  UI. 

V  657.  Yet  humanity  requires,  that  something 
should  be  done  for  our  unfortunate  brethren: 
and  much  might  be  done,  not  only  without  dan- 
ger, but  even  without  difficulty.  The  sume  power 
that  makes  can  unmake  a  law;  and  laws  that 
contradict  the  plainest  principles  of  reason  and 
justice  one  would  think  it  more  difficult  to 
establish,  than  to  abrogate.  Let  those  laws, 
then,  and  customs  be  abrogated,  which  forbid  a 
master  to  give  freedom  to  his  slave;  which  put 
the  health,  and  too  often  the  life,  of  a  black  in 
the  power  of  a  white  man;  which  refuse  to  ad- 
mit, in  a  court  of  justice,  a  black  man's  testi- 
mony against  a  white,  and  of  course  nullify 
every  criminal  law  that  exists  in  favour  of  black 
slaves;  which  authorize  at  all  times  unnatural 
severities,  and  too  often  unjust  condemnations;* 

Britain  hiivc  passed  a  vote  for  tlie  abolition  of  the  slave 
trade.  But,  as  slavery  is  not  yet,  nor  likely  to  be  soon, 
abolished;  and  as  I  think  myself  responsible,  first  to  my 
own  conscience,  and  secondly  to  the  publick,  for  wliat 
I  teach,  I  wish  to  be  known  what  for  these  thirty  years 
and  upwards  I  have  becnpubUckly  teaching  on  tlie  sub- 
ject of  slavery. 

•  The  foUowinjr  is,   I  hope,  a  singular  fact,  but  was 

certainly  a  real  one.    A  clergyman,  an  intimate  friend  of 

mine,  went  to  Jamaica,  to  recover  a  legacy  K  ft  him  by 

his  brother.  While  he  was  there,   he  happened  to  be 

rr sent  at  a  trial  of  three  negros,  a  woman  and  two 


fait  m.  NIGRAL  SCIENCE.  239 

which  give  countenance  to  the  crimes  of  the 
manstealer,  and  of  those  incendiaries,  who  bribe 
die  petty  tyrants  of  Africa  to  execute  schemes 
of  plunder  and  carnage,  in  order  to  force  their 
subjects  or  neighbours  into  slavery;  and  which 
consider  the  black  colour  of  the  Africans,  and 
the  circumstance  of  their  having  been  imported, 
as  a  sufficient  reason  for  making  them  and  their 
posterity  slaves. 

658.  Let  the  clergy  in  our  colonies  undergo 
reformation;  and,  if  nothing  short  of  compulsion 

men.  After  witnesses  were  examined,  a  person  in  tlie 
court  asked  this  g-entleman  what  was  his  opinion  of  the 
prisoners.  My  opinion,  said  he,  must  be  that  of  every 
body  else;  these  people  are  as  innocent  as  I  am.  Aye! 
replied  the  otlier;  but,  for  all  that,  if  you  were  to  live 
awhile  in  Jamaica,  you  would  see  the  necessity  of 
making  an  example  now  and  then.  The  slaves  were 
accordingly  condemned,  and  dragg-ed  to  instant  death; 
gibbets  being  erected  at  the  door  of  the  house.  The  two 
men  met  their  fate  with  a  stern  courage,  and  spoke  not 
a  word.  The  woman,  mounted  on  an  empty  hogsliead, 
with  the  rope  about  her  neck,  told  her  executioners, 
that  she  was  willing  to  die,  if  they  would  only  tell  her 
what  the  crime  was  for  which  she  must  suffer;  but,  in- 
stead of  receiving  any  answer,  she  was  instantly  turned 
off.  This  story  I  give  from  the  report  of  an  eye  witness, 
whose  testimony  I  could  no  more  doubt,  than  that  of 
my  own  senses. 


240  ELEMEN IS  OF  Pait  lU 

can  prevail,  let  them  be  compelled  to  do  their 
duty,  or  resign  their  offices.  At  present  it  is  the 
fashion  amont^  them  to  take  no  notice  of  the  ne- 
gros:  nay,  I  am  informed,  that  in  those  coun- 
tries (in  some  of  them  at  least;  I  hope  it  is  not 
so  in  all),  if  a  clergyman  were  called  to  visit  a 
dying  negro,  he  would  think  himself  as  much 
affronted,  as  if  he  were  summoned  to  attend  a 
sick  ox.  This  I  give,  on  the  authority  of  a  gen- 
tleman, who  was  a  planter  in  Grenada,  and  justly 
complained  of  it  as  a  most  infamous  neglect  of 
duty  on  the  part  of  those  clergy.  Nay,  one,  who 
was  himself  a  clergyman  in  Virginia,  and  perhaps 
is  so  still,  assured  me,  that,  there,  no  attempt 
is  ever  made  to  instruct  a  black  in  the  christian 
religion;  and  that  if  he,  or  any  other  churchman, 
were  in  this  respect  to  depart  from  the  establish- 
ed mode,  he  would  be  ridiculed  Inj  all  his  hrethrcri. 
In  Jamaica,  I  have  too  good  reason  to  believe 
that  not  a  few  of  the  priesthood  affect  to  be  in- 
hdcls;  and  that  many  of  them  will  refuse  baptism 
to  those  black  men  who  desire  it,  unless  a  fee 
be  paid  (three  pounds  twelve  shillings  sterling, 
if  I  am  not  misinformed),  which  very  few  slaves 
can  alVord  to  pay.*  In  behalf  of  those  clergy,  I 

*  About  three  yiai-s  aj^-o,  a  friend  of  mine  was  pre- 
sent, in  a  dining-  party  in  Jamaica,  when  a  chnrchnv' 


PurtlU.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  241 

have  heard  it  said,  that  the  planters  will  not  per- 
mit them  to  preach  the  gospel  to  the  negros. 
But  this  I  do  not  believe,  nor  think  possible. 
Supposing  it,  however,  true,  I  hope  I  shall  give 
no  great  offence,  by  saymg,  that  when  a  planter's 
prohibition,  and  the  express  command  of  Jesus 
Christ,  happen  to  contradict  each  other,  it  may 
be  worth  a  clergyman's  while  to  consider,  which 
of  the  two  deserves  the  preference. 

659.  Let  the  labour  required  of  the  negro  be 
proportioned  to  his  ability,  and  consistent  with 
his  health:  let  him  rest  on  the  Sabbath,  and  re- 
ceive a  christian  education:  let  a  sufficiency  of 
the  necessaries  of  life,  with  reasonable  wages, 
be  allowed  him;  and  when  he  has  served  his 
master  faithfully  for  a  certain  time,  let  him  and 
his  innocent  children  be  free.  All  this  West 
Indians  may  do;  and  reason  and  religion  declare 
it  to  be  no  more  than  their  duty.  And  when  this 
is  done,  the  African  will  be  happy  in  his  exile; 

i. 

told,  with  many  expressions  of  contemptuous  merri- 
ment, that  their  bishop  had  sent  over  some  pious  books 
for  the  edification  of  the  negros;  and,  added  he,  I  have 
been  entrusted  with  a  parcel  of  those  books,  and  shall 
take  good  care  of  thcni;  for  they  are  in  my  house,  safe 
under  lock  and  key;  and  there  tliey  shall  remain.  The 
story  was  well  received,  and  the  man  who  told  it — not 
censured  at  all. 

Vol.  VIIL  X 


242  ELEMENTS  OF,  &c.  Part  UJ. 

his  master  may  grow  rich  without  a  crime;  and 
those  plantations  will  become  like  paradise, 
which  are  now — places  of  torment. 

660.  The  enemies  ofour  religion  long  pleased 
themselves  with  a  conceit,  that  the  Indians  of 
America  were  not  of  the  human  species,  be- 
cause in  the  early  ages  there  could  be  no  means 
of  conveying  into  that  part  of  the  world  colonies 
from  Europe  or  Asia.  One  French  writer  posi- 
tively affirms,  that  between  Asia  and  America 
an  ocean  roars  of  eight  hundred  leagues  in 
breadth.  But  from  late  discoveries  we  learn, 
that  the  eastern  extremity  of  Asia  is  separated 
from  the  western  extremity  of  America  by  a 
straight,  which  has  islands  in  it,  is  generally 
frozen  in  winter,  and  not  more  than  forty  miles 
over.  So  that,  we  may  as  easily  conceive,  how 
America  might  have  been  first  inhabited  by 
emigrants  from  Asia,  as  how  Great  Britain 
could  have  been  peopled,  as  we  have  reason  to 
think  it  was,  by  colonics  from  Gaul. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY 

PART  III. 
OF  POLITICKS. 


ELEMENTS 

OP 

MORAL  SCIENCE. 


MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
PART  THIRD. 

OF  POLITICKS. 

661.  We  are  now  to  consider  the  origin  and 
nature  of  policy  or  civil  government;  which  is  of 
all  human  institutions  the  most  important  and 
complex.  As  an  introduction  to  it,  some  things 
must  be  premised  concerning  the  general  nature 
of  law.  For  the  end  of  just  government  is  pub- 
lick  good:  and  to  publick  good  human  actions 
are  directed  by  means  of  laws.  What  then  is  a 
law?  What  are  the  notions  comprehended  in  it? 
What  are  the  rights,  the  duties,  and  the  obliga- 
tions that  arise  from  it?  The  science  that  contains 
an  answer  to  these  questions,  and  to  others  tha*^ 

X2 


24^  ELEMENTS  or,  8cc.  Parttn. 

depend  on  these,  is  sometimes  called  }urispi-ii* 
dence^  firudentia  juris,  the  science  of  right,  or  of 
law.  Hitherto,  since  we  entered  on  the  practical 
part  of  the  abstract  philosophy,  human  duty  has 
been  the  chief  object  of  our  inquiry;  we  are  now 
to  attend  chiefly  to  what  is  called  right,  a  word 
often  correlative  to  duty,  but  not  always  strictly 
so;  as  will  appear  afterwards. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Of  the  General  Nature  of  Law-. 

662.  If  we  were  to  give  an  account  of  the  law,s 
of  any  particular  country,  we  might  begin  with 
this  definition.  Law  is  a  rule  of  civil  conduct, 
prescribed  by  the  supreme  power  in  a  state,  com- 
manding what  is  right,  and  prohibiting  what  is 
wrong.*  But,  taking  the  word  law  in  a  more  ge- 
neral sense,  and  considering  ourselves  as  subject 
to  the  laws  of  God,  as  Avell  as  of  man,  we  may 
rather  say,  that  law  is  the  declared  will  of  a  per- 
son or  persons  in  authority,  (that  is,  having  a  right 
to  govern)  commanding  some  things,  and  for- 
bidding others,  with  a  promise,  expressed  or  im- 
plied, of  reward  or  convenience  to  those  who 
obey,  and  the  denunciation  of  punishment  or  in- 
convenience to  those  who  disobey.  The  good 
thus  promised,  and  the  evil  thus  denounced,  are 
called  the  sanctions  of  the  law.  They  who  obey 
the  law  enjoy  the  advantage  of  being  protected 
by    it,  and  sometimes  other  positive   reward^ 

*  Blackstone 


248  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

They  who  transgress  are  liable  to  the  punish- 
ment or  penalty  denounced.  That,  under  equit- 
able government,  the  protection  of  law  is  an  un- 
speakable advantage,  will  appear  to  those  who 
consider,  that  a  good  citizen  has  the  whole  power 
of  the  state  engaged  on  his  side,  to  vindicate  his 
rights,  and  guard  him  from  injury. 

663.  Laws  may  be  divided  into  those  of  God, 
and  those  of  man.  The  law  of  God  is  subdivided 
into  the  natural  or  moral  law,  and  the  positive  or 
revealed.  The  former  may  be  discovered  by  a 
right  use  of  reason,  the  latter  is  made  known  by 
revelation.  To  appropriate  certain  portions  of  our 
time  to  the  oftices  of  religion,  is  a  moral  duty, 
discoverable  by  reason,  and  founded  on  the  same 
principle  that  recommends  those  offices;  time 
being  necessary  to  every  work  of  man.  To  set 
apart  one  day  in  seven  for  this  purpose,  is  a 
positive  duty,  which  man  did  not  know  till  it  was 
revealed  to  him.  When  moral  and  positive  duties 
interfere,  so  that  we  cannot  perform  the  one 
without  a  temporary  neglect  of  the  other,  moral 
duties  generally  deserve  the  preference.  To  rest 
from  our  ordinary  business  on  Sunday  is  not  so 
strictly  incumbent  as  to  relieve  distress  on  that 
day,  even  though,  in  doing  so,  we  should  be 
obliged  to  labour  from  morning  to  night.  The 
saticlions  of  the  divine  law  arc,  first,  future  re- 


Chaj).  L  MORAL  SCIEXCE.  249 

ward  or  punishment;  secondly,  the  approbation 
or  disapprobation  of  conscience;  and,  thirdly,  the 
advantages  and  disadvantages  annexed  even  in 
this  life  to  virtuous  and  vicious  conduct.  The 
divine  moral  law,  which  is  also  called  the  law  of 
n'ature,  regulates,  or  ought  to  regulate,  the  inter- 
course of  independent  nations  with  respect  to  one 
another;  and  in  this  view  it  is  commonly  called 
the  law  of  nations. 

664.  Those  laws,  whereby  human  authority 
regulates  the  policy  of  any  particular  nation,  are 
called  the  civil  or  municipal  laws  of  that  nation. 
Both  these  epithets  are  derived  from  the  Latin; 
the  one  from  civi^^  which  denotes  a  person  who 
is  a  member  or  citizen  of  any  political  commu- 
nity; the  other  feom  mujiicifiium^  which  anciently 
denoted  a  community  dependent  on  Rome,  but 
possessing  the  right  of  enacting  laws  for  the  re- 
gulation of  its  own  policy.  And  here  it  may  be 
proper  to  explain  two  or  three  terms  of  the  Ro- 
man law.  A  proposal  for  a  law,  which  in  the 
British  parliament  is  termed  a  bill,  the  Romans 
called  rogatio;  because,  when  the  magistrate  put 
this  question  to  the  Roman  people,  Velitis  jubea- 
tisque,  Quirites^  hoc  fieri?  if  the  people  answeredj 
Uti  rogas^  this  made  the  bill  a  law.  Hence  ferre 
rogationem^  and  sometimes y^rre  legem^  answered 
to  our  parliamentary  phrase,  to  bring  in  a  bill; 


250  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

with  this  difference,  that  the  rogath  was  brought 
before  the  Roman  people,  who  were  the  legisla« 
tors:  whereaB,  with  us,  the  bill  is  brought  before 
the  parliament,  which  forms  our  legislature;  as 
will  be  particularly  described  hereafter.  Legem 
aeii  rogationem  antiquare  answered  to  our  phrase, 
to  thronv  out  the  hill^  not  to  suffer  it  to  pass  into  a 
law.  Legem  abrogare  signified  to  repeal  a  law: 
legem  jubere^  sane  ir  c -,  Jig  ere  ^  or  acci^iere^  to  make 
or  enact  a  law.  Legem  rejigere  is  the  same  with 
abrogare.  When  by  a  new  law  a  clause  of  a  for- 
mer law  was  annulled,  the  phrase  was  de  lege  de- 
rogare:  when  by  a  new  law  a  clause  was  added 
to  a  former  law,  it  was  legem  surrogare. 

665.  Human  laws  may  ascertain,  and  in  some 
cases  limit,  the  law  of  nature,  but  ought  never  to 
contradict  it:  for  tliat  would  be  setting  up  the 
will  of  man  in  opposition  to  the  authority  of  God: 
and  the  more  that  human  laws  deviate  from  the 
law  of  nature,  the  more  unjust  they  become.  In 
countries  subject  to  monarchical  government, 
where  a  distinction  of  ranks,  for  reasons  to  be 
given  hereafter,  is  essential  to  the  good  of  the 
state,  the  law  may  oblige  a  father  of  a  certain 
fortune  and  station  to  leave  the  greatest  part  of 
his  estate  to  his  eldest  son;  who,  becoming  hii* 
futher's  representative,  and  inheriting  his  rank, 
is  liable  to  incur  more  expense  than  any  of  the 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIEXCE,  251 

younger  children:  this  is  reasonable,  because  it 
imposes  no  unnatural  hardship  on  any  body.  But 
were  the  law  to  require  a  father  to  leave  his  for- 
tune to  his  eldest  son,  without  making  any  provi- 
sion, or  a  suitable  provision,  for  his  younger 
children,  such  a  law  would  be  unjust,  because 
contradictory  to  the  divine  law,  both  moral  and 
positive. 

666.  The  laws  of  the  ancient  Romans,  as  col- 
lected by  the  emperour  Justinian,  have  been  called 
emphatically  the  civil  law.  In  Scotland,  and  some 
other  countries,  this  law  serves  as  a  kind  of  sup- 
plement to  the  municipal  law  of  the  land,  and 
great  regard  is  had  to  its  authority;  but  in  Eng- 
land it  is  no  more  regarded  than  that  of  any  other 
foreign  nation.  Municipal  law  is  divided  into 
common  law  and  statute  law.  The  former  is 
founded  in  ancient  and  immemorial  custom;  the 
latter  is  contained  in  written  statutes  or  acts  of 
the  legislature.  I  know  not  whether  any  British 
statute  could  be  produced  which  forbids  murder 
or  theft,  or  gives  a  man  the  disposal  of  his  own 
estate.  But  these  things  have  always  been  so;  and 
this  circumstance  gives  them  the  full  force  of 
laws.  The  common  law  of  England  was  collected, 
about  five  hundred  years  ago,  by  Glanville;  that 
of  Scotland  is  contained  in  a  book  called  Regium. 
Majestateniy  from  the  two  first  words  of  the  book. 


252  ELEMENTS  OF  l\al  HJ. 

On  comparing  these  two  collections,  >ve  find, 
ihat  anciently  the  common  law  was  pretty  much 
che  same  in  both  kingdoms.  But  considerable 
alterations  have  been  introduced  since  that  time. 

667.  The  canon  law  was  compiled  from  the 
decrees  of  the  popish  councils,  and  from  the 
rescrijiie,  or  written  determinations  of  the  popes. 
Except  within  the  pope's  own  dominions,  great 
liberties  are  now  taken  with  it,  even  in  popish 
countries.  Among  protestants  it  has  no  autho- 
rity. Yet  in  our  ecclesiastical  law  many  of  its 
Y)rinciples  are  discernible.  But  these  derive  their 
authority  among  us,  not  from  the  church  of 
Rome,  but  from  acts  of  our  own  legislature, 
-whereby  they  have  been  adopted  and  ratified. 

668.  A  law  must  be  promulgated  to  those  who 
are  to  obey  it;  and,  when  pronmlgated  according 
to  the  established  forms,  no  pretence  of  ignorance 
is  admitted  as  ?i  legal  excuse  for  transgression.  If 
it  were,  every  transgressor  would  plead  ignorance, 
and  so  the  law  would  be  of  no  eflect;  and  people, 
trusting  to  this  plea,  would  not  give  themselves 
the  trouble  to  inquire  what  those  laws  are,  by 
which  tiicy  must  regulate  their  conduct.  How- 
ever, in  a  paiticular  case,  unavoidable  ignorance 
would  no  doubt  be  admitted,  in  cjuity,  as  an 
alleviation  of  the  transgressor's  fault.  Diflerent 
forms  of  promulgation  have  taken  place  in  dif- 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  253 

ferent  nations.  Where  printing  is  practised,  and 
newspapers  circulate,  the  matter  is  very  easy. 
Among  us,  when  a  law  is  made  that  particularly 
concerns  the  lower  orders  of  the  people,  with 
respect  to  them,  as  not  being  supposed  to  be  con- 
versant in  newspapers,  or  in  general  conversation, 
an  interval  of  time  is  allowed,  during  which  the 
law,  though  made  and  promulgated,  does  not 
take  effect. 

669.  The  moral  law  of  nature  is  promulgated 
to  man  by  his  reason  and  conscience;  and  is  as- 
certained, illustrated,  and  enforced,  by  revelation. 
Conscience,  considered  as  the  promulgator  of 
this  law,  has  been,  by  some  writers,  divided  into 
certain,  probable,  dubious,  and  scrupulous.  When 
we  are  sure  that  the  law  is  good,  and  that  our 
conduct  is  conformable  to  it,  this  is  called  certain 
conscience.  When  our  conduct  is  conformable  to 
a  rule,  but  we  are  not  certain  of  the  conformity 
of  that  rule  to  the  law  of  nature,  it  is  probable 
conscience.  When  we  are  doubtful  both  of  the 
rectitude  of  the  rule  and  of  the  conformity  of  the 
action,  it  is  dubious  conscience.  And  when  the 
ground  of  doubt  is  of  small  importance,  con- 
science is  called  scrupulous,  from  a  Latin  word, 
signifying  a  stone  small  in  size,  but  troublesome 
when  it  gets  into  the  shoe  of  the  traveller.  This 
division  is  neither  correct,  nor  material;  and  in 

Vol.  VIII.  Y 


254  ELEMENTS  OF  PartlU. 

its  stead  we  might  put  a  good  rule  of  Cicero, 
never  to  do  that,  of  the  lawfulness  of  which  we 
are  doubtful.  Certain  conscience  alone  is  that 
which  a  man  may  safely  act  upon.  Scrupulous 
conscience,  though  perhaps  the  effect  of  weak 
miderstanding,  is,  however,  entitled  to  reverence; 
as  nothing  can  be  unimportant  to  a  conscientious 
man,  which  he  believes  to  be  his  duty. 

670.  What  is  the  moral  law  of  nature?  is  a 
question  that  has  often  been  proposed.  That  (I 
would  answer)  is  incumbent  on  us  by  the  law  of 
our  nature,  which,  after  candid  inquiry,  our  rea- 
son and  conscience  declare  to  be  right.  Other 
answers  have  been  given.  Some  speak  of  seven 
precepts  of  Noah,  from  which  the  whole  law  of 
nature  is  deducible;  but  of  this  there  is  no  evi- 
dence. Some  have  thought  that  the  law  of  nature 
is  nothing  else  than  the  general  consent  of  all 
nations.  And  it  is  true  that,  with  respect  to  the 
])rincipal  points  of  the  law  of  nature,  all  civilized 
nations  arc  of  the  same  opinion.  But  though 
there  were  only  one  nation,  one  family,  or  one 
person  upon  the  earth,  certain  duties  would  be 
incumbent  on  that  nation,  family,  or  person; 
which  duties  would  result  from,  and  be  a  part 
of,  the  law  of  nature:  so  that  there  is  a  law  of 
nature  previous,  not  only  to  the  consent,  but 
even  to  the  existence,  of  nations.  Others  have 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  255 

said,  that  the  law  of  nature  is  that  rule  of  conduct 
which  men  would  observe  in  a  state  of  perfect 
virtue.  In  such  a  state,  no  doubt,  the  law  of  nature 
would  be  obeyed;  but  in  such  a  state  there  would 
be  no  room  for  many  duties  incumbent  on  men 
by  the  law  of  nature;  those  particularly  that 
regard  the  regulation  of  such  passions,  as  a  sense 
of  injury  is  apt  to  render  excessive.  For  in  such 
a  state  there  would  be  no  injury,  and  conse 
quently  no  room  for  forgiveness,  placubiiity,  and 
mercy,  which  yet  are  duties  enjoined  by  the  law 
of  nature.  The  conceit  of  Mr.  Hobbes,  that  in 
the  nature  of  things  there  is  no  distinction  be- 
tween just  and  unjust,  right  and  vtrong;  and  that 
in  civil  society  the  will  of  human  governours  is 
the  sole  standard  of  duty,  and  consequently  of 
the  law  of  nature;  this  conceit,  I  say,  we  need 
not  stop  to  examine.  For  Hobbes  and  his  para- 
doxes are  now  forgotten,  as  they  deserve  to  be: 
and  Dr.  Clarke,  in  his  exceiicnt  work  on  tlie 
Evidences  of  Religion,  has  proved,  that  this  pa- 
radox is  both  absurd  and  selfcontradictory,  as  well 
as  impious. 

671.  Laws  respect  future  actions.  For  it  would 
be  unreasonable  to  make  a  law  declaring  a  past 
action  unlawful,  which  at  the  time  it  was  per- 
formed was  not  unlawful:  a  law  with  a  retro- 
spect, as  it  is  called,  would  be  a  very  odious  thing. 


256  ELEMENTS  OV  Fait  IH. 

'•  ^Vhere  there  is  no  law  (divine  or  human)  there 
"  is  no  transgression."  Every  law  is  a  precept  or 
command;  and  exeiy  /irece/it  implies /2er/m««io7z. 
That  law,  for  example,  which  commands  men 
not  to  steal  or  murder,  jiermits  men  to  enjoy 
their  property  and  life.  From  the  Jiermissive  part 
of  law,  arises  rights  jus;  which  is  defined  a  power, 
allowed  by  law,  to  have,  do,  or  require  from  an- 
other, some  certain  thing.  From  the  firecefitive 
part  of  law  arises  obligation;  what  the  law  com- 
mands I  am  obliged  to  do;  and  if  I  have  a  right 
to  a  thing,  there  is  an  obligation  on  others  not  to 
violate  that  right;  and  if  I  am  under  an  obligation 
to  do  a  thing,  others  have  a  right  to  require  that 
I  should  do  it.  Obligation  and  right,  therefore, 
do  mutually  imply  each  other,  and  are  both  com- 
prehended in  every  law.  The  former  restrains 
liberty,  the  latter  secures  it.  They  may  be  further 
distinguished  thus.  We  may  dispense  with  a 
right,  but  not  with  an  obligation;  we  may  forgive 
u  debt  due  to  us,  but  of  a  debt  which  we  owe, 
we  can  acc^uit  ourselves  in  no  other  way,  than  by 
paying  it. 

672.  The  obligation  of  law  has  been  divided 
into  moral  and  natural.  We  arc  under  a  moral 
obligation,  that  is,  wc  are  bound  in  conscience,  to 
obey  every  good  hiw.  Wc  are  said  to  be  under  a 
Hiitural  obligation,  that  is,  wc  are  determined  by 
prudence,  to  obey  even  those  bad  laws  which  wc 


Cliap.  L  MORAL  SCIENCE.  fS7 

cannot  transgress  without  incurring  a -penalty- 
Bad  laws,  however,  we  ought  not  to  obey,  if  our 
conscience  declare  it  criminal  to  obey  them:  and 
such  laws  seldom  exist  in  regular  society.  Al? 
the  divine  laws  are  good,  and  guarded  by  the 
most  awful  sanctions;  so  that  to  obey  them  we 
are  under  the  strongest  obligations,  both  natural 
and  moral.  Lav/s  generally  concern  a  whole  class 
of  people.  Yet  a  law  may  be  made,  that  points 
at  one  person;  and  this  sort  of  law,  whether  made 
out  of  favour,  or  out  of  resentment,  the  Romans 
called  pri-oili^iu?n,  from  firivus  and  lex.  The 
English  word  privilege  has  a  different  meaniiig, 
and  always  implies  favour?  or  something  v^hich  it 
is  better  to  have  than  not  to  have. 

673.  Equity  is  distinguished  from  strict  law. 
All  the  divine  laws  are  equitable  and  good.  But 
it  may  happen,  that  a  human  law,  though  good 
upon  the  whole,  shall  in  a  particular  case  be  op- 
pressive. Now,  when  a  judge  moderates  the 
rigour  of  the  law,  by  departing  from  the  letter  of 
it,  and  giving  judgment  according  to  humanity 
and  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case,  he  is 
said  to  decide  according  to  equity.  It  is  generally 
thought  that  inferiour  courts  ought  to  be  courts 
of  strict  law,  because  from  them  an  appeal  may 
be  made  to  a  higher  court;  and  because  the 
judges  in    them  are  not  supposed  to  have  that 

Y2 


258  ELEMENTS  OF  Paillll. 

extensive  knowledge  of  the  law  and  of  human 
affairs,  which  the  higher  judges  probably  have. 
But  supreme  courts  must  be  courts  of  equity; 
always,  however,  adhering  to  law  when  that 
can  be  done  without  oppression.  The  Scotch 
court  of  session,  though  not  a  supreme  court, 
claims  the  privilege  of  deciding  according  to 
equity,  as  well  as  according  to  law.  The  court 
of  chancery  in  England  is  a  court  of  equity.  And 
the  house  of  lords  must  be  considered  as  a  court 
of  equity,  as  well  as  law;  because  its  sentence  is 
final,  and  must  stand,  whether  it  be  according  to 
law  or  not. 

674.  When  out  of  special  favour  a  person  is 
exempted  from  the  obligation  or  penal  sanction 
of  any  law,  it  is  called  dispensation;  and  is  the 
work  of  the  lawgiver,  as  equity  is  of  the  judge; 
for  in  the  law  the  dispensation  must  be  specified. 
With  regard  to  human  laws,  dispensations  may 
be  allowable  and  reasonable.  But  to  grant  a  dis- 
pensation, exempting  one  from  the  obligation  of 
the  divine  law,  or  stating  an  inconsiderable  pe- 
nalty as  an  atonement  for  a  transgression  of  it, 
though  by  the  church  of  Rome  this  has  been 
done,  is  absurd  and  impious;  because  it  sets  in 
opposition  the  will  of  man  to  the  law  of  God. 

675.  Every  variety  in  the  states  or  conditions 
of  men  may  occasion  some  variety  in  their  rights, 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  259 

and  consequently  in  their  laws.  Now  our  states 
o;-  conditions  depend  upon  our  connection,  first, 
with  things  irrational  and  inanimate,  and,  se^ 
condly,  \vith  our  fellow  men.  From  the  former 
connection  are  derived  innumerable  rights  and 
obligations  respecting  the  acquisition  and  enjoy- 
ment of  property;  from  the  latter,  arise  all  the 
social  duties,  and  all  the  laws  that  relate  to  go- 
vernment, commerce,  war,  and  peace. 

676.  That  state,  in  which  men  may  be  supposed 
to  live  before  the  institution  of  government,  has 
been  called  the  state  of  nature;  to  distinguish  it 
from  the  political  state,  which  is  an  artificial  thing. 
In  the  state  of  nature,  supposing  it  to  take  place, 
there  would  be  society,  because  man  is  a  social 
being;  but  there  would  also  be  perfect  freedom, 
equality,  and  independence,  and  men  would  be 
subject  to  no  law,  but  the  law  of  God;  which, 
however,  if  they  could  know  it,  and  were  willing 
to  obey  it,  would  make  the  state  of  nature  very 
happy,  and  render  human  government  unneces- 
sary. But  men,  being  liable  to  ignorance  and 
errour,  and  much  inclined  to  wickedness,  would 
find  the  state  of  nature  exposed  to  great  incon- 
veniencies,  which  could  be  prevented  in  no  other 
way,  than  by  establishing  government,  subordi 
nation,  and  human  laws.  The  state  of  nature  is 
not   wholly   an    imaginary   thinp;.    Tndepe^de^■^ 


260  ELEMEX  rS  or  Part  HI 

nations,  who  acknowledge  no  superiour  but  God. 
are  in  a  state  of  nature  with  respect  to  one  another. 
And  a  number  of  persons,  mutually  independent; 
thrown  by  shipwreck  into  a  desert  island,  would 
at  first  be  in  the  state  of  nature;  though,  no  doubt, 
they  would  soon  find  it  necessary  to  make  regu- 
lations, which  would  introduce  a  sort  of  govern- 
mejit. 

677.  Human  rights,  as  vindicated  by  laws,  have 
been  divided  into  perfect,  imperfect,  and  external. 
Those  are  called  perfect  rights,  which,  being 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  society?  may  be  vin- 
dicated by  force,  or  by  legal  prosecution.  Such 
is  our  right  to  life,  to  health,  to  property,  to  re- 
putation, to  liberty:  whence  there  is  an  obligation 
on  other  men,  not  to  take  our  life,  hurt  our  bo- 
dies, invade  our  property,  deprive  us  of  liberty, 
or  injure  our  reputation.  The  rights  called,  in 
contradistinction  to  the  former  class,  imperfect, 
ai"e  necessary  to  the  hafipiness  of  society,  and  in 
themselves  most  sacred,  but  cannot  be  vindicated 
by  force,  or  by  legal  prosecution.  Such  is  a  bene- 
factor's right  to  the  gratitude-  of 'the  person  to 
whom  he  has  done  good;  the  poor  man's  right  to 
chanty;  and  the  right  which  all  men  have  to  the 
common  offices  of  humanity.  It  has  been  ques- 
tioiicd,  whether  these  be  properly  called  impcr- 
f'tr'i  and  whether  they  be  ri!{htfi-AX.  all.  Not  having 


Chap.  1.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  2^1 

time  to  enter  into  the  controversy,  I  shall  only- 
say,  that  the  common  use  of  language  will  warrant 
their  being  denominated  rights;  and  that  the 
word  imfierfect^  as  here  applied  and  explained, 
can  lead  into  no  mistake.  Those  have  been  called 
external  rights,  which,  though  in  some  respects 
hurtful  in  society,  are  yet  vindicated  by  the  law, 
in  order  to  prevent  greater  evils.  Such  is  the 
miser's  right  to  that  money  which  he  hoards  up 
to  the  injury  of  his  relations,  the  community,  and 
the  poor.  And  such  is  the  right,  which  a  creditor 
may  have  to  exact  rigorous  payment  from  an 
unfortunate  debtor. 

678.  Rights  have  also  been  divided  into  alien- 
able and  unalienable.  The  former  may  be  trans- 
ferred to  others,  and  when  transferred  may  be 
useful:  such  is  our  right  to  property.  The  latter 
cannot  be  transferred;  and,  though  they  could, 
would  be  of  no  use:  such  is  our  right  to  life,  to 
health,  to  innocence,  to  the  performance  of  moral 
and  religious  duty.  These  unalienable  rights  we 
are  not  only  entitled,  but  bound  in  conscience,  to 
maintain.  Rights  are  also  divided  into  natural  and 
adventitious.  The  former  belong  to  all  men,  in 
consequence  of  their  being  men;  the  latter  belong 
to  men  on  the  supposition  of  their  being  placed 
in  certain  circumstances,  and  having  made  cer- 
tain acquisitions.   The   duties  correspondent  to 


262  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  HI. 

the  former  are,  "  hurt  nobody;  do  all  the  good 
"  you  can:"  the  duty  answering  to  the  latter  is, 
"  give  every  man  his  own."  Adventitious  rights 
are  subdivided  into  original  and  derived.  When  a 
man,  by  some  lawful  deed  of  his  own,  acquires  a 
right  to  something,  to  which  nobody  had  a  right 
before;  this  is  original  adventitious  right.  When 
a  man  derives  his  right  from  another  who  for- 
merly had  it,  this  is  derived  adventitious  right. 
Examples  of  both  will  be  given  by  and  by. 

679.  The  chief  of  these  adventitious  rights  is 
property;  which  may  be  defined,  the  right  of  pos- 
sessing and  using  a  thing,  and  of  excluding  others 
from  the  possession  and  use  of  it.  The  origin  of 
property  may  be  explained  as  follows.  All  the 
things  in  this  world  may  be  reduced  to  three 
classes,  rational,  irrational,  and  inanimate.  Of 
rational  beings,  for  reasons  formerly  given,  it  is 
unlawful  to  make  property,  so  as  to  buy,  or  sell 
them;  or  give  them  aA\'ay  into  the  absolute  dis- 
posal of  another.  Inanimate  things  may  be  made 
property  of;  because  without  them  we  could  not 
subsist;  and  because  they  would  flPli^eless,  if  we 
and  other  animals  did  not  use  them.  Irralional 
animals  may  also  be  appropriated,  both  for  labour 
and  for  food;  provided  it  be  done  in  such  a  man- 
ner, as  to  promote  the  good  of  man,  who  is  *he 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  263 

chifcf  inhabitant  of  this  world,  without  doing  in- 
jury to  them. 

680.  To  be  a  little  more  particular  on  this  last 
point.  Animals  that  would  destroy  us  if  they 
could,  we  have  a  right  to  destroy  in  selfdefence. 
To  many  others  of  a  milder  nature  our  protec- 
tion is  a  great  benefit,  and'death,  with  little  or  no 
pain,  is  a  less  misfortune,  than  a  lingering  death 
would  be.  The  endless  multitudes  of  some  irra- 
tional creatures,  as  of  certain  sorts  of  fishes  and 
fowls,  are  a  proof,  that  tliey  were  intended  by  the 
Creator  for  food  to  man,  aiKi  other  animals.  For 
that  one  animal  should  be  supported  by  preying 
on  another  of  a  ditferent  species,  is  agreeable  to 
the  general  economy  of  nature:  even  those, 
that  feed  on  grain  or  grass,  cannot  devour 
eitHer,  or  quench  their  thirst  with  water,  without 
swallowing  living  things,  which  must  all  die 
before  that  grass,  grain,  or  water  can  be  converted 
into  aliment.  And  in  many  situations,  as  in  barren 
islands,  large  towns,  and  sea  voyatj;es,  men  could 
not  be  supported  without  animal  food.  To  which 
we  may  add,  j^at  if  the  usual  slaughter  of  ani- 
mals for  food  were  to  be  discontinued,  they  would 
soon  multiply  to  such  a  degree,  as  to  become  an 
intolerable  nuisance,  both  to  mankind,  and  to  one 
another;  and,  whether  we  used  them  for  food  or 
not,  we  should  be  obliged  in  selfdefence  to  destroy 


2G4  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  lU. 

them.  But  let  it  be  rememberecl,  that  they  are 
percipient  beings,  and  ought  to  be  treated  with 
no  unreasonable  or  avoidable  rigour,  and  to  suffer 
as  little  pain  as  may  be;  and,  when  we  have  oc- 
casion to  kill  them,  we  ought  to  do  it,  if  possible, 
in  an  instant.  Such  a  death,  to  animals  which  do 
not  know  that  they  are  to  die,  and  cannot  even 
conceive  what  death  is,  and  have  nothing  to  fear 
in  consccjuence  of  it,  can  hardly  be  called  an 
evil.  It  does  not  clearly  appear,  that  the  use  of 
animal  food  was  permitted  to  the  antediluvians. 
The  first  grant  that  we  read  of,  with  respect  to 
it,  was  made  to  Noah  after  the  flood;  whereas 
the  use  of  herbs,  and  fruit,  for  food,  was  granted 
immediately  after  man  was  created.  See  Genesis 
i.  29.  and  ix.  3. 

681.  All  things  are  at  first  in  a  state  of,  what 
has  been  called,  negative  community:  in  other 
words,  if  men  were  living  in  the  state  of  nature, 
every  man  at  Jirst  would  have  a  right  to  every 
thing,  and  no  man  would  have  a  right  to  exclude 
another  from  the  use  of  any  thing.  This  is  what 
Cicero  means  when  he  says,  in  the  beginning  of 
his  discourse  on  Justice  (De  Off.  i.  7),  Simt  an- 
■^m  firi'.Hita  nulla  naturd.  In  this  state  we  arc  at 
:>rcscnt,  with  regard  to  those  things,  which  are 
»  oninion,  and  cannot  be  appropriated,  as  air  and 
li!!;lit.   But,  with   respect  to  other  things,  men 


Chap.L  MORAL  SCIENCE.  265 

could  hardly  remain  in  this  stale  for  a  single  day, 
because  property  must  soon  be  acquired,  in  the 
article  of  food  at  least.  Now  original  property 
may  be  acquired  in  two  ways,  by  occupancy^  (oc- 
cufiatione)^  and  by  accession.  Observe,  that  origi- 
nal property  is  that  which  a  man  makes  his  own 
by  some  lawful  action,  and  which  he  derives  not 
from  any  former  proprietor. 

682.  Occupancy  is  the  act  of  seizing  on  some- 
thing which  belongs  to  nobody,  and  of  seizing  on 
it  in  such  a  way  as  to  show  that  he  or  she  who 
seizes  intends  by  so  doing  to  make  it  his  or  her 
own.  If  I  find  a  thing  which  has  no  owner,  I 
make  it  my  own  by  seizing  on  it.  If  I,  with  other 
independent  persons,  were  thrown  by  shipwreck 
into  a  desert  island  where  there  was  plenty  of 
ripe  fruit,  I  should  make  myself  the  proprietor 
of  some  part  of  that  fruit,  by  seizing  on  it,  or  by 
climbing  a  tree,  or  otherwise  exerting  myself,  in 
order  to  get  it:  and  if,  on  coming  down  from  the 
tree,  I  were  to  be  assaulted  by  another  who  had 
done  nothing,  and  to  have  my  fruit  taken  from 
me,  it  would  be  injustice,  and  a  violation  of  pro- 
perty. Those  things  may  be  made  property  of, 
which  may  be  exhausted  by  use,  and  improved 
by  labour.  Water,  air,  and  light,  are  not  things 
of  this  kind,  and  therefore  cannot  be  appropriated, 
but  remain  always  in  a  state  of  negative  commii- 

Vol.  VIII.  Z 


266  J  LI'.MKXTS  OF  Part  111 

nity:  your  right  to  them  is  as  good  as  mine,  and 
mine  as  r^ood  as  yours.  Where  water  is  exhausti- 
ble and  improvable,  as  in  towns  and  very  diy  cli- 
mates, it  may  be  appropriated  and  bear  a  price. 
And  where  running  water  is  valued  on  account 
of  the  fislies  tliat  are  in  it,  it  may  be  bought  and 
sold  in  like  manner. 

683.  Property  in  food,  being  at  all  times  ne- 
cessary, must  take  place  even  in  the  rudest  forms 
of  society.  That  would  probably  be  appropriated 
first,  which  is  most  easily  come  at,  as  the  fruit  of 
trees  and  bushes,  and  other  vegetables;  then  per- 
haps men  would  think  of  preying  on  beasts,  and 
fishes,  and  fowls;  and,  in  many  countries,  this 
must  havq^becn  their  first  provision,  and,  conse- 
quently, hunting,  fishing,  and  fowling  their  first 
employments.  Afterwards,  finding  that  a  provi- 
sion of  animal  food  might  be  secured  for  some 
length  of  time,  by  bringing  the  more  tractable 
animals  together,  and  keeping  them  in  flocks 
and  herds,  men  would  betake  themselves  to  pas- 
turage, in  countries  where  it  was  practicable. 
And  this  we  learn,  from  the  histo,ry  of  the  pa- 
triarchs, to  have  been  one  of  their  earliest  voca- 
tions. 

684.  In  a  good  soil  and  climate,  the  digging 
of  the  ground  :md  the  rearing  of  useful  herbs, 
^^  o\ild  no  (lou)it  be  piacliscd  ia  the  beginning  of 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENX'E.  267. 

society,  both  as  a  recreation  and  as  a  profitable 
art.  But  agriculture,  iji  a  more  enlarged  sense  of 
the  word,  as  it  depends  on  several  other  arts, 
especially  those  of  working  in  wood  and  metal, 
could  hardly  take  place,  till  after  those  arts  were 
invented.  And  the  appropriation  of  land,  or  ter- 
ritory, except  for  the  purpose  of  selfdefence,  in 
order  to  keep  enemies  at  a  distance,  would  hardly 
be  thought  of  till  after  the  establishment  of  agri- 
culture. In  Genesis,  we  find  the  patriarchs  mov- 
ing from  place  to  place  with  their  flocks  and 
herds,  for  the  convenience  of  pasture,  and  claim- 
ing property  in  wells,  because  they  had  dug  them, 
before  they  thought  of  making  property  of  the 
soil.  For  the  countries  in  which  they  sojourned 
were  at  that  time  thinly  inhabited;  and,  though 
productive  of  grass,  were  rather  deficient  in  wa- 
ter. In  many  parts  of  the  east  the  herbage  is  still 
said  to  be  in  common,  on  account  of  its  abund- 
ance, and  the  comparative  fewness  of  the  people. 
685.  To  what  has  been  said  of  the  origin  of 
agriculture,  it  is  no  objection,  that  one  of  Adam's 
sons  was  a  tiller  of  the  ground.  For  the  condi- 
tion of  the  antediluvians  must  have  been  so  dif- 
ferent from  that  of  all  other  men,  that  in  a  matter 
of  this  khid  we  cannot  argue  from  the  one  to  the 
other.  Their  lives  were  much  longer  than  ours; 
they  probably  derived   their  knov/Iedge   of  the 


268  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

most  necessary  arts  from  the  first  man,  who  was 
no  doubt  in  many  respects  enlightened  by  in- 
spiration; and  probably  the  earth  was  more  easily 
cultivated,  and  the  seasons  milder,  in  those  early 
days,  than  they  have  been  at  any  time  since.  This 
we  know,  that  after  the  flood  the  life  of  man  was 
exceedingly  shortened. 

686.  Some  labours  instantly  repay  the  labourer. 
He,  who  digs  a  cave,  or  builds  a  hut,  enjoys  the 
shelter  of  it,  to  which  his  labour  gives  him  a 
right,  provided  he  has  not  encroached  on  any 
body.  Other  labours  do  not  immediately  repay 
the  labourer:  it  is  autumn  that  compensates  the 
toils  of  the  spring.  Now  man  is  made  for  labour; 
and  to  it  must  have  recourse  for  recreation,  if  he 
is  not  driven  by  necessity;  for  without  it  he  can- 
not be  either  happy  or  healthy:  and  the  earth  and 
other  things  require  labour  to  make  them  useful; 
and  we  are  prompted  by  reason  and  foresight,  to 
provide  for  future,  as  well  as  to  remove  present, 
wants.  And  hence  mankind  would  in  time  learn 
to  lay  claim,  not  only  to  present  use,  but  also  to 
permanent  property;  not  in  movables  only,  and 
other  artificial  things,  but  also  in  the  soil  or  ter- 
ritory. 

687.  Permanent  property,  when  acquired,  con- 
tinues till  the  owner  relinquish  it,  or  sell  it,  or 
j;ivc  it  away.  If  given  away,  or  sold,  it  becomes 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  269 

permanent  in  him  to  whom  it  is  sold,  or  given; 
if  relinquished,  it  again  becomes  common,  and 
fails  to  the  first  occupant,  as  before.  A  man's  chil- 
dren, if  the  first  witnesses  of  his  death,  are  na- 
turally the  first  occupants  of  the  property  he 
has  left;  and  the  municipal  laws  of  all  enlightened 
nations  allow  them  to  be  his  natural  heirs.  From 
a  passage  in  the  history  of  Abraham  (Gen.  xv. 
2,  3.),  it  would  appear,  that,  in  those  early  times, 
when  a  man  died  childless,  his  servant  (perhaps 
his  chief  servant)  became  his  heir;  probably,  be- 
cause, being  present  at  his  death,  he  was  of 
course  the  first  occupant  of  the  property  left.  Of 
the  reasonableness  of  admitting  the  validity  of 
testaments,  I  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  after- 
wards. 

688.  From  the  view  of  things  now  given,  it  has 
been  supposed  by  some  authors,  that  the  pro- 
gress of  human  society,  from  rudeness  to  refine- 
ment, consists  of  four  periods  or  stages:  that,  in 
the  first,  men  lived  by  hunting  or  fishing,  or  on 
such  fruits  and  plants  as  the  earth  produces  with- 
out culture;  in  the  second,  by  pasturage;  in  the 
third,  by  both  these,  in  conjunction  with  agricul- 
ture; and,  in  the  fourth,  by  all  these,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  commerce,  w'hich  gives  rise  to  arts  and 
sciences,  and  every  other  elegance  of  life.  In  some 
countries,  particularly  our  own,  this  may  have 

Z  2 


270  ELEMENTS  OP  Part  III. 

happened,  but  could  not  in  all:  some  being  so 
barren  as  not  to  admit  of  agriculture;  many  so 
peculiarly  situated,  as  to  be  incapable  of  com- 
merce with  tbe  rest  of  the  world;  and  some  so 
destitute  of  territory,  and  so  beset  with  the  sea, 
as  to  oblige  the  natives,  from  the  beginning,  to 
live  by  fishing,  or  practise  commerce.  Examples 
will  readily  occur  to  those  who  are  conversant  in 
history  and  geography. 

689.  Of  original  property  a  man  may  occupy 
as  much  as  he  has  occasion  for,  provided  he  do 
no  injury  to  others:  and  tbe  same  rule,  a  little 
extended,  may  determine  the  limits  of  occupancy, 
where  states  or  nations  are  the  occupants.  If  one 
man,  or  a  few  men,  were  to  land  in  a  desert 
island,  it  would  be  unreasonable  that  they  should 
appropriate  the  whole,  unless  the  whole  were 
necessary  to  supply  their  wants.  But  men,  acting 
as  the  servants  of  a  nation,  might,  in  the  name  of 
that  nation,  or  of  its  sovereign,  take  possession  of 
the  whole,  unless  it  were  very  extensive;  because 
the  government  which  they  serve  may  send  co- 
ionics  to  people  it,  or  in  selfdefence  may  find  it 
necessary  to  hinder  foreigners  from  settling  in  it. 
As  to  trie  right  which  some  nations  have  assum- 

1,  of  exterminating  or  driving  away  the  people 
of  any  countiy,  that  they  might  have  room  to 
Hcftlr  i!i  it;  it  is  just  such  a  rir^ht,  as  my  neigh- 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIEXCE.  271 

bour's  family  have  to  murder,  or  drive  me  out  of 
my  house,  that  they  may  have  it  for  themselves. 
The  instance  of  Joshua  taking  possession  of  the 
land  of  Canaan  is  no  objection  to  this  principle; 
as  will  appear  afterwards. 

690.  Some  things,  when  appropriated,  belong 
not  to  any  one  individual,  but  to  a  society.  Of 
this  kind,  in  the  Roman  law,  are  bona  universitU' 
tatum^  property  belonging  to  communities;  as 
market  places,  publick  halls,  publick  walks,  and 
such  lands  as  may  be  bought  by  the  community, 
or  given  to  it.  Of  this  kind  also  are,  what  the 
Roman  lawyers  called  res  mcras^  as  temples;  res 
.sanctas,  as  the  walls  of  a  city;  and  res  religiosas^ 
as  the  sepulchres  of  particular  families.  These 
were  improperly  termed  res  nuUius^  things  be- 
longing to  nobody.  It  is  true  they  belong  not  to^ 
any  individual,  but  they  are  the  property  of  cer- 
tain communities  or  societies.  Highways  and 
publick  bridges  are,  by  the  civil  law,  considered 
as  the  property  of  the  state:  with  us,  they  are 
supposed  to  belong  to  the  king,  as  the  representa- 
tive of  the  state;  and  hence  we  call  the  publick 
road  the  king's  highway. 

691.  It  is  a  maxim  in  the  civil  law.  Quod  nul- 
litis  est.  Jit  occupantis:  what  belongs  to  nobody, 
becomes  the  property  of  that  person  who  seizes 
on  it.  But  in  most  of  the  modern  raonarcliies  of 


272  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

Europe  the  maxim  is,  Quod  nullius  est  Jit  domini 
regis.  Things  found,  when  the  owner  cannot  be 
discovered,  belong,  by  the  law  of  nature,  to  the 
finder  or  occupant;  but  on  this  right  of  property 
the  laws  of  different  countries  have  laid  different 
sorts  of  restriction.  The  Jews  gave  found  treasure 
to  the  owner  of  the  ground  in  which  it  was  found; 
the  Roman  law  gave  it  sometimes  to  the  finder, 
sometimes  to  the  landlord,  and  sometimes  to  the 
publick  treasury.  In  great  Britain  it  has  commonly 
been  considered  as  the  property  of  the  king;  and 
formerly  it  was  criminal  not  to  give  him  notice  of 
it,  when  found;  but  now  he  never  claims  it,  be- 
cause it  is  not  worth  his  while,  and  so  it  remains 
with  the  finder.  How  the  king  should  have  a 
claim  upon  it,  will  appear  aftcrv,arcls,  when  we 
come  to  speak  of  those  feudal  institutions  which 
gave  rise  to  the  modern  monarchies  of  Europe. 

692,  When  a  man  throws  away  his  property, 
or  neglects  it  so  as  to  give  reason  to  believe  that 
he  does  not  mean  to  reclaim  it,  the  first  occupant 
has  no  doubt  a  right  to  it.  In  commercial  coun- 
tries the  law  commonly  fixes  a  time,  before  which, 
if  a  man  does  not  claim  his  property,  having  it  in 
his  power  to  do  so,  he  is  supposed  to  have  relin- 
quished it,  and  loses  his  right  by  what  is  called 
j)rcscrij)tion.  The  terms  of  prescription  are  dif- 
'crf-nt  in  different  countries,  and  with  respect  to 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIEJ^CE  273 

different  sorts  of  property.  Many  corporations 
and  individuals  enjoy  their  estates  by  prescrip- 
tion; that  is,  the  law  permits  them  to  enjoy  those 
things  now,  because  their  predecessors  had  pos- 
sessed them  undisturbed  for  many  years.  This  is 
not  unreasonable.  Many  things  happen,  by  which 
charters  and  original  grants  may  be  destroyed; 
and  if  a  man  and  his  forefathers  have  enjoyed  an 
estate  undisturbed  for  many  years,  it  is  presumed 
that  no  legal  objection  can  be  made  to  his  right, 
and,  consequently,  that  his  right  is  good.  If  ob- 
jections have  been  made  from  time  to  time,  ac- 
cording to  the  established  forms  of  law,  that  will 
alter  the  case.  A  tradesman  may  by  prescription 
lose  his  claim  against  his  debtor:  that  is,  as  the 
law  stands  at  present,  if  he  does  not  present  his 
bill  for  payment  within  five  or  six  years  after  it 
falls  due.  This  too  is  reasonable.  It  imposes  no 
hardship  on  the  creditor  to  oblige  him  to  present 
his  bill;  and  it  prevents  claims  from  being  brought 
against  the  debtor  of  so  old  a  date,  as  that  he  can 
hardly  know  whether  they  be  just  or  unjust.  So 
much  for  occupancy,  the  first  way  of  acquiring 
original  property.   See  §  681. 

693.  The  second  way  is  by  what  is  called  ar- 
cession;  by  which  we  acquire  the  original  pro- 
perty of  something,  in  consequence  of  its  being 
strictly  connected  with  another-  thing  which  h^- 


274  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

longs  to  us.  Of  these  accessions  the  lawyers 
enumerate  several.  The  proprietor  of  money  lent 
is  entitled  to  the  interest  of  it,  and  the  owner  of  a 
tree  or  a  cow,  to  the  fruit  or  the  calf:  this  is  call- 
ed./rwf^?^.?.  He  who  buys  a  growing  wood  is 
proprietor  of  all  the  additional  increase  of  the 
tree:  this  is  termed  increment um.  Another  is 
denominated  alluvio;  when  ground  is  by  a  river 
brought  over  from  the  proprietor  on  the  one  side 
to  the  proprietor  on  the  other.  If  this  be  done 
gradually,  it  is  properly  accession,  because  the 
former  owner  might  have  prevented  it;  but  if  a 
large  piece  is  brought  over  at  once,  it  seems  rea- 
sonable, as  such  a  thing  could  be  neither  foreseen 
nor  prevented,  that  the  proprietor  should  not  lose 
his  right.  New  islands  sometimes  rise  in  seas  and 
rivers.  If  the  sea  or  river  belonged  to  any  person 
or  people,  the  new  island  also  belongs  to  that  per- 
son or  people:  if  this  w^s  not  the  case,  the  new 
island  may  be  approprititcd  by  occupancy;  unless 
the  neighbours  have  reason  to  think  they  may  be 
in  danger  from  foreigners  getting  into  it;  in 
which  case  the  right  of  selfdcfence  will  justify 
their  interposing,  in  order  to  obtain  an  equitable 
settlement.  Other  accessions  are  mentioned  by 
the  UiiiYics  oi  com?nijilio,  co?{/uf<w  Hjitdjicafio^  &c. 
rvery  question  relating  to  which  may  be  solved 
by  any  person  of  common  sense. 


Chap.  I.  MOKAL  SCIENCE.  27 S 

694.  The  sea  was  mentioned  as  property;  ab- 
surdly, it  may  be  thought,  as  that  should  be  open 
to  all  the  •world.  And  this  is  in  general  true; 
though  the  same  right  of  selfdefence  may  au- 
thorize exceptions.  A  maritime  people  have  an 
undoubted  right  to  hinder  from  coming  within  a 
certain  distance  of  their  coast  foreigners  suspect- 
ed of  hostile  purposes;  as  well  as  those,  who,  by 
fishing,  would  deprive  the  natives  of  part  of  that 
provision  to  which  nature  gave  them  a  right;  for 
that  to  the  fishes  found  on  oz^r  coast  for  example, 
mir  people  have  an  exclusive  right,  will  hardly  be 
denied;  unless  there  be  such  plenty,  as  may 
serve  others  as  well  as  ourselves.  Contraband 
adventurers  too  may  be  prohibited  from  ap- 
proaching too  near,  on  pain  of  forfeiting  their 
cargos. 

695.  The  right  of  property  comprehends  these 
five  rights.  First,  the  right  of  possession:  second- 
ly, the  right  of  using:  thirdly,  a  right  to  exclude 
others  from  possession  and  use;  for,  without 
this,  the  two  former  rights  would  be  nothing: 
fourthly,  the  right  of  recovering  our  own  when 
lost:  and  fifthly,  the  right  of  transferring  what  is 
alienable.  The  duties  and  obligations  correspond- 
ing to  these  rights,  are  obvious,  and  universally 
understood. 

696.  I  come  now  to  the  second  class  of  adven- 
titious rights  (see  §  678),  which  are  derived  from 


276  LLF.MENTS  OF  Part  IlT. 

some  deed  of  a  former  proprietor.  They  are  di- 
vided into  personal  and  real.  A  personal  derived 
right  terminates  in  some  person:  thus  a  master 
has  a  personal  right  to  the  service  of  him  whom 
he  has  hired;  and  thus  a  creditor  may  be  satisfied 
■with  a  personal  or  general  security  from  his 
debtor,  as  a  bill  or  a  bond,  without  demanding  a 
right,  by  a  pledge  or  otherwise,  to  any  particular 
part  of  the  debtor's  goods.  These  personal  rights 
are  real  in  one  sense  of  the  word,  that  is,  they 
are  not  fictitious,  but  genuine.  But,  in  contradis- 
tinction to  these,  those  derived  rights  have  been 
called  real  which  terminate  not  in  a  person,  but 
in  some  thing;  for  the  word  real  (in  barbarous 
Latin  rcalis)  is  derived  from  res.  If  I  have  lent 
money  to  a  man  who  gives  me  some  part  of  his 
goods,  in  the  way  of  pledge,  to  be  kept  by  me  if 
the  debt  is  not  paid,  I  am  said  to  have  a  real 
right. 

697.  There  is  a  derived  real  right  to  partial 
property,  and  a  derived  real  right  to  full  pro- 
perty. In  the  former  case,  one  is  proprietor  along 
with  another,  or  with  others;  in  the  latter,  one  is 
sole  ]iroprietor.  The  following  are  examples  of 
derived  real  rights  to  fmvlial  property.  First, 
bona  Jide  Jiosseasio.  When  a  man  innocently  be- 
comes possessed  of  what  belongs  lo  another,  as 
ii)  tlic  cast;  of  llnding  what  is  lost,  he  is  a  pn- 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  277 

sumptive  proprietor,  a  bona  fide  possessor,  and 
has  a  right  to  keep  what  he  has  found  from  every 
person  but  the  owner;  who,  on  receiving  it  back, 
is  bound  to  indemnity  him  for  any  trouble  or  ex- 
pense he  may  have  incurred  in  preserving  it, 
and  in  finding  out  the  person  whose  property  it 
is.  If  the  finder  have  received  benefit  from  it,  let 
him  make  the  owner  an  amicable  compensation; 
if  it  have  perished  through  no  fault  of  the  finder, 
he  cannot  be  liable  in  damages.  There  is  no  dif- 
ficulty in  determining  any  case  that  may  be  sup- 
posed to  occur  in  a  matter  of  this  kind. 

698.  Secondly,  the  right  of  ew^azY:  or  that  ri^ht 
which  one  may  have  to  a  thing,  an  estate  for  ex- 
ample, after  a  certain  number  of  years  are  past, 
in  which  case  one  is  said  to  have  the  right  in  re- 
version; or  after  the  death  of  certain  persons,  in 
which  case  one  is  said  to  have  it  in  remainder. 
One  may  leave  one's  property,  or  give  it  away, 
to  another;  or,  in  the  event  of  his  death,  or  not 
performing  conditions,  to  a  second;  or,  in  case  he 
should  die,  or  not  perform  conditions,  to  a  third, 
and  so  forward;  and  every  one  of  these  persons 
has  a  right  of  entail.  Or  a  man,  disposing  of  an 
estate  of  his  own  acquisition,  may  leave  it  for  so 
many  years  to  one  person,  for  so  many  subse- 
quent years  to  another,  for  so  many  more  to  a 
third,  &;c.  Such  disposals  are  in  general  not  un- 

VoL.  VIII.  2  A 


278  ELEMENTS  OF  Pait  HI- 

reasonable,  as  the  right  of  making  them  results 
from  the  very  nature  of  property:  but  municipal 
law  may  limit  such  rights,  where  the  publick 
gooci  seems  to  require  it.  There  is  another  sort 
of  entail  very  common  in  tliis  country.  A  man 
possessed  of  an  estate  in  land,  who  can  prove 
that  he  has  no  debt,  may,  if  he  pleases,  by  a  deed 
called  an  entail,  executed  according  to  certain 
legal  forms,  settle  that  estate  upon  his  heirs  in 
such  a  manner,  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  them 
to  diminish  it.  So  that  he,  who  inherits  an  entail- 
ed estate,  cannot  have  credit  to  borrow  more 
money,  than  he  can  satisfy  his  creditors  that  he 
can  pay  during  his  life,  or  that  his  heir  can  pay 
without  encroaching  on  the  inheritance.  Such 
emails  lay  a  restraint  on  luxury,  and  secure  the 
perpetuity  of  estates  as  far  as  that  can  be  done  by 
jiuman  policy;  but  they  throw  incumbrances  in 
tlie  way  of  private  business,  and  seem  to  be  rather 
detrimental  to  a  commercial  nation.  And  it  often 
liappens,  in  consequence  of  these  entails,  that  the 
younger  children  of  people  of  fortune  are  poorly 
provided  for. 

61)9.  A  third  derived  right  to  partial  property 

^  JNs  cm/ilnjtcnticuin^  or  the  right  of  holding  in 

lee,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  called  in  Scotland,  in 

feu:  which  takes  place,  when  a  man  possesses  as 

]iis  own  a  certain  improvable  thing,  as  a  piece  of 


Ciiap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  279 

ground,  on  paying  a  yearly  tribute  to  his  supe- 
riour,  that  is,  to  the  person  from  whom  he  derives 
his  right.  It  differs  from  a  lease,  which  gives  one 
the  use  of  a  house  or  piece  of  ground  for  a  limit- 
ed time  only.  The  holder  in  fee  is  the  proprietor 
of  what  he  holds;  and  may  sell  it  to  another; 
though  he  is  commonly  subject  to  some  restric* 
tions  with  respect  to  the  mode  of  alienation.  The 
ancient  and  technical  name  of  this  sort  of  right 
is  derived  from  the  Greek  ef^^vTivuv,  to  plant  or 
ingraff.  Anciently,  it  seems,  this  tenure  was,  and 
indeed  it  is  still,  found  to  be  a  good  encourage- 
ment to  the  cultivation  of  barren  ground.  A  man 
who  possesses  a  field  as  his  own,  and  knows  he 
may  dispose  of  it  to  advantage  when  he  has  im- 
proved it,  willingly  incurs  the  expense  of  im- 
provement; which  he  who  holds  by  lease,  unless 
it  be  a  very  long  one,  is  in  ordinary  cases  under 
little  or  no  temptation  to  do.  To  the  truth  of  this 
remark,  many  fine  fields  in  this  neighbourhood 
bear  testimony.  In  the  memory  of  persons  not 
much  older  than  I  am,  most  of  them  weref  wild 
heath,  or  watery  and  rocky  desert. 

700.  A  fourth  derived  right  to  partial  property 
is  fiignusy  and  a  fifth  is  /iij/iot/ieca.  When,  as  a 
security  for  a  debt,  a  certain  piece  of  goods  is 
put  by  the  debtor  into  the  hands  of  the  creditor, 
to  be  kept  by  him  till  the  debt  is  paid,  this  is 


280  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  HI 

pignus  or  pledge.  When  eitlicf  the  law,  or  a 
deed  of  the  debtor,  transfers  to  the  creditor,  as  a 
security  for  a  debt,  not  the  property  itself,  but  a 
legal  right  to  some  part  of  the  debtor's  property, 
this  is  hypotheca;  and  is  sometimes  in  the  Scotch 
law  termed  hyfiothec^  as  in  French  it  is  hyfiothe- 
que:  the  English  word  mortgage  comes  near  it  in 
signification,  but  is  not  the  same.  If,  in  Scotland, 
a  farmer  become  bankrupt,  his  landlord  has  an 
hypothec  on  his  crop  for  payment  of  the  rent; 
that  is,  may  insist,  without  ranking  himself 
among  the  other  creditors,  that  as  much  of  the 
crop  shall  be  given  him,  as  will  pay  the  full  rent 
of  that  crop.  In  like  manner,  house  carpenters 
and  shipwrights  have  an  hypothec  on  the  house 
or  ship  repaired,  for  the  materials  and  other 
charges  of  reparation;  and  ship  masters,  on  the 
cargo  for  their  freights.  Pledges  and  hypothecs 
being  real  rights,  the  law  considers  as  preferable 
to  personal  ones.  They  are  better  securities  for 
the  payment  of  debt,  than  bills  or  bonds. 

701.  A  sixth  derived  right  to  partial  property 
is  called  .wrvitua^  or  servitude;  which  is  a  right 
to  some  small  use  of  another's  property,  or  to 
some  influence  over  it.  Thus,  in  the  country,  I 
may  have  a  right  to  drive  my  cattle  to  water 
through  a  neighbour's  field;  and  in  a  town,  if  I 
11  a  building  a  liousc,  I  may  have  a  right  to  fasten 


eiiap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENXE.  281 

some  of  the  beams  in  my  neighbour's  wall;  and 
he  may  have  a  right  to  prevent  my  building  so 
near  or  so  high,  as  to  make  his  house  dark  or 
unhealthy.  The  Roman  law  divided  sei-xutm&s 
into  urban£  and  rustics. 

702.  The  last  of  these  derived  rights  to  partial 
property  that  I  shall  mention  is  feodum^  or  the 
right  of  holding  in  Jief^  that  is,  of  possessing  an 
estate  as  one's  own,  on  condition  of  rendering 
homage  and  personal  service  to  the  superiour. 
This  sort  of  tenure  was  introduced  by  those  na- 
tions, who,  in  the  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  centu- 
ries, came  from  the  northern  parts  of  Europe, 
overturned  the  Roman  empire,  and  established 
themselves  in  France,  Spain,  Italy,  and  the  other 
countries  which  they  conquered.  They  were 
called  by  different  names,  Goths,  Huns,  Vandals, 
Franks,  Normans,  Sec.  but  seem  originally  to 
have  been  the  same  people;  or  at  least  to  have 
very  much  resembled  one  another  in  manners, 
laws,  and  government.  They  left  their  own  coun- 
tries, probably  because  they  found  them  uncom- 
fortable, and  had  heard  that  in  the  southern  parts 
of  Europe  the  necessaries  of  life  might  be  more 
easily  obtained,  and  in  greater  abundance;  and 
actuated  too,  perhaps,  by  a  spirit  of  ambition  and 
conquest:  and  whole  nations  of  them  emigrated 
at  once,  without  any  view  of  ever  returning 

2  A  - 


282  ELEMENTS  OF  rurt  HI. 

Such  emigrations  were  in  former  times  not  im- 
common.  Cesar*  gives  a  particular  account  of  a 
projected  emigration  of  the  Helvetii;  which  he 
opposed,  from  an  apprehension  that  they  would 
molest  the  Roman  province,  and  some  other 
nations  in  friendship  with  Rome;  and,  having 
defeated  them  in  several  battles,  and  killed  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  of  them,  compelled 
the  remaining  hundred  and  ten  thousand  to  re» 
turn  to  tlieir  ov^^n  country.  And  about  fifty  years 
before  this  period,  the  Cimbri  and  Teutones 
emigrated  from  the  northern  parts  of  Germany, 
with  a  view  to  settle  in  the  Roman  province,  or 
in  Italy,  and  were  overthrown  by  Caius  Marius, 
with  a  slaughter  that  amounted  almost  to  final 
cxtcrminationc 

703.  But  to  return  to  the  subverters  of  the 
Roman  empire:  they,  like  their  predecessors  in 
emigration,  were  a  bold  and  hardy  race  of  men, 
lovers  of  liberty  and  independence,  and  fond  of 
military  enterpiizc.  When  they  had  conquered  a 
country,  their  plan  was,  not  to  destroy  the  na- 
tives, but  to  settle  among  them,  and  introduce 
their  own  laws  and  customs.  To  their  comman- 
der, who  at  first  was  chosen  l)y  them,  and  aftcr- 
M  ards  became  thtdr  king,  they  made  a  presrnt  of 

'  liJl.  G.;U  lib    1 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  283 

all  the  conquered  territory,  on  condition  of  his 
dividing  it  among  them;  which  he  did  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner. 

704.  He  retained  as  much  of  it  as  was  thought 
sufficient  for  the  support  of  his  dignity;  and  what 
he  possessed  he  held  of  no  superiour.  It  was, 
therefore,  property  of  that  sort  which  afterwards 
came  to  be  called  allodial;  from  two  northern 
words,  a//,  which  signified  then  what  in  our  lan- 
guage it  does  now,  and  odh,  property.  The  rest 
of  the  conquered  territory  he  divided  among  the 
officers  of  his  army,  who  were  afterwards  consi- 
dered as  nobility,  and  who  held  their  lands  of  the 
king,  and  held  them  as  their  own,  on  condition  of 
rendering  him  personal  service,  and  attending 
him  in  war,  at  their  own  charges,  when  sum- 
moned for  that  purpose;  all  which  they  swore  to 
perform,  declaring  themselves  at  the  same  time 
his  m<?w,  homines;  whence  was  derived  the  barba- 
rous Latin  word  homagium^  and  our  English  term 
hovKige.  This  sort  of  tenure  was  called  fcodmn.^ 
feod^  and  by  corruption  feud;  from  two  northeriA 
v/ords,/"<°,  reward,  and  odh^  property;  which  in- 
timated, that  these  nobles  held  their  lands  m  firo- 
perty  as  a  reward  for  military  service.  And  hence 
the  government,  laws,  and  customs,  introduced 
by  these  people  are  called/^orfc/,  or  feudal. 

T05.  The  nobility  of  a  feudal  kingdom   vi^ere- 


284  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  111 

the  king's  immediate  vassals;  a  word  which  did 
not  signify  slaves,  but  persons  who  held  their 
lands  of  a  superiour,  from  whom  they  were  sup- 
posed to  derive  them.  The  nobles  had  also  their 
vassals,  who,  m  after  times,  and  in  some  coun- 
tries, were  called  armig-eri.,  armour  bearers,  or 
esquires,  bearers  of  shields;  which  last  term 
comes  from  the  French  escu  (probably  from  scu- 
tum) or  ecu,  which  formerly  signified  a  shield: 
and  the  esquiies  held  their  lands,  each  of  his  im- 
mediate superiour,  and  by  the  same  feudal  tenure, 
according  to  which  their  superiour  held  his  lands 
of  the  king.  Thus  the  whole  conquered  territory 
was  divided  among  the  conquerors;  and  the  king, 
on  summoning  his  nobility  to  war,  was  instantly 
attended  by  them,  and  they  by  their  vass.ds  the 
esquires,  and  these  by  their  vassals;  (for  the 
greater  esquires  had  their  vassals,  as  well  as  the 
nobles);  so  that  all  the  military  pait  of  the  nation 
was  in  arms  at  once.  No  plan  of  policy  could,  in 
those  days,  be  better  contrived  for  securing  a 
conc|uest.  And  European  nations,  who  had  not 
been  subdued  by  the  nortliern  warriours,  adopted 
in  process  of  time  the  same  policy;  cither  because 
they  admired  tlie  wisdom  of  it,  or  because  they 
wished  to  he  like  their  neighbours.  Thus  the 
feudal  government  became  almost  universal  in 
Einoi^e.  Into  England  it  was  first  introduced  in 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE,  285 

its  full  extent,  about  seven  liundred  and  twenty 
years  ajjo,  by  William  the  conqueror,  who 
brought  it  from  his  own  country  of  Normandy. 

706.  All  human  institutions  are  liable  to 
change.  The  feudal  system  soon  became  a  dif- 
ferent thing  from  what  it  had  been  origmally. 
Arms  being,  in  the  opinion  of  these  people,  the 
only  honourable  profession,  the  lower  orders  of 
men,  including  husbandmen  and  artificers,  were 
not  permitted  to  be  soldiers,  and  were  really 
slaves,  though  the  condition  of  all  was  not  equally 
servile.  The  nobles  at  the  same  time  were  grow- 
ing more  and  more  powerful.  Their  lands  at  first 
were  held  during  the  king's  pleasure,  and  their 
titles  of  honour  were  only  for  life:  but  both 
lands  and  titles  became  hereditary;  and  certain 
offices  of  great  power  and  profit  were  held  in  the 
same  manner;  as,  in  Scotland,  those  of  high  con- 
stable, earl  marischal, .  high  admiral,  &c.  And 
then,  by  legacies,  lucrative  marriages,  and  other 
lucky  incidents,  some  of  the  nobility  acquired  so 
great  wealth  and  influence,  each  having  a  sepa- 
rate jurisdiction  within  his  ow^n  territory,  that 
they  began  to  consider  themselves  as  almost 
equal  .to  the  king  himself;  which  made  them 
regardless  both  of  him,  and  of  the  authority  of 
the  law.  The  history  of  those  times  contains,  for 
some  centuries,  little  more  than  contests  between 


286  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III 

the  kings  and  nobles;  the  former  striving  to  re- 
gain the  privileges  they  had  lost,  or  imprudently 
given  away;  and  the  latter  endeavouring  to  secure 
advantages,  to  which,  because  they  had  long  en- 
joyed them,  they  thought  they  had  a  good  right. 
Circumstances,  however,  some  of  which  will  be 
mentioned  hereafter,  concurred  at  last  to  better 
the  condition  of  the  common  people,  to  enlarge 
men's  notions  on  the  subject  of  liberty,  to  repress 
the  insolence  of  the  nobles,  and  to  strengthen  the 
authority  of  the  kings  and  of  the  law.  And  thus, 
the  feudal  system  was  at  last  broken  down,  in 
some  countries  later,  in  others  earlier.  But,  to 
tliis  day,  feudal  laws,  feudal  manners,  and  feudal 
language,  prevail  more  or  less  in  almost  every 
country  of  Europe.  So  much  for  derived  rights 
to  partial  property. 

707.  A  derived  right  to  full  property  (see  § 
697)  may  take  place  in  these  four  ways:  First, 
at  the  death  of  the  former  proprietor,  and  with  hi& 
consent:  secondly,  at  his  deaths  and  inde/icndtmtly 
071  his  consent:  thirdly,  duririg  his  life,  and  nnth  hie 
consent:  fourthly,  during  his  Vfc^  and  indvficndcntUj 
on  his  consent. 

708.  In  the  first  way,  namely,  at  the  death  of 
the  former  proprietor,  and  with  his  consent,  a  de- 
rived right  of  full  property  is  conveyed,  by  testa- 
ment.   A  testament  is  a  declaration  of  our  willi 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  28 ^ 

made  according  to  certain  forms,  to  this  end,  that 
it  may  have  no  effect  till  our  death,  and  may  then 
determine  the  appropriation  of  the  property  wc 
may  leave  behind  us.    It  would  be  unwise  in  a 
lawgiver  to  discourage  industry;  one  great  mo- 
tive to  Avhich  is,   that  we  may  do  good  to  our 
surviving  relations  and  friends;  and  it  would  be 
cruel  to  expose  men  to  the  inconvenience  that 
might  attend   the    alienation   of  their   property 
during  their  life.  And,  if  the  validity  of  testa- 
ments were  not  allowed,  there  would  in  many 
cases  be  no  sufficient  security  for  the  payment  of 
the  debts  of  the  deceased;   which,  as  life  is  un- 
certain, would  be  injurious  to  every  man's  credh. 
That  testaments   should  be  valid,  is  therefore 
most  reasonable;  and  is  admitted  by  the  laws  of 
all   polite   nations.  Whether  they  derive   their 
validity  from  natural  or  civil  law,  is  a  question 
with  which  men  of  theory  may  amuse  themselves, 
but  is  not  material.  It  is  true,  that  a  dead  man 
can  have  no  influence  on  any  of  the  furniture  of 
this  world;  but  it  is  equally  true,  that  by  the  law 
of  nature  he  has  the  disposal  of  his  property  as 
long  as  he  has  life  and  reason;  and  if  so,  he  may 
dispose  of  it  before  his  death,  on  this  condiiion, 
that  the  person  who  is  to  inherit  shall  not  have 
it,  nor  use  it,  while  the  other  lives:  he   might 
even  exact  from  his  heir  an  oath  to  this  purpose, 


^88  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

which  oath  would  certamly  be  binding  by  the  law 
of  nature.  The  forms,  according  to  which  valid 
testaments  are  to  be  made,  it  must  be  left  to  the 
law  of  the  land  to  determine.  They  are,  accord- 
ingly, different  in  diff'erent  countries,  and  as  they 
relate  to  diff'erent  sorts  of  property;  but,  in  gene- 
ral, they  ought  not  to  be,  and  in  this  country  they 
are  not,  very  complex,  at  least  with  regard  to 
movables.  Forms,  however,  are  necessary,  to 
prevent  forgery,  and  other  frauds;  and  \o  give 
legal  authority  to  those  who  arc  to  execute  the 
will  of  the  testator. 

709.  Secondly;  when  a  man  dies  intestate,  that 
is,  without  making  a  will,  the  law,  inde/ie?ide?itly 
on  his  consent,  determines  the  succession  to  his 
property.  This  too  is  reasonable,  as  well  as  ne- 
cessary. For  most  men  know,  or  may  know,  the 
persons  whom  the  law  would  make  their  heirs, 
If  a  man  wish  his  legal  heir  to  be  his  real  heir, 
he  needs  not  make  a  will;  and  if  he  has  made 
none,  it  may  be  presumed  that  this  was  his  wish. 
A  man's  natural  heirs  are  his  children,  or  nearest 
relations,  among  whom  the  law  of  nature  would 
give  preference  according  to  the  degree  of  con- 
sanguinity, without  respect  to  age  or  sex;  and 
would  provide  as  liberally  for  the  youngest 
daughter  as  for  the  eldest  son.  But  here  munici- 
pal laws  interpose,  and  regulate  inheritance  ac- 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  289 

cording  to  the  exigencies  of  different  govern- 
ments. In  a  republick,  where  the  citizens  are  sup- 
posed to  be  equal,  or  nearly  so,  and  where  the 
preservation  of  this  equality  tends  to  the  preser- 
vation of  the  government,  the  children  of  the 
same  father  ought  all  to  inherit  equally.  But  in 
monarchy  it  is  otherwise.   (See  §  665). 

710.  Thirdly;  a  real  right  to  full  property 
may  be  transferred  during  the  life^  and  with  the 
consent^  of  the  former  proprietor,  by  means  of 
contracts.  The  Roman  law  distinguished  between 
contractum  and  jiactum;  limiting  the  former  to 
matters  of  commerce,  and  the  latter  to  other 
covenants,  to  marriage,  for  example.  But  in  our 
tongue  this  distinction  is  unnecessary.  A  contract 
is  the  consent  of  two  or  more  persons,  in  the 
same  design,  mutually  expressed  or  signified,  in 
order  to  constitute  some  right  and  obligation. 
They  are  necessary  in  human  affairs;  for  without 
them  we  could  neither  supply  one  another*s  wants 
in  a  way  equitable  to  ourselves,  nor  depend  on 
one  another's  services.  They  may  be  expressed 
in  words,  or  by  any  other  signs  to  which  the 
persons  concerned  ngree  to  give  the  same  mean- 
ing. Written  contracts  have  this  advantage,  that, 
being  more  within  the  reach  of  the  law^  they  are 
more  easily  enforced  than  such  as  are  not  com- 
mitted to  writing.  These, however,  may  be  equajlv 

Vol.  VIII.  2B 


290  Elements  of  Part  ni 

binding  on  the  conscience.  The  rights  conveyed 
by  contracts  are  perfect  rights  (§  677);  for  the 
promiscuous  violation  of  them  would  overturn 
society.  If  in  themselves  lawful,  they  cannot  be 
annulled  but  by  the  consent  of  the  contracting 
parties;  and  some  of  the  more  solemn  covenants, 
as  marriage,  cannot  be  made  null  without  the 
authority  of  the  law.  Contracts  differ  from  reso- 
lutions; for  these,  in  many  cases,  we  may  alter 
without  blame,  and  they  confer  no  right  on  others. 
They  differ  also  from  those  promises  which, 
whether  declared  to  be  conditional  or  not,  arc 
universally  understood  to  be  such.  A  man  pro- 
mises to  come  to  me  tomorrow;  but  death,  sick- 
ness, and  many  other  accidents,  will  justify  his 
not  coming;  a  man  promises  to  leave  me  a  lega- 
cy; but  my  misbehaviour,  or  a  change  in  his 
circumstances  for  the  worse,  may  excuse  his  not 
doing  it.  However,  it  is  the  duty  of  every  man  to 
avoid  rash  promises,  to  take  care  not  to  deceive 
or  disappoint  others,  and  to  shun  the  appearance 
of  fickleness. 

711.  The  validity  of  contracts  may  be  affected, 
jirst,  by  the  understanding,  and,  secondly,  by  thr 
vill  of  the  contractors;  and,  thirdly,  by  the  mat- 
ter of  the  contract.  First,  by  their  understanding. 
A  contract  implies  consent;  and  consent  implies 
'he  use  of  reason,  and  some  knowledge  of  the- 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  291 

nature  of  those  things  in  regard  to  ^yhich  the 
consent  is  given.  To  fit  a  man  for  managing  his 
own  affairs,  a  certain  maturity  of  age  is  neces- 
sary. What  that  is,  and  how  far  the  validity  of 
contracts  may  be  affected  by  the  contractor*^ 
immaturity  of  age,  it  belongs  to  human  laws  to 
determine.  With  us,  minority  ceases,  and  a  man 
is  supposed  capable  of  managing  his  own  affairs, 
when  the  twenty -first  year  is  completed;  but  a 
private  person,  from  prudential  considerations, 
may  prolong  for  some  years  the  minority  of  his 
heir;  and  an  act  of  parliament  may  shorten  that 
of  the  heir  of  the  crown,  and  make  him  capable 
of  legally  discharging  all  the  functions  of  royalty 
at  eighteen,  or  even  earlier.  By  the  civil  and  Scotch 
law,  males  before  fourteen,  and  females  before 
twelve,  can  do  nothing  in  their  own  affairs,  which 
the  law  holds  to  be  valid;  but  their  parents,  or,  if 
these  are  dead,  their  guardians,  act  for  them:  and, 
during  this  period,  they  are  said  to  be  in  the  state 
ofpupillarity.  After  these  years,  and  till  they  be 
one  and  twenty,  they  are  minora;  and,  w  hile  they 
are  so,  may,  if  their  parents  be  dead,  choose 
curators  to  manage  their  business,  unless  cura- 
tors have  already  been  appointed  for  them  by 
their  father. 

712.  With  respect  to  marriage,  and  the  age 
at  whifch  it  may  be  legally  contracted,  the  laws  of 


292  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  UI. 

different  countries  differ  greatly.  In  Scotland, 
minors  may  marry  without  the  consent  or  know- 
ledge of  either  parents  or  guardians;  and  mar- 
riage contracted  even  by  pupils  becomes  valid,  if 
the  parties  agree  to  live  together  after  their 
minority  commences.  The  English  law  resembles 
the  Roman  with  regard  ta marriage.  In  England, 
all  marriages,  celebrated  without  the  regular 
publication  of  banns  in  the  parish  church,  where 
either  of  the  parties,  not  being  a  widow  or 
widower,  is  under  the  age  of  twenty-one,  and 
celebrated  without  consent  of  the  father,  or,  if  he 
is  dead,  of  the  mother  and  guardians,  arc  null, 
and  the  children  of  such  marriage  illegitimate. 
If  the  consent  of  the  mother  and  guardians  be 
unreasonably  withheld,  the  matter  may  be  deter- 
mined by  the  lord  chancellor;  but  no  power  can 
force  the  iiither's  consent;  or,  if  he  is  alive,  make 
op  for  the  want  of  it.  If  the  law  of  England  be 
too  rigid  in  this  particular,  as  some  think  it  is, 
that  of  Scotland  is  undoubtedly  too  little  so.  In 
this  particular,  however,  the  English  law  is  easily 
evaded.  If  the  persons  who  wish  to  marry  can 
make  their  escape  into  Scotland,  and  get  the 
nuptial  ceremony  performed  there,  though  within 
lialf  a  mile  of  the  English  border,  (a  thing  often, 
anci  vith  no  great  difliculty  accomplished)  the 
marria(j:e,  in  the  judgment  of  the  British  legis- 


Chap.  L  MORAL  SCIENCE.  S93 

lature,  is  valid.  Surely,  either  the  English  law 
^vith  respect  to  legal  marriage  is  wrong;  or  to 
tolerate,  in  this  way,  the  evading  of  it,  is  mere 
mockery  of  legislation. 

713.  How  far  imprudence  or  mistake  may  in- 
validate contracts,  is  in  general  well  enough  un- 
derstood, though  not  easily  expressed  in  few 
words.  One  thing  is  clear,  namely,  that  all  fraud 
ought  to  be  discouraged.  Contracts,  made  with 
idiots,  with  mad  men  during  their  frenzy,  or 
with  drunk  men  when  the  drunkenness  is  ap- 
parent, ought  not  to  be  valid;  because,  without  a 
fraudulent  purpose,  nobody  would  transact  busi- 
ness with  such  a  person.  In  the  case  of  drunken- 
ness, however,  there  may  be  exceptions  to  this 
rule.  All  drunk  men  are  not  equally  incapable 
of  managing  their  affairs;  and  all  sober  men  are 
not  equally  acute  in  discerning  the  state  of  an- 
other man's  mind.  And  there  are  some  contracts, 
marriage,  for  example,  which  ought  to  be  bind- 
ing even  upon  drunk  men,  and  in  fact  are  so. 
Let  those,  who  think  there  is  any  hardship  in 
this,  be  careful  to  keep  themselves  always  sober; 
a  circumstance  of  which  no  man  will  ever  have 
occasion  to  repent. 

714.  Secondly;  whatever  affects  the  freedom 
of  the  will  may  affect  the  validity  of  contracts.  Id 
g^nevaj,  extorted  contracts  are  not  valid.  But  to 

55  B?- 


J 94  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  HI. 

this  maxim  there  are  many  exceptions.  If  an 
army  is  forced  into  a  treaty  by  a  victorious 
enemy,  (which  often  happens)  that  treaty  must 
be  sacredly  kept:  if  it  were  not,  the  evils  of  war 
•would  be  remediless  and  endless.  Extorted  pro- 
mises ought  to  be  fulfilled,  when  by  so  doing  the 
publick  good  is  promoted,  and  the  person  who 
promises  not  materially  injured.  If  a  pirate  sets 
me  at  liberty  on  my  promising  a  ransom,  I  ought 
to  pay  that  ransom  if  I  can;  not  because  he  has 
any  rif^ht  to  it,  but  because,  if  I  did  not,  he  might 
be  more  unrelenting  to  other  prisoners.  In  all 
cases  of  this  kind,  the  person  from  whom  the 
promise  is  extorted,  ought  to  consider  how  far 
his  nonperformance  may  aflect,  first,  the  publick 
good,  and,  secondly,  the  dignity  of  his  own 
character.  See  the  story  ofRegulus,  and€icero*s 
remarks  upon  it,  in  his  third  book  on  moral  dutie?: 
see  also  the  tenth  chapter  of  the  first  book. 

715.  Thirdly;  valid  contracts  must  all  be  pos- 
sible and  lawful.  Contractors,  however,  may  some- 
times be  mistaken  with  respect  to  this  possibility 
and  lawfulness:  if  the  mistake  was  unavoidable^ 
they  should  suffer  no  loss;  wiicre  fraud  appears, 
let  it  be  discouraged.  *Of  inconsistent  contracts 
with  the  same  person,  the  first  is  null,  and  the 
last  valid;  with  diflcrcnt  persons,  the  fijst  is  valid, 
and  the  last  null.    If  1  hire  a  ^servant,  at  a  certain 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  295 

rate  of  wages,  and  afterwards  agree  to  give  him 
more,  I  am  bound  by  the  last  agreement.  If  a 
man  marry  a  second  wife  while  the  first  is  liv- 
ing, the  first  marriage  is  valid,  the  last  is  both 
null  and  criminal. 

716.  Some  contracts  are  intended  for  the  bene- 
fit of  one  only  of  the  contracting  parties,  and 
these  are  called  gratuitous,  and  said  to  be  three; 
mdndatian^  when  one  without  reward  undertakes 
to  do  business  for  another;  commodatmn,  when 
one  allows  another,  gratis,  the  use  of  a  thing  for 
a  certain  time,  defiositum^  when  one  undertakes, 
without  asking  any  thing  for  his  trouble,  the 
charge  and  keeping  of  some  part  of  another's 
property.  These  contracts  are  common,  and  the 
rights  and  obligations  arising  from  them  univer- 
sally understood. 

717.  Those  other  contracts,  which  are  intended 
for  the  equal  advantage  of  the  contracting  parties, 
have  in  Scotland  been  called  o?ierous.  The  gene- 
ral rule  with  regard  to  them  is,  that  equality  be 
preserved.  All  the  persons,  therefore,  concerned 
in  them,  ought  to  have  the  same  opportunities 
of  knowing  the  value  of  those  things  in  regard  to 
which  the  contract  is  made.  Now  those  things 
have  value,  which  are  useful  or  agreeable;  and 
the  price  of  a  thing  is  in  proportion  to  the  diffi- 
culty of  obtaining  it,  and  the  demand  there  is  for 


296  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III 

it.  Difficulty  of  obtaining  a  thing  may  be  occa- 
sioned many  ways;  as,  if  there  be  but  a  small 
quantity  of  it  in  the  world;  if  any  accident  make 
that  quantity  less  than  ordinary;  if  much  labour, 
learning,  or  genius  be  required  in  the  labourer 
or  artist  who  produces  it;  or  if  the  persons  em- 
ployed about  it  are,  according  to  the  custom  of 
the  country,  obliged  to  live  in  an  expensive  man- 
ner.* Value  and  price  are  not  the  same.  For 
some  things  of  great  value  bear  no  price:  such 
are  church  benefices,  which  the  law  forbids  to  be 
bought  or  sold;  and  such  arc  those  good  things 
which  cannot  be  apj^ropriatcd,  as  air  and  light. 
On  the  other  hand,  things  of  little  use  may  bear 
great  price,  if  much  desired  and  rarely  met  with, 
as  gold  and  diamonds.  Nay,  in  some  savage  na- 
tions, things  of  no  value  at  all,  as  red  feathers 
and  glass  beads,  will  be  thankfully  received  in 
exchange  for  hogs,  and  other  articles  of  provision. 
718.  The  most  ancient  and  most  obvious  sort 
of  commercial  contract  is  barter,  or  the  exchange 
of  goods  for  goods.  But  where  there  is  no  other 
sort  of  commerce,  contracts  of  barter  must  be 
liable  to  great  inccjualities.  1  may  want,  for  ex- 
ample, a  thing  of  small  value  which  my  neigh- 
Ij^Lir  can  spare,  as  a  ])air  of  shoes,  and  havo  no- 

*  Ilulclics<>i\ 


Chap.  1.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  29V' 

thing  that  I  can  spare  to  give  for  it,  but  a  thing 
of  great  value,  which  cannot  be  divided,  as  a 
horse.  Or  it  may  be  necessary  for  nie  to  carry 
some  of  my  property  from  home,  to  support  me 
on  a  journey;  and  yet  I  may  find  it  inconvenient 
or  impossible  to  move  my  sheep,  oxen,  grain,  or 
a  sufficiency  of  other  provision,  for  that  purpose. 
For  managing  commerce,  therefore,  with  ease, 
and  in  order  to  preserve  equality  in  buying  and 
selling,  letting  and  hiring,  and  other  contracts  of 
the  samtB  nature,  it  will  be  necessary  to  contrive 
some  sort  of  standard  goods,  universally  desired 
and  valued,  which  every  man  may  be  willing  to 
take  in  exchange  for  what  he  sells,  because  by 
them  he  may  procure  whatever  he  wants  to  buy. 
These  standard  goods  must  be  of  great  priccj 
that  they  may  be  easily  carried  about,  and  that  a 
small  quantity  of  them  may  be  an  equivalent  for 
a  great  quantity  of  other  goods:  they  must  also 
be  durable,  and  of  a  firm  and  tough  consistency, 
and  not  liable  to  be  either  broken  or  much  worn 
by  use;  and  they  must  be  capable  of  being  divided 
into  very  small  parts  without  losing  any  of  their 
substance.  These  properties  belong  to  the  pre- 
cious metals  of  gold  and  silver,  which  are  ac- 
cordingly used,  in  all  commercial  countries,  for 
money;  that  is,  for  a  general  standard  of  vaUir 
or  price. 


^98  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III 

719.  Money  was  anciently  dealt  out  by  weight: 
we  still  speak  of  a  pound  sterling,  and  of  exfieiise 
and  exjiending  money;  words,  which  in  their  ety- 
mology refer  to  weighing.  But  this  method  of 
reckoning  money  is  both  troublesome  and  unsafe; 
for  the  metal,  though  sufliciently  heavy,  may  not 
be  sufficiently  pure;  and  of  the  purity  of  metal 
few  people  are  judges.  Coin,  therefore,  or 
stamped  money,  was  introduced;  whereof  the 
value  is  known  at  sight,  and  the  purity  attested 
by  the  stamp;  which  the  publick  only  has  a  right 
to  affix,  or  the  sovereign  acting  by  publick  au- 
thority: so  that  he,  who  counterfeits  the  legal 
coin,  incurs  the  punishment  of  high  treason, 
because  he  usurps  one  of  the  rights  of  sove- 
reignty. This  at  least  is  the  punishment  of  him 
who  in  Great  Britain  is  convicted  of  coining 
gold  or  silver  money,  which  is  our  true,  ancient, 
and  current  coin;  copper  money  not  having  been 
introduced  into  South  Britain,  i\\\  the  reign  of 
Charles  II.  By  the  law  of  England,  the  counter- 
feiter of  copper  coin,  is  guilty,  not  of  high  trea- 
son, or  of  fi'lony,  but  of  a  trespass,  or  misde- 
meanour, punishable,  however,  with  two  years 
imprisonment,  and  otlier  inconvcniencics. 

720.  Pure  silver  or  gold,  not  stamped  into 
coin,  is  called  bullion.  Coin  stamped  and  thr 
j^amc  wcifrht  of  bullion  (unrht  to'<>c  as  ncnr  as 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  299 

possible  of  the  same  value,  the  expense  of  coin- 
ing being  but  a  trifle.  If  coin  bear  a  higher  value 
than  the  metal  is  worth,  foreign  nations  \vould 
not  take  our  money  at  the  price  we  pay  for  it; 
and  our  people  would  find  their  account  in  car- 
rying their  goods  to  a  foreign  market,  where 
they  would  receive  coin  of  more  intrinsick  value 
than  could  be  had  at  home.  If  the  bullion  were 
more  valuable  than  the  coin:  if,  for  example,  a 
crown-piece  melted  would  sell  for  more  than 
five  shillings,  (which  is  said,  but  I  can  hardly 
believe,  to  have  been  the  case  with  our  old  crown- 
pieces,  many  of  which  are  affirmed  to  have  been 
worth  five  shillings  and  four  pence),  people  would 
be  tempted  to  melt  the  coin,  and  sell  it  for  bul- 
lion, or  to  send  it  abroad,  and  dipose  of  it  there; 
and  the  more  cash  there  was  in  circulation,  the 
more  would  government  be  a  loser. 

721.  Money,  like  other  things,  is  more  or  less 
valuable,  as  it  is  less  or  more  plentiful.  Since 
South  America  was  discovered,  more  than  a 
thousand  millions  sterling  have  been  imported,  in 
gold  and  silver,  from  that  country  into  Europe. 
The  consequence  is,  that  our  money  has  been 
continually,  and  indeed  rapidly,  sinking  in  its 
value:  that  which  is  now  bought  for  twenty  shil- 
lings would  not  perhaps  have  cost  twenty  pence, 
three  hundred  years  ago.  This  means,  not  th^it 


500  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  III. 

the  thing  has  become  dearer,  but  that  money  has 
become  cheaper:  a  man's  labour  or  food  being  as 
valuable  then  as  it  is  now.  The  necessaries  of 
life,  though  their  price  is  not  always  the  same, 
have  at  all  times  the  same  value  nearly;  some 
differences  may  indeed  happen  in  a  time  of 
plenty  or  of  scarcity,  but  those  are  not  consider- 
able in  a  computation  that  includes  a  number  of 
years:  and  seasons  of  great  plenty  or  great  scar- 
city are  not  frequent.  For  seventy  years  before 
the  year  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty- 
two  there  was  not  in  North  Britain  a  season  of 
extraordinary  scarcity. 

722.  Upon  the  principle  now  laid  down  with 
respect  to  the  necessaries  of  life,  we  may  form 
conjectures  concerning  the  value  of  ancient  mo- 
ney, and  of  our  own  money  in  former  times.  If, 
for  example,  in  this  country,  three  hundred  years 
ago,  an  ordinary  ox  was  sold  for  five  shillings, 
and  if  such  an  ox  is  now  sold  for  five  pounds,  we 
infer,  not  with  certainty,  but  with  probability,  that 
a  shillmg  of  that  time  must  have  been  equal  to 
one  of  our  pounds:  as  the  intrinsick  value  of  the 
ox,  whether  used  for  food  or  for  labour,  must 
have  always  been  nearly  the  same.  And  if  at 
Rome,  in  the  time  of  Augustus,  an  ox  was  sold 
for  a  certain  number  of  sesterces,  we  may,  by  an 
easy  calculation,  form  a  conjecture  concerning 


Cliup.  /.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  301 

the  value  of  a  sesterce  of  that  time  in  our  present 
money.  In  England,  in  the  year  twelve  hundred, 
a  horse  was  sold  for  twelve  shillings  and  five 
pence;  an  ox  for  four  shillings  and  eight  pence; 
a  hog  for  three  shillings;  a  sheep  for  twenty 
pence.  In  Scotland,  about  the  year  thiiteen 
hundred,  a  hen  was  valued  at  one  halfpenny,  or 
six  pennies  Scotch;  a  Scotch  pint  (two  English 
quarts)  of  French  wine  at  three  pence;  a  cow  at 
five  shillings;  an  ox  at  six  shillings  and  eight 
pence. 

723.  Notes  or  bank  bills  that  pass  for  money 
are  to  be  considered  as  personal  securities  on 
trading  companies,  for  the  payment  of  certain 
sums  of  gold  or  silver.  The  value  which  the 
company  receive  for  the  note  when  issued  they 
oblige  themselves  to  give  for  it  when  returned 
upon  them.  And  in  nations  where  stamped  leather 
or  paper  is  used  for  money,  these  things,  being 
in  themselves  of  no  value,  must  be  supposed  to 
derive  what  value  is  annexed  to  them  from 
a  contract,  whereby  the  publick,  that  is  the 
government,  obliges  itself  to  give  for  them  what 
it  received.  Money  made  of  the  baser  metals 
3nust  be  bulky  in  proportion  to  the  cheapness  of 
the  metal.  Lycurgus,  in  order  to  abolish  com- 
merce at  Sparta,  made  a  law,  that  all  the  current 
i-oin  should  be  of  iron,,  which  in  that  country  was 

Vol.  VII J.  2C 


302  ELEiVlENTSOF  f 'art  III 

very  cheap.  Hence  the  Lacedemonian  money 
was  so  unwieldy  that  nobody  cared  to  have  any 
thing  to  do  with  it,  and  the  little  traffick  they  had 
was  in  the  way  of  barter. 

724.  In  commercial  society,  it  is  sometimes 
necessary  to  fix,  for  certain  commodities,  a  Arc- 
tium legitimun^  or  legal  price,  which  cannot  be 
exceeded  This  is  particularly  the  case  with  those 
things  in  regard  to  which  the  seller  has  it  in  his 
power  to  take  advantage  of  the  buyer.  If  they 
who  lend  money,  that  is,  who  sell  the  use  of  it 
for  a  limited  time,  could  exact  any  price,  that  is, 
any  rate  of  interest  for  it  they  pleased,  the  lender 
might  in  many  ways  take  advantage  of  the  bor- 
rower's necessity.  A  certain  rate  of  interest, 
therefore,  is  fixed  by  law;  and  those  money- 
lenders, who  exact  or  accept  of  more,  are  liable 
to  a  prosecution  for  usury ^  which  in  England  is  a 
trespass  punishable  by  a  fine  not  less,  I  think, 
than  thrice  the  amount  of  the  sum  lent.  The 
interest  of  money  is  greater  or  less,  according  to 
the  scarcity  or  plenty  of  money  in  any  country; 
and  according  to  the  greater  or  less  risque  there 
may  be  of  insolvency  on  the  part  of  the  borrower. 
In  ancient  Rome,  the  sum  lent  was  supposed  to 
be  divided  into  a  hundred  parts,  one  of  which  was 
payable  monthly,  as  interest;  so  that  the  rate  was 
'  ^\\c\\v.  fur  cent.  In  Kni^land.  under  Henry  VIII. 


Chap.  I,  MORAL  SCIENCE.  303 

and  Queen  Elizabeth,  the  legal  interest  was  ten 
p.er  cent,  and  eight  in  the  reign  of  James  I.  Under 
Charles  II.  it  was  reduced  to  six;  and  by  a  statute, 
still  in  force,  of  Queen  Anne,  it  was  further  re- 
duced to  five/?*??-  cent,  which  is  the  highest  inte- 
rest that  the  law  now  allows  to  be  paid  or  exacted. 
Money  lent  on  mortgage  may  be  had  at  four  fier 
cent,  the  security  being  so  good  that  there  is  little 
or  no  risk  of  losing  it;  and  a  considerable  part  of 
the  money  lent  to  government  pays  only  three 
per  cent,  because,  while  the  government  lasts, 
there  is  no  risk  at  all  of  this  kind. 

725.  Whether  it  be  lawful  to  lend  money  on 
interest,  has  been  made  a  question.  The  canon 
law,  and,  as  some  think,  the  law  of  Moses,  de- 
clare it  to  be  unlawful;  and  Aristotle  is  of  the 
same  opinion,  because  money,  being  naturally 
barren,  cannot  without  absurdity  be  made  to 
breed  money.  But,  in  answer  to  Aristotle,  it  may 
be  said,  that  a  house  is  as  barren  as  a  shilling;  for 
we  never  heard  of  houses  breeding  houses,  or 
shillings  breeding  shillings;  yet  if  I  were  to  allow 
another  man  the  use  of  my  house  for  a  year,  it 
would  hardly  be  equitable  to  forbid  my  accepting 
any  rent  from  him.  With  the  canon  law  Me  have 
not  much  concern,  as  protestants  deny  its  autho- 
rity. And  as  to  the  law  of  Moses,  it  expressly 
allows  interest  to  be  exacted  from  a  strangeir 


^04  ELEMENTS  OF  I»uit  III, 

though  (for  reasons  peculiar  to  the  Jewish  policy) 
not  from  an  Israelite.  Much  profit  may  be  made 
by  the  use  of  money;  to  lend  it  is  generally  at- 
tended with  some  risk  and  inconvenience:  and  if, 
by  means  of  my  money  lent  him,  a  man  get  a 
hundred  pounds,  which  without  my  money  he 
could  not  have  gotten,  it  is  surely  as  reasonable 
that  he  should  allow  me  part  of  his  gain,  as  that 
I  should  give  wages  to  a  servant,  or  pay  freight 
to  a  ship  master.  To  elude  the  laws  relating  to 
usury  is,  I  believe,  neither  difficult  nor  uncom- 
mon; but  usury  is  so  hateful  a  thing,  that  no  man 
who  regards  his  character  will  ever  incur  the 
disgrace  of  it. 

726.  When  a  man  sets  a  greater  value  on  a 
thing  than  it  is  worth;  because  he  has  had  it 
long;  because  it  has  been  peculiarly  useful  to 
him;  Cr  because  he  got  it  from  a  friend;  the  price 
at  which  he  rates  it  is  called  firethim  afftctionis. 
If  he  is  to  sell  it,  he  ought  to  let  the  buyer  know 
that  he  overvalues  it;  and  then  the  bargain  will 
be  fair.  But  if  I  take  a  liking  to  any  part  of  a 
man's  property  which  he  is  willing  to  sell,  and 
if  I  set  a  higher  value  on  it  than  the  seller  does, 
or  than  it  is  worth,  he  ought  not  to  take  advan- 
tage of  my  fondness  or  ignorance.  Sometimes, 
by  the  consent  of  all  parties,  a  sale  may  be 
ap:rpcd  on,  which  no  inequality  betwern  the  value 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  305 

of  the  thing  sold  and  the  price  given  shall  be 
allowed  to  nullify.  Such  is  the  sale  by  auction, 
where  the  price  is  not  fixed  by  the  seller,  but 
by  the  best  bidder,  who  is  the  purchaser.  The 
Romans  called  it  auctio,  probably  because  every 
successive  bidder  (auget)  increases,  or  raises  the 
price.  It  was  also  called  a  sale  sub  hasta;  because 
a  spear  was  stuck  in  the  ground  at  the  place 
where  the /zr^rco  (or  auctioneer)  took  his  station. 
Of  this  sort  of  contracts,  that  are  opposed  to 
gratuitous  (see  §  716,  717),  and  intended  for  the 
equal  advantage  of  the  contracting  parties,  there 
is  a  great  number  in  commercial  society,  as  bar- 
ter, buying  and  selling,  letting  and  hiring,  insur- 
ance, partnership,  &c.  into  the  detail  of  which  we 
need  not  enter,  as  their  laws,  to  all  those  who  are 
concerned  in  them,  are  well  enough  known. 

727.  Contracts  are  enforced  in  various  ways, 
by  pledges,  mortgages,  penalties,  securities,  &c. 
They  are  also  enforced  by  oaths.  The  design  of 
an  oath  is,  not  to  induce  the  Deity  to  be  more 
attentive,  or  give  him  any  new  right  of  punishing 
falsehood;  but  to  impress  ourselves  with  the 
strongest  motives  to  veracity,  by  aggravating  the 
guilt  of  untruth;  perjury,  and  every  other  sort  of 
iuise  swearing,  being  both  dishonest  and  impious. 
An  oath,  being  an  act  of  devotion,  ought  to  be 
administered,  and  taken*  with  solemnity.  It  (^m- 

?  C  2 


306  FXEMENTSOF  Part  III. 

prehends  the  import  of  these  words.  "  In  thy 
"  presence  I  stand,  O  God  of  truth:  thou  know- 
"  est  that  what  I  say  is  true:  if  I  speak  falsely,  I 
''  know  that  1  justly  forfeit  thy  favour,  and  deserve 
"  punishment.'*  In  such  a  declaration  uttered  with 
sincerity,  and  a  clear  conscience,  can  there  be  any 
thing  unchristian,  or  prejudicial  to  society?  Surely 
not.  Christians  are  warranted  to  swear,  in  confir- 
mation of  the  truth,  not  only  by  the  laws  of  all 
christian  countries,  the  necessity  of  the  thing, 
and  the  many  examples  of  solemn  swearing  re- 
corded, without  being  blamed,  nay,  with  appro- 
bation, in  the  Old  Testament;  but  also,  by  the 
example  of  St.  Paul,  in  several  parts  of  his  epis- 
tles: and,  by  still  higher  authority,  that  of  our 
Saviour  himself,  who,  when  adjured  by  the  high- 
priest,  condescended  to  return  an  explicit  and 
immediate  answer;  which,  among  the  Jews,  was 
one  form  of  administering  and  taking  an  oath. 

728.  Thatevangeliculprcccpt,thercfore,'*  swear 
"  not  at  all,*'  either  must  be  understood  to  refer 
to  unnecessary  and  profane  swearing,  which  in 
the  decalogue  is  called  "  taking  the  name  of  God 
"  in  vain,"  or  may  be  thus  interpreted,  *'  adhere 
"  so  scrupulously  and  habitually  to  truth,  that 
*'  men,  knowing  your  veracity,  and  confiding  in 
"  it,  may  have  no  occasion  to  make  you  confirm 
*'  your  vrs  or  no  bv  an  oat!}."  Tiiis  whole  Rubjr.i  • 


Uiap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  307 

is  explained  with  the  greatest  accuracy  and  per- 
spicuity in  the  fourth  volume  of  archbishop 
Seeker's  sermons.  As  the  obligation  of  oaths  is 
most  sacred,  and  every  sort  of  disregard  to  them 
tends  to  the  destruction  of  society,  all  practices 
ought  to  incur  punishment,  which  lessen  men's 
reverence  for  an  oath,  and  for  the  adorable  name 
of  the  Supreme  Being.  Such  a  practice  is  com- 
mon swearing,  of  which  it  is  shocking  to  consi- 
der, how  slightly  it  is  animadverted  on  by  the  law, 
and  how  scandalously  encouraged  by  the  magis- 
trate; lor  all  those  crimes  the  magistrate  must 
be  supposed  to  encourage,  which  he  either  per- 
petrates himself,  or  against  which  he  refuses,  or 
neglects,  to  put  the  law  in  execution.  This  crime 
is  wholly  inexcusable;  no  natural  propensity 
prompts  to  it;  in  his  first  attempts  to  acquire  the 
habit  of  it,  a.  man  must  bo  actuated  by  afiectationj 
as  well  as  impiety. 

729.  It  also  tends  to  lessen  the  reverence  due 
to  oaths,  when  they  are  too  frequently,  and  on 
trivial  occasions,  exacted;  or  when  they  are  ad- 
ministered, or  taken?  wi'Jiout  due  solemnity.  la 
these  two  respects,  I  can  pay  no  compliment  to 
the  laws  and  customs  of  this  country.  It  is,  how- 
ever, just  to  acknowledge,that,  of  those  who  tak- 
and  administer  oaths,  there  are  among  us  some 
individuals,  who  know  what  tbev  ar-?  about,  w'^ 


308  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  UU 

make  the  spectators ./I'e/  that  they  know  it.  The 
words  of  an  oath  ought  to  be,  and,  if  the  framers 
of  it  understand  their  own  language,  and  have  any 
skill  in  grammar,  always  may  be,  so  plain,  that 
the  sense  cannot  be  mistaken:  and  he  who  swears, 
and  he  who  administers  the  oath,  should  under- 
stand them  in  the  same  sense.  If  the  swearer, 
taking  advantage  of  the  unavoidable  imperfection 
of  language,  affix,  to  any  word  or  phrase  of  the 
oath,  a  meaning  which  he  would  be  unwilling  to 
declare  to  the  world,  and  which  he  knows  to  be 
different  from  the  intention  of  the  person  who 
exacts  the  oath,  and  prescribes  the  form  of  it; 
this  is  perjury,  of  the  most  dangerous  and  crimi- 
nal nature;  and  as  much  worse  than  ordinary 
false  swearing,  as  poisoning,  which  cannot  be 
foreseen  or  prevented,  or  in  common  cases  de- 
tected, is  worse  than  ordinary  murder. 

730.  Perjury  being  a  proof  of  extreme  wicked- 
ness, and  tending,  more  immediately  than  theft, 
robbery,  and  many  other  crimes  punishable  with 
death,  to  the  destruction  of  society,  it  may  be 
thought  that  in  all  nations  it  should  bo  considered 
us  a  capital  crime.  And  indeed,  if  we  attend 
merely  to  the  enormity  of  the  guilt,  we  could 
hardly  call  those  laws  severe  that  should  punish 
it  in  evei7  instance  with  death.  But,  were  this  the 
■:iso,  it  m'g-ht  !)p  apprehended,  that  many  pprsop>. 


Clvap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  309 

called  to  give  testimony  on  oath,  would  from  the 
fear  of  incurring  such  a  punishment,  be  too  much 
intimidated  to  declare  their  mind  freely,  and 
would  rather  keep  out  of  the  way  of  examination, 
than  appear  in  the  cause  of  truth  and  justice. 
False  swearing,  therefore,  though  nobody  pre- 
tends to  extenuate  its  guilt,  is  considered  as  one 
of  those  crimes  which  in  many  cases  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  punish  with  infamy.  In  the  case  indeed 
of  an  innocent  man  losing  his  life,  in  consequence 
of  the  perjury  of  witnesses,  the  delinquents  ought 
certainly  to  be  put  to  death;  because  they  are 
guilty,  not  only  of  wilful  murder,  and  the  most 
audacious  impiety,  but  of  entailing,  as  far  as  in 
them  lies,  infamy  on  the  memory  of  the  sufferer, 
and  anguish,  and  perhaps  disgrace,  on  his  friends 
and  relations. 

731.  A  strict  regard  to  truth  in  every  thing  we 
Sky  or  do  is  an  indispensable  duty.  All  men  have 
a  right  to  expect  it  from  us;  for,  without  it, 
speech,  instead  of  a  blessing,  would  be  a  snare 
and  a  curse,  and  the  comforts  of  social  life  at  an 
end.  On  some  occasions,  however,  when  we  do 
not  even  pretend  to  declare  the  truth,  and  where 
it  is  not  expected  from  us,  as  in  composing  an 
instructive  or  amusing  fable,  there  is  no  deviation 
from  integrity,  because  we  mean  no  deception, 
■jr,d  m  fact  nobodv  is  deceived:  which  is  also  the 


310  ELEMENTS  OF  Vavi  IIJ. 

case  in  those  coinplimental  forms  of  speech,  that 
are  universally  known  to  express  a  great  deal 
more  than  they  mean;  as  when  we  address  a  man 
of  a  certain  rank,  by  the  title  of  lord,  or  subscribe 
ourselves  the  humble  servants  of  a  person  whom 
perhaps  we  should  not  think  it  incumbent  on  us 
to  obey  in  any  thing.  In  very  large  towns,  too, 
where  people  have  so  numerous  an  acquaintance, 
that  if  they  were  to  admit  every  visitant,  they 
could  have  no  time  to  look  after  their  own  affairs, 
it  cannot  be  blamable  to  deny  their  being  at  home, 
if  the  phrase  conveying  the  denial  be  generally 
understood  to  mean  nothing  more,  than  that  they 
are  not  at  leisure.  It  were  better,  no  doubt,  if 
these  deviations  from  the  literal  use  of  language 
were  fewer;  but  in  complying  with  a  custom,  tha 
softens  the  harshness  of  refusal,  does  no  harm 
in  society,  and  neither  offends  nor  deceives  any 
individual,  there  can  be  no  great  evil.  To  use 
the  words  of  deception,  in  order  to  do  good  to 
the  person  deceived,  may  be  not  only  warrantable, 
but  a  duty.  Were  a  physician  always  to  tell  his 
patients  that  they  were  in  danger,  when  he 
thought  them  so,  his  visits  might  do  more  harm 
than  good.  To  quiet  a  sick  person's  mind,  to 
pacify  a  madman,  to  defend  the  helpless  from  an 
oTiraged  advcrsarv,  deviations  from  strict  truth. 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  311 

if  there  be  no  other  way  of  accomplishing  the 
benevolent  purpose,  are  undoubtedly  lawful. 

732.  It  is  another  great  duty  in  the  use  of 
speech,  to  make  it  not  only  pleasing  to  others, 
but  also  profitable;  by  giving  good  advice,  cor- 
recting errour,  allaying  the  violence  of  passion, 
enforcing  good  principles,  and  discountenancing 
bad;  by  encouraging  the  timorous,  comforting 
the  afflicted,  reproving  in  meekness  the  trans- 
gressor; and  always  using  such  words,  as  may 
neither  raise  evil  thoughts  in  others,  nor  give 
proof  of  any  indelicacy  in  ourselves.  The  cynicks 
of  old,  ana  some  of  the  stoicks,  maintained,  that 
in  '^vords  there  is  no  indelicacy;  that  there  can  be 
no  harm  in  speaking  of  any  thing  that  is  natural; 
and  that,  if  we  may  speak  without  blame  of  any  one 
crime,  or  any  one  part  or  function  of  the  human 
body,  we  may,  in  like  manner,  of  any  other.  But 
this  is  vile  sophistry,*  tending  to  the  utter  de- 
basement of  man,  and  founded  in  the  grossest 
ignorance  of  human  nature  and  human  language. 

733.  Words  may  do  much  harm  as  well  as 
much  good.  Many  of  them  not  only  convey  the 
speaker's  meaning,  but  also  exhibit  the  disposi- 
tion of  mind  wherewith  he  speaks;  and,  in  the 
bearer,  not  only  raise  ideas,  but  stimulate  pas- 

^  See  CLrcro  de  Officiis.  I,  35. 


.!^ 


LLEMENTSOF  Part  Hi. 


sions:  and  that  which  either  stimulates  bad  pas- 
sions in  us,  or  sets  an  ensnaring  example  of  them 
in  others,  is  surely  no  matter  of  indifference. 
There  are  functions  and  parts  of  our  bodily  frame, 
which  may  be  signified  by  two  sorts  of  words; 
first,  by  those  that  express  the  meaning  and  no- 
thing more,  and  such  are  the  words  that  anato- 
mists and  philosophers  use;  and  secondly,  those 
that  express  the  meaning,  together  with  a  sensual 
and  profligate  inclination,  or  some  other  indeli- 
cacy, in  him  who  speaks.  Words  of  this  last 
character  are  called  obscene;  and  prove  the 
speaker  to  be  equally  destitute  of  good  principles 
and  good  breeding.  Words  there  are  too,  ex- 
pressive of  crimes,  that  signify  on  the  part  of  the 
speaker  either  disapprobation,  or  no  disapproba- 
tion; of  the  former  sort  are  adultery^  murder;  of 
tlic  latter,  an  affair  ofgalhnitnj^  an  affair  of  honour^ 
and  those  other  sneaking  circumlocutions,  where- 
by modern  profligacy  endeavours  to  confound 
the  distinctions  of  rigiit  and  wrong.  And  among 
robbers  and  thieves  there  is  said  to  be  a  similar 
jargon,  to  notify  certain  crimes  to  those  of  the 
}^ang  who  have  been  initiated,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  insinuate,  that  to  those  crimes  the  speaker 
has  no  disinclination,  but  cunsi'lcrr.  them  as  tools 
,  crtaining  to  his  trade. 

rr.4.  Fourthly,  and  lastly  (.-e  %  707,710);  A 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE..  313 

derived  right  to  full  property  may  be  obtained 
during  the  life  of  the  former  proprietor,  by  the 
force  of  laws,  independently  on  his  consent;  and 
this  may  happen,  in  consequence,  first,  of  lawful, 
and  secondly,  of  unlawful,  actions.  First,  In  con- 
sequence of  lawful  actions.  He  who  is  named 
the  executor  of  a  testament,  and  in  every  testa- 
ment an  executor  must  be  named,  is,  by  accept- 
ing that  office,  obliged  to  pay  the  legacies  and 
debts  of  the  deceased,  as  far  as  the  property  left 
is  sufficient  for  that  purpose.  And  he  whose  busi- 
ness has  been  managed,  in  his  absence,  or  during 
his  minority,  by  friends  who  had  no  formal  com- 
mission to  do  so,  is  under  an  obligation  to  in- 
demnify the  managers,  and  ratify  every  contract 
prudently  entered  into  by  them  for  his  advantage. 
Obligations  of  this  sort  are  said  to  be  quasi  ex 
contractu^  as  if  they  arose  from  a  contract;  and 
they  are  often  called  quasi-contracts. 

735.  Secondly,  In  consequence  of  unlawful  ac- 
tion€.  He  who  does  injury  is  obliged  to  repair  it, 
or  is  otherwise  punished  for  it.  The  doctrine  of 
injury  and  reparation,  of  crimes  and  punishments, 
forms  a  most  important  part  of  jurisprudence; 
but  is  so  extensive,  that,  considering  the  short- 
ness of  the  time  allotted  to  this  part  of  our  acade- 
mical course,  and  the  great  variety  of  subjects 
that  are  still  before  us,  I  cannot  think  myself  at 

Vol.  Vni.  2  D 


14  ElfeMENTSOF  Part  HI. 

liberty  to  enter,  however  briefly,  into  the  detail  of 
it.  I  shall  therefore  conclude  this  head,  with  a 
few  miscellaneous  observations;  after  referring, 
for  further  particulars,  to  Blackstone's  Com- 
mentaries on  the  laws  of  England;  in  which  not 
only  the  English  law,  but  also  the  principles  of 
general  jurisprudence,  are  explained  with  singu- 
lar ingenuity,  precision,  and  elegance.  The  juris- 
prudence of  Hutcheson  and  Grotius  on  the  law 
of  peace  and  v/ar,  may  also  be  read  with  great , 
advantage. 

736.  That  to  the  utmost  of  our  ability,  we 
ought  to  repair  any  damage  we  may  have  done 
to  others,  is  selfcvident:  and  it  is  no  less  evident, 
that  we  must  not  promote  our  own  interest  to 
the  detriment  of  another,  or,  if  any  necessity 
force  us  to  this,  that  wc  ought  to  make  good  his 
loss  as  soon  as  it  is  in  our  power.  Laws  prohibit- 
ing injury  would  be  of  no  effect,  if  the  injurious 
were  not  obliged  to  indemnify  those  they  have 
injured:  and  society  would  not  be  safe,  if  they 
who  arc  inclined  to  be  injurious  were  not  re- 
strained by  the  fear  of  punislimcnt.  He  may  be 
deemed  tlje  author  of  injury,  and  is  liable  to  be 
punished  accordingly,  who  has,  cither  by  him- 
self, or  Ml  compact  with  others,  been  instru- 
mental in  doing  it:  but  the  contrivers,  advisers, 
or  leaders  in  such  injury  arc  the  greatest  delin- 


iGhap.L  MORAL  SCffiNCfe.  31 J 

quents,  and  ought,  if  possible,  to  be  in  the  first 
place  animadverted  on.  In  criminal  cases,  all 
the  agents  are  liable  to  punishment:  six  persons 
equally  concerned  in  the  murder  of  one  ought  all 
to  suffer  death;  because  equality  of  guilt  requires 
equality  of  punishment;  and,  if  any  one  of  the 
six  be  punished  or  pardoned,  there  is  no  reason 
why  every  one  should  not. 

757.  Damage,  which  he  had  accidentally  done 
to  ai^other,  without  any  evil  purpose,  a  generous 
man  will  repair,  if  he  is  able,  but  can  hardly  be 
obliged  by  law  to  repair.  Yet  such  damage  the 
law  ought  not  to  overlook;  for  people,  from  the 
fear  of  consequences,  as  well  as  from  more  liberal 
motives,  should  always  be  on  their  guard  against 
the  commission  of  injury.  Damage,  unavoidably^ 
and  without  injurious  intention,  done  by  persons 
acting,  duly  authorized,  in  the  service  of  their 
country^  as  by  soldiers,  constables,  magistrates, 
&c.  should  be  repaired  by  the  community.  Dam- 
age done  by  free  servants,  if  the  master  is  entire- 
ly innocent,  ought  to  be  repaired  by  themselves. 
Damage  done  by  slaves,  cattle,  or  dogs,  ought  to 
fall  upon  their  owner,  if  it  was  possible  for  him  to 
have  foreseen  or  prevented  it.  No  provocation 
should  make  our  enemy  cease  to,  be  the  object  of 
our  benevolence.  When  the  injury  is  repelled, 
and  cdmpensated,  and  we  have  established  our 


316  KLEMKNTSOr  Part  IlL 

riglit,  and  obtained  security  against  like  injury 
from  the  same  person  for  the  future,  our  ani- 
mosity towards  him  ought  to  be  at  an  end. 

738.  If  the  injurious  party,  notwithstanding  re- 
monstrances, persist  in  injury,  violence  may  be 
used  to  compel  him  to  be  quiet,  and  grant  both 
indemnification  for  the  past,  and  security  against 
future  injury.  Hence  the  origin  of  just  war; 
which  may  also  be  made  for  the  prevention  of 
injury,  when  there  is  reason  to  believe,  that  in- 
jury is  intended,  and  that  nothing  but  force  can 
prevent  it.  Wars  are  either  publick  or  private. 
The  former  are  undertaken  by  a  state,  and  in 
name  of  the  body  of  a  people,  or  of  the  sovereign, 
as  the  representative  of  that  people:  the  latter 
are  those  which  have  sometimes  taken  place 
among  private  persons.  Publick  wars  have  been 
divided  into  solemn  and  civil.  Solemn  wars  art- 
formally  declared,  and  authorized  by  one  state 
against  another,  or  by  regular  societies  against 
pirates,  or  other  avowed  and  formidable  enemies 
of  mankind.  Those  are  called  civil  wars,  wliicii 
take  place  between  difl'erent  parties  in  the  sam^^ 
community,  contending  for  power,  privileges,  &c. 
and  these,  of  all  forms  of  hostility,  are  the  worst; 
as  being  the  most  unnatural,  the  most  ruinous, 
and  the  most  c fleet ually  subversive  of  private  an*' 
])ublick  virtue. 


(^iuip.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  317 

739.  Private  wars  between  individual  men  in 
the  state  of  nature,  are  nearly  in  their  principle, 
though  not  in  their  extent  or  consequences,  on 
the  same  footing  with  publick  wars  between  na- 
tions; for  it  was  already  observed,  that  independ- 
ent nations  are  in  the  state  of  nature  with  respect 
to  one  another.  Every  gentle  method  should  be 
tried,  every  reasonable  offer  of  pardon  and  ac- 
commodation made,  and  a  spirit  of  forgiveness 
manifested,  before  men  have  recourse  to  mea- 
sures so  violent;  but  if  these  be  necessary  after 
all,  they  are  justifiable  on  the  plea  of  necessity, 
and  the  right  of  selfdefence;  a  right,  which  be- 
longs equally  to  private  persons,  and  to  com- 
munities; and  which  neither  these  nor  those  can 
dispense  with,  or  relinquish,  without  endangering 
the  existence  of  the  human  race.  All  this  is 
agreeable  to  reason;  and  is  besides  warranted  by 
tlio3e  passages  of  scripture,  that  enjoin  submis- 
sion to  government,  celebrate  the  virtues  of 
patriotick  warriours,  or  speak  without  disappro- 
bation of  the  fnilitary  life.  Passages  of  this  sort 
are  numerous  in  the  Old  Testament,  and  may 
also  be  found  in  sufficient  abundance  in  the  New. 
See  particularly  the  eleventh  chapter  of  the  epis- 
tle to  the  Hebrews;  the  second  chapter  of  the 
first  epistle  of  Pctcr^  the  fourteenth  verse  of  th-e 


ol8  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  Hi, 

third  chapter  of  Luke;  the  tenth  chapter  of  Acts 
uf  the  Apostles,  &c. 

740.  In  the  state  of  nature,  men  may  defend 
their  perfect  rights  by  force,  if  gentler  methods 
are  ineffectual.  But  in  civil  society  we  are  under- 
stood to  have  committed  the  right  of  violent  de- 
fence to  the  law  and  the  magistrate;  they  being 
at  once  more  equitable  defenders,  and  more 
powerful:  and  therefore,  in  civil  society,  legat 
prosecution  takes  place  of  what  in  the  natural 
state  would  be  force.  But  if  we  be  in  such  a 
situation,  as  to  derive  no  protection  frpm  the  law 
or  the  magistrate,  and  no  aid,  or  no  sufficient  aid 
from  one  another;  as  in  the  case  of  being  attacked 
by  thieves  in  the  night,  or  by  robbers,  the  right 
of  selfdefcnce  justifies  our  repelling  force  by 
force.  A  good  man,  however,  will  be  tender  of 
the  lives  of  his  fellow  men,  even  of  the  most  in- 
jurious; and  rather  submit  to  be  robbed  of  such 
a  sum  as  he  can  spare,  than  put  the  robber  to 
death;  but  when  there  is  no  other  alternative 
than  either  to  kill,  or  be  killed^  or  ruined,  \\c 
owe  it  both  to  ourselves,  and  to  society,  to  defend 
our  property  and  life,  though  the  consequences 
to  the  aggressor  be  fatal. 

74  1.  It  belongs  to  this  place  to  consider  what, 
may  be  said  for,  and  against  duels. 'For  them  lit- 
■'  %  I  think,  can  be  said,  except  that  they  promote 


Chap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  31^ 

polite  behaviour,  by  making;  men  afraid  of  one 
another;  and  that  the  abolition  of  them  would  be 
difiicult,  and  might  be  attended  with  evil,  by  hir- 
nishing  profligate  men  with  a  temptation  to  assas- 
sinate. But  these  are  weak  apologies.  The  Athe- 
nians and  Romans  were  in  their  better  days  as 
polite  as  we;  much  more  so,  indeed  we  must  ac- 
knowledge them  to  have  been,  if  we  take  into  the 
Account  the  grossness  of  their  religion,  and  the 
» purity  of  ours:  yet  they  were  strangers  to  duel- 
ling, as  well  as  to  those  ridiculous  notions  of  ho- 
nour which  ^give  rise  to  it;  and  it  is  impossible  to 
mention  a  single  instance  of  their  unpoliteness, 
which  duelling,  if  it  had  been  fashionable  among 
them,  would  have  prevented.  Nor  do  we  find,  in 
our  days,  at  least  among  the  enlightened  part  of 
mankind,  that  persons  who  do  not  fight  duels  are 
less  distinguished  for  elegance  of  behaviour  than 
those  that  do:  with  some  exceptions,  the  contrary 
will  perhaps  be  found  to  be  the  case.  And  it  is 
not  very  honourable  to  human  nature  to  suppose, 
that  nothing  but  the  fear  of  death,  or  of  disgrace, 
can  prevail  on  persons  in  the  higher  ranks  of  life 
to  practise  the  common  rules  of  goodnature  and 
civility. 

742.  That  it  is  difficult  to  prevent  duelling,  I 
shall  be  willing  to  admit,  when  I  have  seen  any 
}ey;islature  attempt  the  prevention  of  it,  seriously. 


320  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  Hi. 

and  yet  unsuccessfully.  But  this  has  not  happen- 
ed as  yet,  so  far  as  I  know.  A  more  despicable 
mockery  of  legislation  there  cannot  be,  than  that 
pretended  prohibition  whereby  our  law  is  said  to 
discouiage  it.  For  surely  those  laws,  or  those 
customs  established  in  defiance  of  law,  which 
grant  not  only  indemnity,  but  honour,  to  the 
transgressor,  and  punish  obedience  with  infamy 
and  ruin,  must  mean,  either  nothing  at  all,  or 
nothing  but  publick  mischief.  As  to  assassination: 
it  is  true,  that  in  modern  Italy,  where  duels  are 
rare,  it  is  veiy  common;  but  it  is  impossible  to 
prove,  that  the  infrequency  of  the  one  enormity, 
occasions  the  prevalence  of  the  other.  Two  or 
three  centuries  ago,  when  the  point  of  honour, 
in  regard  to  single  combat  was  carried  to  a  very 
extravagant  height,  assassinations  were  in  most 
jiarts  of  Europe  common  to  a  degree  that  fills 
us  with  horrour.  In  fact,  it  is  not  unnatural,  that 
he,  to  whose  mind  one  species  of  murder  is 
become  familiar  without  being  shocking,  should, 
without  great  difficulty,  be  able  to  reconcile 
himself  to  any  other.  To  plead  in  behalf  of  duels, 
that  they  prevent  assassination,  is  not  less  absurd, 
than  to  plead  in  behalf  of  jobbery,  that  it  prevents 
theft. 

74.3.  The  aim  of  penal  law  ought  to  be  to  pre- 
■vnt  crimes,  and  deter  from  injury,  by  the  fear 


i;hap.  I.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  321 

of  punishment.    In  most  countries,  uhete  the- 
government  has  been   of  long  standing,  penal 
statutes  are  generally  too  many,  and  too  severe; 
and  some  of  them,  it  is  to  be  feared,  (though  the 
law  and  the  magistrate  ought  to  be  exempt  from 
passion),  even  vindictive.    One  reason  may  be, 
that  they  were  made  when  society  was  disorderly, 
and  perhaps  but  half  civilized;  the  natural  conse» 
quence  of  which,  would  be  a  sanguinary  temper 
in  the  lawgiver,  and  in  the  person  inclined  to 
injury   a  degree   of  fierceness,   which  nothing 
could  intimidate,  but  the  apprehension  of  severe 
punishment.    In   some  states   of  society   some 
crimtes  may  be  more,  and  some  less,  prevalent 
or  dangerous  than  others;  and  different  degi-ees 
of  legal  severity  become  necessaiy,  according  to 
circumstances.   The  time  was  when  theft  was 
more  dangerous  than   at  present,  because  the 
means  of  securing  property  were  les«  to  be  de- 
pended on;  and  then,  to  hang  a  man  for  stealing 
a  sheep  might  not  be  so  unreasonable  as  it  would 
be  now.  The  time  now  is,  when  forgery  is  per- 
haps more  dangerous  than  at  any  former  period; 
for  now  men  seem  to  be  more  inclined  to  it  than 
formerly;  and  now  the  credit,  and  consequently 
the  existence,  of  commercial  nations,  would  be 
at  an  end,  if  that  wickedness  were  not  most  se- 
verely punished:  and  accordingly,  though  nobody 


352  ELEMENTS  OF  Part  lit. 

doubts  the  king's  right  to  remit  the  punishment 
due  even  to  this  crime,  it  is  not  now  pardoned, 
and  certainly  ought  not.  From  these  considera- 
tions it  seems  to  follow,  that  in  every  nation  the 
penal  law  ought  from  time  to  time  to  be  revised; 
and  alterations  made  in  it,  according  to  the 
change  of  circumstances. 

744.  That  there  ought  to  be,  if  it  were  possible, 
as  many  degrees  of  punishment,  as  there  may  be 
of  guilt  in  the  criminal,  and  of  danger  in  his 
crime,  is  undeniable.  But  human  wisdom  will 
never  be  able  to  regulate  this  matter  exactly; 
for,  after  all  that  fallible  lawgivers  can  do,  some 
punishments  will  be  too  severe,  and  others  too 
mild.  It  has  been  doubted,  whether  capital  pu- 
nishment be  in  any  case  allowable;  and  proposed, 
that  slavery,  hard  labour,  and  other  severities, 
should  be  substituted  in  its  room.  That  it  should 
be  seldom  inflicted;  that  in  general  it  is  more 
frequent  than  it  ought  to  be;  and  that  to  the 
community  the  labour  of  convicted  criminals 
might  be  more  serviceable  than  their  death,  is 
rtadily  admitted.  But  both  reason  and  scripture 
«jcm  to  declare,  that  some  crimes  deserve  it, 
pLirlicularly  murder:  "  Whoso  sheddcth  man's 
-'  blood,  by  man  shall  his  blood  be  shed,"  is  u 
very  ancient  law;  and  it  woulxl  not  be  easy  to 
prove  it  unreasonable.  Severe  punishments,  how- 


Chap,!.  MORAL  SCIENCE.  32o 

ever,  have  not  always  the  consequences  that  one 
would  expect  from  them;  when  rnimoderately 
severe,  they  counteract  themselves,  because  the 
publick  humanity  refuses  to  execute  them:  it  is 
the  certainty,  rather  than  the  severity  of  punish- 
ment, that  most  effectually  restrains  the  injurious. 
745.  From  the  prevalence  of  sensuality,  dissi- 
pation, gaming,  atheism,  irreligion,  and  that  un- 
bounded licentiousness  of  the  press,  which  gives 
almost   the   same   encouragement  to   the  most 
abominable,  and  the  most  useful,  publications, 
capital  crimes,  and  of  course    capital   punish- 
ments, are  in  this  country  frequent  to  a  most 
lamentable  degree.  Yet  punishments  unreason- 
ably severe  cannot  be  said  to  be  frequent  in  this 
country.  Where  the  letter  of  the  law  would  au- 
thorise them,  juries,  humanely,  and  I  hope  con- 
scientiously, mitigate  the  offence,  or  acquit  the 
prisoner;  or  judges,  and  other  persons  of  influ- 
ence, recommend  him  tothe  royal  mercy,  which, 
in  our  time,  has  never  been  withheld,  except 
where  the  publick  good  required  that  it  should 
be  withheld.  As  to  slavery,  proposed  as  an  ex- 
change for  capital  punishment,  it  suits  not  the 
genius  of  our  people,  (see  §  612).   To  see,  in 
every  parish  perhaps,  enslaved  convicts,  would 
be  an  intolerable  eyesore  to  a  true  Briton.    Soli- 
tary imprisonment,  with  hard  labour,  has  beer* 


[,24:  ELEMENTS  OF,  &c,  I'art  III. 

projected,  as  a  substitute  for  capital  punishment: 
but  it  may  be  doubted,  whether  that  is  not  worse 
than  death;  and  whether,  by  pteying  on  the  spi- 
rits of  the  delinquent,  and  tainting  his  imagina- 
tion, it  might  not  too  often  terminate  iu  frenzy 
and  selfdestruction. 


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